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Summary 
 
Muslim women in Britain are the only religious group of women more likely to be 
economically inactive than active, this has been the case since the onset of large-scale 
migration of Muslim women to Britain from the 1960s. This thesis aims to examine and 
explain the persistent presence of Muslim women in the looking after home category of 
economic inactivity, over time and generation. A new system of state benefit payments 
is being rolled out across the UK; Universal Credit is likely to lead to changes in 
household economies and the ways in which Muslim women engage with the labour 
market.  
Qualitative research into economic inactivity has remained remarkably static over the 
years. This contrasts with the contemporary and vibrant field of quantitative studies of 
ethnic and religious inequalities in the labour market. This study applies a systematic 
mixed methods research approach, where both qualitative and quantitative paradigms 
are given equal weight at all stages. The quantitative component of the study involved 
multivariate analysis of the EMBES 2010 dataset. This analysis fed into the design of a 
qualitative phase of research which was undertaken over a period of nine months in an 
area of high Pakistani density. 
The study of labour market outcomes for Muslim women is made complex because of 
the layering of disadvantage and discrimination based on migrant status, gender, and 
social class as well as race, ethnicity and religion. This thesis attempts to engage with 
this complexity to describe and understand the interplay of structural and socio-cultural 
factors that lead to high levels of economic inactivity in the looking after home category. 
Evidence is found for both inter and intragenerational shifts and changes. Recently-
arrived first generation women are the most marginalised within families, co-ethnic 
communities and labour markets – both in the mainstream and in the enclave. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Understanding and Explaining the Economic 
Inactivity of Muslim Women in the Looking After 
Home Category 
 
High rates of economic inactivity among British Muslim women have been noted since 
the large-scale migration of Muslim women from South Asia in the 1970s (Anwar 1979; 
Shaw 1988). The economically inactive are those who are not in employment, who 
have not been seeking work within the last 4 weeks and/or are unable to start work 
within the next 2 weeks (ONS 2018). Economically active British Muslim women are a 
select and atypical group (Heath and Cheung 2007). The economic inactivity of Muslim 
women needs to be better understood (Heath and Martin 2013). It is this gap that this 
thesis aims to fill. Khattab and Hussain (2017) suggest that labour market penalties 
vary according to specific labour market outcome. This thesis further develops this 
suggestion by examining a sub-category of economic inactivity: ‘looking after home and 
family’ (LAHF). 
 
Quantitative studies show us that, despite rapid social change since this period, rates 
of economic activity for this group of women remain stubbornly low (Heath and Martin 
2013; Khattab and Hussain 2017). Qualitative studies have not kept pace with the ever 
more detailed statistical data available on the labour market outcomes of Muslim 
women. Prior to this study, narrative accounts from economically inactive British 
Muslim women themselves were either absent from discussions, or at least a decade 
out of date.  
 
Researchers have been able to quantify in detail an ethno-religious penalty, showing 
the extent to which British Muslim women are falling behind other groups in measures 
of generational improvements in labour market outcomes (Heath and Martin 2013; 
Khattab and Hussain 2017). But without a mix of quantitative and qualitative accounts, 
it is impossible to assess how far this penalty is a result of ethnic and/or religious 
discrimination against these women, patriarchal attitudes within their community or 
informed choices made by the women themselves.  
 
Using a mixed methods research approach, this study uses quantitative data to identify 
statistically significant variables in the explanation of economic inactivity in the LAHF 
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category. Qualitative methods are used to assess how customs, beliefs and 
relationships - those things that statistics cannot accurately describe - might explain 
some of the ethno-religious penalties Muslim women face. Too often, researchers and 
policy makers have been tempted to treat British Muslim women as a homogenous 
group. A mixed methods research approach enables the examination of complex social 
phenomena. Such an approach has the potential to move the discussion around the 
economic inactivity of Muslim women from binary categorisations to continua and more 
complex understandings of diversity and differentiation (Collins 2012); for example, by 
cohort, generation, social class or patterns of religiosity. This study aims to combine 
insights from nationally representative quantitative data with rich, contemporary 
narrative accounts from Muslim women, to inform a useful, and timely, debate about 
their labour market outcomes and socio-economic wellbeing.  
 
1.1 Context of the study 
Integration is “the extent to which people from all backgrounds can get on with each 
other, enjoying and respecting the benefits that the United Kingdom has to offer” 
(Casey 2016, p.20). Socio-economic exclusion is a sign of integration failure (Local 
Government Association 2017). Employment is the most important driver for integration 
and minority ethnic women have specific needs and particular experiences of the 
labour market (Heath and Li 2015; Runnymede Trust 2016). 
 
Studies of economic inactivity among British Muslim women form part of a wider 
debate about social mobility, integration and inequality in the UK. The issue of how 
states and societies manage, and react to, the entry of immigrant groups has been the 
subject of political, media, academic and public scrutiny and debate since the onset of 
large-scale migration from the British colonies since the 1970s (Heath 2014). 
 
A major overhaul of the benefits system is currently being rolled out by the Government 
(Hick and Lanau forthcoming). The new Universal Credit system will treat each adult in 
the household as a separate claimant, each with an independent responsibility to be in 
work or seeking work (Hick and Lanau forthcoming). This is likely to have a significant 
impact on Muslim households, Muslims in the UK are the religious community most 
likely to experience poverty, with 50 per cent in poverty (Heath and Li 2015). This 
represents a significant change from the tax credits system which is thought to have 
promoted single-earner households where there was no financial benefit of a second, 
low-paid, income (Rubery and Rafferty 2013). A better understanding of economic 
inactivity among Muslim women is important to both policy-makers and practitioners to 
understand how this change might impact on Muslim families. 
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1.2 Muslim women in a multicultural context 
The concept of multiculturalism and anti-racism policies frame policy discourse around 
the integration of ethnic minority groups in Britain; equality of opportunity and life 
chances for minority groups are the desired outcome rather than cultural assimilation 
(Heath et al. 2000).  The existence of diverse and multiple identities is recognised and 
diversity is viewed positively as a strengthening feature of British society (Muttarak 
2014). It is expected that over time generations of migrant families will benefit from a 
British education and achieve parity with the majority White group in terms of their 
socio-economic status and opportunities (Muttarak 2014). Labour market equality is 
central to the structural integration of immigrants and their children. Economic activity is 
an important measure of the successful socio-economic integration of ethnic minority 
groups (Cheung 2014; Runnymede Trust 2016).   
 
The attention of policy and public concern is currently focused on what is seen to be 
the failure of Muslim communities to integrate effectively with mainstream British 
culture on a range of cultural and socio-economic outcomes (Casey 2016). Multicultural 
policies have been blamed for the entrenchment of separate communities and are 
considered to have “corrosive consequences for trust and solidarity” by critics (Heath 
and Demireva 2014, p161). Although the focus of this research project is on the labour 
market outcome of economic inactivity and not cultural integration, the public and policy 
discourse around Muslims in Britain represents an important backdrop because it feeds 
into negative perceptions and stereotypes of Muslims and opens the possibility of 
ethnic or religious discrimination in the labour market. 
Most Muslims are visibly different in terms of their ethnic group and they are sometimes 
an overtly religious group, making them subject to racial, ethnic and cultural 
discrimination.  Their labour market outcomes, although uniformly poor, are gendered 
due to life stage, particularly marriage and child-bearing, more so than women of other 
religious belongings (Khattab et al. 2017). Whilst Muslim women are more likely to be 
economically inactive, Muslim men are more likely to be unemployed, own accounts 
workers and to occupy marginal positions in the labour market (Cabinet Office 2017). 
Muslim households have lower than average income and are concentrated in areas of 
high co-ethnic concentration in disadvantaged urban areas, affecting their access to 
diverse social networks which enable social mobility and occupational attainment. 
Muslim experiences of the British education system are polarised, 33% of Muslim 
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women have higher education qualifications whilst 40% have no qualifications (Khattab 
and Modood 2018). 
 
1.3 Looking after home and family 
Looking after home and family (LAHF) is a distinctly female form of economic inactivity.  
4% of the adult population of England and Wales are in the LAHF category and only 
5% of those are men (author’s analysis of Census 2011 data for England and Wales: 
ONS 2016). The national average for all women in the LAHF category is 7%; once 
retirees are excluded, LAHF accounts for 38% of all working age economically inactive 
women in Britain (author’s analysis: ONS 2016). Muslim women are twice as likely 
(14%) to be in the LAHF category than the national average; LAHF accounts for 49% of 
economic inactivity amongst British Muslim women once retirees are excluded 
(author’s analysis: ONS 2016).  
 
It is the persistent and significant presence of Muslim women in this category since the 
onset of large-scale migration from Commonwealth countries in South Asia from the 
1950s onwards that sets them apart from women of the White majority as well as other 
BME women (Anwar 1979; Cheung 2014; Khattab and Hussain 2017). The fact that so 
many British Muslim women are looking after home and family rather than working can 
lead to negative stereotyping of an already disadvantaged group of women. High levels 
of economic activity are seen as emblematic of the distance of Britain’s Muslim 
population from mainstream British values and norms (Casey 2016) 
 
Over the past decade, partly in response to terror attacks in England perpetrated by 
second-generation British Muslim men, social policy debates about the UK’s Muslim 
communities have included discussions of integration, multiculturalism and British 
values. The reasons why British Muslim women join the formal labour market or remain 
looking after home and family have become part of this discussion. For some 
commentators, ‘traditional’ and patriarchal ethnoreligious cultural norms and values are 
embedded in British Muslim communities and are the cause of high levels of economic 
inactivity (Casey 2016).  While discussions of British values and integration do benefit 
from quantitative analysis, it has been interesting to see how little qualitative research 
has been done with economically inactive British Muslim women. For example, the 
Casey Review (Casey 2016) and the Report of the Women and Equalities Committee 
on employment opportunities for Muslim women (Women and Equalities Committee 
2016) largely include the views of experts and community leaders about these women, 
with few contributions from economically inactive women themselves.  
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The evidence in the literature demonstrates that LAHF is a complex and multifactorial 
phenomenon and any explanation of it must encompass structural, cultural and social 
factors (MCB 2016; Runnymede Trust 2016). Using a mixed methods research 
approach, it will be possible to identify specific barriers to economic activity, the extent 
to which LAHF is experienced as a disadvantage by Muslim women, and identify areas 
worthy of further investigation or social policy discussion. A mixed methods focus on 
the LAHF category of British Muslim women makes this analysis an original 
contribution to the existing body of literature on ethnoreligious inequalities in the British 
labour market. 
 
1.4 The focus of this study 
The central concern for this study is to understand why so many British Muslim women 
are economically inactive, specifically in the category of looking after home and family, 
and to explain the lack of generational change in this outcome. A mixed methods study 
can assess broad social outcomes and examine how family relationships play out in a 
British Muslim context to affect the decisions a woman makes about working or 
remaining economically inactive.   
 
The study assesses the significance of migrant generation and cohort, social class, and 
educational achievement when it comes to influencing decisions to work or look after 
home. An illustrative model of migration is developed and analysed to see what it tells 
us about the high economic inactivity rates of British Muslim women. The study asks 
how far living in a neighborhood with a high density of British Muslims promotes or 
inhibits economic activity. It examines if, and how, aspects of religiosity (belief and 
practice) affect British Muslim women's attitudes to work.  
 
1.5 Approach 
This section will require a brief biographical detour. I have been an academic 
researcher since 2007, carrying out qualitative research with women and families from 
ethno-religious minority groups. I worked on two ESRC projects that were affiliated with 
the Centre for the Study of Islam in the UK, based at Cardiff University. This research 
centre specialises in the qualitative and ethnographic study of British Muslim 
communities, with a particular ethos of improving understandings, countering negative 
stereotypes and working in collaboration with local Muslim community organisations. 
My doctoral studies have been based in the ‘Islam-UK Centre’.  
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When I moved from Cardiff to the North of England in 2012 I found that the demand for 
quantitative, statistical researchers was much greater than that for a solely qualitative 
researcher. I decided to undertake a Masters in Social Change at Manchester 
University which had a significant component of training in statistical methods to upskill 
and become more employable.  
During my time on the course I heard Professor Anthony Heath give a lecture on the 
socio-economic circumstances of Muslims in Britain which included the economic 
inactivity of Muslim women. I found that Professor Heath was referring to dated 
qualitative research about the everyday lives of Muslim women. When I read further 
into the topic I found that he, and other researchers, had no choice but to rely on dated 
qualitative research because the topic had simply not been addressed recently, or in 
any detail, by qualitative researchers. In fact, these quantitative researchers were 
stating the need for up-to-date qualitative research in their publications and this is, in 
part, the gap my project aims to fill. 
In a short period of time I went from puzzled as to what might be influencing the life 
choices made by British Muslim women, to frustrated at the lack of contemporary 
narrative accounts from these women, to excitement that this was an area where I 
could make a significant research contribution.  
Given the existing statistical body of literature on the topic I could have relied on this to 
guide the qualitative phase but there has been real value in conducting multivariate 
analysis independently. Not only have I developed advanced skills in quantitative 
research but, I have become accustomed to the language and terminology of the, 
largely quantitative, field of studies of labour market inequalities among ethnic and/or 
religious minority groups in Britain. It is to this field of research and body of literature 
that this thesis makes an original contribution. 
 
1.6 Thesis structure 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The theoretical framework for the project is explained and located within the, mainly 
quantitative, body of literature on ethnoreligious penalties in the British labour market 
and theories of socio-economic integration or assimilation. The existing literature on 
economic inactivity amongst Muslim women is explored and evaluated and specific 
gaps in understandings and explanations of economic inactivity are identified. The 
qualitative literature relating to socio-cultural constraints is evaluated and is identified 
as needing significant updating. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology Part I 
This chapter outlines the mixed methods research framework applied to the study. The 
specific mixed methods research approach used is systematic QUANT-QUAL, wherein 
both paradigms are given equivalent weight. The approach was selected so that 
quantitative and qualitative research insights could be integrated throughout the 
project. This chapter contains the quantitative methodology and critical reflections on 
some of the questions asked in the EMBES. As suggested by the direction of the 
approach, the study was designed so that the quantitative findings fed into the 
development of the qualitative phase. The qualitative methodology is presented after 
the quantitative findings. 
 
Chapter 4: Quantitative Findings.  
This chapter presents the results of bivariate and multivariate analysis of the EMBES 
2010. The original contribution of the quantitative study is that the socio-economic 
outcome being measured is not just economic inactivity, but the specific category of 
LAHF. 
 
Chapter 5: Methodology Part II 
This chapter explains how the quantitative findings fed into the design of the qualitative 
research phase and outlines the qualitative methodology. This chapter includes critical 
reflections on the qualitative research process.  
 
Chapter 6: Qualitative Findings I  
This first qualitative findings chapter introduces a model of Pakistani migration to 
Britain from the 1950s onwards, integrating the qualitative literature with empirical 
qualitative findings on pre-migration, early settlement and childhood experiences of the 
interviewees. This chapter attempts to fully engage with, and describe, the complexity 
of migration patterns by developing a system of categorising 'types' of female migration 
to Britain. The categories allow the identification of inter and intra-generational shifts 
and changes in the qualitative data.  
 
Chapter 7: Qualitative Findings II 
This chapter describes the social networks and family relationships that impact on the 
economic activity of Muslim women in the study area of Mohallaton. I maintain the 
system of categorisation developed in Chapter 6 to describe inter and intra 
generational change and the impact this has on women’s decisions about work or 
looking after home.  
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Chapter 8: Qualitative Findings III 
This chapter examines the religious practices and religious beliefs held by Muslim 
women in relation to work and economic inactivity, identifying generational and cohort 
change. I find evidence that binary categorisations are insufficient, and that Muslim 
women display a spectrum of religious beliefs and practices, some of which have a 
direct bearing on their experiences in the workplace and their decisions about seeking 
work.  
 
Chapter 9: Discussion and Implications 
This chapter integrates the quantitative and qualitative findings from the project and 
makes recommendations for policy-makers, future research and for the Muslim 
community. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Examining and Evaluating Explanations for High Levels 
of Economic Inactivity Among British Muslim Women 
 
2.1 Introduction  
A persistent pattern of high levels of economic inactivity in the ‘looking after home and 
family’ (LAHF) category amongst Muslim women in Britain has been evidenced in 
qualitative and quantitative studies undertaken since the 1970s ( Anwar 1979;  Modood 
1997;  Cheung 2014;  Khattab and Hussain 2017). The aim of this review of the 
literature is to find out what is known about the causes of economic inactivity among 
British Muslim women. There will be a focus on the research methods used to 
accumulate this evidence over time. Any areas where the literature has not advanced 
will be highlighted as ‘gaps’ which might be filled by new research, or a different 
research approach. Areas of the literature that rely on homogenised or dated accounts 
of Muslim women with insufficient nuance and differentiation are of concern.  
The main way that the literature is differentiated in this review is whether it was 
generated using quantitative, qualitative, or mixed, methods research. Attention will be 
paid to the period of time in which the research was conducted. The review required 
examination of literature from a diverse range of academic sources that encompass 
qualitative and quantitative sources; from quantitative studies of labour market 
inequalities; ethnographic studies within the field of the sociology of religion; to social 
geography and intersectional feminism, amongst others. Anthropological and 
ethnographic studies will be included under the broad term of ‘qualitative studies’ for 
brevity.  
Muslim women in Britain occupy a range of social identities, some of these have been 
identified as sources of disadvantage for their labour market outcomes. This is not to 
say that these sources of identity are not advantageous and positive features in 
aspects of their lives outside the labour market. The factors that are identified in the 
literature as contributing to high levels of economic inactivity amongst Muslim women 
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include: gender; race; religion; ethnicity; social class; migrant status; residence in area 
of high co-ethnic concentration; marital status and family formation. The complex and 
overlapping nature of the disadvantages that British Muslim women face is explored in 
this literature review.  
This review of the literature begins with an outline of assimilation or integration theories 
that predict generational improvements in labour markets outcomes for ethnic minority 
(EM) groups over time. A lack of generational improvement in labour market outcomes 
for some EM groups, holding factors such as level of education or age constant, 
provides evidence that ethnic and/or religious (ethno-religious) discrimination is driving 
labour market inequality. Studies of differential outcomes for EMs in the British labour 
market are largely statistical and the quantitative body of literature on ethno-religious 
labour market penalties is evaluated. Qualitative or mixed methods research on the 
socio-cultural factors (marriage practices, social networks and family structures) that 
impact on economic activity is then reviewed. The research questions that emerge from 
the review are presented in the final section of this chapter.  
2.2 Generational changes in labour market outcomes 
Whether people work, the work they do and how they progress within a given 
occupation are ways in which the successful integration of minority groups in Britain is 
measured; socio-economic integration is key to the social inclusion of EM groups 
(Cheung 2014; Runnymede Trust 2016). High levels of economic inactivity amongst 
British Muslim women are perceived, by some, as an indication that they are not 
successfully integrated (Casey 2016).  
The study of labour market inequalities experienced by ethno-religious minority groups 
in Britain is underpinned by an expectation of generational change and processes of 
assimilation or integration. Government rhetoric in the UK has focused on 
accommodation via integration through multicultural policies rather than assimilation 
(Waters et al 2010). However, the expectation that socio-economic integration is a 
generational process is common to both integration and assimilation theories. The ideal 
that second-generation EMs will attain, or make substantial progress towards, socio-
economic parity with the majority population, is common to US assimilation theory and 
to the British conceptualisation of integration. 
The migrant generation is expected to have relatively poor socio-economic outcomes 
for reasons which include: the emotional, social and economic costs of migration; 
downward social mobility due to a lack of fluency in English and recognised 
qualifications; and racism or discrimination (Heath 2014). Second, and subsequent, 
generations are expected to gradually adopt the values, norms and culture of the 
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majority population and gain the knowledge, qualifications and skills which will allow 
them to achieve better outcomes in the  labour market (Muttarak 2014; Waters 2014).  
Despite participation in the British education system, British Muslims have not 
experienced significant generational improvements in their labour outcomes (Heath 
and Li 2008; Cheung 2014). It is useful to consider theories of EM assimilation in more 
detail to assess how these relate to the experiences of British Muslim women. 
2.2.1Theories of assimilation and integration 
Classical theories of assimilation were developed in the US and were based on the 
experiences of White European migrants and their patterns of absorption into 
mainstream American culture over the second-generation (Heath 2014). The process 
was considered to be complete by the third generation with social and cultural 
assimilation and convergence of socio-economic outcomes. This was known as 
‘straight line assimilation’, a one-way process which required EM groups to give up 
their ethnic distinctiveness (Waters et al. 2010; Waters and Jiménez 2005). 
Subsequent migrations to the US from Africa, Asia and Latin America, and the 
persistent inequalities faced by generations of African Americans, revealed that 
assimilation did not occur in the same way for visible ethnic minorities and the theory 
had to be reconsidered (Heath 2014).  
Portes and Zhou (1993) criticised assimilation theory for being inapplicable to waves of 
visibly and culturally distinct migrant groups to the US and other countries. Their 
empirical work demonstrated how shared economic, cultural and social resources 
created diverse life-chances and opportunities for the second-generation of different 
ethnic groups (Portes and Zhou 1993). They found that assimilation could be straight 
line, segregated or downward as a result of assimilation into the mainstream, ethnic or 
racial subcultures or a combination of these (Portes and Zhou 1993).  Segregated 
assimilation was characterised by communities where there was preservation of ethnic 
norms and values alongside a commitment to socio-economic integration with 
mainstream society (Portes and Rumbaut 2005). The surrounding co-ethnic community 
was an important source of the reinforcement of norms and expectations that 
supported a commitment to socio-economic integration in terms of educational and 
employment (Portes and Rumbaut 2005). Segregated assimilation was the form of 
assimilation most associated with upward social mobility for the second-generation 
(Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2005). 
Assimilation theory was ‘reworked’ by Alba and Nee in response to segregated 
assimilation theory (Alba and Nee 1997). Assimilation was redefined as the creation of 
sufficient cultural solidarity to maintain a national existence, not the eradication of all 
signs of ethnic origin (Alba and Nee 1997).   Ethnic boundaries and identities came to 
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be seen as social constructions and the second-generation had the potential to 
challenge or cross social boundaries that their parents were not able to (Alba and Nee, 
1997).  The personal, psychological and social costs of boundary crossing to 
individuals meant that some groups in society were slower or unable to assimilate into 
the mainstream.  Ethnic communities could provide the resources for the attainment of 
social parity for their members with limited contacted with the mainstream (Alba 2005). 
Both reworked and segregated assimilation theories are gender neutral and assume 
the same opportunities for assimilation for men and women. Insufficient attention is 
paid to differences in power relations and resources between men and women (Anthias 
2007). Portes’ conception of ethnic capital has been further developed in the British 
context to explain educational success among working class Muslim young people by 
Modood and colleagues (Shah et al. 2010; Khattab and Modood 2018). The inherent 
gender neutrality of the theory remains problematic in this more contemporary 
development (discussed in detail in later in this review). The gender neutrality of  
concepts relating to assimilation may limit their explanatory capabilities for high level of 
economic inactivity for Muslim women in Britain because it is a highly gendered labour 
market outcome.  
Assimilation theories are useful because they provide a firm theoretical basis for 
conceptualising economic activity as a baseline for the socio-economic integration of 
British Muslim women. The focus on generational change within assimilation theories is 
a way to make structured comparisons between different groups of Muslim women 
according to their migration trajectories. It is however likely that the study of 
generational change for British Pakistani women will be more complex than the first-
second generation or parent-child generation binaries that are common in theories of 
assimilation. 
2.2.2 Migrant generations 
The integration of immigrants is a generational process (McAndrew and Voas 2014). 
Generational change is a yardstick to measure changes in immigrant groups (Waters 
and Jimenez 2005). Generational change is contextual and varies among different EM 
groups (Heath 2014). The theoretical interest in studies of labour market outcomes is 
not in generation defined by date of birth but in generation defined by place of birth 
(Heath and Li 2008).  Generation is the ancestral distance from point of arrival in a 
society, it is sometimes a temporal gauge (Waters and Jiménez 2005; Waters et al. 
2010). The migration of Muslims to Britain has taken place since the 1960s and 
continues to the current day therefore generation cannot be effectively operationalised 
as a proxy for birth cohort (Waters et al. 2010; Waters 2014). 
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The concept of generation, as opposed to birth cohort, focuses on internal changes 
rather than structural changes (Waters 2014). Generational change is a slower process 
for groups where there is constant replenishment of ethnic norms and traditions 
through family reunion and where strong links are maintained with countries of origin 
(Heath 2014). Like Mexican Americans in the US, Pakistani households are a mix of 
generations, for example with a second-generation father and a first-generation mother 
(Waters and Jimenez 2005; Waters 2014). Qualitative research provides evidence that 
transnational marriage is an important source of migrant replenishment among British 
Pakistanis; it has been the predominant marriage pattern for second-generation British 
Pakistanis since the 1980s (Shaw 1988; 2000; Charsley 2006; Charsley et al. 2016).  
Pakistani and Bangladeshi families in Britain, like Mexican Americans in the US, are a 
mix of cohorts, each cohort is a mix of generations, and households are a mix of 
generations (Waters 2014). Each birth cohort experiences the same life chances but 
has a different dynamic in relation to their ethnic group and wider society (Waters and 
Jiménez 2005; Waters 2014). It is important to consider birth cohort alongside 
generation to examine the effects of protracted immigrant replenishment on 
assimilation (Waters and Jiménez 2005). Period effects (changes over time) are 
important within the labour market and are likely to be even more important in the case 
of migrants and their descendants (Heath and Li 2008). Generational change amongst 
EM groups is hard to ascertain in the UK because government statistics have ignored 
generational change and tend to present EMs as homogenous entities (Heath 2014). 
This is misleading because some EM groups have large proportions of second or third-
generation members and others are made up of more recent arrivals (Heath 2014; 
Waters et al. 2010).  
There is a rich and ongoing tradition of qualitative research to complement quantitative 
studies in the US (Waters and Jimenez 2005); a comparable body of qualitative 
literature on generational change in socio-economic outcomes does not exist in Britain. 
There are however ethnographic and anthropological studies conducted with Pakistani 
communities in British towns and cities from the 1970s and 1980 (for example, Anwar 
1979; Shaw 1988; Werbner 1990). These sources form an essential body of evidence 
to assess generational change in the absence of a comprehensive set of appropriate 
statistics (Waters 2014). These qualitative studies include empirical research 
conducted in Pakistan and Britain and some analysis of local and national datasets, as 
such they avoid the criticism of anthropological studies as partial histories that focus on 
social agency without acknowledging structural forces (Ratcliffe 2004). Whilst these 
qualitative sources are clearly valuable, it is concerning that they continue to be cited in 
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statistical literature to contextualise the current socio-cultural circumstances of Muslim 
women in Britain.  
The specific focus of these qualitative studies on British Pakistanis must be 
acknowledged from the outset. No other ethnic group of Muslim women in Britain has a 
comparable body of literature on early migration and settlement patterns. In taking 
account of the migration and settlement of Muslim women in Britain, this section of the 
review is largely limited to studies of Pakistani women of necessity because this group 
was the focus of this body of literature. These detailed localised studies contain 
important information about the material and social conditions of British Pakistani 
women and shed light on constraints to economic activity for first and second-
generation British Muslim women. 
Quantitative studies provide evidence that generational change varies by ethnicity. For 
example, Heath and Li (2008) examined generational, lifecycle and period effects on 
the employment of EM groups in Britain. They classified migrant generations in two 
cohorts; ‘early arrivals’ were people who had arrived in Britain by the 1970s; ‘recent 
arrivals’ were people who migrated to Britain and entered the labour market at the 
same time as the second-generation. The ‘second-generation’ were the British-born 
children of early arrivals who came into adulthood in the 1990s and 2000s. Heath and 
Li used the General Household Survey (GHS) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 
1972-2005 to create a pooled data set of approximately 4.7 million records to follow 
through the employment experiences of each of the three ‘cohorts over 34 consecutive 
years. They found little evidence of generational change in the labour market outcome 
of unemployment over time. Black Africans, Black Caribbeans, Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis are subject to persistent inequalities and discrimination in the labour 
market, regardless of generation (Heath and Li 2008; Cheung 2014).  
Overall, there is little evidence of generational improvement in the socio-economic 
conditions of Muslims in Britain. There is a marked continuity in poor housing, 
residence in areas of high deprivation and poor labour market outcomes for Muslim, 
particularly Pakistani and Bangladeshi, men and women (Heath and Li 2015; Cabinet 
Office 2017). The working lives of second-generation Pakistani and Bangladeshi men 
are characterised, like the first-generation, by underemployment, unemployment and 
undereducation and women by their economic inactivity (Modood 1997; Heath et al. 
2000; Cheung 2014). Muslims households remain some of the most socio-
economically deprived and disadvantaged in Britain (Khattab et al. 2010; Heath and Li 
2015).  
Generational continuity in poor socio-economic outcomes is upheld in qualitative 
studies. Upon revisiting the Pakistani community in Oxford in the late the 1990s, twenty 
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years after conducting her original anthropological study, Shaw found a marked 
consistency in the lifestyles of the first and second-generation (Shaw 2000). Kalra 
(2000) and Werbner (1990) also found little improvement in the socio-economic 
circumstances between generations in their ethnographic studies of Pakistani 
communities in Oldham and Manchester respectively.  
Despite a continuance in poor socio-economic outcomes there is evidence that more 
recently arrived migrants differ from their first-generation predecessors. ‘Marriage 
migration’ is the most important source of migration from the South Asian subcontinent 
to Britain today (Waters 2014). A recently arrived ‘bride’ from Pakistan may be joining a 
family settled in Britain for over two generations and is likely to have been ‘selected’ as 
a marriage partner because of her education and ability to speak English (Charsley et 
al. 2016). Some recently arrived migrants are of equivalent status to the second-
generation in terms of education and language fluency (Shaw 2000; Charsley 2006; 
2007).  
More recently arrived Pakistani migrants arrive into communities and households that 
have been settled in Britain for two decades or more. Although there is little evidence of 
change in high rates of LAHF among first-generation women over time, there may be 
differences in the barriers and constraints they face. What these differences are and 
how they play out in the lives of recently arrived first-generation Muslim women will be 
an important contribution to this body of literature.   
An exploration of migrant generation may be a useful way to begin to differentiate 
between different groups of Muslim women. It will then be possible to identify if there 
are specific barriers to labour market participation for different groups of women, for 
example by generation or cohort. Alternatively, it may be the case that barriers to 
economic activity are common to all Muslim women. 
There is clearly greater complexity in the migration experiences of Muslim women than 
can be captured within the first-second generation dichotomy. A detailed, 
comprehensive and contemporary mapping of Muslim migration to Britain would be 
helpful to add depth and nuance to understandings of generational change more 
generally as well as to the explanations of economic inactivity. Given that the bulk of 
existing research evidence on first-generation Muslim migrants to Britain from the 
1960s onwards focuses on the experiences of Pakistanis it is likely that such a 
mapping exercise would necessarily have to focus on the experiences of Pakistani 
migration to Britain.  
Finally, the lack of statistical evidence for generational improvement in the outcome of 
economic inactivity does not necessarily mean that generational changes are not 
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occurring. It may be the case that attitudes of individuals and norms within families and 
communities are shifting but the results of these changes are not yet apparent in the 
statistics on labour market outcomes. There has certainly been a sharp increase in 
higher education (HE) participation among Muslim young women, apparent from the 
mid-1990s onwards (Dale 2002b; Khattab 2012).This indicates that some shifts are 
occurring in relation to the socio-economic aspirations and expectations of young 
British Muslim women and will be discussed later in this review. 
2.3 Ethnicity, religion and labour market outcomes 
2.3.1 The ethnic penalty 
Economic inactivity is one of four possible labour outcomes that are used to measure 
the labour market integration of EM groups in Britain. The other outcomes refer to the 
economically active population in terms of occupational attainment, unemployment and 
levels of pay. The 1991 Census of England and Wales was the first to include a 
question on ethnicity; this signified a significant advance in identifying national level 
ethnic inequalities in the labour market (Heath et al. 2000).   
When statistical analyses of labour market disadvantage amongst EM groups in Britain 
do not include a measure of economic inactivity, significant proportions of Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi (P&B) women are excluded. P&B women are more likely to be 
economically inactive than men and women of other ethnic groups. High levels of 
inactivity mean that P&B women in employment or unemployment (the economically 
active) are a ‘select group’ and therefore their experiences may not be typical (Heath 
and Cheung 2006). This is an indication that economic inactivity may require a specific 
focus and a different research approach than other labour market outcomes.  
Anthony Heath, along with colleagues, has conducted some of the most influential 
studies in the field of ethnic inequalities in the British labour market. This body of 
research, conducted from the 1990s onwards, established the ‘ethnic penalty’ as an 
important factor in the experiences of EM groups in the British labour market across all 
four labour market outcomes. The ‘ethnic penalty’ refers to any unexplained differences 
in labour market outcomes after controlling for age, qualification and UK birth; 
discrimination is likely to be a major component (Heath et al. 2000). Heath and Cheung 
(2006) further refine this definition to make clear that ethnic penalty is a broader 
concept than that of discrimination, although discrimination is still likely to be a major 
component. 
The ethnic penalty varies for different ethnic groups. From the earliest of studies 
Indians in Britain emerged as relatively advantaged in all labour market outcomes 
compared to Black Caribbeans, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Heath et al. (2000) 
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conducted an analysis of labour market outcomes using the General Household Survey 
1985-1992 and found that Indians achieved as well or better than the White groups 
whilst Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were disadvantaged. They suggested that the 
discrimination at play was not related to ‘race’ or skin colour but other aspects of 
ethnicity such as religion or other forms cultural distinctiveness (Heath et al. 2000). The 
introduction of a question on religious belonging to the Census of England and Wales 
2001 and other national datasets enabled the examination of the extent to which 
religion formed part of the observed ethnic penalty.  
2.3.2 The religious penalty  
Studies from 2001 onwards moved on from studying the extent of the ethnic penalty to 
examining the impact of the effects of religious affiliation, or the combined effects of 
ethnic and religious (ethnoreligious) belonging, on socio-economic outcomes. The 
inclusion of the question on religion in the Census of 2001 was motivated by increasing 
public and policy attention on the disadvantages faced by Muslims in Britain and the 
perceived lack of integration amongst the second-generation (Sherif 2011). 
Religious belonging can provide group identity and practical support for migrants and 
therefore assist the integration process (Anwar 1979; McAndrew and Voas 2014).  
Integration can also be hindered if the basic values of religion are significantly different 
from the majority population (McAndrew and Voas 2014). Muslims in Britain are 
markedly different from the White majority because of their socio-economic 
disadvantage and their distinctive socio-cultural identities (Khattab 2012). Religiosity 
affects the economic activity of Muslim women in two ways: extrinsically, through 
experience of racial and religious discrimination and intrinsically, through the choices 
they make in light of religious beliefs relating to work and employment (Khattab and 
Hussain 2017). 
The current societal context of Britain is one where Islamophobic discourse is prevalent 
in public spheres including in the labour market and within workplaces (Khattab and 
Modood 2018). Stereotypes of Muslim women focus on their perceived subservience 
and powerlessness; Islam is viewed as a constraint to the agency of Muslim women 
(Cheruvallil-Contractor 2012; Khattab and Modood 2018). Young British women attract 
public interest and scrutiny and are often reduced to their religious affiliation 
(Cheruvallil-Contractor 2012). In fact, Muslim women are more likely to experience anti-
Muslim hatred or Islamophobia than Muslim men: 57% of reports to Tell Mama (a 
national response and support service for victims of anti-Muslim hatred and 
Islamophobia in the UK) came from Muslim women in 2017, 53% of reports were from 
‘visibly’ Muslim women (Tell Mama 2018). 
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Studies conducted since 2001 have shown that religious belonging can account for 
some of the observed ethnic penalties in labour outcomes. Heath and Martin (2013) 
conducted an analysis of data from the 2005 and 2006 Annual Population Surveys 
(APS). They found Muslim women were more likely to be inactive than women of other 
religious belongings within all ethnic groups, and that all ethnic groups of Muslim 
women were significantly less likely to be economically active than white British 
Christian women; these findings suggest a consistent and shared Muslim effect, or a 
Muslim penalty, on economic activity independent of ethnicity (Heath and Martin 2013). 
A key finding was that the Muslim penalty was largest in the case of women’s 
economic activity. Although direct discrimination against Muslims is a plausible factor in 
explaining inequalities in unemployment, it is unlikely to explain why Muslim effects are 
larger for economic activity than for unemployment (Heath and Martin 2013). Heath 
and Martin (2013) suggest that factors related to social networks or traditional family 
values may be part of the explanations for high levels of economic inactivity.  
Alongside evidence for an overarching Muslim penalty there is evidence for diversity in 
labour market outcomes among Muslims in Britain. For example, Indian Muslims are 
disadvantaged in relation to Indians of other religious belongings but they are less 
disadvantaged than Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (Brown 2000). The evidence 
suggests that the Muslim penalty varies by both ethnicity and labour market outcome 
(Brown 2000; Khattab and Hussain 2017).  
Skin colour, or racial discrimination, forms a component of the religious penalty. Being 
White in the labour market is a labour market advantage for all groups except for White 
Muslims, and White Muslims face less severe labour market penalties than South 
Asian Muslims (Khattab 2009; 2012). South Asian Muslim women are more likely to 
face discrimination and prejudice due to both racial and cultural discrimination (Khattab 
2009; 2012). Khattab argues that the ethnic penalty is a proxy for discrimination by 
race (skin colour) and culture (religion). Khattab’s conclusions regarding racial 
discrimination are convincing but those regarding culture are not because he reduces 
culture to religion, thereby failing to fully acknowledge the complexity of ethno-religious 
belonging.  
Culture may be a source of disadvantage for reasons other than, or in addition to, 
discrimination in the labour market and this is likely to be the case for economically 
inactive women, as suggested by Heath and Martin (2013). For example, cultural 
practices that promote patriarchal gender norms may restrict economic activity.  By 
designating religion as a proxy for culture, ethnicity becomes little more than a 
categorisation of country of origin or heritage. Ethnicity and culture are, in fact,  
enacted and displayed in many  ways other than simply skin colour and religiosity.  
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The interplay between ethnic culture and religiosity is multifaceted. South Asian 
ethnicities are often described as ‘pan-ethnic’ (Muttarak 2014); the reasons for this 
include more than shared skin colour. As well as a history of a shared nationality (and 
regional conflict), there is a legacy of shared practices including: rituals and traditions; 
household structures and gender norms; shared language; caste systems; and kinship 
networks (Anwar 1979; Shaw 1989; Afshar 1994). In fact, much of the debate around 
‘religion versus culture’ within Pakistani communities, where an Islamic identity is 
prioritised over a ‘cultural’ Pakistani identity, is based on the pervasiveness of traditions 
and rituals that are thought of as South Asian rather than Islamic (Shaw 2000; Charsley 
2007; Bolagnani and Mellor 2012). Ethnic values are therefore not just religious but are 
generationally transmitted customary, cultural and idealised practices, attitudes and 
worldviews from countries of origin (Afshar 1994).  
2.3.3 Religiosity and Economic Inactivity  
It is difficult to separate the effects of ethnic culture from religious affiliation. By 
identifying distinct aspects of religiosity, such as practices and beliefs, it becomes 
possible to begin to understand why religious affiliation significantly increases the 
likelihood of economic inactivity among Muslim women. Differentiating between ethnic 
and religious factors is a complex task (Heath and Li 2015). Not least because of the  
interplay of ethnicity and religion in the interpretation of religious texts and the 
transmission of Islamic practices and beliefs (Gilliat-Ray 2010a; Cheruvallil-Contractor 
2012; Scourfield et al. 2013). Two core Islamic practices of prayer (salah) and head 
covering (hijab) and Islamic beliefs about gender roles emerge in the literature as 
distinct aspects of religiosity that can be observed and evaluated in terms of their 
impacts on economic activity using statistical and/or qualitative research methods.  
Qualitative research confirms that Islamic beliefs play an important role in the everyday 
lives of Muslim women. Muslim women play a central role in the transmission and 
upholding of religious beliefs, values and practices in their families and communities 
(Maynard et al. 2008; Scourfield et al. 2013; Akhtar 2014). Recommended gender roles 
in Muslim communities often locate women in caring roles and men as breadwinners 
(Afshar 1994; Maynard et al. 2008). Muslim societies place a greater value on the roles 
of women as wives and mothers than on their independent socio-economic status 
(Afshar 1994; Akhtar 2014).  
There is evidence that there are generational differences in expressions of Islamic 
beliefs and religious practice. In her qualitative study of Muslim women in Bradford, 
Akhtar (2014) found that first-generation women saw religion as a way of preserving 
traditional cultural heritage and to protect their children from British society. In contrast, 
second-generation South Asian Muslim women saw religion as liberating and a means 
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to assert their rights to go to university, to be economically active, and to choose their 
own marriage partner (Akhtar 2014). The weight of qualitative evidence suggests that 
most second-generation Muslim women believe that adherence to Islamic faith is not, 
of itself, a deterrent to women’s participation in the labour market (Dale et al 2002a; 
2002b). Instead, ethnic norms and cultures relating to gender roles from countries of 
origin are seen by young second-generation Muslim women as constraints to economic 
activity (Dale et al. 2002a; 2002b; Akhtar 2014). On the other hand, first generation 
women frame their economic inactivity in terms of their religious belief that the most 
important roles for Muslim women are as wives and mothers in the domestic sphere 
(Shaw 2000; Dale et al. 2002a; Maynard et al. 2008). 
Statistics tend not to give information about the content of these beliefs, this evidence 
is essential to understand if the content of religious beliefs limits economic activity, and 
any changes in these beliefs over time and generation. A lack of longitudinal studies of 
Muslim women or studies that include women at later life stages such as marriage and 
motherhood mean that there is insufficient evidence for the effect of religious beliefs 
and practices on economic inactivity in adulthood. The work of Maynard et al. (2008) is 
a useful, but rare, example of such a study. 
Most of the evidence on the use of religious argumentation to secure freedom from 
ethnic norms and tradition is based on research conducted with young, second-
generation middle-class participants (Cheruvallil-Contractor 2012; Bolagnani and 
Mellor 2012). It is not known whether working-class women share the standpoint of 
their middle-class peers. There is also little attention paid to generational difference; it 
is not known if more recently arrived first-generation women share the beliefs of their 
birth cohort of second-generation women, or those of older women of the same migrant 
generation.  
An example of this approach is Shaw’s qualitative study of Pakistani women in Oxford, 
she groups recently arrived first-generation migrants with the second generation (Shaw 
2000). In Dales’ study of adult P&B economically inactive women in Oldham 
interviewees are distinguished by age, ‘older women’ and ‘younger women’, without 
differentiating by migrant generation (Dale 2002a). In their study of experiences of 
education and employment among young South Asian women, Ahmad et al. (2003) 
state in their methodology that they set out to interview second-generation young 
women who were single and without children so that their labour market participation 
was not affected by childcare issues (Ahmed et al. 2003, p.8). These approaches have 
meant that the experiences of younger first-generation women have been marginalised 
and there has been insufficient attention paid to the challenges they face to economic 
activity. There is a need to build a contemporary body of qualitative evidence on how 
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religious beliefs and practices impact on the economic activity of Muslim women that 
systematically differentiates by migrant generation and encompasses a wider range of 
socio-economic backgrounds.  
If the main cause of economic inactivity was religiosity per se then single women would 
be as likely as married women to be inactive, but this is not the case. Recent research 
into the impacts of religiosity on economic activity shows that it does not have a 
negative effect on economic activity (Khattab et al. 2017). Married Muslim women are 
significantly more likely to be economically inactive than single women (Dale and 
Holdsworth 1997; Salway 2007; Khattab et al. 2017). Khattab and Johnston et al.  
(2017) find that there is a decrease in economic activity amongst Muslim women upon 
both life stages of marriage and child-rearing and an increase in the economic activity 
of Muslim men at the same life stages; they suggest that this is evidence for delineation 
of gender roles in Muslim families.  Gender roles within marriage are set by a complex 
mix of Islamic and ethnic culture as well as personal and psychological factors; the 
strong effect of marriage on economic activity might incorporate some aspects of 
religious beliefs (Khattab et al. 2017).  
Many of the studies referenced above conclude that diversity in the labour market 
experiences among Muslim women is the result of different migration trajectories, pre-
migration trajectories, gender, race and religion (Brown 2000; Heath and Martin 2013; 
Khattab and Hussain 2018). Further research that considers measures of religiosity 
and other social-cultural factors, particularly social capital, is required to better 
understand the labour market penalties that Muslim women face (Heath and Martin 
2013; Cheung 2014). Ethnic traditions and gender norms are considered to account for 
some the ethnic penalty that Muslim women face in their economic activity. Ethnic 
traditions will be examined in more detail later in this review. 
The literature on labour market penalties begins to demonstrate the complexity and 
multifactorial nature of explanations of economic inactivity. Religion affiliation has been 
established as a significant factor in explanations of economic inactivity amongst 
women. The literature on the effects of religiosity (practice and beliefs) on economic 
activity is emergent and can vary according to the construction of measures of 
religiosity. The development of appropriate measures of religiosity in quantitative 
studies of labour market outcomes is a work in progress in the UK and an area which 
requires further testing and development. A complementary body of qualitative 
evidence is likely to be helpful in the development of appropriate questions in surveys 
or to provide guidance for research direction. 
The close and overlapping nature of ethnic and religious cultures mean that the effects 
of religion are difficult to separate from ethnicity. Some of the measured religious 
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penalty is likely to include features of ethnicity and vice versa. In the everyday lived 
experiences of British Muslim community life, religious practice and beliefs are strongly 
influenced by ethnic cultures and traditions (Gilliat-Ray 2010a; Scourfield et al. 2013). 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi women consistently emerge most likely to be economically 
inactive in models that compare outcomes by religion, ethnicity or ethno-religious 
group. Bearing in mind these complexities in separating out the effects of religion from 
ethnicity, this study will refer mainly to the existence of an ‘ethno-religious penalty’ in 
the labour market outcomes of Muslim women. 
The greater effect of the Muslim penalty on economic inactivity than unemployment 
demonstrated in Heath and Martin’s study (2013) is an indication that a different 
research approach may be required for this labour market outcome. The fundamental 
decision to become economically active is likely to be influenced by factors in addition 
to discrimination. Although the ‘chill factor’, hesitance to be economically active 
because of widespread perceptions of discrimination, may be a factor in these 
decisions (Heath and Martin 2013). This decision to participate in the labour market is 
subject to a wider range of constraints than those imposed within the labour market. It 
is in the study of economic inactivity that the inability to include detailed accounts of 
socio-cultural preferences or constraints through solely quantitative analysis is brought 
into sharp relief. 
Statistical studies rely on existing qualitative evidence to shed light on some of the 
factors that might explain high rates of economic inactivity. There is a lack of 
contemporary qualitative research evidence on economically inactive adult Muslim 
women whilst quantitative studies have been given vitality by the introduction of 
questions on ethnicity and religion in the Census of England and Wales. Quantitative 
researchers have come to rely on rather dated qualitative literature to contextualise and 
explain some of their statistical findings as a result. The following sections review 
evidence of the causes of economic activity among Muslim women in qualitative, 
quantitative and mixed methods research that include socio-cultural factors in addition 
to religion or ethnicity.  
Research on ethnic and religious penalties focus on the impact of structural 
discrimination in the labour market, with little examination of individual agency and 
choice. The focus on structural discrimination is however important because it is a 
constant reminder that racism, based on skin culture and culture, is a constant feature 
of the labour market experiences of EM groups in Britain. Socio-cultural factors that 
impact on labour market outcomes operate within the context of structural 
disadvantage that is based on racial, ethnic, and cultural discrimination.  
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2.4 Socio-cultural explanations 
Most studies that examine economic inactivity amongst British Muslim women suggest 
that gendered ethnic traditions and norms form part of the ethnic or religious penalty.  
This section is largely limited to socio-cultural factors impacting on the economic 
activity of Pakistani women because a similarly extensive body of ethnographic or 
anthropological sources does not exist for Bangladeshi or Indian Muslim women. 
Ethnic ‘traditions’ are frequently used as socio-cultural explanations of economic 
inactivity; they refer to the status and expectations of women within families, 
communities and marital relationships.  ‘Tradition’ is a loose term often used to capture 
a range of enduring customary cultural practices and ideals in South Asian families. 
These practices and norms are usually  underpinned by selective interpretations of 
Islamic sources and texts (Afshar and Barrientos 1999). A lack of a clear definition of 
the term ‘tradition’ leaves it open to negative cultural stereotypes and assumption. 
By carefully reviewing the qualitative literature it was possible to identify some of the 
practices or norms within British Pakistani families and communities that are 
encompassed in the term ‘traditions’ and are thought to have direct or indirect impacts 
on economic activity. The relevant traditions refer to marriage practices and gender 
norms (Shaw 1988; 2000; 2009; Werbner 1990; Charsley 2006; 2007; Salway 2007; 
Dale 2008; Akhtar 2014). By identifying specific practices it became possible to assess 
what is known about their impact on economic activity for particular groups of women, 
identify any evidence for generational change, and to consider how knowledge and 
research on the effects of socio-cultural practices might be advanced.  The impact of 
these socio-cultural practices will be discussed in detail in the following sections, 
preceded by a discussion of the social structures within which traditional practices are 
constituted and enacted. 
2.4.1 British Pakistani social structure  
Family structure and caste or kinship networks (biraderis) framed social relations in the 
earliest British Pakistani communities and families. These social structures  are 
essential to understanding the socio-economic position of British Pakistani families and 
communities. These social structures were transported from Pakistan by first-
generation migrants and reinterpreted in the British context; they are the result of the 
interplay of socio-cultural norms within prevailing structural conditions (Modood 2004). 
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Most Pakistani migrants to Britain were of rural origins, therefore the social structures 
reproduced social hierarchies of villages in Pakistan (Shaw 1988; Werbner 1990; Kalra 
2000). 
The Pakistani social structure, in Pakistan and Britain, is self-perpetuating and resistant 
to change (Fischer, 1991; Afshar, 1994; Shaw 1988; Anwar 1979).  It has enabled the 
continuation of socio-cultural traditions and the transmission of norms and values of 
family, community and gender relations that have limited the economic activity of 
women (Afshar 1994; Shaw 2009). Knowledge of the gendered forms of social 
organisation in Pakistani families are essential to understandings of how the 
explanatory variables commonly used to explain economic inactivity, such as migration, 
education, marriage, family formation, are experienced by Pakistani women 
2.4.2 Family structure and life-stages  
Family hierarchies in British Pakistani families were determined by age and sex, 
women were formally subordinate to men (Shaw 1988; Anwar 1979).  Clearly defined 
roles within family hierarchies left little room for independent inclinations or initiatives 
(Shaw 1988). The presence of the older generation was a form of cultural and 
emotional control over younger generations (Afshar 1994).  Daughters, and daughters-
in-law, were located at the very bottom of family hierarchies. Male and female worlds 
had their own hierarchical structures, authority lay with the eldest male in a family 
(Anwar 1979; Shaw 1988). Male heads of families made decisions about work, 
marriage and residence for the second-generation (Anwar 1979; Werbner 1990; 
Fischer 1991).  Older women had authority over younger women, “a new bride had to 
defer to the authority of the mother-in-law” (Shaw 1988, p.73).  
Positions in family hierarchies were not related to biological age but to social age. 
Biological age is age in years; physical age relates to physical transformations; and 
social age relates to socio-culturally defined ideas about appropriate attitudes and 
behaviour (Maynard et al. 2008). In their qualitative study of experiences of age and 
aging of older EM women Maynard et al. (2008) found that Pakistani and Bangladeshi  
women were more likely to feel ‘old’ as a social category than women of other 
ethnicities because they experienced the rites of passage of becoming  mothers, 
grandmothers and widows sooner than other women.  Older Pakistani and Bangladeshi  
women, as mothers-in-law and grandmothers, were not expected, nor did they expect, 
to be economically active (Maynard et al. 2008). 
As daughters and daughters-in-law, young women occupied a low status in Pakistani 
families and had little authority or control in decisions around their own futures in terms 
of education, work or marriage. Despite the lack of control over these important 
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decisions, Pakistani women largely accepted the ascribed values of marriage and 
motherhood as important markers of identity and a sense of fulfilment (Werbner 1990; 
Afshar 1994; Maynard et al. 2008). Acceptance, however, does not necessarily equate 
to choice and agency. There is some evidence of shifts in the gendered power 
structures within households and decision-making authority within families, for example 
with increasing acceptance of negotiations relating to education and employment for 
young women (Dale 2002b). There is little evidence in the literature as to inter or 
intragenerational change, other than for middle-class and degree-educated single 
young Muslim women.  
The protection of family honour and the need to control female sexuality was important 
to families, the honour and prestige of men and families was bound to the behaviour of 
women (Shaw 1988; Werbner 1989; Afshar and Agarwal 1989). In Pakistan religious 
texts were invoked to represent women as dependent on and protected by men, both 
economically and socially (Afshar and Agarwal 1989). A range of cultural practices 
including veiling, restrictions on movement in physical space, and specifications of 
behavioural norms were placed on Pakistani women by men to reduce the risk of 
shame and dishonour to families (Afshar and Agarwal 1989; Werbner 1990). These 
cultural practices restricted the access of young Pakistani women to higher education 
and the labour market. 
2.4.3 Social networks  
Caste and kinship framed socio-economic relationships in British Pakistani 
communities (Anwar 1979; Shaw 1988; Werbner 1990). Position in the Pakistani caste 
structure provided an indication of the social and economic resources held prior to 
migration by individuals and groups. Caste is a complex and hierarchical system of 
social relations, it is a patrilineal and ascribed status (Fishcer 1991; Shaw 2000). Most 
Pakistanis deny caste exists because Islam imposes equal status on all Muslims, this 
made caste issues very difficult to investigate and research (Shaw 1998; Werbner 
1990). Shaw found that three categories of caste: Ashraf (noble); Zamindar 
(landowning); Kammi (artisan or service). The three categories are confirmed in the 
work of Anwar (1979) and Werbner (1990). Each caste has a distinct social, historical 
and economic status (Shaw 1988; Fischer 1991). Caste was essential to the concept of 
biraderi, which were flexible social networks that could include local extended family, 
family in Britain and Pakistan, or all members of a caste (Shaw 1988; Werbner 1990). 
Biraderi networks and relationships were important to both migration and settlement of 
Pakistani men in Britain (Anwar 1979; Shaw, 1988; Werbner 1990). Families pooled 
resources of information and finances to assist the migration of a man, including the 
costs of acquiring a passport and airfare. When that man arrived in Britain he would 
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find work and accommodation with the assistance of a Pakistani men. This migrant 
would then save, remit money to Pakistan and act as a sponsor for another migrant. 
Chains of migration involved family, caste members or those from the same village or a 
neighbouring village and were framed by the ideology of obligations to kin (Anwar 
1979; Shaw 1988). This led to selective and localised migration from certain areas of 
Pakistan to certain towns in Britain (Anwar 1979; Kalra 2000). Chain migration created 
the conditions for continuity and persistence in social structure and attitudes from place 
of origin, including those relating to gender norms (Anwar 1979; Shaw 1988).  
An understanding of caste and kinship networks provided in the qualitative body of 
research provides an insight into the intricacies and nuances of persistent strong co-
ethnic social ties among British Pakistani communities. There is clearly more to the 
strong co-ethnic ties than religious belonging alone. Kinship networks provided a 
context for migration and the shared experience of socio-economic marginalisation. 
Little is known about how Pakistani women experience economic activity in areas of 
high co-ethnic density in the contemporary context, how this has changed over time, or 
how it might differ in its effects on different generations or cohorts of Muslim women.  
2.4.4 Marriage practices 
Quantitative studies provide compelling evidence that marriage has a significantly 
negative effect on the economic activity of Muslim women (Holdsworth and Dale 1997; 
Salway 2007; Dale 2008; Khattab et al. 2017). The statistical evidence for the effect of 
marriage on economic activity before 2001 is limited to analysis by ethnic group, 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi women are the focus of these studies. Findings on the 
effects of marriage on women from these South Asian ethnic groups are often 
generalised to all British Muslim women. There are a small number of quantitative 
studies that have since looked at the effects of marriage on economic activity by 
religious belonging (Khattab et al. 2017). 
Muslim women, or P&B women, are most likely to of all the main ethno-religious groups 
in Britain to experience significant drops in economic activity upon marriage and a 
further drop upon motherhood (Khattab et al. 2017). Qualitative research has added 
valuable insights into the socio-cultural factors that play out in marriage and the ways in 
which marriage might constrain the economic activity of Muslim women 
Arranged Marriage  
In Britain, most Muslims marry within their own ethnic groups, and have done since the 
onset of migration, this is often marriage to a cousin or member of the kinship group 
(Peach 2006; Shaw 2009; Charsley 2016). Arranged marriage was strongly related to  
maintaining the integrity of hierarchical and patriarchal family structures and kinship 
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networks (Werbner 1988; Fischer 1991). Endogamous marriage reinforced cultural 
norms and values from Pakistan that favoured and valued gendered divisions of 
exclusively male-breadwinner and female-homemaker roles in families and households 
(Afshar 1994; Shaw 1988; 2009).  
Pakistani and Bangladeshi second-generation young women expected that they would 
have to negotiate work with their husbands and mothers-in-law (Dale 2002a; 2002b; 
Ahmad et al 2003). Mothers-in-law were influential and powerful in the decisions young 
women made about work (Dale et al 2002; Afshar 1994; Dale et al. 2002a). Women 
with university degrees and ‘worthy careers’ (in the traditional professions) were most 
successful in these negotiations with their husbands and in-laws (Dale et al. 2002a; 
2002b; Ahmad et al. 2003; Dale 2008). The accounts of women from working class 
families and households with no higher education qualifications, who are in fact the 
largest proportion of Muslim women are missing from contemporary qualitative 
narratives around the labour market experiences of Muslim women.  
Transnational Marriage 
The reinforcement of gendered norms around male breadwinner and female 
homemaker roles is considered to be strongest where one partner in a marriage is a 
first-generation migrant (Dale 2008; Charsley 2006; 2016). Transnational marriage was 
prevalent in Pakistani communities throughout the 1990s (Shaw 2000; 2009). Arranged 
marriages of the second-generation to cousins or kin in Pakistan protected 
transnational family interests and cultural ideals, and strengthened ties with Pakistan 
(Dwyer 2000; Charsley 2006). Pakistani kin in Pakistan could exert significant pressure 
and refusals of marriage proposals were disruptive to relationships and material 
interests (Shaw 1988; 2000). By arranging transnational marriages for their children, 
first-generation parents were able to share educational and employment opportunities 
with their family in Pakistan. Restrictive immigration policies meant that Pakistani 
families were limited in the ways in which they could support labour migration to Britain 
(Shaw 2000; Werbner 1990). The sending of remittance to Pakistan remains important 
to more recently arrived first-generation Pakistani men (Kalra 2000; Charsley 2006).  
First-generation partners were seen as better able to maintain ethno-religious values 
and to impart these to their children (Shaw 2000; Charsley 2006; 2007). Younger first-
generation women were thought to be: more dutiful and modest; less independent, 
assertive and argumentative; and more committed to marriage than second-generation 
Pakistani young women (Shaw 2009). These attributes were regarded as conducive to 
the maintenance of family and community networks and ties (Shaw 1988; 2000). In 
Pakistan, girls receive early socialisation to adapt to their husband’s family, to respect 
elders, and to behave and dress modestly (Afshar 1994). The greater likelihood of a 
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wife from Pakistan to be, and to remain, economically inactive and unable to contribute 
to household finances indicates that socio-cultural stability was preferred over 
improved socio-economic circumstances in some families.  
The expectations of married women within Pakistani households and communities 
were set by older first-generation women. The arrival of wives in the 1970s exerted a 
“moral pressure” on Pakistan men (Shaw 1988, p.47).  First-generation female 
migrants experienced greater direct practical and moral control over their households 
sooner than they would have in Pakistan (Shaw 1988; Werbner 1988; Akhtar 2014). 
This authority was asserted in the form of maintaining Pakistani norms and values 
rather than integration with majority British values. “Some women see their role in 
Britain quite explicitly in terms of maintaining and transmitting cultural and religious 
values and protecting their families from Western influences…it is largely women who 
are responsible for the distinctive structure and social life of the community today; it is 
in this that their power lies.” (Shaw 1988, p5).  
The maintenance and transmission of cultural and religious norms was key to the 
migration of Pakistani women. Economic activity or social integration was not a strong 
expectation, in fact, it was discouraged. In older age, first-generation women continue 
to see themselves as ‘guardians of kin’ who are central to the moral and economic 
wellbeing of their families in their transmission of cultural and religious traditions, 
practices and beliefs and the reproduction of norms (Maynard et al. 2008). Qualitative 
researchers have found that first-generation P&B women give priority to their domestic 
roles over economic activity. They see their roles within homes as legitimate and fruitful 
(Salway 2007; Maynard et al. 2008). The lack of contemporary research on 
economically inactive second-generation and more recently arrived first-generation 
women means that it not possible to draw the same conclusions about the value they 
place on their roles within the domestic sphere. This is an area that would benefit from 
more systematic differentiation by generation or cohort. 
There is some evidence that recently arrived male migrants, the husbands of second-
generation Pakistani women, are less ‘traditional’ in their attitudes to gendered 
domestic roles and attitudes to women working than might be expected (Charsley 
2007; Dale 2008). Men who migrate to the UK for marriage are in the unusual situation 
of joining their wife’s family and leaving behind their own family, social networks, and 
employment. Charsley (2006) suggests that marriage migration may result in the loss 
of much of men’s traditional power in the family and women may be in a more powerful 
position to renegotiate traditional gender roles. Second-generation women who marry 
transnationally, like older first-generation women, may have greater authority and 
decision-making power in their own households because their in-laws are in Pakistan. 
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Whether this has led to increased levels of economic activity has yet to be empirically 
proven. 
Like first-generation women, first-generation men are also expected to uphold Pakistani 
norms and values when they migrate to Britain after marriage. In Dales’ (2008) mixed 
methods study of the effects of transnational marriage on economic activity, second-
generation women viewed first-generation husbands as more ‘traditional’ and 
unaccepting of their wives working. Dale complemented the qualitative data with a 
statistical analysis of LFS data from the years 1998-2005 and  found no additional 
negative effect on economic activity for those women in the data who had a first-
generation husband. The factors that had the biggest impact on a woman’s likelihood 
of being economically active were whether she had recognised qualifications, whether 
she had young children, whether she was Pakistani or Bangladeshi and whether she 
has been born overseas. Dale went on to hypothesise that increases in HE 
participation rates for P&B young women would reduce the likelihood of transnational 
or arranged marries and economic activity rates would increase (Dale 2008). 
Dale’s hypothesis assumed that commitment to ‘traditional’ gender norms will reduce 
with marriage between UK-born spouses. This assumption may be too simplistic given 
the strong support for delineated male-female households roles  in British Pakistani 
families and communities. Changes in attitudes to gender norms may require larger 
scale shifts than at the level of the individual or couple. There is limited qualitative 
evidence of intergenerational change to gender norms. There is some quantitative 
evidence for generational shift in attitudes to gender norms (Heath and Demireva 
2014). Continued high rates of economic activity among second-generation women 
would suggest though that these are not playing out in everyday lives, yet. Further, 
responses to this question may be influenced by desire to provide socially acceptable 
norms in the British context rather than an accurate reflection of lived experiences.  
Changes to immigration law that meant that British nationals had to prove that they 
were able to provide financial support to an overseas partner without recourse to public 
funds may have forced some British Pakistani women into the labour market 
(Mohammad 2010). This point is hard to substantiate statistically and if indeed this was 
the case it may have meant short-term labour market participation to meet the 
requirements of the immigration process. It is difficult to assess the impacts that such 
short-term ‘bursts’ of economic activity might have on the aspirations and orientations 
of Muslim women towards work in the formal economy and one which might be 
interesting to explore. 
Marital Status 
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Marriage is a consistent and significant factor in explanations of economic inactivity 
among Muslim women. Single Pakistani and Bangladeshi  women are as likely to work 
as women of other ethno-religious groups, differences arise after marriage (Dale 2008; 
Khattab et al. 2017). Second-generation women therefore are likely to have undertaken 
formal paid employment before marriage or family formation. Most recently arrived first-
generation migrants who arrive as spouses of second-generation men are less likely to 
have experience of formal economic activity. However, historical patterns of informal 
work among first-generation P&B women suggest that more recently arrived female 
migrants may have some experience of work in secondary labour markets (Anwar 
1970; Werbner 1990; Phizacklea 1990).   
There is little information available about the experiences currently inactive women 
have had of work, and the reasons behind their economic subsequent economic 
inactivity and their future work aspirations. A longitudinal or life-story approach might 
be helpful to develop better understandings of the factors that lead to economic 
inactivity. Furthermore, such an approach may provide useful indications for the 
assistance and support Muslim women need to return to the labour market should they 
wish to do so. 
The effects of socio-cultural factors, or traditions, vary by marital status. Traditional 
practices limit the educational opportunities and the type of work that single women do 
in terms of profession, location and timing of work (Ahmad et al. 2003; Mohammad 
2010). For married Muslim women with children, traditional practices constrain overall 
economic activity. In the literature is assumed that the effects of marriage and 
motherhood apply equally across all generations and cohorts of Muslim women, this 
implies a lack of agency and an inherent inability to change and adapt to the British 
context. There is a lack of information about how these traditions play out in in the 
contemporary context, how they impact on the economic activity of women, and any 
evidence of generational change or difference.  
There is a need for contemporary empirical qualitative evidence for the ways in gender 
roles and responsibilities within marriage affect the economic activity of Muslim women. 
This contemporary work should examine the effects on migrant generation to capture 
nuance and differentiation. It may indeed be the case that marriage has a consistent 
and common effect on the economic activity of all British Muslim women. This universal 
effect may be a result of commonly held religious beliefs, regardless of ethnicity or 
migrant generation, however, this claim has not been substantiated in the existing body 
of literature.  
Family responsibilities and marriage can explain some of the differences in economic 
activity between ethnic groups but not all; religious and ethnic discrimination against 
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Muslims, which has increased since 9/11, remains an important source of labour 
market disadvantage for Muslim women (Dale 2008). Any negative impacts of marriage 
and family formation then act alongside, and in addition to, structural discrimination 
based on race, ethnicity and religion.  
2.4.5 The interplay of structural and socio-cultural factors 
It has been demonstrated in the literature that ethnic traditions affect the economic 
activity of Muslim women within the contexts of family and community structures. The 
disadvantaged and marginalised positions occupied by Pakistani men in the British 
labour market are also essential parts of the explanation for high levels of economic 
inactivity amongst Pakistani women. Household socio-economic status is determined 
by occupation of the primary wage earner and is an indication of the cultural, social, 
material and economic resources within households. Muslim households in Britain 
have belonged to the lower stratums of the working class since the onset of migration 
from Pakistan in the 1960s (Werbner 1990). Literature on the socio-economic 
circumstances of distinct waves of male and female migration from Pakistan is 
examined in detail in Chapter 5, in this section the ways in which the labour market 
experiences of Muslim men have led to constraints to the economic activity of women 
are outlined. Three issues are identified: reactive ethnicity; the state benefits system of 
tax credits and the work patterns of Muslim men.  
The marginalised position that Muslim men occupied within British society made them 
retreat into a defensive position of safeguarding the distinctive moral frameworks of 
their own ethno-religious minority communities (Mohammad 1999; Kalra 2000; 
Vertovec 2004). Reactive ethnicity emerged because of both structural constraints and 
cultural preference and led to a marked mindset about integration in British society 
among Pakistanis in Britain (Vertovec 2004). Reactive ethnicity was more apparent 
among British Pakistanis than other EM groups (Shah et al. 2010). Instead of traditional 
ethnic gender norms being challenged over time, they were reinforced to maintain the 
cultural integrity of Pakistani communities and to provide an alternative system social 
structure and means for attaining  social mobility (Dwyer 2000).  Reactive ethnicity was 
an alternative reaction to integration into majority norms which led to the reaffirmation 
of ethnic solidarity and self-consciousness (Portes and Rumbaut 2001).  
 
The sharing of social and economic resources after the recession of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s and dependency on the ethnic enclave for work deepened 
interdependencies and the shared norms that maintained the social framework of the 
local Pakistani community (Kalra 2000). Female heterosexual purity and its protection 
against perceived risks in the British context were central to the ways in which girls and 
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young women were socialised and the opportunities open to them were framed 
[Mohammad 2010).  Reactive ethnicity had disproportionate effects on young Pakistani 
women and led to greater patriarchal control over them as part of a defensive 
discourse (Dwyer 2000). The behaviour, movement and attire of Muslim girls were 
scrutinised and monitored in working class Pakistani communities because they were 
required to reflect the religious commitment of their communities (Mohammed 2005a; 
2005b; Dwyer 1999). Access to post-compulsory education were restricted in the 
1980s and many young women were not allowed to work (Shaw 2000). 
 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi men were, and remain, concentrated in low paid work that 
required long working hours as manual workers, own accounts workers such as taxi 
drivers, and as owners of small businesses (Anwar 1979;  Kalra 2000; Cabinet Office 
2017). These occupations do not allow for flexible working patterns that would easily 
allow the sharing of domestic or childcare responsibilities.  The previous state benefit 
system of tax credits deterred women in low income households from working (Modood 
1997). The loss of state benefits income may have meant that the formal economic 
activity of women in these families would not have brought any additional financial 
benefit whilst creating a dual burden for women. This is likely to have been a deterrent 
to undertaking formal economic activity. The occupational status of P&B men therefore 
is likely to be an important factor in the economic inactivity of P&B women. 
2.4.6 Informal work 
Unofficial work in family businesses and ‘off-the-books’ home-working among has long 
underestimated actual economic activity rates of Muslim women (Afshar 1994; Modood 
1997; Holdsworth and Dale 1997; Maynard et al. 2008). Qualitative studies 
demonstrated that homeworking was prevalent among Pakistani women in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Anwar 1979; Shaw 1988; Werbner 1990; Phizacklea 1990). The main form 
of employment for Pakistani homeworkers was sewing work, or ‘piecework’, for local 
Pakistani manufacturing firms (Phizacklea 1990; Werbner 1990). Other examples of 
informal paid work included sewing shalwar kameez for other women, cooking 
samosas for local shops or catering companies, homeworking for local manufacturers; 
and work in family businesses (Anwar 1979; Shaw 1988; Werbner 1990; Mohammad, 
1999; 2010). This type of work was gained by word-of-mouth through kinship networks 
and did not require formal applications or previous experience of work in the primary 
labour market (Brah 1994). Homeworking entailed long and unsociable hours around 
childcare and domestic responsibilities but enabled Pakistani women to work around 
the shift-work of their husbands (Anwar 1979; Shaw 1988; Werbner 1990).   
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A woman who undertook formal work outside of family homes symbolised the inability 
of a man to provide for his family and raised questions about the respectability of the 
woman (Shaw 1988; Brah 1994). Men from rural areas of Pakistan saw their wives and 
daughters working as a direct affront to their male honour (Afshar and Barrientos 
1990).  This socio-cultural attitude to the work of Muslim women was a severe 
constraint to formal labour market participation to first-generation women and was a 
major factor in the wide acceptance of homeworking amongst Pakistani women from 
the onset of female migration from Pakistan (Phizacklea 1990).  
Informal work was a compromise between economic need and the demands of gender 
segregation (Afshar 1994). P&B first-generation women were most likely of all EM 
women to have taken part in informal work (Maynard et al. 2008). Unlike their first-
generation mothers, many second-generation young women saw work in the ethnic 
enclave as undesirable because of the associated low and poor working conditions 
(Brah 1994; Dale 2002a). The undesirability of work in the ethnic enclave further limited 
the opportunities open to them (Brah 1994; Mohammad 2010).  
There is no comprehensive research evidence that estimates the extent or 
characteristics of work in the informal labour market for EM women since the work of 
Annie Phizacklea (1990) on homeworkers in the manufacturing sector in the 1980s. 
The reasons given for this by researchers are the difficulties in securing access and 
participation of unofficial workers and the length of time taken to build trust and rapport 
amongst vulnerable and marginalised groups working the secondary labour market 
(Modood 1997). This is an important gap in the existing body of evidence on economic 
inactivity amongst Muslim women, very little is known about informal work among 
Muslim women.  
2.4.7 Comparisons with other EM Women 
The work of black and EM feminist researchers conducted in the 1980s and 1990s 
offers a useful point of comparison between Pakistani or Muslim women with those of 
other ethno-religious belongings. Women of other ethnicities were more likely to be 
economically active in the first-generation and far less likely to be economically inactive 
in second and subsequent generations. There are few contemporary qualitative 
sources that compare the socio-economic outcomes of Muslims with other religious 
groups of EM women. This is likely to be because first and second-generation Sikh and 
Hindu women occupy better socio-economic positions and are assumed to be more 
accultured to British norms and values (Abbas 2003). 
Some of the socio-cultural traditions outlined above for P&B women are shared with 
other EM women. For example, the centrality of honour and shame within hierarchical 
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and patriarchal family and community structures is not restricted to Muslims, nor to 
Pakistanis (Shaw 2009). Josephides’ (1988) study of Greek Cypriots in Britain provides 
an example of another ethno-religious group in which “honour and shame underlie 
every aspect of social and economic life” and women are constrained in their economic 
activity as a result (Josephides 1988, p34). Hindu and Sikh women who migrated from 
India also came from ethno-religious cultures that have some similarities with Pakistani 
patriarchal patterns of family and community relations (Bhachu 1988; Westwood 1988). 
First-generation Sikh, Hindu and Greek Cypriot women arrived with a clear expectation 
that they would work whereas for Pakistani, their roles within families were key to their 
migration (Josephides 1988; Brah 1994; Bhachu 1988; Westwood 1988; Shaw 1988).  
In terms of physical difference or skin colour, South Asian women share phenotypical 
characteristics; the phenotypical differences of Greek Cypriot women from the white 
British majority are less pronounced than that of South Asian women. The fact that 
South Asian women who are not Muslim have better labour market outcomes is 
evidence that racial discrimination is not the only factor leading to economic inactivity. 
There is evidence that the cumulative effects of colour discrimination and cultural 
distance makes a difference to labour market outcomes (Khattab 2009; 2012). Greek 
Cypriot women are likely to be Christian and although there may differences in 
expression of religious beliefs than that of Christianity in Britain the cultural distance 
may be less pronounced than that between Islam and Christianity.  
Some of the differences in labour market participation among the first generation might 
be caused by structural factors around the time of migration. For example, the 
availability of work opportunities in local labour markets and the timing of migration. 
The residential concentration of Greek Cypriot communities has been in London where 
there are wider pools of opportunities for work, in comparison to Pakistani 
concentrations in Northern towns and cities (Josephides 1988). Bhachu (1985) 
suggests that Indian women were more likely to be employed than Muslim women 
because of their earlier migration in the 1960s and early 1970s, before the economic 
recession of the late 1970s. The availability of low-skilled work in the manufacturing 
and service sectors upon their arrival meant that the norm of Indian women working 
was established early on (Bhachu 1985; Brah 1994). The migration of Pakistani women 
during the late 1970s took place at the point at which large-scale decline in the 
manufacturing sector in Britain occurred (Kalra, 2000). There is less evidence of 
informal work in ethnic enclaves for Indian women, although some women did assist in 
family businesses. Indian women were more likely to work in the formal labour market, 
albeit in low-paid manual work in factories and processing plants (Westwood 1988; 
Bhachu 1988).  
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Sikh and Hindu women had fewer children and their children tended to be older on 
arrival which meant that childcare was not a significant barrier to their economic activity 
(Bhachu 1988; Vertovec 2004). Muslim women were likely to have young children, 
larger families and caring responsibilities for children and elders (Brah 1994).  Less 
hierarchical family structures meant that Hindu and Sikh women had greater power 
within family structures to renegotiate gender roles and this may have  led to more 
egalitarian roles in households (Bhachu 1988; Westwood 1988). Indian women seem 
to have had greater control over their lives and households after migration than 
Pakistani women for whom family elders, in Britain and Pakistan, continued to play an 
important role in family decision making.  
First-generation Indian men were better educated and more likely to be fluent in 
English upon migration than Pakistani and Bangladeshi men, they fared better in 
employment than Pakistani and Bangladeshi men after the recession of the late 1970s 
(Clark and Drinkwater 2002). Indian men were not concentrated in late night work shift 
work in take-aways and taxis to the same extent as Pakistani men and therefore their 
working patterns were not as significant a barrier to the economic activity of their wives. 
Indian households were less likely to be dependent on state benefits and therefore 
reductions in overall household income due to state benefits may not have been a 
constraint to the economic activity of women (Modood 1997). 
 
Pre-migration conditions in respective countries of origin may also be key determinants 
of the differences in economic activity between different ethnic groups of Muslims 
(Brah, 1994; Brown 2000; Modood 2004).  Vertovec (2004) states that differences in 
the social and political structures, colonial history, religious practice and economic 
development in countries of origin have led to the disadvantaged socio-economic 
circumstances of British Muslims. It is suggested that pre-migration conditions may 
explain more about the phenomenon of the economic inactivity of Muslim women than 
the inequality faced by them since their arrival in Britain (Brown 2000; Heath and Martin 
2013).   
 
Large datasets can provide information about which source countries individuals within 
the Muslim population originate from and provide some indication as to the different 
levels of social and human capital they might possess (educational or occupational 
attainment, rural-urban origins). They cannot, however, explain the impact that 
migration histories might have on labour market behaviour at an individual or family 
level.  Pre-migration histories are perhaps more suited to more qualitative examination, 
using a narrative approach that can provide insights into the dynamics of the 
mobilisation of resources and social networks from countries of origin (Khattab 2012).   
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2.5 Education and economic activity 
The role of religion, and particularly Islam, has been examined and theorised more 
comprehensively in the examination of educational outcomes for Muslim women than 
their labour market outcomes. These studies provide explanations for sharp increases 
in higher education (HE) participation and attainment from the mid-1990s onwards 
among P&B young women from households and neighbourhoods of low socio-
economic status (Modood 2004; Franceschelli and O’Brien 2014; Bagguley and 
Hussain 2016). The evidence base and theorisation for educational outcomes may 
provide some direction for understanding other socio-economic outcomes, such as 
high levels of LAHF, for Muslim women in Britain.   
The big story about education for P&B young women in the 1990s was the sharp 
increase in participation in university level education (Dale et al. 2002b). However, P&B 
young women also continue to be more likely to leave school with no qualifications than 
to have a HE qualification. Rather than overall generational improvement, there has 
been polarisation in the educational attainment of second-generation British Muslim 
women (Modood 1997; Khattab 2009; 2012). The focus on the literature around 
education for Muslim women has been on understanding the success of women in 
attaining HE qualifications rather than the continued disadvantage faced by a large 
proportion of second-generation Muslim women.  
Educational attainment plays a critical role in economic activity and occupational 
attainment (Modood 2004). Recognised formal qualifications have a strong and positive 
association with positive labour outcomes (Heath and McMahon 2000). HE 
qualifications significantly increase the likelihood of economic activity among Muslim 
women (Dale et al. 2002b; Dale 2008; Khattab and Hussain 2017). HE is the most 
significant protective factor against economic inactivity for Muslim women (Cheung 
2014). Not only is there a direct link between education and positive labour market 
outcomes but degree level qualifications have a moderating effect on socio-cultural 
barriers to economic activity for Muslim women (Dale 2008).  
Bagguley and Hussain’s (2016) analysis of the Young Cohort Survey of England Wales 
in the years 1988/1995/2001 demonstrated improvements in GCSE and A Level 
performance for P&B young women between 1980-2001. Labour Force Survey figures 
for 19–24-year olds studying for first or higher degrees in 1995 showed very similar 
national levels for White British and Pakistani and Bangladeshi young women of 13% 
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(Dale et al. 2002b). Figures from the Higher Education Statistics Agency showed an 
increase of 95% for Bangladeshi women and 71% for Pakistani women as full-time 
first-year students on degree-level courses between 1994/5 and 1998/9 (Dale et al 
2002b). Young P&B women narrowed the gender gap in uptake of higher education 
during this period (Dale et al. 2002b; Bagguley and Hussain 2016). In 1994/5, young 
women represented 38% of first year P&B students and by 1999/2000 this had risen to 
44% and 46%, respectively (Dale et al. 2002b).  
Although from the late 1990s P&B women were more likely to participate in HE level 
education, and to hold undergraduate qualifications than White British women, some 
inequalities remain. Young P&B women were less likely to enter prestigious 
universities, more likely to drop out of university and are less likely to attain a 2.1 or 
higher (Shiner and Modood 2002; Modood 2006). 
Quantitative analyses show that HE qualifications delay marriage, reduce the likelihood 
of marrying a first-generation partner and significantly increase the likelihood economic 
inactivity after marriage and family formation (Dale 2008). Qualitative research shows 
that holding HE qualification shifts the power imbalances for young women within P&B 
families. Holding a HE qualification improves the confidence and negotiating power of 
women to continue to work after marriage and family formation (Dale et al. 2002b; 
Bolagnani and Mellor 2012). Research conducted from the 1990s shows that parents 
were supportive of education of boys and girls (Dale 2002; Abbas 2003; Shah et al. 
2010).  
The maintenance of close ties with social networks may mean that attitudes to 
education and marriage in Britain are influenced by social patterns from Pakistan. 
Wives in Pakistan are largely expected not to work but it is socially accepted that they 
should have equal education to their husbands. For example, a woman who wants to 
marry a civil servant should be at least Matric (GCSE equivalent) or FA (A Level 
equivalent) qualified, Matric level education is the norm for women in Pakistan. Fischer 
(1991) identified a trend in Punjabi cities of daughters being educated to the level of 
prospective marriage partners, parents of daughters who hoped that their daughters 
would marry doctors or lawyers would send them to law school or medical school but 
very few women practiced these professions. In this way the education of a daughter is 
seen as part of her dowry or improves her understanding of her husband’s work 
(Fischer 1991).  
Sharp increases in HE participation among P&B young women from the mid-1990s 
onwards indicate shifts in community and family attitudes (Dale et al. 2002b; Ahmed et 
al. 2003; Bagguley and Hussain 2016). This socio-cultural shift is perhaps not as 
significant as it first seems. Shaw (2000) suggests that second-generation young 
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women had to agree to an arranged marriage as a condition of being allowed to attend 
university. Dale et al. (2002b) found that parents and young women saw the intrinsic 
value of education without necessarily associating it with future economic inactivity; 
higher education was not incompatible with early marriage or motherhood.  
It is possible that HE has been accommodated within the existing or traditional 
frameworks of family and community, but economic activity has not. The normative 
shifts in British Pakistani communities that have resulted in large-scale acceptance of 
participation in HE for single young women do not necessarily extend to economic 
activity for married women. Female participation in education may be related to the 
prestige and social status of Pakistani families, rather than to expectations of future 
economic activity (Shaw 2000). There is some qualitative evidence that suggests that 
the drive for educational success may have been fuelled as much by the marriage 
market as the labour market amongst British Pakistanis in the late 1990s (Abbas 2003; 
Ahmad et al. 2003). 
Ethnic Capital  
Modood explains high levels of HE participation among young EM people in terms of a 
migrant drive for self-improvement and to succeed in the face of discrimination in the 
labour market (Modood 2004; 2006). In Britain, socioeconomic status is a strong 
determining factor of educational success for the White British population; advantaged 
class backgrounds provide superior resources that lead to education success (Modood 
2006). Two thirds of White students at university are from non-manual backgrounds 
whilst two thirds of P&B students are from manual class backgrounds (Modood 2006). 
Modood suggests that this indicates large scale familial and personal investment in 
social mobility through education (Modood 2006).  
Despite overall deprivation, urban ethnic residential  enclaves can be economically 
dynamic and aspirant (Modood 2004). Dense co-ethnic social networks are closed 
structures that can form a protective barrier to prevent disaffection or assimilation into 
an underclass and, at the same time, promote educational attainment through the  
intergenerational enforcement of norms (Shah et al. 2010). Modood built on Portes’ 
theory of ethnic capital, later adding religious capital, to explain a strong drive for HE 
qualifications based on mixed methods research with Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
families (Shah et al. 2010; Khattab and Modood 2018).  
Modood suggests that Pakistani families and communities hold shared beliefs and 
values about the importance of education and a competitive spirit exists amongst 
parents about the relative success of their children (Modood 2006). The web of 
obligations, expectations, and information within the close-knit ethnic community 
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enables the successful transmission of high aspirations for social mobility from the first 
to the second-generation because norms and values are enforced uniformly throughout 
the community (Shah et al. 2010).   
Religious capital is a component of ethnic capital in P&B families (Modood 2006). Islam 
promotes educational aspirations; provides motivation for improvement and learning; 
leading a more disciplined life; and avoidance of downward levelling norms by 
providing an alternative social network (Modood 2006). Franceschelli and O’Brien 
(2014) extend Modood’s conception of ethnic capital and identify Islamic capital as a 
dynamic of resource transfer in South Asian Muslim families. They conducted 52 
interviews in 15 families and found that Islam was the platform upon which values that 
promoted educational attainment were shared across generations and the basis for 
social network that reinforced these norms and values (Franceschelli and O’Brien 
2014). They found that internal family roles, and gender relations were informed by 
Islamic values but also by ethnic culture and the socio-economic status of parents 
(Franceschelli and O’Brien 2014).  
Reflexivity Theory 
Modood’s conceptualisation of ethnic capital theory has been criticised for paying 
insufficient attention to gender differences (Bagguley and Hussain 2016). The research 
evidence in education amongst the British P&B second-generation shows that gender, 
migration pathways and changes over time can all lead to different experiences, even 
within the same sibling group (Shaw 2000; Khattab and Modood 2018). Ethnic capital 
that is now thought to promote educational success for young Pakistani women has not 
always operated in the same way (Bagguley and Hussain 2016). Further, ethnic capital 
leaves little room to consider the agency and choices of young Muslim women, instead 
the emphasis is on shared familial and community norms (Bagguley and Hussain 
2016).  
Bagguley and Hussain (2016) argue that ethnic capital is a better explanation for the 
reproduction of inequality and a weak explanation of generational change. Ethnic 
capital may still be operating to disadvantage the substantial proportion of Muslim 
women who leave the British educational system with no qualifications.  Bagguley and 
Hussain (2016) conducted a comprehensive qualitative study of over one hundred 
second-generation South Asian young women in education between the ages of 16 to 
25.  They described their interviewees as skilled cultural navigators who were able to 
affect decisions around choice of degree subject, location of university and marriage to 
make decisions that were congruent with prevailing norms and values. Educational 
success is therefore explained by the reproduction of the South Asian middle class. 
Khattab and Modood (2018) suggest that such critical reflexivity is not independent of 
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the inculcation of parental norms and that reflexivity theory can be incorporated into 
ethnic capital theory (Khattab and Modood 2018). 
Religion Versus Culture Arguments 
The use of religious versus culture arguments has been noted in the literature for 20 
years or more (Afshar 1994; Mohammad 1999; Cheruvallil-Contractor 2012). Bolagnani 
and Mellor (2012) suggest that the religious versus culture debate is not a theory but a 
social construction that describes how second-generation Muslim women use the 
distinction between oppressive ethnic traditions and an acultural and universal 
interpretation of Islam as a source of empowerment, to access their rights within Islam 
and to implement change. Muslim women in Britain have used this form of negotiation 
to attain greater spatial freedoms, access to higher education, to delay marriage 
arrangements and to secure access to paid employment (Mohammad 1999; Dwyer 
2010; Cheruvallil-Contractor 2012).  The successful use of religious argumentation is 
largely seen in educated and middle-class Muslim families (Bolagnani and Mellor 2012; 
Cheruvallil-Contractor 2012). 
In all three of the above explanations for changes in HE participation rates among 
young Muslims women the focus is on educational success. The research samples for 
the studies include young people participating in post-compulsory education. This has 
meant that the large proportion of P&B young women who have no qualifications are 
not included in this research. It is within these more disadvantaged groups where the 
evidence of the gendered effects of ethnic capital and constrained forms of reflexivity is 
likely to be found. The theories might be further developed by more detailed 
examinations of any differences in parental expectations, attitudes and support that 
might be associated with parents’ migrant generation, social class and  gender.  
All the theories or concepts described above have the potential to explain the more 
disadvantaged outcomes of working-class young people, but none go as far as to do. 
This is surprising in light of the fact that such research would improve understanding of 
the disadvantages faced by a particularly marginalised group. Nevertheless, by 
explicitly acknowledging the importance of socio-economic status in their approaches 
they do leave space for further analysis and research to be undertaken to add to the 
theories as they have been developed thus far.  
2.6 Social capital 
Social capital is a concept used within the social sciences to understand the 
mechanisms that affect the life chances of individuals and the wellbeing of 
communities, it is the ability of actors to secure benefits by membership in social 
networks and is inherent in social relationships (Lin 2000).  Social capital is used as a 
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predictor for a range of outcomes including performance within educational systems, 
occupational attainment and employment (Portes 1998).  Levels of social capital are 
dependent upon the quality and quantity of resources that an individual has access to 
and the location of that individual within a social network (Granovetter 1973).  Bonding 
social capital refers to within-group (intra-ethnic) connections, while bridging (inter-
ethnic) social capital refers to between-group connections (Lancee 2010).   
Under the homophily principle, social interactions tend to take place with people with 
similar attributes (Muttarak 2014). Disadvantaged groups cluster around inferior socio-
economic positions and are dependent on social networks with fewer resources and 
restricted information and influence (Lin 2000). Working class communities are 
dependent on bonding social capital that limits their access to sources of information 
about employment opportunities leading to high unemployment and welfare 
dependency (Portes 1998).  High levels of bonding social capital within working class 
Muslim communities may therefore lead to high rates of economic inactivity among 
women because of a lack of resources to support their economic activity, alongside 
community norms that support traditional gender roles.  
Bridging social capital is especially important to the occupational attainment of EM 
groups, potential employers are highly likely to be of the majority ethnicity and therefore 
the ability to engage with social networks outside of one’s own ethnic group is 
important (Lancee 2010). Bridging social capital provides access to wider and more 
diverse range of contacts and information about labour market opportunities and is 
positively associated with better labour market outcomes for EM groups (Lancee 2010; 
Cheung 2014). The evidence on the impact of bonding social capital on labour market 
outcomes for EM groups is more mixed. Close co-ethnic ties can lead to conformity in 
downward levelling norms when a minority group is disadvantaged (Portes 1998).  
Bonding social capital can also provide a buffer from discriminatory employment 
practices in wider society by providing work opportunities in ethnic enclaves or family 
owned businesses (Portes 1998; Lancee 2010).  
High levels of co-ethnic concentration amongst EM groups are sometimes used as a 
proxy for bonding social capital within EM groups. The residential concentration of P&B 
communities is an issue of policy concern because it has perceived negative effects for 
wider socio-economic and cultural integration (Casey 2016). Areas of high P&B co-
ethnic density tend to be areas of high multiple deprivation. Residential concentration in 
the early stages of migration and settlement was a source of practical, social and 
emotional support. It also reinforced the social organisation and norms and values of 
the sending country, including gender norms around the unacceptability of work outside 
the home for women (Anwar 1979; Shaw 1988).  
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Muslims remain disproportionately concentrated in areas of high levels of multiple 
deprivation (Peach 2006). The spatial location of Muslim households in deprived areas 
has several direct socio-economic consequences; space and segregation can 
determine employment opportunities and exacerbate labour market disadvantage 
(Khattab et al. 2010). EMs living in areas of multiple deprivation are more likely to be 
underemployed and overqualified, unable to find work commensurate with their 
qualifications (Khattab et al. 2010). The residential segregation of minority groups is a 
matter of social exclusion and discrimination as well as choice (Modood 2004).    
 
Networks of co-ethnic businesses in areas of high co-ethnic concentration are called 
ethnic enclaves. The social structure within ethnic communities can constrain, advance 
or change individual economic goals. There can be negative effects of community 
solidarity. For example, strong norms encouraging mutual assistance within extended 
families and amongst community members may limit individual freedom and action. 
Levelling pressures are attempts to keep successful members in the same situation as 
their peers to prevent successful members from leaving (Portes and Sensenbrenner 
1993). There are unequal power relation in enclaves, suggests that the maintenance of 
bonding social ties is particularly disruptive for women and the young (Mohammad 
2005a; Anthias 2007); ethnic enclaves provide resources for the social mobility of men, 
not women (Anthias 2007).  High levels of co-ethnic density within P&B 
neighbourhoods and social networks are considered by some to deter Muslim women 
from economic activity (Casey 2016).  
The negative effect of high levels of residential concentration on economic activity 
amongst Pakistani women is largely assumed to have remained constant. There is 
however evidence that positive role models can have a positive influence on HE 
participation and economic activity (Ahmad et al. 2003). The effect of residence in 
areas of high ethnic concentration on the economic activity of Muslim women has 
clearly shifted somewhat over time. The effect it had on first-generation women cannot 
be assumed to be the same for second-generation women or for more recently arrived 
first-generation migrants.  
Gossip and censure from other women was a highly constraining feature of life in 
close-knit Pakistani communities (Mohammed 1999; Shaw 2000; Ahmad et al. 2003).  
Gossip is a form of social control that places severe restrictions on Pakistani women, it 
was this feature of the lives of Pakistani women that set them apart from women of 
other ethnicities (Shaw 2000). There was a utilitarian aspect to gossip amongst first-
generation Pakistani women, it was a way for women to exchange information on 
practical aspects of life such as education, healthcare and opportunities to find informal 
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work in the ethnic enclave (Werbner 1990). Werbner (1990) found that the most 
isolated and marginalised women within the enclave were recently arrived first-
generation women, particularly those with young children. They did not benefit from 
advice and support from other Pakistani women, where they undertook informal work 
they were more likely to be exploited by being paid low rates for their work (Werbner 
1990). 
Ethnic capital theory focuses on the positive aspects of high co-ethnic density in social 
networks to explain improved socio-economic outcomes. Modood’s theory of ethnic 
capital has not been used to explain economic inactivity or unfavourable labour market 
outcomes for young women, although it has the potential to do so. Ethnic capital may 
explain socio-economic success for some Pakistani women and economic inactivity for 
others. There is compelling evidence in the literature that the same processes of norms 
enforcement and intergenerational closure that are thought to support educational 
success have limited educational and employment opportunities for P&B women in 
Britain for decades (Afshar 1994; Dwyer 2000; Mohammed 2005a; 2005b). The 
evidence on the overall effects of high co-ethnic density on socio-economic outcomes 
is therefore mixed and worthy of further examination.  
High levels of co-ethnic density do not necessarily equate to access to bonding social 
capital, or inability to access bridging social capital (Lancee 2010; Muttarak 2014). A 
thorough examination of bonding and bridging social capital would require mapping 
and assessing the strength, nature and extensity of social ties using social network 
research and methods.  There is a lack of contemporary literature and empirical 
evidence on the type and nature of social ties economically inactive Muslim women in 
Britain have and how they might result in economic activity. This is another area that 
new research could make an original contribution.  
2.7 Research Themes and Questions 
This thesis will address the research themes and related questions presented below in 
Figure 2.1. These themes and questions have emerged through an evaluation of 
relevant literature, presented in this chapter. A number of ‘gaps’ have been identified 
where original contributions can be made to explanations of high levels of economic 
inactivity in the looking after home and family category among British Muslim women. 
The following chapter will outline the research approach and methodology for the 
research phase of the project. 
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Figure 2.1: Summary of Research Themes and Research Questions 
 
 
 
 
Research Theme Research Question 
Theme 1:  Explaining 
Economic Inactivity in the 
Looking After Home and 
Family Category 
1. What are the key explanatory variables for high 
levels of economic inactivity in the LAHF category 
amongst British Muslim women? 
 
 
 
Theme 2  
Generational Change 
2a. Is there evidence of generational change in 
the LAHF outcome? 
 
2b. Do the causes and experiences of economic 
inactivity differ by migrant generation or cohort? 
 
 
 
 
Theme 3  
British Muslim Women in 
Work 
 
3a. What experiences of work do British Muslim 
women in the LAHF category have?  
 
3b. Do experiences of work vary by generation or 
cohort? 
 
3c. What are the work-related aspirations and 
expectations of British Muslim women and do 
these differ by migrant generation or cohort? 
 
 
Theme 4  
Religion and Religiosity  
 
4. Do religious beliefs and practices have an 
impact on economic inactivity amongst British 
Muslim women? If so, how, and is there 
generational variation? 
 
 
Theme 5  
Bonding Social Capital 
 
5. Do dense British Muslim communities and 
social networks promote or inhibit economic 
activity amongst women? 
 
 
 
Theme 6  
Home and Family 
6a. What is the contemporary picture of the 
impact of marriage on the economic activity of 
Muslim women? 
6b. How does the occupational status of partners 
impact on the economic activity of Muslim 
women?  
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Chapter 3: Methodology I 
Mixed Methods Research Strategy 
Phase 1, Quantitative Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction to the Mixed Methods Research Strategy 
The research questions raised in the literature review emerged from a range of sources 
that crossed disciplines and research approaches. The primary research question 
(RQ1) addresses the need to identify the specific structural and socio-cultural variables 
that lead to high levels of economic inactivity in the Looking After Home and Family 
(LAHF) category of economic inactivity. Research questions 2-6 relate to the need to 
develop contemporary and detailed understandings of some of the structural and socio-
cultural factors identified in the literature as associated with high levels of LAHF among 
British Muslim women.   
Quantitative sources evaluated in the literature review examined labour market 
outcomes by ethnicity and religious belonging: some specifically examined high levels 
of economic inactivity amongst Muslim women. These studies provided a picture of the 
patterns of economic inactivity among British Muslim women using nationally 
representative cross-sectional data. Some studies find evidence for a specific Muslim 
penalty in the British labour market (Heath and Martin 2013); whilst others examine 
ethnic variations in labour market outcomes among Muslim women and refer to ethno-
religious penalties (Khattab 2009; 2012). The interaction of ethnicity and religion is 
complex, and it is difficult to separate out the effects of each (Heath and Li 2015). 
Therefore, this project will refer, mainly, to an ethno-religious penalty. 
The ethno-religious penalty was evaluated as being a conceptual device that can be 
used to frame the multiple structural and socio-economic disadvantages British Muslim 
women face in the labour market and wider society. The qualitative literature provided 
evidence on some of the socio-cultural constraints to economic activity experienced by 
British Muslim (mainly Pakistani) women in the contexts of households and dense co-
ethnic communities. In this project, all socio-cultural factors relating to economic 
inactivity amongst Muslim women are analysed within the context of ethno-religious 
penalties that are experienced by Muslim women and Muslim men.  
The literature review revealed that economic inactivity in the LAHF category is a result 
of structural and socio-cultural factors that overlap and are inter-related. The separation 
of structural and socio-cultural variables was a conceptual mechanism to evaluate the 
extant literature. The research questions emerging from the literature review are a mix 
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of those suited to either qualitative or quantitative inquiry, or both. The research themes 
and questions are summarised in Table 3.1 below, along with the research approach 
that will be applied to each question. 
Figure 3.1 Summary of Research Questions and Research Approach 
 
 
Mixed methods research (MMR) bridges the theoretical and methodological divides 
between qualitative and quantitative paradigms and allows the articulation of different 
layers and types of explanation (Bryman et al. 2008; Brannen and Moss 2012; Hesse-
Biber 2016). This approach to research involves not only triangulation and multimethod 
research, but the integration of qualitative and quantitative methods to create a holistic 
picture of the social phenomenon of interest (Brannen and Moss 2012; Siddiqui and 
Research Theme Research Question Research 
Approach 
Theme 1:  Explaining 
Economic Inactivity in 
the Looking After Home 
and Family Category 
1. What are the key explanatory variables for 
high levels of economic inactivity in the LAHF 
category amongst British Muslim women? 
 
Quantitative 
and  
Qualitative 
 
 
Theme 2  
Generational Change 
2a. Is there evidence of generational change in 
the LAHF outcome? 
 
 
Quantitative  
 
2b. Do the causes and experiences of 
economic inactivity differ by migrant generation 
or cohort? 
 
 
Qualitative 
 
Theme 3  
British Muslim Women 
in Work 
 
3a. What experiences of work do British 
Muslim women in the LAHF category have?  
Qualitative  
3b. Do experiences of work vary by generation 
or cohort? 
Qualitative  
3c. What are the work-related aspirations and 
expectations of British Muslim women and do 
these differ by migrant generation or cohort? 
Qualitative  
Theme 4  
Religion and Religiosity  
 
4. Do religious beliefs and practices have an 
impact on economic inactivity amongst British 
Muslim women? If so, how, and is there 
generational variation? 
 
Quantitative 
and  
Qualitative 
Theme 5  
Bonding Social Capital 
 
5. Do dense British Muslim communities and 
social networks promote or inhibit economic 
activity amongst women? 
 
Quantitative 
and  
Qualitative 
Theme 6  
Home and Family 
6a. What is the contemporary picture of the 
impact of marriage on the economic activity of 
Muslim women? 
Quantitative 
and  
Qualitative 
6b. How does the occupational status of 
partners impact on the economic activity of 
Muslim women?  
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Fitzgerald 2014). MMR involves the strategic integration of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches at all stages of the research: from the formulation of research questions to 
the interpretation and discussion of results (Becker and Sempik 2008; Collins 2012; 
Elliott et al. 2018). MMR is a pragmatic choice in light of the range of research 
questions emerging from the review of evidence (Hesse-Biber 2012) 
The literature review revealed that researchers using statistical methods to explain high 
levels of economic inactivity amongst Muslim women have come to rely on now rather 
dated qualitative studies to explain some of the socio-cultural factors that cannot be 
examined using quantitative methods. There are limited examples of MMR in the 
examination of economic inactivity of Muslim women, and in the field of labour market 
inequality among EMs in Britain more generally - the MMR contributions of Angela Dale 
and colleagues have been noted in the literature review (Dale et al. 2002a; 2002b; Dale 
2008). The methodology for this project was designed to produce findings that gave 
equal weight to qualitative and quantitative components.  
The specific MMR approach taken in this project is ‘systematic QUANT-QUAL’; the 
capitalisation indicates that each approach is given equal weight in method and 
analysis (Creswell et al. 2003). This approach requires the integration of the two 
paradigms without compromising the unique position of each (Siddiqui and Fitzgerald 
2014). Therefore, the methodology is presented in two chapters: this chapter, 
Methodology Part I, includes details on the quantitative research methodology and 
precedes the presentation of bivariate and multivariate findings in Chapter 4.  
The methodology for the qualitative phase is presented in Chapter 5, Methodology Part 
II, which includes an explanation of how the statistical findings feed into the design of 
the qualitative phase. Qualitative findings are presented in Chapters 6 through to 8. 
Findings from the two phases are integrated in the concluding discussion presented in 
Chapter 9 (Collins 2012). The quantitative and qualitative components of the project 
are structured as distinct phases to maintain the rigour of research methods from each 
paradigm (Brannen and Moss 2012). 
3.2 Quantitative Methodology  
3.2.1 EMBES 2010: Description of dataset and survey methodology  
The British Electoral Survey (BES) began in 1961 and is one of the longest running 
British social surveys. The primary purpose of the survey is to understand why people 
vote and how and why they vote the way they do. The ESRC funded a one-off survey 
of ethnic minorities in Britain to take place after the General Election in 2010, to survey 
the political and social life of the five major, visible ethnic minority groups in Britain: 
Black African; Black Caribbean; Indian; Pakistani; and Bangladeshi. The Ethnic 
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Minority British Election Survey of 2010 (EMBES 2010) was a distinct survey with a 
separate sample and fieldwork process to the BES. It was, however, designed to be 
complementary to the main survey by asking some of the same questions (Howat et al. 
2011).  
The Ethnic Minority British Election Survey 2010 is an “authoritative” dataset (Heath 
2014, p.3). The survey contained a nationally representative, clustered, stratified, 
random sample of the largest ethnic groups in Britain. The final sample had 2,787 
respondents with approximately 600 of each ethnic group, except Bangladeshis (350-
400). 40% of the sample were Muslim, 25% Christian and 14% Hindu; Sikhs and those 
with no religion constituted 10% of the total sample. The overall response rate was 
between 58-67%. Fieldwork took place between the 7th of May and the 31st of August 
2010 (Howat et al. 2002). 
Areas of high ethnic minority density in Britain were over-sampled, and those with less 
than 2% of ethnic minorities were excluded. The sampling method led to the random 
selection of 31,000 addresses in England, Scotland and Wales. More than 83% of 
these addresses were screened, in person by interviewers, to ascertain whether a 
member of one of the five selected minority groups was resident at each address. The 
doorstep interviewers then randomly selected one adult member from the household 
who had self-classified as a member of one of the five ethnic groups (aged 18 years or 
over) to interview. The interviews lasted around 45 minutes and used computer 
assisted personal interview (CAPI) techniques which included a self-completion 
module. Most interviews were conducted entirely in English, a few were conducted in 
an ethnic language by the interviewers and some made use of a ‘household translator’ 
(Howat et al. 2011). 
The EMBES 2010 contains an exciting range of questions for researchers of religious 
and ethnic minority groups in Britain and particularly of Muslims in Britain. The 
randomised sampling strategy means that statistical findings can be generalised to the 
wider population of each ethnic minority group. When the statistical phase of this 
project began in late 2014, a number of studies in the field of ethnic inequalities in the 
labour market using EMBES 2010 had been published in a special issue of the Ethnic 
and Racial Studies Journal (Volume 37 No.1 2014). These studies acted as reference 
point for the development of the quantitative methodology and were key sources of 
information for the literature review.  
3.2.2 Binary and multivariate analysis  
SPSS has been used to conduct the statistical analysis for this project. It is a resource 
supported by Cardiff University and a package that the researcher has been trained to 
use. 
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Binary analysis using the cross-tabulation function in SPSS, examines the relationship 
between an outcome variable (in this case LAHF) and potential explanatory variables 
(for example, marriage or high bonding social capital). This form of bivariate analysis 
explores whether the relationship between the two variables is statistically significant or 
the outcome of chance using the Pearson Chi-square measure of significance. The 
Pearson Chi-square is a test statistic that identifies statistically significant differences 
between observed and expected frequencies of variables in a cross-tabulation to 
identify whether the outcome is the result of chance or not. A chi-square result of <0.05 
is a statistically significant result which indicates that the association between the 
dependent variable and the independent variable is not by chance alone (Voght and 
Burke Johnson 2011).  
The method for conducting multivariate analysis was binary logistic regression, which 
allows the analysis and prediction of a dichotomous outcome, i.e. one of two possible 
outcomes for a given dependent variable (Chao-Ying et al. 2002). Logistic regression is 
used to describe and test hypotheses about the relationships between a categorical 
outcome variable and one or more categorical or continuous predictor variables (Chao-
Ying et al. 2002). In this analysis, the dichotomous outcome is whether a woman is 
economically active or LAHF. Details on the variables selected and their construction 
are presented in Chapter 4. The remainder of this chapter will present findings from a 
preliminary, exploratory bivariate analysis of the EMBES 2010 dataset to demonstrate 
how survey questions and resulting data were evaluated for selection in the analysis 
presented in Chapter 4. 
3.3 Exploratory Analysis by Research Theme, EMBES 2010 
Theme 1: Explaining Economic Inactivity in the Looking After Home and Family 
Category  
RQ1. What are the key explanatory variables for economic inactivity in the 
looking after home and family category amongst British Muslim women? 
The answer for this question will be sought using binary and multivariate analysis of the 
range of variables identified as significant, or potentially significant, predictors of 
economic inactivity in the literature review along with control variables. This phase of 
the project aims to make an original contribution to the statistical body of knowledge on 
the labour market outcomes of British Muslim women by focusing on the LAHF 
category of economic inactivity. The multivariate modelling is expected to bring greater 
insight into the LAHF category due to the inclusion of measures of social capital, socio-
economic status and religiosity in a single statistical model.   
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Figure 3.2 EMBES Survey Questions on religious affiliation, ethnicity and economic 
activity 
 
The statistical modelling will include two stages: the sample for Stage A will include all 
ethnic minority (EM) women and will control for religious belonging; Stage B will include 
only Muslim women and will control for ethnicity. The extent of the Muslim penalty on 
LAHF will be assessed in Stage A and ethnic variations in the Muslim penalty will be 
assessed in Stage B. The two stages of modelling follow the method of Heath and 
Martin’s (2013) examination of the effect of religious belonging on some of the 
observed ethnic penalties in labour outcomes.  
EMBES Question [survey question code] Response Categories  
Firstly, please could you look at this card 
and tell me which of these best describes 
your ethnic group? 
[zq101] 
WHITE 
X5 White Categories 
MIXED 
X4 Mixed Categories  
ASIAN 
9 Asian or Asian British – Indian 
10 Asian or Asian British – Pakistani 
11 Asian or Asian British – Bangladeshi 
12 Any other Asian/Asian British background 
BLACK 
13 Black or Black British – Caribbean 
14 Black or Black British – African 
15 Any other Black/Black British background 
16 Chinese 
17 Any other ethnic group 
DK REF 
Do you regard yourself as belonging to any 
particular religion? 
[zq106_1] 
1 Yes 
2 No 
DK REF 
Which one [religion]? 
[eq106_a] 
1 Christian 
2 Jewish 
3 Hindu 
4. Muslim 
5 Sikh 
6 Buddhist 
7 Other (WRITE IN) 
DK RE 
Which of the descriptions on this card best 
applies to you? [eq65_1] 
 
1 In paid work 
2 In full-time education 
3 Unemployed for six months or more 
4 Unemployed for less than six months 
5 Permanently sick or disabled 
6 Retired 
7 Looking after the home 
8 Doing something else (WRITE IN) 
DK REF 
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Heath and Martin (2013) pooled the results of the 2005 and 2006 Annual Population 
Survey (APS). Along with other standard control variables such as age, education and 
gender, they controlled for marital status, dependent children and migrant generation. 
They created two models: Model 1 excluded Muslim Pakistanis or Muslim 
Bangladeshis due to ethnicity or religion being “inextricably confounded” for these 
groups, thereby examining only ethnic groups with religious diversity; Model 2 
contained all ethno-religious groups, including Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (Heath and 
Martin 2013, p.1012). They found evidence for an overarching Muslim penalty within all 
ethnic groups for the outcome of economic inactivity amongst women (Heath and 
Martin 2013).  
The statistical analysis will answer the research questions within the parameters set by 
the inclusion of selected independent variables. The selection of independent variables 
is driven by the theory and evidence evaluated in the literature review. Qualitative 
findings may bring additional explanatory variables to light, or, illuminate the reasons 
why some of the independent variables are significantly positively, or negatively, 
associated with LAHF. 
Theme 2: Generational Change 
 
The quantitative phase of research will address RQ2a and the qualitative phase will 
address RQ2b. Heath reminds us that the EMBES is a cross-sectional survey and as 
such, any conclusions on generational change should be treated as provisional due to 
the potential of within-group, or birth cohort, differences in each migrant generation 
(Heath 2014). There is little evidence of generational improvements in labour market 
outcomes for Muslims in Britain, particularly those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
ethnicities (Heath and Li 2008; Heath and Martin 2013; Cheung 2014).  
It is useful to note how generational change has been measured in other studies. For 
example, Cheung (2014) used the EMBES 2010 dataset to assess generational 
change in labour market outcomes. She defined the first-generation as those who 
arrived in the UK at 12 years or older, the second-generation were all those who were 
born in Britain or arrived before the age of 11 (Cheung 2014). The results of this 
analysis showed that that substantial ethnic and religious penalties did not vary by 
generation and that Muslim women suffered the largest penalties (Cheung 2014).  
Overall, there is a low response rate to questions about parental country of birth (30%) 
in the EMBES 2010, so it is not possible to identify third or 2.5 generation cases. The 
RQ2a. Is there evidence of generational change in the LAHF outcome? 
RQ2b. Do the causes and experiences of economic inactivity differ by migrant 
generation or cohort? 
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large number of invalid (missing/not known/refused) responses to the question on 
parental country of birth is interesting and unexpected, as it is not a sensitive question 
in the same way that household income or even religious affiliation might be. The 
response rate to the question about the respondent’s own country of birth is better at 
70%. Due to reduction in sample size, once all females of working age who are not 
either economically active or LAHF are excluded, it is likely that a more fine-grained 
analysis of generation may not be possible.  
Figure 3.3 EMBES 2010 Survey Questions on Migrant Generation 
EMBES Question [survey question 
code] 
Response Categories  
In which country […] were: 
You [bq102_1] 
Mother[eq52_m] 
Father [eq52_f]  
born? 
 
1 England 
2 Scotland 
3 Wales 
4 Northern Ireland 
5 India 
6 Pakistan 
7 Bangladesh 
8 Other [WRITE IN] 
DK REF 
 
Theme 3: British Muslim Women in Work 
RQ3a. What experiences of work do economically inactive British Pakistani have?  
RQ3b. Do experiences of work vary by generation, cohort or socio-economic status? 
RQ3c. What are the work-related aspirations and expectations of British Muslim 
women and do these differ by migrant generation or cohort? 
 
Theme 3 is the only research theme that contains questions that can only be answered 
using qualitative methods. As a cross-sectional survey, the EMBES does not contain 
information about the previous work experience of interview respondents, and therefore we 
have a static picture of high numbers of economically inactive women and no evidence of 
changes in economic activity status over time. Statistics on marriage and family formation 
(discussed below) will however give an indication of changes over life-stage.  
 
Theme 4 Religion and Religiosity  
Although bivariate analysis on measures of religiosity will be presented in Chapter 4, it 
is of interest to note that two thirds of all EMBES 2010 respondents with a religious 
belonging stated that they partook in individual religious activity daily; a quarter of 
respondents stated that they did so five times a day. Five daily prayers are one of the 
five pillars of Islam and therefore an essential part of Islamic practice; 91% of those 
RQ4. Do religious beliefs and practices have an impact on economic inactivity 
amongst British Muslim women? If so, how, and is there generational variation? 
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engaging in individual practice five times a day were Muslim. The question prompts 
respondents to think about individual religious practice in terms of prayer and 
meditation. This might involve a variety of religious practices which could entail 
different levels of preparation and commitment in terms of time or preparation.  
Figure 3.4 EMBES 2010 Survey Questions on Religiosity: Salience and Practice  
 
Salah (Islamic prayer) requires mental and physical preparation including ablutions, 
specific clothing requirements, a clean space and a prayer mat. Each of the five daily 
prayers take place throughout the day according to the position of the sun, marking 
sunrise, noon, evening etc and daily prayer times change throughout the year. There is 
some flexibility to these requirements and it is acceptable to make some adjustments if 
required. For example, it is possible to ‘make up’ missed prayers at the next 
opportunity to pray. This is likely to be different to meditation, which may involve simply 
finding a quiet moment and space to reflect, which Muslims might also do regularly 
throughout the day.  
As salah is so important in Islam, there may be an element of social desirability in 
Muslim responses to this question. The category of ‘five times daily’ is likely to have 
been included to accommodate Islamic religious practice. The question may be subject 
to a high degree of social desirability bias (Lavrakas 2008); respondents may have 
selected this response because it was the ‘correct’ response for a Muslim, but it may 
not be an accurate reflection of their practice. Data resulting from this question remains 
EMBES Question [survey question 
code] 
Response Categories  
How important is your religion to you? 
[eq4] 
Extremely important 
2 Very important 
3 Somewhat important 
4 Not very important 
5 Not important at all 
DK REF 
In the past 12 months, how often did you 
participate in religious activities or attend 
religious services or meetings with other 
people, other than for events such as 
weddings and funerals? 
[eq106_4] 
1 At least once a day 
2 At least once a week 
3 At least once a month 
4 Occasionally (but less than once a month) 
5 Only on festivals 
6 Not at all 
DK REF 
In the past 12 months, how often did you 
do religious activities on your own? This 
may include prayer, meditation and other 
forms of worship taking place at home or 
in any other location 
[zq106_5] 
1 Five times a day 
2 At least once a day 
3 At least once a week 
4 At least once a month 
5 Only on festivals 
6 Not at all 
DK REF 
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important despite the potential of bias because it provides an opportunity to unpack 
Islamic practice and thus move towards quantifying and measuring the impact of 
religious practice on socio-economic outcomes.  
Khattab et al. (2017) make an important contribution to the study of economic activity 
patterns amongst Muslim women by including a measure of religiosity. They construct 
a measure of religiosity that combines religious attendance at a service (communal 
religious practice) with a measure of religious salience (importance of religion). Their 
selection of communal religious practice to measure levels of religiosity among Muslim 
women is interesting because communal religious practice is not obligatory for Muslim 
women and there are low levels of female attendance at mosques in Britain (McAndrew 
and Voas 2014). In their examination of generational changes in religiosity using the 
EMBES 2010 dataset, McAndrew and Voas (2014) find that being female is associated 
with higher religious salience, lower communal practice and higher levels of private 
practice in comparison to EM men.   
Khattab et al. (2017) find that men show a much higher level of religious commitment 
than women: 68% compared with 24%. They also find that higher religiosity is 
positively associated with economic activity for women: economic activity was 30% 
higher among the more religious group than the less religious. The theoretical 
explanation that Muslim women with stronger religious identities have better 
negotiating power is not problematic, and there is qualitative evidence of Islam being 
an important part of negotiations around access to HE and work. However, the 
construction of the measure of religiosity in this model may be flawed; the inclusion of a 
measure of private practice is likely to be a far better indicator of the effects of 
religiosity on economic inactivity among Muslim women. 
Theme 5: Bonding Social Capital  
RQ5. Do dense British Muslim communities and social networks promote or 
inhibit economic activity amongst women? 
High levels of co-ethnic density are often operationalised as a proxy for bonding social 
capital in quantitative studies to allow examination of the opportunities respondents 
might have to access bonding and bridging social capital. Section 8 in the EMBES 
questionnaire collected data on co-ethnic density in a range of social spheres. The first 
subsection included questions about a range of ‘associations or clubs’ and the second 
subsection is titled ‘community cohesion’. Respondents were asked about their 
participation in a range of social activities or social spheres and were then asked about 
the co-ethnic composition of the groups of people who participated in them. 
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Figure 3.5 EMBES 2010 Survey Questions on Social Capital – Clubs and Associations 
 
Cheung (2014) used the responses to these questions to construct an index of social 
capital. The index for bonding social capital included the sum of measures of co-ethnic 
density among neighbours and friends, associations and groups, places of worship and 
workplaces. For the bridging social capital index, the sums of non co-ethnic friends in 
the same social spheres or networks were included. Her analysis showed that bridging 
social capital was significantly and negatively associated with economic inactivity for 
Muslim women, whilst bonding social capital was not significantly associated with 
economic inactivity. 
Some exploratory binary analysis of the EMBES was undertaken to consider the 
construction of a similar index of social capital for use in this analysis. It is important to 
note from the outset that answers to this question are not a precise measure of social 
capital for each respondent. Instead, they provide an indication of the opportunities to 
develop social networks and inter-personal relationships and contacts within, or outside 
of, their own ethnic groups.  
In relation to questions about association and clubs, the words ‘club’ or ‘hobby’ may not 
have any cultural relevance to first-generation ethnic minority groups. These terms 
might be viewed as particularly British (and perhaps outdated) ways to describe group 
activities. Group activities within ethnic communities may be regular and inclusive, but 
EMBES Question [survey question 
code] 
Response Categories  
Do you know of any [co] ethnic, cultural or 
religious associations or clubs in or near 
the city or town in which you live? [eq41] 
Yes 
2 No 
DK REF 
Have you taken part in the activities of an 
ethnic or cultural association or club in the 
past 12 months? [eq43] 
Yes 
2 No 
DK REF 
Which kind of organization(s) have you 
been active in? [eq44] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How many members are from the same 
ethnic or religious group as you? [eq45] 
 
1 Sports club or team 
2 Hobby club 
3 Charity group 
4 Political or citizens’ group 
5 Children’s school group 
6 Other (WRITE IN) 
DK REF 
 
1 All of them 
2 Most of them 
3 About half of them 
4 A few of them 
5 None of them 
DK REF 
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participants might not use the terms ‘club’ or ‘association’ to describe them. For 
example, halaqas or dars are Islamic study groups that are often held in private homes 
with small groups on a weekly basis. Informal groups and meetings such as these are 
likely to result in some form of investment in, or mobilisation of, bonding social capital, 
but may go unrecognised in the EMBES dataset.  
The points made above in relation to questions about social capital raised doubts about 
the inclusion of data resulting from these questions as independent variables or as 
components of an index of social capital. Nevertheless, there were some interesting 
findings from the bivariate analysis of questions relating to these social activities which 
are useful to bear in mind for the qualitative phase of the project. Muslim women had 
the highest rates of participation in children’s school groups and charity groups among 
women, and indeed, compared to men from other religious groups. These social 
settings could be ideal locations for the engagement of research participants in the 
qualitative phase or may be used as prompts when exploring social networks with 
interviewees.  
Figure 3.6 EMBES 2010 Survey Questions on Social Capital – Community Cohesion 
 
As a social site for the development of social capital, ‘place of worship’ is not the best 
measure of social capital among Muslim women. The use of mosques is gendered and 
the ways in which Muslim women use these spaces for social interactions can be 
EMBES Question [survey question 
code] 
Response Categories  
As far as you know, how many of your 
friends have the same ethnic background 
as you? eq46_1 
 
As far as you know, how many of the 
people you work with have the same 
ethnic background as you? [eq46_2] 
 
 
All of them 
2 Most of them 
3 About half of them 
4 A few of them 
5 None of them? 
DK REF 
All of them 
2 Most of them 
3 About half of them 
4 A few of them 
5 None of them? 
6 Not in employment/ work 
DK REF 
As far as you know, how many of the 
people in your neighbourhood have the 
same ethnic background as you? [eq46_3] 
All of them 
2 Most of them 
3 About half of them 
4 A few of them 
5 None of them? 
DK REF 
As far as you know, how many of the 
people at your church or place of worship 
have the same ethnic background as you? 
[eq46_4] 
All of them 
2 Most of them 
3 About half of them 
4 A few of them 
5 None of them? 
6 Do not go to church/ a place of worship DK/REF 
57 
 
limited and constrained by both the design of mosque buildings and the attitudes of 
mosque committees towards the participation of women in communal religious life; this 
is often determined by school of Islamic thought and practices from the countries of 
origin (Brown 2006). Regular attendance for congregational prayer at a mosque is a 
religious obligation for Muslim men, but not for Muslim women: attendance at Friday 
prayers, for example. Attendance at places of worship is therefore not an appropriate 
measure of religiosity or evidence for social networks and connections for Muslim 
women. ‘Place of work’ and ‘place of worship’ questions were both dropped at this 
point because both were likely to be of little relevance in the lives of economically 
inactive Muslim women; high co-ethnic density in neighbourhoods and friendship 
groups were considered to be the most appropriate proxies for bonding social capital 
for Muslim women. 
Theme 6:  Home and Family 
RQ6. What is the contemporary picture of the impact of marriage on the 
economic activity of Muslim women? 
RQ6b. How does the occupational status of partners impact on the economic 
activity of Muslim women?  
The EMBES contains some questions that might be used to determine the 
occupational (or socio-economic) status of the partners to answer RQ2b including: 
household income; main source of household income; or partners employment status. 
Bivariate analyses of data arising from these questions will be presented in Chapter 4. 
Socio-economic status measures are not often included in analyses of ethnic 
inequalities in the labour market. 
The literature review identified marriage and motherhood as significant indicators of 
economic inactivity amongst British Muslim women. The reasons why marriage might 
cause economic inactivity amongst Muslim included adherence to traditional gender 
norms of male-breadwinner/female-homemaker. The impact of these norms is thought 
to be exacerbated by transnational marriage and reactive ethnicity resulting from poor 
labour market outcomes in terms of low occupational status and high unemployment 
amongst Muslim men. Practical difficulties around organising childcare and domestic 
responsibilities around the self-employment, own accounts work or shift work of men 
were also identified as possible reasons for higher levels of inactivity among women. 
The tax credit system, which favours large families, may mean that a woman’s work 
may reduce state benefit income and therefore her being in formal paid employment 
will not bring any additional financial benefit to the household. 
Marriage and the presence of children will be included in the analysis as control 
variables. Examples of other studies that included marriage and family formation as 
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independent variables include Holdsworth and Dale (1997); Dale (2008) and Khattab 
and Johnston (2017). These quantitative studies have included life-stage variables 
which are constructed using marriage and the presence of children. They found that at 
every life-stage Pakistani and Bangladeshi women were more likely to be economically 
inactive than women of other ethnicities. Single Pakistani and Bangladeshi, UK-born 
women with no children and educated to degree-level had the same probability of 
being economically active as all other ethnic minority women. They concluded that 
cultural factors relating to the expectations of women held by others after marriage and 
motherhood played a significant role in the economic inactivity of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi women.  
Dale (2008) conducted an MMR study of the effects of transnational marriage on 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi women. Dale (2008) complemented qualitative data, based 
on interviews with 18 Pakistani and Bangladeshi second generation young women, 
with a statistical analysis of Labour Force Survey data from the years 1998-2005 which 
included a life-stage variable. She found no additional negative effect on economic 
activity for those women in the data who had a first-generation husband. The factors 
that had the biggest impact on a woman’s likelihood of being economically active were 
whether she had recognised qualifications; young children; whether she was Pakistani 
or Bangladeshi; and whether she had been born overseas. Given that recently arrived 
first-generation women were shown to be disadvantaged in terms of economic 
inactivity in the labour market, the omission of these women from the qualitative data 
collection phase is interesting. The study would have been enhanced by inclusion of 
qualitative data arising from interviews with first-generation women.  
It is not possible to measure the impact of socio-cultural factors of gender norms within 
households using statistical data; this will be explored using qualitative methods. 
Although the quantitative studies mentioned above find an effect of life-stage which 
they attribute to traditional gender norms within Pakistani and Bangladeshi families, 
they cannot describe gender norms, how they take effect, how they are experienced by 
Muslim women or how they may have changed over time. It is not possible to construct 
a similar life-stage variable using the EMBES 2010 dataset because it is not known if 
the children in the household are the children of the respondent. Marriage and the 
presence of children will be included in the analysis as separate binary variables and 
experiences of marriage and household SES will be examined in detail in the 
qualitative research phase.  
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Figure 3.7 EMBES Survey Question - Marital Status and Presence of Children; Household 
Income and Partner’s Work 
EMBES Question [survey question 
code] 
Response Categories  
Can I just check which of these applies to 
you at present? 
[[zq90] 
1 Married 
2 Living with a partner 
3 Separated (after being married) 
4 Divorced 
5 Widowed 
6 Single (never married) 
DK REF 
How many people are there in your 
household? How many of those [people in 
household] are under 18? 
Range: 0 ... 97 
DK REF 
 
 
 
Which of the letters on this card 
represents the total income of your 
household from all sources before tax - 
including benefits, savings and so on? 
Please just tell me the letter. [zqinc] 
Q Less than £5,000 
T £5,001 – £10,000 
O £10,001 – £15,000 
K £15,001 – £20,000 
L £20,001 – £25,000 
B £25,001 – £30,000 
Z £30,001 – £35,000 
M £35,001 – £40,000 
F £40,001 – £45,000 
J £45,001 – £50,000 
D £50,001 – £60,000 
H £60,001 – £70,000 
P £70,001 -£80,000 
S £80,001 or more  
[Annual income] 
Which of these is the main source of 
income for you (and your partner) at 
present [zq97]  
 
1 Earnings from employment (own or spouse / 
partner's) 
2 Occupational pension(s) - from previous 
employer(s) 
3 Private pension(s) 
4 State retirement or widow's pension(s) 
5 Jobseeker's Allowance/ Unemployment benefit 
6 Pension Credit/ Minimum Income Guarantee/ 
Income Support for pensioners 
7 Invalidity, sickness or disabled pension or 
benefit(s) 
8 Other state benefit or tax credit (WRITE IN) 
9 Interest from savings or investments 
10 Student grant, bursary or loans 
11 Dependent on parents/other relatives 
12 Other main source (WRITE IN) 
Which of the descriptions on this card best 
applies to your wife/husband/partner? 
[eq65_2] 
 
1 In paid work 
2 In full-time education 
3 Unemployed for six months or more 
4 Unemployed for less than six months 
5 Permanently sick or disabled 
6 Retired 
7 Looking after the home 
8 Doing something else (WRITE IN) 
DK REF 
 
 
60 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary  
The MMR strategy and quantitative methodology have been outlined in this chapter. 
The data available in the EMBES 2010 dataset has been critically evaluated and 
appropriate variables identified for analysis. Through the evaluation of questions asked 
and data available in the EMBES, some of the advantages of the MMR approach have 
become clear. The ability to plan a project and pose research questions that require 
both qualitative and quantitative inquiry is valuable in the study of the complex and 
overlapping disadvantages Muslim women face in the labour market. Furthermore, 
having the flexibility to address any additional qualitative questions that the quantitative 
analysis might throw up, without having to rely solely on the existing literature, is 
exciting. The results of bivariate analysis are presented in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Quantitative Findings 
  Muslim Women in the Looking After Home and Family 
Category in the EMBES 2010 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Labour market outcomes in Britain vary by religious belonging, and Muslims in Britain 
suffer the largest penalties (Heath and Martin 2013). The disadvantage that British 
Muslims face is thought to be caused largely by a religious penalty, or ethno-religious 
penalties, in the labour market. The religious penalty associated with high levels of 
economic inactivity amongst Muslim women is larger than that of other labour market 
outcomes; it is likely that factors other than discrimination in the labour market are 
causing this difference (Heath and Martin 2013). This identified penalty may include 
socio-cultural factors that act as constraints to Muslim women in relation to their 
ethnoreligious belonging. In socio-economic terms, Muslim households are the most 
disadvantaged in Britain; the economic inactivity of Muslim women is an important 
driver of this disadvantage (Heath and Li 2015, p.7). 
Economic inactivity is one amongst several labour market outcomes used to measure 
the socio-economic integration of ethnic minority (EM) groups in Britain. The 
economically inactive are those people who are neither in work nor seeking work (ONS 
2017). Khattab and Hussain (2017) suggest that labour market penalties vary 
according to the specific labour market outcome. The statistical analysis presented in 
this chapter applies this insight by focusing on those in the ‘looking after the home and 
family’ (LAHF) category of economic inactivity. British Muslim women are more likely to 
be economically inactive than active and LAHF is the modal category of economically 
inactive Muslim women in Britain. 
 
High levels of economic inactivity amongst British Muslim women in the LAHF category 
cause concern because they are indicative of a lack of socio-economic integration and 
generational improvement. Other categories of economic inactivity such as illness or 
disability, full-time education, and retirement are more easily understood and do not 
cause the same level of policy or societal concern. The Casey Review, a UK 
government commissioned review of social integration, expressed grave concerns that 
high levels of LAHF among Muslim women signalled a desire to remain apart from 
wider British society (Casey 2016). It has been suggested that the Casey Review did 
not adequately address the persistent structural labour market disadvantage faced by 
Muslims in Britain (Runnymede 2016). This quantitative analysis is part of a mixed 
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methods research project that aims to provide a more holistic picture of the causes of 
high levels of LAHF among British Muslim women.  
LAHF is a gendered form of economic inactivity. Once early retirees are excluded, 
LAHF accounts for 38% of all working age economically inactive women in Britain, 
compared with 2% of economically inactive men (author’s analysis of Census 2011 
data for England and Wales, ONS 2016). There are twice as many Muslim women in 
the LAHF category than the national average for all women: 14%, as compared to the 
national average of 7% (author’s analysis, ONS 2016). LAHF accounts for 49% of 
economic inactivity amongst British Muslim women once retirees are excluded 
(author’s analysis, ONS 2016). It is the persistent and significant presence of British 
Muslim women in this category of economic inactivity from the time of their arrival in 
Britain from the 1970s onwards that sets them apart from women of the White British 
majority, as well as other EM women (Anwar 1979;  Heath and Martin 2013; Khattab et 
al. 2017). 
 
A focus on the LAHF category makes the statistical analysis presented in this chapter 
an original contribution to the existing body of literature on ethnoreligious inequalities in 
the British labour market. It is important to acknowledge from the outset the effects of a 
relatively small sample size on this statistical analysis, which makes use of the Ethnic 
Minority British Election Survey of 2010 (EMBES 2010).  The resulting models may be 
fragile given the small sample size or may have low statistical power. The findings 
presented here are accordingly tentative and require further validation with larger 
datasets, for example in the event of a new EMBES for GE2022 or using the 
Understanding Society ethnic minority booster sample. Nevertheless, it is anticipated 
that the analysis will usefully contribute findings to a little-understood area of labour 
market inequality. The statistical findings presented in this chapter are part of the 
process of understanding and explaining LAHF within the context of a wider mixed 
methods study. 
 
The quantitative phase of this project directly addresses some of the research 
questions posed at the conclusion of the literature review chapter. The statistical 
analysis is designed to be the first phase of a systematic QUANT-QUAL mixed 
methods project. The resulting findings will feed into the planning of the qualitative 
phase as outlined in the preceding methodology chapter (Chapter 3). The findings from 
the qualitative and quantitative phases of research will be brought together in the 
discussion chapter of this thesis. The aim of the mixed methods approach is to bring 
greater depth and nuance to understandings and explanations of high levels of 
economic inactivity amongst Muslim women in Britain. 
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The following section of this chapter reminds the reader of the research themes and 
questions identified as best suited to quantitative inquiry, alongside a brief recap of 
existing knowledge and theory. Detailed methodological points about the use of the 
EMBES were covered in Chapter 3. The results of bivariate analysis and recoding 
strategies are presented in Section 4.3. The results of the multivariate analysis are 
presented in Section 4.4. Finally, in Section 4.5, the findings are discussed along with 
some implications for the subsequent qualitative phase of the project. 
 
4.2 Recap of Existing Evidence and Research Themes  
 
Theme 1: Explaining Economic Inactivity in the Looking After Home and Family 
Category  
RQ1.What are the key explanatory variables for economic inactivity in the 
looking after home and family category amongst British Muslim women? 
Religious affiliation is increasingly seen as more salient than ethnic identity in 
explaining labour market disadvantage among EM groups (Brown 2000; Cheung 
2014). A distinct Muslim penalty in labour market outcomes has been identified (Heath 
and Martin 2013). There is also evidence of diversity in the labour market experiences 
of Muslim women from different ethnic groups (Brown 2000; Khattab 2009; 2012); 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi women are disadvantaged in relation to Indian and White 
Muslim women (Khattab 2012).  
 
The existence of a religious penalty is expected to be upheld in this analysis. The main 
point of interest is the extent to which measures of religiosity, social capital and socio-
economic status add to explanations of LAHF amongst Muslim women and explain 
some of the religious penalty they face in the labour market. By including distinct 
measures of structural and socio-cultural domains a picture will emerge of their 
association with LAHF. It is expected that some unexplained disadvantage will remain 
because of unmeasured ethno-religious penalties caused by discrimination. 
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Theme 2: Generational Change 
RQ2a. Is there evidence of generational change in the LAHF outcome? 
RQ2b. Do the causes and experiences of economic inactivity differ by migrant 
generation or cohort? (Qualitative inquiry only) 
There is limited evidence of generational improvements in labour market outcomes for 
Muslims in Britain, particularly those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi (P&B) ethnicities 
(Heath and Li 2008; Cheung 2014). Migrant generation and age are included as control 
or explanatory variables in studies of economic inactivity amongst EM women, on the 
assumption that second- and later-generation women will be more likely to participate 
in the labour market; and that labour market performance exhibits lifecycle and social 
generational effects. Both age and generation emerge as statistically insignificant in 
much of the existing literature and there is little evidence for generational 
improvements in economic activity rates amongst Muslim women (Heath and Martin 
2013; Cheung 2014).  Although Khattab and Hussain (2017) have more recently found 
some evidence of intergenerational improvement. There are no studies however that 
focus on the very specific outcome of LAHF; migrant generation or age variables may 
well operate very differently for LAHF. 
 
Theme 3: British Muslim Women in Work (qualitative inquiry only) 
Theme 4 Religion and Religiosity  
Perhaps confounding expectations regarding religiosity, studies have found that higher 
levels of religiosity are not significantly associated with LAHF; high levels of religiosity 
may even have a positive effect as a source of empowerment (Khattab et al. 2017). In 
qualitative studies, the religious versus culture argument has long been acknowledged 
to support negotiations that young second-generation Pakistani and Bangladeshi  
women engage in with their parents to access university-level education (Dale et al. 
2002b; Bolagnani and Mellor 2012). ‘Islamic capital’ has also been identified as a 
source of positive norms reinforcement that supports socio-economic integration and 
success through educational attainment (Franceschelli and O’Brien 2014; Khattab and 
Modood 2018).  There are also some indications in the literature that first-generation 
Muslim women hold religious beliefs that discourage participation in the formal labour 
market (Dale et al. 2002a; Akhtar 2014).  
 
RQ4. Do religious beliefs and practices have an impact on economic inactivity 
amongst British Muslim women? If so, how, and is there generational variation? 
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There is mixed evidence in the literature about the impact of religiosity on socio-
economic outcomes. There is little empirical evidence in the literature, qualitative or 
quantitative, on how religious practices and beliefs inhibit economic activity, over and 
above religious discrimination which is assessed through the existence of a religious 
penalty. For example, it is not known whether adherence to the requirement of five 
daily prayers constrains economic activity or how religious beliefs might deter a woman 
from entering the labour market.  
 
 
RQ5. Do dense British Muslim communities and social networks promote or 
inhibit economic activity amongst women? 
High co-ethnic density is used as a proxy for bonding social capital in this analysis, 
whilst bearing in mind that high density does not necessarily lead to high levels of 
bonding social capital. There is mixed evidence of the effects of bonding social capital 
on socio-economic outcomes. The co-ethnic community can provide sources of support 
that promote educational attainment and labour market participation (Lancee 2010; 
Modood and Khattab 2018). However, ethnic capital may partly explain socio-economic 
success for some Pakistani women whilst explaining economic inactivity for others 
(Bagguley and Hussain 2016). Further, there is compelling evidence in the literature 
that the same processes of norms enforcement and intergenerational closure that are 
now thought to support educational success have limited educational and employment 
opportunities for Pakistani women in Britain for decades (Shaw 1988; Afshar 1994; 
Dwyer 2000; Mohammad 2010). The evidence on the overall effects of high co-ethnic 
density on socio-economic outcomes is therefore mixed and worthy of further 
examination.  
Theme 6 Home and Family 
6a. What is the contemporary picture of how the life-stages of motherhood and 
marriage impact on the economic activity of Muslim women? 
6b. How does the occupational status of men impact on the economic activity of 
Muslim women?  
The strong negative effect of marriage on economic activity among Muslim women is 
considered to be associated with gendered domestic roles and family structures. 
Traditional Pakistani family structures restricted the education and economic activity of 
young women in the 1980s and 1990s (Shaw 1988; Werbner 1990; Afshar 1994). 
Women’s participation in formal paid work was a source of dishonour and shame for 
their husbands (Shaw 1988; Afshar 1994). For many young Muslim women, economic 
Theme 5 High Co-ethnic Concentration 
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activity after marriage had to be negotiated with husbands and mothers-in-law (Dale 
2002b; Ahmad et al. 2003). The impact of marriage on the economic activity of Muslim 
women in the contemporary context requires updating. Also, some of the observed 
effects of marriage on economic activity might be related to the socio-economic status 
of husbands as well as traditional socio-cultural practices. 
 
Household socio-economic status (SES) is determined by occupation of the primary 
wage earner, it is an indication of the cultural, social, material and economic resources 
within households (Khattab et al. 2017). There is little evidence of generational 
improvement in the disadvantaged and marginalised positions that Muslim men have 
occupied in the British labour market since their migration to Britain (Werbner 1990; 
Kalra 2000; Cheung 2014).  The long working hours of Muslim men constrain the 
extent to which they can practically contribute to household tasks, placing the 
responsibility for child-care and domestic work solely on women thus reinforcing 
traditional gender norms (Werbner 1990; Shaw 2000). Further, the tax credit system of 
state benefits favours larger families if there is only one wage-earner in the household 
(Rubery and Rafferty 2013; Hick and Lanau forthcoming). A woman being in work 
therefore may not be of any additional financial benefit to the household, particularly if 
low educational attainment limits her to low-paid work (Khattab et al. 2017).  
 
It is expected that married women from households where the main source of income 
is state benefits, and those whose husbands have occupations associated with low 
SES, will be more likely to be economically inactive. This will be related to the structural 
effects of the state benefits system and the organisation of own-accounts and manual 
work, as well the socio-cultural effects of economic marginalisation on ethno-religious 
minority groups (Mohammad 2005a; 2005b). 
 
4.3 Bivariate Analysis  
Bivariate analysis of the EMBES 2010 was conducted to guide the selection of 
variables for inclusion in the subsequent modelling stage. The findings from this 
preliminary stage of analysis and explanations of how response categories were 
recoded will be presented in this section. Bivariate analysis was conducted using the 
cross-tabulation function in SPSS software using two or three way crosstabulations, i.e. 
examining the effect of one or two independent variables on LAHF.  
 
Statistically significant associations of variables with LAHF have a Pearson chi-square 
value of less than 0.05 (p=<0.05). Significant associations are noted in the table notes 
and in the accompanying analysis. The dataset was weighted with the appropriate 
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weight (Weight_trimmedF2FALL5). Unweighted sample size (N) is included in the 
tables although the percentages are the results of analyses after the weight has been 
applied. 
 
Dependent Variable – Looking After Home and Family (LAHF) 
This analysis compares women of working age (between 18-65 years of age) in the 
LAHF category with those who are economically active (in paid work and unemployed). 
All women falling within response categories for other forms of inactivity (student/ill or 
disabled/early retiree/other), and over the age of 65, are excluded from the analysis. 
The minimum age for EMBES respondents was 18 years old.  
Religious Groups 
Of the sample of the 1407 women who stated they had a religion in the EMBES, 1265 
(91%) women belonged to one of the four religious groups included in this analysis: 
Muslim; Hindu; Sikh and Christian. Women belonging to other religious groups were 
excluded from the analysis. There were 897 (unweighted N) valid responses for both 
religious belonging and the two categories of economic activity (active or LAHF), see 
Table 4.1 below. The percentage of Muslim women in the LAHF category, 51%, is 
more than twice as high than that of women from other religious groups. This provides 
strong justification for the focused attention on Muslim women in this project.  
Table 4.1 Percentage LAHF by religious group 
 Christian  Hindu Muslim Sikh All 
%LAHF 11.1% 19.6% 51.2% 15.5% 30.4% 
N 327 85 426 59 897 
Table Notes: 
1. Author’s analysis, Ethnic Minority British Election Study, 2010.  
2. Variation in LAHF status by religious affiliation significant (p=<0.05) for all religious groups. 
 
Ethnicity 
The overlap of ethnicity and religion for some groups, namely Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis, meant that the inclusion of ethnicity would have been problematic in a 
model measuring the impacts of religious belonging on economic inactivity for EM 
women (VIF statistic >3, indicating high collinearity). Further, it was not possible to 
include distinct ethno-religious groups within each religious category due to small 
numbers within the LAHF category for religious groups other than Muslim. Therefore it 
was decided that modelling would take part in two stages. Stage A would compare the 
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likelihood of LAHF among women of different religious groups only, to assess the 
extent of the Muslim penalty in relation to the LAHF category. In Stage B ethnicity 
would be included in models that predicted LAHF among Muslim women only. Black 
Caribbean Muslim women were excluded from Stage B because of their very small 
numbers. 
Migrant Generation 
In Table 4.2 (below) evidence for generational decline in LAHF is observed for all 
religious groups. Amongst the second-generation, LAHF is a category of significant 
size for Muslims women only. First-generation Muslim women are the only group of 
women more likely to be LAHF than economically active. In Figure 4.1 (below), it can 
be seen that a higher percentage of second-generation Muslim women are in the LAHF 
category than the first generation of other religious groups. The binary analysis 
suggests generational decline in LAHF amongst all religious groups, including Muslim 
women. Migrant generation is associated with LAHF for all religious groups, other than 
Christian.  
Table 4.2 LAHF by generation and religious group  
  Christian Hindu Muslim Sikh All 
G1% LAHF  12.9% 27.9% 61.2% 23.1% 37.8% 
G1 N  170 104 258 52 584 
G2 % LAHF 5.1% 0.0% 34.4% 6.1% 17.4% 
G2 N 79 37 128 49 293 
Table Notes: 
1: Author’s analysis, Ethnic Minority British Election Study, 2010.  
2: Variation in LAHF by generational status is significant at the 5% level for all religious groups other than 
Christian. 
3. G1 is first-generation and G2 is second generation 
4. The absence of any Hindu LAHF G2 women is likely to be caused by sampling error rather than being a 
representative picture 
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Figure 4.1 Percentage LAHF by religious group and generation, EMBES 2010 
 
 
Second-generation Muslim women are approximately half as likely as first-generation 
Muslim women to be LAHF, 34% compared to 61%. The direction of generational 
change is in line with expectations of assimilation or integration theories, however, the 
extent of generational change among Muslims, in comparison to Hindu and Sikh 
groups, is small. LAHF does not appear to be a notable labour market outcome for 
second-generation women of religious groups other than Muslim. In fact, there are no 
second-generation Hindu women who are inactive and below 10% Christian and Sikh. 
Migrant generation plays a role in high levels of LAHF for all religious groups but clearly 
for Muslim women, it is only part of the explanation. There are sufficient numbers of 
LAHF first and second generation Muslim women to allow migrant generation to be 
included in multivariate modelling in Stage B (Muslim women only) as well as in Stage 
A (all EM women). 
The EMBES 2010 captured data on country of birth for all respondents, and length of 
time spent in the UK for those born in another country. Theoretically, this allowed 
differentiation between first and subsequent migrant generations and differentiation 
between recent and long arrived migrants. More fine-grained analysis and modelling of 
LAHF and migrant generations or cohorts using the EMBES 2010 was not possible in 
this analysis due to the small sample of LAHF women for groups other than Muslim.  
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Measures of Religiosity  
Religious Salience 
Table 4.3 (below) shows that EM women across the sample demonstrate high levels of 
religious salience. 33% of women with high religious salience were inactive, compared 
to 14% of those with low level religious salience. 31% of Muslim women with low 
religious salience were economically inactive, compared to 52% of those with high 
religious salience. There appears to be a relationship between high levels of religious 
salience and LAHF, however, religious salience is not significantly associated with 
variance in LAHF for any of the religious groups other than for Hindu women. 
Nevertheless, this variable will be included in the modelling stage because of its 
significance for Hindu women and to test more robustly whether the lack of association 
still holds after control variables have been taken into account 
Table 4.3 Religious salience by religious group and generation  
  
Christian Hindu Muslim Sikh 
All 
Women   
High Salience 87.2% 77.0% 95.1% 82.1% 88.6%   
N 383 97 511 72 1063   
%LAHF High 
Salience 
10.60% 23.9% 52.3% 16.7% 32.6% 
  
N (high salience)  272 62 403 46 930   
%LAHF Low 
Salience  
13.9% 5.7% 31.3% 15.4% 14.0% 
  
N 55 23 22 13 113   
G1 High Salience 94.3% 81.9% 97.1% 85.9% 92.6%   
N 239 72 325 39 675   
G2 High Salience 72.0% 76.3% 92.2% 77.6% 82.9%   
N 144 25 186 33 388   
Table Notes:  
1. Author’s analysis, Ethnic Minority British Election Study, 2010.  
2. Variation in LAHF by religious salience is significant at the 5% level for the Hindu group only. 
 
Religious Practice 
There are two available measures of religious practice in the EMBES: frequency of 
communal practice (religious activities with others) and individual practice (religious 
activities by yourself).  Some important considerations were raised about these 
questions in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3).  
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Individual Practice 
Individual daily practice signifies both a personal commitment to faith and a 
prioritisation of the ritual aspects of faith, not least because of the personal organisation 
or adjustment required to undertake such activities at frequent points throughout the 
day. To make comparisons between religious groups, bearing in mind small sample 
sizes for some groups of women in some of the response categories, ‘daily’ versus 
‘less frequently’ proved a natural cut-point. As can be seen in Table 4.4 below, 73% of 
all EM women undertake some form of individual daily religious practice.  
Table 4.4 Frequency of individual religious practice by religious group and 
generation, % LAHF by frequency of individual practice 
  Christian Hindu Muslim Sikh All Women 
Prays Daily 63.7% 66.9% 86.5% 52.8% 73.1% 
N 416 100 525 73 1114 
%LAHF Prays 
Daily 
10.9% 26.0% 53.6% 21.7% 36.2% 
%LAHF Prays 
Less Frequently  
11.4% 7.7% 36.0% 7.1% 14.9% 
G1 % Daily 69.0% 77.0% 90.9% 76.6% 80.6% 
 N 238 71 322 39 670 
G2% Daily 51% 41% 78% 26% 58.8% 
 N 142 25 183 33 383 
Table Notes: 
1. Author’s analysis, EMBES 2010 
2. Variation in LAHF by individual religious practice is significant at the 5% level for all groups but 
Christian. 
 
In Table 4.4 it is observed that Muslim women tend to exhibit considerably higher rates 
of individual religious practice than members of other faiths, 66% of Muslim women 
undertake daily religious activities by themselves five times a day (see Figure 4.2 
below). Muslim women are more likely to undertake daily individual religious practice 
than women of other religious belongings (see Figure 4.3 below). High levels of 
individual religious practice amongst Muslim women may be inflated because the 
survey question is subject to social desirability bias. The question may also have been 
interpreted as religious activities other that ritual prayer, for example, beginning 
everyday tasks with a dua, or short verse in remembrance of Allah, is an aspect of 
Muslim religious practice (Scourfield et al. 2013). The likelihood of overstatement of 
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levels of individual practice has been discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3) and is noted 
here whilst including it as an independent variable in the modelling stage  
Figure 4.2 Percentage frequency of individual practice, Muslim women, EMBES 
2010 
  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Percentage daily individual practice by religious group and 
generation, EMBES 2010 
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The greatest generational decline in religiosity is evident within the measure of 
individual religious practice: there is a 22 percentage point difference between all 
second-generation and first-generation women (see Figure 4.3, above).  First-
generation Muslim women have the highest percentage of those who undertake some 
form of individual practice daily at 91%. Muslim women have the highest percentages 
of individual religious practice within each generation. Muslim women exhibit the least 
generational decline under this measure of religiosity with a 13 percentage point 
difference between first and second-generations although decline among Christian 
women is also relatively low with an 18 percentage point difference, albeit from a much 
lower starting point for the first-generation. 
The measure of individual daily religious practice is significant when cross-tabulated 
against LAHF for all groups other than Christians. Of the 86% of Muslim women who 
practice daily, more are likely to be LAHF than economically active; the LAHF 
percentage for Muslim women who pray daily is 54% (see Table 4.4, above). In Figure 
4.4 (below) it can be seen that Muslim women are more likely to be LAHF than women 
from other religions who undertake some form of individual practice on a daily basis. All 
women who practice infrequently are less likely to be LAHF than those who practice 
daily, yet there are at least three times more LAHF Muslim women than for other 
religious groups in the infrequent category. 
 Bivariate analysis of individual practice amongst Muslim women shows that Muslim 
respondents tend to exhibit considerably higher rates of individual religious practice 
than members of other faiths, even if shy of prayer five times a day. Levels of LAHF 
decrease with lower levels of individual practice and the association is statistically 
significant. In Figure 4.5 below, the results of the bivariate analysis indicate that the 
percentage of LAHF Muslim women decreases with lower levels of religious practice. 
Variation in LAHF is significantly associated with five times and infrequent individual 
practice for Muslim women, the association with daily practice is non-significant. 
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Figure 4.4 Percentage LAHF by frequency of individual religious practice and religious 
group, EMBES 2010
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Percentage LAHF by frequency of individual religious activity, Muslim 
women only, EMBES 2010 
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Communal Practice 
‘At least weekly’ versus ‘less frequent’ was the natural cut point for comparison 
between religious groups for this IV. In the EMBES sample, there is evidence of 
generational decline in this measure of religiosity for all women (-15%), however, the 
change is very small for Muslim women at -2%. Notably, communal practice does not 
have a statistically significant relationship with LAHF for any of the religious groups 
other than Sikh when cross-tabulation analysis is run for each group separately. 
Accordingly, the results for generational differences are not presented here. 
The lack of significant association between LAHF and communal practice may a result 
of the ambiguity of the question and potentially a lack of relevance for religious groups 
where women do not traditionally take part in formal communal religious practice 
(discussed in detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.3). The question may also be subject to the 
same overstatement and social desirability bias in response as for individual practice. 
The lack of statistical significance for the association between LAHF rates and 
communal practice, together with concerns about its relevance to Muslim women, 
mean that this variable will not be included in the modelling stage.  
Table 4.5 Communal religious practice and percentage LAHF 
  Christian Hindu Muslim Sikh 
Weekly Plus 
Communal 
Practice 
69.0% 33.9% 36.9% 32.8% 
N 345 174 509 122 
%LAHF Weekly 
Plus  10.4% 23.9% 54.4% 27.6% 
 N 183 46 160 29 
Table Notes: 
1. Author’s analysis, EMBES 2010 
2. Variation in LAHF by communal religious practice is significant at the 5% level for only the Sikh 
group 
 
Communal practice emerges as the weakest indicator of the impact of religiosity on 
economic activity, with relatively small differences in the percentage of LAHF women 
between infrequent and regular communal practice and the association is statistically 
insignificant. Across all three measures of religiosity Muslims are the most religious 
group, followed by Christians whose religiosity appears not to impact on their economic 
activity. Religious salience is the measure with the lowest indication of generational 
change across all religious groups and its association with LAHF is only significant for 
Hindu women. Private religious practice is significantly associated with LAHF for all 
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religious groups other than Christian. The greatest evidence of generational decline is 
evident in individual religious practice, as found by McAndrew and Voas (2014). 
Marital Status 
The married category includes all married and partnered women and the single 
category all single, divorced, separated and widowed women. The results of the 
bivariate analysis for this variable are presented below in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.6 
below.  
Single Hindu and Muslim women are significantly less likely to be LAHF than married 
women. Single Muslim women are more likely to be LAHF than single women from any 
other religious group. The association of marriage with LAHF for Christian women is 
insignificant since rates are low for both the single and married. A specific Black female 
effect is likely to be at play here which is probably ethnonational rather than religious; 
women of Caribbean heritage participate in the labour market at very high rates indeed. 
Married women make up only 58% of the total Christian LAHF population whilst for the 
other religious groups married women make up 88% or more of their LAHF 
populations. In Figure 4.6 and Table 4.6 it can be seen that Muslim women are more 
likely to be LAHF than women of other religious groups, within each marital status and 
generation category. 
Figure 4.6 Percentage LAHF by marital status within each religious group, EMBES 
2010 
 
 
 
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0%
Christian
Hindu
Muslim
Sikh
Married LAHF Single LAHF
77 
 
Table 4.6 Percentage marital status by religion and generation and percentage LAHF 
by marital status 
 Christian Hindu Muslim Sikh All women 
Married  43.9% 68.3% 69.2% 69.4% 61.8% 
N 418 101 530 73 1112 
Married G1 49.1% 78.9% 77.1% 85.7% 69.9% 
N 238 72 324 39 673 
Married G2 33.0% 33.3% 55.3% 51.7% 46.5% 
N 144 25 106 33 388 
Married %LAHF 13.1% 27.4% 59.1% 19.5% 39.0% 
N  125 57 308 45 633 
Married 
Proportion of 
LAHF  
58% 100% 90% 88% 87 
Table Notes: 
1. Author’s analysis, EMBES 2010 
2. Variation in LAHF by marital status is significant at the 5% level for Hindu and Muslim women only. 
 
Household Socio-economic Status (SES) by Partner’s Occupation 
An interaction term was constructed using the variables for marital status and 
occupational status of partner (MaritalStatus*PartnerSES) as an indicator of household 
socio-economic status (SES). Class 1 represents professional or managerial 
occupations; Class 2, intermediate occupations and own-accounts workers; and Class 
3, manual workers and the unemployed/inactive. Women from Class 3 households are 
most likely to be LAHF (see Table 4.7 below). Muslim women are most likely to form 
part of Class 3 households. For Muslim women there is an apparent consistent and 
negative relationship between socio-economic status and LAHF, with the percentage of 
LAHF women increasing as socio-economic status decreases although the difference 
between the intermediate and the professional group appears small. 
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Table 4.7 LAHF by MaritalStaus*PartnersOccupation 
  Single Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 
Christian 56.5% 14.2% 7.5% 21.7% 
N 279 43   23 74 
%LAHF 9.6% 6.8% 0 20.6% 
Hindu 30.5% 31.6% 12.1% 25.9% 
N 35 30 11 25 
%LAHF 0 23% 11% 40% 
Muslim 31.2% 13.6% 11.3% 43.7% 
N 182 61 54 234 
%LAHF 23.9% 49.3% 51.9% 64.4% 
Sikh 30.3% 25.4% 13.1% 33.1% 
N 21 19 8 25 
%LAHF 7.4% 12.9% 0 33.3% 
Table Notes: 
1. Author’s analysis, EMBES 2010 
2. Variation in LAHF by household SES is significant at the 5% level for all religious groups 
 
There are further differences in LAHF across the SES categories that can be observed 
in Table 4.7 (above). Class 3 has the highest percentage of LAHF women across all 
four religious groups: there are twice as many LAHF women in Class 3 than in any 
other SES category. Accordingly, socio-economic status is significantly associated with 
LAHF for all religious groups. Muslim women in each SES category are approximately 
twice as likely to be LAHF than women of other religion groups. Indeed, Muslim women 
in Class 2 and 3 households are more likely to be LAHF than economically active. It is 
interesting to note that for all religious groups, including Muslim, it is only Class 3 
household SES that is significantly associated with variation in LAHF. It is important to 
note that this measure of household SES combines the effect of marriage and partner’s 
occupational status.  
Generational differences in SES status by partners occupation are presented in Figure 
4.7 below. First-generation women are more likely to be in Class 3 households than 
second-generation women, this is true across all religious groups. Class 3 is the modal 
SES category for first-generation women in all religious groups but Hindu. Muslim 
women are the only group where Class 3 is the modal SES category amongst the 
second-generation. Furthermore, the percentage of second-generation Muslim women 
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in Class 3 households is approximately twice that of second-generation women in other 
religious groups. 
Figure 4.7 Percentage socio-economic status by religious group and generation. 
EMBES 2010 
 
 
Main Source of Household Income 
The question relating to main source of household income had a very good response 
rate with 1249 valid responses from females, in comparison to the response rate of 836 
valid responses to the question relating to annual household income. Source of income 
is a less direct question about household economic circumstances which may be 
experienced as less intrusive by respondents; indeed, the difference in response rate 
would suggest that this is the case. The question relating to main source of income will 
be used in this analysis. 
The source of income variable was recoded into two categories, paid employment and 
all other sources; don’t know and refused responses were included in ‘other sources’ to 
maintain sufficient sample sizes within response categories. Paid employment is an 
indication of stability and financial independence whilst most of the ‘other’ sources are 
less stable because they are dependent on external circumstances such as goodwill or 
means testing (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.6 for all response categories to the income 
source question). The ‘other income’ category includes households where income is 
significantly bolstered by state benefits.  
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Table 4.8 Other income Source by religion and generation, and percentage LAHF by 
other income source 
Table Notes: 
1. Author’s analysis, EMBES 2010 
2. Variation in LAHF by other income source significant at the 5% level for all religious groups, except 
for Hindu 
 
In Table 4.8 (above) it can be seen that a third of all female respondents to the EMBES 
live in households where the main source of income is something other than paid 
employment. This is considerably higher for the Muslim women in the sample where 
55% rely on a source of income other than formal paid employment. Of the 274 women 
with an alternative income source, 34% are inactive, and three-quarters are Muslim. 
74% of women reliant on an alternative source of income are first-generation. Christian, 
Hindu and Sikh women are less likely than Muslim women to rely on ‘other income’.  
Women who live in households where paid employment is the main income source are 
less likely to be LAHF than those with alternative sources of income. This is true across 
all religious groups but for Muslims the difference is smaller (45% LAHF for those with 
a paid employment source, and 63% for those with alternative source of income). 
There is generational decline across this measure of vulnerability in the financial 
resources of households, but this decline is smaller for Christian and Muslim groups. 
Note that there were no second-generation Hindu women in the sample reliant on 
anything other than income from paid employment. Living in a household where the 
main source of income is anything other than paid employment is significantly 
associated with LAHF for all religious groups except for Hindu: financial insecurity 
seems to increase the likelihood of LAHF. 
 
  Christian  Hindu  Muslim Sikh All Women 
Other Income 
Source 
31.2% 8.7% 55.4% 4.8% 30.5% 
N 397 100 481 69 1047 
G1 31.7% 19.8% 43.6% 14.8% 33.0% 
G2 30.2% 10.3% 30.7% 14.3% 25.7% 
%LAHF within 
other income 
source 
21.2% 28.6% 62.5% 70% 49.6% 
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Bonding Social Capital Neighbourhoods or friendship groups where most (more 
than half or all) members are co-ethnic are regarded as residential areas or social 
networks of high bonding social capital for the purpose of this analysis. Binary variables 
were created for the two social spheres of neighbourhood and friendship groups.  
In Table 4.9 (below) it can be seen that 56% of all EM women had dense co-ethnic 
friendship groups; most ethnic groups have friends of the same ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds, this is known as ethnic homophily (Muttarak 2014). Christian women 
have the lowest levels of co-ethnic density in their friendship groups at 48%. Muslim 
women are marginally more likely to have dense co-ethnic friendship groups than Sikh 
or Hindu women. High levels of co-ethnic density in friendship groups emerged as 
significantly associated with LAHF for Muslim women only. Lower levels of co-ethnic 
density in friendship groups were associated with lower levels of LAHF amongst 
women from all religious groups.  
Table 4.9 Bonding social capital in friendship groups by religion and generation, 
percentage LAHF by bonding social capital in friendship groups. 
  Christian  Hindu  Muslim Sikh 
Total 
High Bonding Social Capital  47.6% 56.9% 59.9% 58.3% 55.6% 
N  408 101 513 71 1093 
G1 52.4% 63.3% 65.5% 54.1% 60.2% 
G2 37.1% 42.1% 54.0% 60.3% 49.3% 
%LAHF within High Bonding  60% 58.6% 69.2% 76.9% 66.5% 
Table Notes: 
1. Author’s analysis. EMBES 2010 
2. Variation in LAHF by bonding social capital in friendship groups  is significant at the 5% level for 
Muslim women only 
3. Small N for inactive Hindu and Sikh women 
 
In Table 4.10 (below) it is observed that Muslim women are most likely to live in co-
ethnically dense neighbourhoods: 34% compared with 10% of Hindu and 17% of Sikh 
women. High levels of neighbourhood bonding social capital were significantly 
associated with LAHF for Muslim women only. 
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Table 4.10: Bonding social capital in neighbourhood by religion and generation, 
percentage LAHF by bonding social capital in neighbourhood 
  Christian  Hindu  Muslim Sikh Total 
High Bonding Social 
Capital  
9.6% 19.5% 34.2% 17.1% 22.9% 
N  380 93 503 71 1047 
G1 12.2% 24.8% 32.4% 18.3% 23.8% 
G2 5.3% 5.7% 38.2% 14.3% 22.6% 
%LAHF within High 
Bonding 
Neighbourhood 
20.0% 7.7% 59.1% 76.9% 44.9% 
Table Notes: 
1. Author’s analysis, EMBES 2010 
2. Variation in LAHF by bonding social capital in neighbourhoods is significant at the 5% level for 
Muslim women only 
Overall, bonding social capital across the two domains of friendship groups and 
neighbourhoods was significantly associated with LAHF for Muslim women only. 
Analysis within each religious group revealed that high levels of bonding social capital 
in the domains of friendship groups and neighbourhoods were only significantly 
associated with LAHF for Muslim women. Note however that small sample sizes of 
inactive women in Hindu and Sikh groups are likely to have affected the overall 
significance of these measures for these religious groups. 
Motherhood 
The EMBES 2010 included a question on the number of people within households who 
are below the age of 18. The continuous variable was included in the analysis as a 
nominal variable with three categories: no children; one to three children; four or more 
children. None of the Hindu or Sikh respondents had more than three children, this 
category was only relevant for small numbers of Muslims and Christians. A dummy 
variable was therefore created 0 for no children and 1 for the presence of children. 
The results of the bivariate analysis for the presence of children are presented below in 
Table 4.11. Unsurprisingly, the presence of children has a statistically significant 
association with LAHF for all women. Levels of LAHF for second-generation women 
without children are very low, Muslim women are the only second-generation group to 
show high rates of inactivity in the absence of dependent children. There is a difference 
of less than 10 percentage points for Sikhs and Christians when comparing no children 
to children being present, while the presence of children increases the LAHF 
percentage from 11% to 39% for second-generation Muslim women.  
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Table 4.11 Percentage dependent children present by religion and generation, and 
percentage LAHF where dependent children present 
  Christian  Hindu  Muslim Sikh 
Children Present  76.9% 50.6% 82.8% 62.0% 
 N 325 89 506 71 
Children Present 
% LAHF 
14.5% 30.2% 56.8% 17.5% 
G1 No Children 
%LAHF 
2% 19% 57% 23% 
G2 No Children 
%LAHF 
0% 0% 11% 0% 
G1 Children 
Present %LAHF  
21% 39% 64% 26% 
G2 Children 
Present %LAHF  
6% 0% 39% 9% 
Table Note:  
1. Author’s analysis, EMBES 2010 
2. Variation in LAHF by presence of children in household is significant at the 5% level all religious 
groups 
 
Education 
Exploratory analysis revealed that overseas qualifications were correlated with 
overseas birth and would have a large number of missing responses at the modelling 
stage. Accordingly, British qualifications are used as the point of comparison in this 
analysis. Furthermore, British qualifications are more directly associated with economic 
activity in the British context. Exploratory analysis showed that 48% of first-generation 
women had a British qualification and therefore this was a legitimate point of 
comparison between the two generations. It should be noted though that the sample of 
women with British qualifications in the EMBES 2010 is largely made up of the second-
generation. The results of the binary analysis of the association between educational 
attainment and LAHF are presented in Table 4.12 below. 
Muslim women are the least likely to hold British HE qualifications. Second-generation 
Muslim women are more likely than other religious groups to have a highest 
qualification of GCSE level or below and are most likely to have no qualifications at all. 
The higher number of women with no qualifications is likely to explain some of the 
higher levels of LAHF among single second-generation Muslim women than single 
second-generation women from other religious groups. The alternative to LAHF for 
women with no or low qualifications is likely to be low-skilled and low-paid work. 
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Table 4.12 Educational attainment (British qualifications) by religious group, and 
percentage LAHF within attainment category   
 Christia
n  
Hindu  Muslim Sikh Total 
First Degree and Higher 27.5% 32.7% 23.3% 36.0% 27.5% 
FE 41.8% 27.6% 36.1% 24.4% 35.5% 
GCSE or Below 30.7% 39.8% 40.6% 39.5% 36.9% 
N 320 57 296 51 724 
First Degree and Higher % 
LAHF 
6.6% 0.0% 25.4% 6.5% 38,5% 
FE Qualification % LAHF 2.7% 0.0% 26.7% 0.0% 29.4% 
GCSE or Below % LAHF 10.8% 5.9% 54.2% 0.0% 70.7% 
Table Notes: 
1. Author’s analysis, EMBES 2010 
2. Variation in LAHF by educational attainment is significant at the 5% level for Muslim women only 
 
Education is only significantly associated with LAHF for Muslim women. Muslim women 
form the largest proportion of all LAHF women in every educational category, two-thirds 
or more. Given the significant and large number of Muslim women with no 
qualifications it may be the case that the same, or similar, socio-cultural factors that 
limit educational attainment act in the same way for economic activity. One way of 
checking the combined effect of gender norms and higher education is by combining 
the marital status variable with HE status (HE qualification/No HE qualification) in an 
interaction term, MaritalStatus*HE. This interaction term was then cross-tabulated with 
the dependent variable and layered by the religious group variable, the results of the 
analysis for Muslim women are presented in Table 4.13 and Figure 4.8 below. 
The interaction between education and marital status is significantly associated with 
LAHF for Muslim women. Only 5% of single Muslim women who hold a HE qualification 
are LAHF compared to 32% of single women who do not. 32% of married Muslim 
women with HE qualifications are LAHF. In other words, marital status seems to cancel 
out some of the positive effects of a HE qualification. Married women without HE 
qualifications are twice as likely to be LAHF than married women with HE 
qualifications. There is likely to be a generational effect here with first-generation 
women being far less likely to hold a British HE qualification and more likely to be 
married. 
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Table 4.13 Percentage LAHF in HE&MaritalStatus interaction for Muslim women only 
  
Single w. HE Single no HE 
Married no 
HE 
Married w. 
HE 
%LAHF 
5.3% 32.3% 65.3% 32.4% 
N 
19 99 271 37 
Table Notes: 
1. Author’s analysis, EMBES 2010 
2. Variation in LAHF by HE*MaritalStatus interaction is significant at the 5% level  
 
 
 
Figure 4.8 Percentage LAHF in HE&MaritalStatus Interaction for Muslim Women only, 
EMBES 2010 
 
 
 
4.4 Multivariate Modelling  
 
4.4.1 Modelling Strategy 
Statistical modelling was undertaken in two stages. In Stage A the likelihood of being in 
the LAHF category is predicted for all EM women by including the independent 
variables examined in the bivariate analysis above. This allows examination of the 
Muslim penalty on the LAHF outcome. The small sample size of LAHF women in the 
EMBES 2010, for all religious groups other than Muslim, meant that ethno-religious 
groups could not be differentiated in Stage A. In Stage B the likelihood of being LAHF 
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amongst Muslim women only is predicted. Ethnicity is included as an explanatory 
variable in Stage B to allow examination of ethnic variations in the Muslim penalty. 
In each model relevant independent variables are included with LAHF as the 
dependent variable (DV). The results of each model provide information about the 
association of each independent variable (IV) with the DV, in this case the likelihood of 
women being LAHF. The measure presented on size of effect in this analysis will be 
the ‘b’ value, or log odds.  The log odds for each independent variable (IV) in the model 
provides information on whether that variable increases (positive result e.g. b=1.500) or 
decreases (negative result e.g. b=-1.500) the likelihood of a woman being LAHF. The 
log odds for each category of the IV is in comparison to a reference category and 
accounts for the effects of other IVs in the model. Reference categories are the 
comparison groups within each variable. For example, the modelling result for the IV of 
marital status will measure the likelihood of married women being LAHF in reference to 
(or in comparison with) single women.  
Statistically significant results indicate that the association between the dependent 
variable and the independent variable is not by chance alone (Voght and Burke 
Johnson 2011). SPSS produces a score for the significance of each IV in a model. The 
accepted measure of statistical significance in the social sciences is a significance 
score of less than 0.05. Significant results will be denoted by an asterix following the b 
value e.g. 1.500*. A result of <0.01 is a more stringent measure of significance. Any 
result that is statistically significant at less than 0.01 level will be denoted by two 
asterixis e.g. 1.500**. 
The inclusion of one IV may reduce the significance or log odds (b value) of another IV 
in the model. For example, age may be a significant predictor in a model, but when 
level of education is added to a subsequent model it may reduce the log odds of age, 
or change the result of age from significant to non-significant. In each model presented 
in this analysis, different combinations of IVs are included to see if, and how, they 
affect one another within and between models. The IVs in each model are listed in the 
tables below. The independent variables relating to income source, religiosity and 
social capital are included separately in models with the ‘main effects’ (control 
variables) in each stage to see how they change the predictive capabilities of the model 
and the log odds of the other IVs, all IVs are then all included in a single model to see 
their overall effect.  
Due to the small sample size of the EMBES, and the small number of economically-
inactive women in some religious groups it was not possible to include all the IV’s 
identified as significant in the bivariate analysis in the models. The interaction terms 
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MaritalStatus*PartnersOccupation and MaritalStatus*HE could not be included in the 
model along with the main effect of marriage because of high correlation between the 
variables (they were measuring the same effect). This is likely to be caused by the 
relatively small sample in the EMBES 2010.   
IVs in the Stages A and B are presented in Figure 4.9 (Stage A) and Figure 4.10 
(Stage B) below. IVs appear in bold, reference categories in italics and the categories 
of the IV measured appear in standard font. These figures are followed by Tables 4.14 
and 4.15 (Section 4.4.2, Modelling Results) which present the results of multivariate 
modelling for Stage A and Stage B respectively. The statistics for model fit are included 
at the end of the column for each model. The results of multivariate modelling are then 
discussed in Section 4.4.2. 
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Figure 4.9 IV categories for Modelling Stage A, comparing LAHF among all EM women by religious belonging 
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Figure 4.10 IV categories for Modelling Stage B, LAHF amongst Muslim Women 
 
Model B1 
Main Effects 
Model B2 
Income Source 
Model B3 
Ethnicity  
Model B4 
Religiosity 
Model B5 
Social Capital 
Model B6 
Religiosity and 
Social Capital 
 
Migrant 
Generation 
Reference: UK 
Born 
Overseas Birth 
 
Age (mean 
centred) 
 
Education 
Reference: No 
quals 
Up to GCSE 
GCSE 
FE 
HE Plus 
 
Marital Status  
Reference: Single 
Married or 
Partnered 
 
Presence of 
Children 
Reference: No 
Children 
Children Present 
 
All Main Effects 
 
Income Source 
Reference: Paid 
Employment 
Other Source 
 
All Main Effect 
 
Income Source 
 
Ethnicity 
Reference: Indian 
Pakistani 
Bangladeshi 
Black Africa 
 
All Main Effects  
 
Income Source 
 
Ethnicity  
 
Religious Practice   
Reference: Less 
Frequent 
Daily Religious 
Practice 
 
Religious Belief 
Reference: less 
than strong  
Strong religious 
belief 
 
All Main Effects  
 
Income Source 
 
Ethnicity 
 
Religious Practice 
 
Religious Belief 
 
Neighbourhood 
Co-ethnic Density 
Reference: half or 
less  
More than half  
 
Friendship Co-
ethnic Density 
Reference: half or 
less  
More than half  
 
All Main Effects  
 
Income Source 
 
Ethnicity  
 
Religious Practice 
 
Religious Belief 
 
Neighbourhood 
Co-ethnic Density 
 
Friendship Co-
ethnic Density 
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4.4.2 Modelling Results 
 
 
Independent Variables  
Model A1 
Main 
Effects 
Model A2 
Income 
Source 
Model A3 
Religiosity 
Model A4 
Co-Ethnic 
Density  
 
Model A5 
Religiosity and 
Co-Ethnic 
Density 
Religious Belonging of results 
too      
Ref: Christian      
Hindu 0.334 0.478 0.511 0.435 0.447 
Muslim 1.964** 1.764** 1.722** 1.604** 1.544** 
Sikh 0.206 0.252 0.175 0.222 0.137 
Migrant Generation      
Ref: UK Birth      
Overseas Birth 0.485*  0.407 0.504 0.302 0.31 
Age (mean centred) -0.001  -0.013 -0.015 -0.017 -0.018 
Marital Status                   
Married/Partnered 
     
Ref: single      
Married/Partnered 1.103**  1.630** 1.603** 1.698** 1.701** 
Table 4.14 Binary Logistical Regression Results, Stage A. Predicting Belonging to the Looking After Home and Family Category of 
Economic Inactivity Category Amongst Religious Groups of Ethnic Minority Women in Britain. Data Source: EMBES 2010  
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Independent Variables  
Model A1 
Main 
Effects 
Model A2 
Income 
Source 
Model A3 
Religiosity 
Model A4 
Co-Ethnic 
Density  
 
Model A5 
Religiosity and 
Co-Ethnic 
Density 
Children       
Ref: No Children      
Children Present 0.908** 0.931** 0.910** 1.012** 1.005** 
Education                     
Ref: No Qualifications      
Up To GCSE -1.076** -1.201** -1.184** -1.191** -1.192** 
GCSE -1.283** -1.205** -1.126** -1.194** -1.129** 
FE -2.340** -2.206** -2.302** -2.308** -2.363** 
HE -1.845**  -1.626** -1.490** -1.750** -1.662** 
Main Income Source             
Ref: Income from Employment      
Other Income Source   
 
1.175** 
1.173** 1.138** 1.163** 
Religious Salience      
Ref: Low Salience       
High Salience   -0.232  -0.245 
Individual Religious Practice:       
Ref: Infrequent       
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Independent Variables  
Model A1 
Main 
Effects 
Model A2 
Income 
Source 
Model A3 
Religiosity 
Model A4 
Co-Ethnic 
Density  
 
Model A5 
Religiosity and 
Co-Ethnic 
Density 
Daily Religious Practice   0.702*  0.709* 
Neighbourhood       
Ref: Low Co-ethnic Density       
High Co-ethnic Density    0.148 0.096 
      
Friendship       
Ref: Low Co-Ethnic Density      
High Co-ethnic Density    0.167 0.146 
      
N 758 734 725 685 680 
Cox and Snell 32 33 34 33 34 
Nagelkerke R Squared 48 48 48 47 48 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 0.019 0.008 0.000 0.039 0.007 
% Correct Prediction 
(No IVS) 
67.3 68.2 68.3 68.6 68.7 
% Correct Prediction 
(With IVS) 
79.3 79.2 81.2 79.8 81.2 
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Independent Variables  
Model B1 
Main Effects  
Model B2 
Income 
Source 
Model B3 
Ethnicity 
Model B4 
Religiosity 
 
Model B5   
Social 
Capital 
 
Model B6 
Religiosity 
and Social 
Capital 
Migrant Generation:        
Ref: UK Birth       
 Overseas Birth 0.352 0.284 0.452 0.364 0.574 0.480 
Age (mean centred) 0.016 0.005 0.003 -0.005 0.001 -0.003 
Marital Status       
Ref: Single       
Married 1.407** 1.651** 1.629** 1.668** 1.175** 1.575** 
Children Present        
Ref: No children present        
Children Present 0.908** 0.712** 0.787* 0.821* 0.908* 1.004* 
       
Table 4.15  Binary Logistical Regression Results, Stage B. Predicting Belonging to the Looking After Home and Family 
Category of Economic Inactivity Amongst Muslim Women in Britain. Data Source: EMBES 2010  
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Independent Variables  
Model B1 
Main Effects  
Model B2 
Income 
Source 
Model B3 
Ethnicity 
Model B4 
Religiosity 
 
Model B5   
Social 
Capital 
 
Model B6 
Religiosity 
and Social 
Capital 
Education        
Ref: No Qualifications       
Up To GCSE -0.270 -0.450 -0.337 -0.342 -0.364 -0.392 
GCSE -0.915* 0.881* -0.854 -0.941* -0.695        -0.762 
FE -1.953** -1.858** -1.734** -1.941** -1.891** -1.991** 
HE -1.623** -1.492** -1.449** -1.655** -1.710** -1.317** 
Main Income Source        
Ref: Income from Employment        
Other Income Source  0.634* 0.922** 0.764* 0.957* 0.847* 
Ethnicity       
Ref: Indian       
Pakistani   0.689 0.582 1.260** 1.169** 
Bangladeshi   0.194 0.135 0.678 0.643 
Black African   -0.813 -1.045 -0.356 -0.447 
Religious Salience       
Ref: Low Religious Salience       
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Independent Variables  
Model B1 
Main Effects  
Model B2 
Income 
Source 
Model B3 
Ethnicity 
Model B4 
Religiosity 
 
Model B5   
Social 
Capital 
 
Model B6 
Religiosity 
and Social 
Capital 
High Religious Salience    0.007  -0.153 
Religious Practice       
Ref: Infrequent       
Five Times a Day    0.536   
At Least Daily    0.582  0.551 
Neighbourhood Co-Ethnic 
Density       
Ref: Low Co-ethnic Density       
High Co-Ethnic Density     0.101 0.068 
Friendship Co-Ethnic Density       
Ref: Low Co-ethnic Density       
High Co-Ethnic Density     0.118 0.017 
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Independent Variables  
Model B1 
Main Effects  
Model B2 
Income 
Source 
Model B3 
Ethnicity 
Model B4 
Religiosity 
 
Model B5   
Social 
Capital 
 
Model B6 
Religiosity 
and Social 
Capital 
N 390 373 373 367 349 346 
Cox and Snell 23 23 26 30 29 30 
Nagelkerke R Squared 31 31 35 40 39 40 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 0.302 0.295 0.824 0.115 0.198 0.102 
% Correct Prediction (No IVS) 53.1 52.1 52 52 51 51.2 
% Correct Prediction (With 
IVS) 71.1 71.3 73.5 74.5 75.1 74.9 
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4.4.3 Discussion of Modelling Results  
Stage A 
Main Effects Model A1 
This analysis gives an original insight into the effect that independents variables 
selected for multivariate analysis have on the specific category of Looking After Home 
and Family (LAHF). The first model includes all control variables and religious 
affiliation. Age, marriage, generation, and education were included as control variables. 
The results of the model show that Muslim women are the only religious group 
significantly more likely to be LAHF than the reference group of Christian women. Age 
emerges as a non-significant predictor of being LAHF in the main effects model (A1) 
and across all models in Stage A.  
Migrant generation is a significant and positive predictor of LAHF at the 5 percent level 
in the main effects model. It has smaller log odds than all other significant IVs in Model 
A1. Nevertheless, its significant effect is indicative of intergenerational change. First-
generation women are more likely to be LAHF than second-generation when key 
demographic factors in the main effects model are held constant.  This indicates 
economic integration in labour market terms by immigration generation 
In Model A1 education is the only variable that reduces the likelihood of a woman being 
in the LAHF category. For all EM women, having any level of education significantly 
reduces the likelihood of LAHF compared to the reference category of no qualifications, 
significant at the 1 percent level. Interestingly, rather than further or higher levels of 
education progressively reducing the likelihood of being LAHF, the log odds of FE in 
reducing the likelihood of LAHF are greater than that of HE level qualifications.  The FE 
variable includes all qualifications above GCSE and below undergraduate degree and 
therefore encompasses a range of qualifications. But it is the effect of attendance at 
university, and undergraduate degree attainment specifically, that is most often linked 
to greater levels of economic activity amongst Muslim women (Dale 2008; Khattab 
2009; 2012).  
The effect of FE is consistently larger than HE across all six models in Stage A. The 
difference between the negative effects of FE and HE on LAHF are as large as the 
differences between GCSE and HE. Due to the unexpectedness of this result the 
construction of the variables relating to education were checked, reconstructed and 
remodelled to check for errors. In the binary analysis above, a single variable was 
constructed for up to and including GCSE qualifications. This was broken down further 
into two categories of up to GCSE and GCSE at this stage of the modelling. The larger 
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negative effect of FE than HE on LAHF remained consistent after these checks. Some 
possible explanations for this finding will be raised in the discussion section. Other than 
the greater than expected effect of FE, education is operating on LAHF in the direction 
expected in models of integration: all levels of British qualifications significantly reduce 
the likelihood of LAHF. 
In Model A1, marriage significantly increases the likelihood of LAHF among EM 
women. The presence of children below the age of 18 in households increases the 
likelihood of LAHF amongst all women across all six Stage A models. The lack of 
information about the ages of children, other than their age below 18, meant that more 
detailed life-stage variables that distinguish between ages of children and marital status 
could not be constructed. Further, the question in the EMBES asked about the 
presence of children in the household, it is not known whether they were the children of 
the person completing the survey. A more detailed analysis of the presence of children 
is therefore not possible. This lack of detail may account for some of the effects of the 
presence of children in the household being underestimated.  
Model A1 shows that marriage, the presence of children and first-generation status all 
significantly increase the likelihood of EM women being LAHF; all levels of education 
significantly reduce it. Models A2 to A6 include additional variables that relate to socio-
economic status; social capital or religiosity to assess whether they can contribute 
further to explanations of LAHF among EM women in Britain. 
Model A2 – Main Source of Household Income 
Model A2 includes the income source variable. There are two categories of source of 
income included in the variable: households where the main source of income is paid 
employment (reference category) and households where the main source of income is 
anything other than paid employment, including state benefits and allowances. This 
variable has a significant (p= <0.01) and positive association with being LAHF in Model 
A2. The income source variable is included across all subsequent Stage A models and 
is found to have a consistent and positive association with LAHF. 
The inclusion of this variable makes the association of migrant generation with LAHF 
non-significant, it does not reduce the significance of any other variables included in 
Model A1. Once this indicator of household SES is included, generational differences in 
LAHF are no longer significant.  
The inclusion of the income source variable does not appear to improve overall model 
fit from Model A1, other than increasing Nagelkerke R squared value by 42% to 47%. 
However, the variable itself has a significant and consistent effect across Models A2 to 
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A6 without any issues of collinearity with other variables. Income source is a useful 
addition to explanations of LAHF amongst EM women in Britain. 
Model A3 – Measures of Religiosity 
In Model A3 two measures of religiosity are included alongside all variables from Model 
A2. The first measure is of religious salience, comparing those with high religious 
salience with all others. The second measure is of frequency of individual religious 
practice, comparing those who partake in some form of individual religious practice 
daily to those who practice less frequently.  
High religious salience does not increase the likelihood of being LAHF. Religious 
practice has a significant and positive association with LAHF. EM women who 
undertake some form of religious practice daily are more likely to be LAHF than those 
who practice less frequently or not at all.  
Model A4 – Measures of Bonding Social Capital 
This model includes two measures co-ethnic density. The first measure compares 
those who live in neighbourhoods of high co-ethnic density with those who live in more 
mixed neighbourhoods. The second measure compares high levels of co-ethnic density 
within friendship groups with those with inter-ethnic friendship groups. High levels of 
co-ethnic density are defined as more than half of the neighbourhood or friendship 
group being co-ethnic compared to half or less co-ethnic. Neither measure of co-ethnic 
density emerges as a significant variable that affects the likelihood of LAHF.  
Model A5 Religiosity and High Co-ethnic Density 
In Model A6 the two measures of religiosity and two of social capital are included with 
all the variables from Model A2.  
Of the four variables measuring social capital and religiosity, individual religious 
practice is the only one that emerges as a significant and positive predictor of LAHF. 
The log odds  of individual religious practice are small relative to the other variables 
that are positively associated with LAHF such as presence of children, marriage, 
religious belonging and income source.  
Stage B  
B1 Main Effects Model 
In the main effects model, and across all the models in Stage B, neither overseas birth 
nor age are significantly associated with LAHF. Marriage and the presence of children 
are significantly and positively associated with LAHF among Muslim women.  
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In Stage A all levels of qualification were significantly and negatively associated with 
LAHF. In Model B1, only education from GCSE (grades A-C) upwards are significantly 
and negatively associated with LAHF. The log odds of FE are greater than HE as in 
Stage A.  
Model B2 Income Source 
The second model in Stage B introduces the variable for main source of household 
income. The income source variable retains significance in all Stage B models. 
Model B3 – Ethnicity 
None of the ethnic groups are significantly more or less likely to be LAHF than Indian 
women in this model. In this model migrant generation and age are non-significant. The 
inclusion of ethnicity variables makes some difference to the associations of education 
with LAHF. GCSE level qualifications do not significantly reduce the likelihood of 
women being LAHF upon the inclusion of the ethnicity variable, only post-compulsory 
qualifications do.  
Model B4 – Religiosity 
The two measures of religiosity, individual practice and religious salience are included 
in Model B4. The log odds of all independent variables remain consistent in size and 
significance with the preceding models. It is possible to include three measures of 
individual religiosity when modelling LAHF for Muslim women only: five times a day and 
at least daily; with less frequent than daily as the reference category. More frequent 
religious practice is not significantly associated with LAHF. As in Stage A, religious 
salience is not significantly associated with LAHF. 
 
Model B5 Measures of Social Capital 
In this model the two measures of co-ethnic density, neighbourhood and friendship 
group, are included. It is in this model that significant ethnic differences between 
Muslim women emerge. When measures of high co-ethnic density are included 
Pakistani women are the only ethnic group significantly more likely to be LAHF than 
Indian women. It is possible that high levels of co-ethnic density increase the likelihood 
of LAHF among Pakistani women.  Despite making changes to the significance  of 
Pakistani ethnicity in the model, the two measures of social capital have small non-
significant and positive associations with LAHF. 
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Model B6 Measures of Social Capital and Religiosity  
All measures of religiosity and social capital are included in this model. Most of the 
independent variables remain similar in log odds and significance to the main effects 
model. However, as with Model B5 which included measures of co-ethnic density only, 
qualifications below FE do not significantly reduce the likelihood of being in the LAHF 
category for Muslim women. The result of the modelling suggests that the reduced 
significance of qualifications at GCSE level and below is related to features of high co-
ethnic density in neighbourhoods and friendship groups. Also, as in Model B5, 
Pakistani emerges as the only ethnic group that is significantly more likely to be LAHF 
than the reference group of Indian. This suggests that high co-ethnic density operates 
differently for Pakistani women than for Muslim women of other ethnicities.  
Neither measure of co-ethnic density emerges as a significant predictor of LAHF in its 
own right in this model. Log odds of the social capital variables remain small, positive 
and non-significant as in Model B5. Both measures of religiosity remain non-significant 
as in Model B4. Frequent religious practice is significantly associated with LAHF 
amongst all EM women, but is not associated with LAHF for Muslim women, 
Model Fit Results 
The statistical measures for how well the models fit the data show that the models are 
insignificant for All Women but significant for Muslim women. Despite the lack of 
significance under this measure, Stage A models threw up interesting findings, 
particular around the significant association of income source with LAHF which holds 
for all women as well as Muslim women. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test (p=>0.05) is a 
particularly stringent test of significance. The models constructed for Muslim women in 
Stage B are robust predictors of LAHF. The R-squared values show that both Models 1 
and 2 for Muslim women explain between 30-40% of variation in LAHF and the 
inclusion of predictor variables have improved the fit of the models in Stages A and 
Stage B. The inclusion of the independent variables in the models for Muslim women 
improve the predictive capabilities of the model by approximately 5% from the Main 
effects model in B1. The models in Stage B are good predictors of LAHF amongst 
Muslim women. 
The fit of the models for All Women may improve with a larger dataset. Nevertheless, 
some interesting patterns that emerge. Most notably the Muslim penalty is upheld, 
strongly indicating that there is a distinctive Muslim female pattern of LAHF and it 
appears that Muslim women, even the most educated, withdraw from the labour market 
upon marriage. Income source and daily practice are significantly associated with 
LAHF for all women, indicating that high levels of religiosity increase LAHF among all 
102 
 
women, not just Muslim women. In fact, religious practice is not significantly associated 
with LAHF for Muslim women in Stage B. Despite the inclusion of a variety of structural 
and socio-cultural variables to explain LAHF, the interplay of independent variables in 
the statistical models provide incomplete explanation. This is unsurprising because 
unmeasured discrimination (ethno-religious penalties) are likely to cause some of the 
labour market inequalities examined in this chapter. 
 
4.5 Conclusion  
4.5.1 Answering the Research Questions 
Theme 1:  Explaining Economic Activity in the Looking After Home and Family 
Category 
RQ1. What are the key explanatory variables for economic inactivity in the LAHF 
category amongst British Muslim women? 
The results of this analysis show that the key explanatory variables of high levels of 
LAHF amongst Muslim women when using quantitative methods are: marriage; the 
presence of children in the household; and where the main source of household 
income is not from paid employment (most likely state benefits). Pakistani ethnicity is 
significantly associated with LAHF when measures of social capital are accounted for. 
Only post-compulsory qualifications significantly and consistently reduce the likelihood 
of LAHF amongst Muslim women. Measures of social capital or religiosity do not 
significantly increase the likelihood of LAHF among Muslim women but the measure of 
household SES (income source) does. The results indicate that structural factors 
relating to labour market outcomes and opportunities for Muslim men are of greater 
significance in explanations of LAHF than socio-cultural explanations, 
Theme 2: Generational Change 
2a. Is there evidence of generational change in the LAHF outcome? 
The results of the bivariate analysis show that there is generational change across all 
the IVs analysed. There is evidence of generational decline in LAHF when each IV is 
cross-tabulated against LAHF by religion and layered by migrant generation among 
women in each of the four religious groups. Although the percentage change is greater 
for Muslim women in some cases, this is generally from a starting point of higher 
overall rates of LAHF. For many of the IVs, second-generation Muslim women are 
more likely to be LAHF than first-generation women of other religious belongings, 
marital status and presence of children in particular. Measures of religiosity and high 
levels of co-ethnic density in neighbourhoods and friendship groups are the IVs which 
show the lowest levels of generational decline amongst all EM women. 
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In Stage A, overseas birth emerges as a significant and positive predictor of belonging 
to the LAHF category of economic inactivity in one of the seven models: Models A1 
which contained only the main effect IVs. This means that the additional variables in 
subsequent models, which covered the structural factors of household SES by income 
source, and socio-cultural factors of bonding social capital and religiosity, made 
migrant generation an insignificant predictor of LAHF. This indicates that these 
additional variables may be experienced by women of different migrant generations in 
similar ways to lead to the same labour market disadvantage.  
The findings on overseas birth, or first-generation status, are mixed. But the weight of 
the evidence, bivariate analysis and statistical modelling, presented in this chapter 
suggests that some generational decline is occurring in LAHF amongst EM women, 
although at a slower rate among Muslim women. First-generation EM women are 
disadvantaged in relation to the second-generation. The small sample size did not 
allow for more detailed examinations by generation or age so the identification of 
distinct birth cohorts was not possible. 
The lack of statistical significance for migrant generation in Stage B indicates a lack of 
generational decline in the LAHF outcome for Muslim women, in line with the findings 
of Cheung (2014) and Heath and Martin (2013). But, lack of statistical evidence for 
generational decline in LAHF rates does not necessarily mean that generational 
change is not occurring. Second-generation women may be as likely to be LAHF but 
their experiences of, and attitudes to, paid employment may be very different from 
those of first-generation women. Similarly, more recently-arrived first-generation 
women may be different to their earlier first-generation predecessors. Attitudes to, 
experiences of, and motivations for, economic activity are topics which will be of 
importance to the subsequent qualitative inquiry.   
Theme 4 Religion and Religiosity  
RQ4. Do religious beliefs and practices have an impact on economic inactivity 
amongst British Muslim women? If so, how, and is there generational variation? 
The existence of an overarching Muslim penalty is upheld in the results of all models in 
Stage 1. Muslim women are the only religious group significantly more likely to be 
LAHF than Christian women in all Stage A models. The log odds of religious affiliation 
vary across the models and reduce in size from Model A1 (main effects) upon the 
inclusion of variables in subsequent models. High co-ethnic density, measures of 
religiosity and SES can explain some of the Muslim penalty identified in Model A1. A 
significant disadvantage remains for Muslims and this is likely to be caused by the 
unmeasured effect of ethno-religious discrimination.  
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In the Stage B models, and upon the inclusion of the variable relating to bonding social 
capital, Pakistani ethnicity became statistically significant. Pakistani women are the 
only ethnic group significantly more likely to be inactive than Indian Muslim women and 
this appears to be related to high co-ethnic density in neighbourhoods and friendship 
groups. This finding supports previous findings in relation to ethnic diversity in labour 
market outcomes for Muslim women (Brown 2000: Khattab 2009; 2012). The 
association of co-ethnic density with LAHF appears to vary by ethnic belonging.  
Religious salience emerges as a non-significant predictor of LAHF for Muslim women 
in the binary analysis and in both stages of statistical modelling. Frequency of 
individual religious practice is a better predictor of labour market outcomes, significant 
in both the binary analysis and in Stage A models. EM women who undertake some 
form of individual practice at least daily are more likely to be LAHF than those who 
practice less frequently. Religious practice is however a non-significant predictor of 
LAHF among Muslim women in the Stage B models. There are however several issues 
around the wording of questions on religious practice in the EMBES 2010 and the high 
level of positive responses (indicating social desirability bias) amongst Muslim women 
in the more frequent categories of religious practice. These issues have been 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and in the earlier sections of this chapter.  
The percentage of Muslim women who stated that they undertake some form of 
religious practice five times a day or at least daily is higher than amongst women of 
other religious belongings. These high figures seem unlikely to be an accurate 
reflection of individual religious practice amongst Muslims in Britain. This viewpoint is a 
result of the author’s own experiences of being a British Muslim, personal knowledge of 
British Muslim communities and an outcome of having conducted academic research 
with Muslim communities over a period of ten years (Khan 2012; Scourfield et al. 
2013). The statistic around high levels of individual practice was checked with 
interviewees and gatekeepers during the qualitative fieldwork phase, and with other 
academic researchers in the field of British Muslim studies throughout the course of the 
PhD project. The consensus was that this figure of high levels of individual practice 
was inflated for several possible reasons. The wording of questions around religious 
practice in surveys require further consideration and more rigorous testing, perhaps in 
the form of cognitive testing, to uncover a means of attaining more accurate responses.  
Theme 5 High Co-ethnic Concentration 
RQ5. Do dense British Muslim communities and social networks promote or 
inhibit economic activity amongst women? 
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The binary analysis shows that half or more of all EM women, of first and second-
generation, are likely to have co-ethnically dense friendship groups. Muslim women 
with dense co-ethnic friendship groups and neighbourhoods are more likely to be LAHF 
than those with more mixed social networks and neighbourhoods. In modelling Stages 
A and B measures of high co-ethnic concentration are not significantly associated with 
LAHF.  
As such, the findings presented in this chapter do not support arguments for the 
positive (Franceschelli and O’Brien 2014; Khattab and Modood 2018) or negative 
(Dwyer 2000; Mohammad 2005a) effects of dense co-ethnic neighbourhoods on socio-
economic outcomes. The findings do lend support to the argument that married women 
are disadvantaged in relation to their labour market outcomes and that the influence of 
co-ethnic social networks may operate differently, and as a source of labour market 
disadvantage, for married women. The statistical measures of co-ethnic density do not 
however tell us how life in dense co-ethnic neighbourhoods is experienced, or the 
barriers it might raise to economic activity. The volume of evidence and opinion would 
suggest that the effects on economic activity are negative (Mohammad 2005a; 2005b; 
2010; Casey 2016) 
Theme 6 Home and Family 
RQ6a. What is the contemporary picture of the impact of marriage on the 
economic activity of Muslim women? 
RQ6b. How do occupational status of partners impact on the economic activity 
of Muslim women?  
The binary analysis shows that LAHF is a far more common labour market outcome for 
married women than for single women. Amongst single women, Muslim is the only 
religious group with a notable proportion of LAHF women. 24% of single Muslim 
women are LAHF compared to 60% of married Muslim women. This indicates that 
there are factors that impact equally on single and married women to result in LAHF 
that are unrelated to marriage, such as bonding social capital or socio-economic status. 
Twice the percentage of married Muslim women are LAHF compared to married 
women from other religious groups. Although there is some evidence of generational 
decline in this outcome for Muslim women, married second-generation Muslim women 
are more likely to be LAHF than second-generation women of other religious 
belongings. The results strongly indicate that marriage is a major contributing factor in 
high levels of LAHF amongst Muslim women. In the binary analysis marriage had a 
strong and positive association with LAHF, this is one of the most notable distinctions 
between Muslim women and those of other religions. In the modelling stages, both A 
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and B, marriage has a strong, constant and positive association with the likelihood of a 
woman being LAHF.  
In the binary analysis Muslim women who lived in households where children were 
present were more likely to be LAHF than women of other religions. The question 
asked in the EMBES asked about the presence of individuals below the age of 18 in 
the household, it is not certain that they are the children of the survey respondent. 
Overall the log odds of the presence of children are smaller than those of marriage 
across all Stage A and Stage B models, it has a positive and significant association 
with the likelihood of women being in the LAHF category. The presence of children is 
significant at the <0.05 level  for Muslim women in Stage B, whilst it is significant at  
<0.01 level for all women in Stage A. 
The results of this analysis support the argument that daughters-in-law, or married 
women, are disadvantaged in their labour market outcomes in relation to daughters, or 
single women. This finding supports the argument that married women are subject to 
greater barriers or constraints in family or community life when other variables such as 
education and age are held constant. There is a lack of statistical significance for 
migrant generation in models in Stage B for Muslim women, indicating that strong 
gendered social norms about economic activity are operating in a similar way on all 
married Muslim women. Log odds for the presence of children in the household are 
similar in models across Stages A and B. Marriage seems to operate as a greater 
constraint than family formation. The results with regards to marriage provide a strong 
lead for the direction of qualitative investigation. 
Bivariate analysis of the interaction terms MaritalStatus*PartnerSES showed a 
significant association between Class 3 (manual/unemployed) households and LAHF 
for all religious groups. A higher percentage of Muslim women in Class 1 households 
were LAHF than women of other religious belongings. It may be the case that Muslim 
women with partners of higher SES are choosing to be LAHF because there is no 
financial necessity for them to work and they have therefore chosen to prioritise their 
roles as wives and mothers in the domestic sphere. There are indications that this 
variable might produce more fruitful results in statistical analysis with a larger sample. 
Qualitative interviews might shed light on how Muslim women make decisions about 
their economic activity in relation to SES or source of household income.  
The other income source variable was significantly and positively associated with LAHF 
across the Stage A and Stage B models. The income source variable in Model A2 
reduces the log odds of Muslim belonging and education, increases the log odds of 
marriag,e and causes the migrant generation variable to become non-significant as 
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compared to Model A1. Income source is a less significant factor in the explanation of 
LAHF among Muslim women (p=<0.05 in Stage B) than for all EM women (p=<0.01 in 
Stage A). Nevertheless,  the other income source variable had consistent log odds and 
significance in all Stage B models. Income source is a useful addition to explanations 
of LAHF amongst EM women in Britain.  
Education 
Education was included as a control variable in the model but there were several 
interesting findings related to this variable. In Stage A models all levels of British 
qualifications significantly reduce the likelihood of LAHF amongst EM women as 
compared to having no qualifications. Education has the expected effect on labour 
market outcomes within theories of integration and assimilation. In Stage B only 
qualifications at FE level and above have a consistent and positive effect on reducing 
the likelihood of women being LAHF amongst Muslim women in most of the models. 
GCSE qualifications do not significantly reduce the likelihood of LAHF on the inclusion 
of ethnicity and measures of co-ethnic density in Stage B. Pakistani ethnicity is 
significant only in the models where measures of co-ethnic density are included. This 
indicates that secondary education level qualifications do not reduce the likelihood of 
LAHF among Pakistani women; these women may be more likely to choose to be 
LAHF, or they have fewer opportunities to enter the labour market.  
It is largely only qualifications from FE onwards that reduce the likelihood of LAHF 
among Muslim women whereas in Stage A models, all levels of education reduce the 
likelihood of LAHF amongst all EM women. This finding lends credence to the belief 
within Muslim communities that the second-generation must work harder than the 
White majority and have a higher level of educational attainment to succeed in the 
labour market and achieve socio-economic parity (Dale et al 2002; Khattab and 
Modood 2018).  Labour market entry may only be possible for Muslim women with 
post-compulsory qualifications because they have access to resources that facilitate 
their economic activity that women without qualifications do not, such as access to 
bridging social capital. All children must attend school until Year 11 and  therefore will 
have unconditional access to GCSE level education. Up to this stage their attainment 
may be reflective of structural and legal frameworks around education for children 
rather than their own, or parents’, socio-cultural preferences. Young Muslim women 
who come from families that permit access to post-compulsory education may also 
receive support for economic activity after leaving education.  
The high number of second-generation Muslim women with no qualifications is cause 
for concern and is likely to be strongly related to their economic inactivity. Women with 
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no formal qualifications are likely to encounter difficulties in finding employment. 
Furthermore, low levels of educational attainment are also an indication of a lack of the 
material, social and cultural resources required to support educational attainment 
and/or a lack of parental support for education or subsequent economic activity 
amongst some Muslim parents. Post-compulsory education significantly reduces the 
likelihood of LAHF for Muslim women; it reduces structural barriers to gaining 
employment but may also indicate fewer socio-cultural barriers to education and work 
for single women, but not necessarily for married women.  
There was a significant and positive association of marriage with the likelihood of 
women being LAHF in the multivariate analysis. The results of the bivariate analysis of 
the MaritalStatus*HE interaction strongly indicate that the reason why Muslim women 
at all educational levels are more likely to be inactive than women of other religious 
belongings is related to experiences of marriage. Married women with HE qualifications 
are significantly more likely to be LAHF than single women with HE qualifications.  
FE has a greater log odds than HE across all models and both stages. This result is 
surprising as the weight of evidence, qualitative and quantitative, suggests that it is 
higher education, university attendance and undergraduate degree level qualifications 
that most significantly improve labour market outcomes for EM women. The FE 
variable in this analysis includes a range of qualifications from GCSE up to first degree, 
including A Levels, Advanced level GNVQs and diplomas, the range of qualifications 
may explain this surprising result. Also, it may be the case that FE level qualifications 
are most suited to employment opportunities available in the local labour markets found 
in disadvantaged areas and/or areas of high ethnic density. This finding also supports 
the suggestion that women with HE qualifications are unlikely to work if they are unable 
to find work that is commensurate with their qualifications.  
There is no definitive answer to this finding, but it is of interest and an indication that 
qualification levels other than HE should be considered in relation to labour market 
outcomes. Also, the construction of education variables, particularly the differentiation 
of levels of attainment, needs to be carefully outlined in statistical studies. It may be the 
case that in previous studies HE has included diplomas or technical qualifications 
whilst in this study HE qualifications included first degree and above only. 
4.5.2 Conclusion and Implications  
By including measures that cut across socio-cultural and structural domains this 
analysis sought to explain some of the “complex inequality structure” that British 
Muslim women face in becoming, or remaining, economically active (Khattab and 
Hussain 2017, p.15) The results show that the inequalities cut across socio-cultural and 
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structural domains. The specific measure of the social capital was statistically 
insignificant in the modelling stage. However, all structural and cultural constraints are 
experienced within the contexts of social networks. There is ethnic diversity in the 
outcome of LAHF among Muslim women and Pakistani women are significantly more 
likely to be LAHF than Muslim women of other ethnic groups. 
Low levels of generational change and statistical insignificance for the migrant 
generation variable indicate that the circumstances of Muslim women across the two 
generations are more similar than those of first and second-generation women of other 
religious belonging. Lower levels of generational change are indicative of strong 
normative patterns, framed by structural discrimination. Generational decline in LAHF 
rates is occurring  more slowly for Muslim women than for women of other religious 
groups . Nevertheless, the evidence for generational change (most evident in binary 
analysis) cannot be discounted. Low levels of measured changes in outcomes do not 
mean that generational shifts are not occurring, more subtle shifts and changes may be 
discernible in qualitative inquiry. 
Marriage and education have significant and opposing effects on LAHF for Muslim 
women. The qualitative literature on experiences of economically-inactive adult British 
Muslim women is now rather dated (Shaw 1988; Werbner 1990; Brah 1994). Ethnic 
traditions, gender norms, family and community structures are likely to have undergone 
some changes, if not transformation, since this early qualitative research was 
undertaken. A contemporary insight into the effects of marriage and family formation on 
economic inactivity through qualitative inquiry will be an important contribution to the 
existing literature.  
Some of the observed effects of marriage on LAHF may be related to the low-income 
employment status of husbands and a reliance on the state benefits system for 
household income. In these cases, the economic activity of a woman may not bring any 
additional financials benefits to, and might even reduce, overall household income. The 
consistent significant association with other income source and LAHF in the statistical 
findings has led to a specific question on income source being added to Theme 6 
Home and Family for the qualitative phase. Research question 6c:  What is the effect of 
main source of household income, and particularly the receipt of state benefits, have 
on LAHF? 
The findings in relation to religiosity were interesting. Individual religious practice 
emerged as a stronger predictor of LAHF than religious salience or communal practice 
among the women in the sample. Some concerns were raised about the way in which 
questions about religiosity were asked within the EMBES 2010. Qualitative interviewing 
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will provide insight into the content of religious beliefs about economic activity. By 
including questions about everyday routines a picture of religious practice in the lives of 
individual women will emerge which will enable further conclusions to be drawn about 
the responses elicited by the survey method in the EMBES 2010.  
Cross-sectional data from the EMBES 2010 cannot answer the question of how LAHF 
is experienced by Muslim women. It may be the case that it is viewed as evidence for 
poor integration and vulnerability by academics and policy-makers but is experienced 
differently by some Muslim women themselves. There is also insufficient empirical 
qualitative evidence on how Muslim women experience the effects of high co-ethnic 
density, religiosity and household socio-economic status on LAHF in the contemporary 
context. The collection and analysis of qualitative data arising from this project will seek 
to fill these gaps.  
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Chapter 5: Methodology II 
Mixed Methods Research Strategy 
 Phase 2: Qualitative Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter introduces the qualitative phase of the research project. In the first 
section, the theoretical and practical underpinnings of the research plan are outlined. 
The second section of the chapter consists of critical reflections on the qualitative 
research process. The mixed methods research (MMR) strategy used in this project is 
sequential QUANT-QUAL wherein both research approaches are given equal weight at 
all stages (Creswell et al. 2003). The direction of the sequence indicates that the 
quantitative phase feeds into the qualitative research and analysis. 
A statistical analysis of the Looking After Home and Family (LAHF) category of 
economic activity was presented in Chapter 4. Binary and multivariate analysis of the 
EMBES 2010 dataset was conducted to identify significant explanatory variables in 
explanations of high levels of LAHF among British Muslim women. The qualitative 
phase of the project has been designed to create a dataset that is complementary to 
the statistical analysis of the EMBES 2010; adding depth to the breadth of statistical 
findings of a nationally representative dataset (Teddlie and Yu 2007; Elliot et al. 2018). 
The quantitative findings made a substantial contribution to the development of a 
purposive sample of interviewees that allowed comparability between cases; 
comparison and contrast are core to qualitative data analysis strategies in MMR 
projects (Hesse-Biber 2010).  
5.2 Integrating quantitative findings and designing a purposive 
sample 
The bivariate analysis presented in Chapter 4 revealed evidence for generational shifts 
across a range of socio-economic outcomes, including economic inactivity.  Second-
generation Muslim women were not, however, significantly less likely to be LAHF than 
first-generation women in the multivariate modelling stage. The discussion concluded 
that the lack of evidence for statistically significant generational change in the outcome 
of LAHF did not necessarily mean that the explanatory variables played out in the 
same way in the lives of first and second-generation Muslim women. Generational 
theories of integration or assimilation suggest that different migrant generations will 
have different socio-economic experiences as well as outcomes. The qualitative data 
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will provide evidence on what changes, if any, are taking place in the contexts of 
Muslim families and communities with regard to LAHF. No evidence of change will be 
an equally interesting finding, particularly if evidence for marked continuity in the 
ethnoreligious norms and practices that might impact negatively on economic activity is  
identified.  
A focus on generation is justified by the emphasis on generational change in theories 
of socio-economic integration. More detailed understandings of the disadvantages 
faced by different groups of Muslim women in the labour market are required to 
understand the lack of generational improvement in economic activity. The sample of 
interviewees will therefore be stratified primarily by generation. The consensus on the 
optimum number of interviews to be conducted in a qualitative doctoral level study is 30 
(Baker and Edwards 2012; Bremborg, 2011). Accordingly, interviews will be 
undertaken with 15 first-generation and 15 second-generation women.  
The existing body of qualitative evidence on socio-cultural practices, or ‘traditions’, that 
result in high levels of LAHF among Muslim women requires updating to reflect the 
current societal context. Most of the qualitative literature on ethnoreligious norms is 
based on empirical research with British Pakistani women; to use the existing literature 
as a reference point for comparisons over time and generation for other ethnic groups 
is problematic. Further, the multivariate analysis showed that Pakistani women were 
the only ethnoreligious group of Muslim women who were significantly more likely to be 
LAHF than Indian women. These factors justify limiting the sample to Pakistani women.  
A sample of only Pakistani women will make possible assessments of change over 
time and generation by referring to an extensive body of literature. Pakistanis are the 
largest ethnic group of Muslims in Britain and have a long history of migration and 
settlement, therefore trends across first, second and even third generations will be 
evident within this group. This strategy will also reduce the ‘noise’ created by ethnic 
variations in religious practice, which can be substantial (Gilliat-Ray 2010a).  
On a practical level, the researcher is a fluent speaker of Urdu and Punjabi and has 
experience of conducting qualitative research in these languages. Therefore, any first 
generation Pakistani participants could be interviewed in their first language and their 
interviews transcribed by the researcher - removing the need for language 
interpretation and translation services. Also, by focusing on a single ethnicity the 
recruitment of participants could take place in a single area of high co-ethnic density, 
allowing comparisons to be made between Muslim women of different migrant 
generations and birth cohorts who live in the same geographically bounded community.   
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Marriage, motherhood and income source emerged as consistent and positive 
indicators of LAHF among Muslim women. These variables will be included in the 
qualitative phase under the research theme Home and Family.  Income source had 
originally been included in the statistical analysis as a measure of household socio-
economic status. The variable turned out to be a significant predictor of LAHF among 
all groups of women, in modelling stages A and B. A specific research question on 
income source was therefore added: RQ6C What is the impact of the receipt of state 
benefits on LAHF among Muslim women? The occupational patterns and economic 
activity of men will also be addressed during the interviews. The research theme 
around experiences of work relies solely on qualitative analysis because as a cross-
sectional dataset the EMBES does not allow examination of changes in economic 
activity over time. 
Close examination of the methodologies of qualitative research into the economic 
activity of Muslim women revealed that previous empirical qualitative work has involved 
interviews with a limited range of Muslim women. The Muslim women sampled in this 
previous research are often young (between adolescence and early adulthood); second 
or third migrant generation; educated to a minimum of GCSE level within the British 
education system; and fluent in English (Dale 2008; Bagguley and Hussain 2016). A 
further criticism of previous qualitative studies is that respondents appeared to have 
been recruited from locations such as university faith-based groups and networks of 
educated and/or professional groups. A key methodological aim was that the sample 
should, as far as possible, include women who are ‘hard (or harder) to reach’. To 
examine a range of experiences over time and life-stages, and perhaps both economic 
activity and inactivity, the sample of interviewees will include women aged over 30 at 
the time of interview with an upper age limit of 65.  
Quantitative findings relating to religiosity revealed that religious salience was an 
insignificant predictor of LAHF. It was suggested in the discussion of statistical findings 
that it is perhaps the content of religious beliefs relating to economic activity, rather 
than religious salience, that may affect economic activity. There is evidence of 
generational differences in religious beliefs and practice (Dale 2002a; Akhtar 2014). 
Little is known about the religious beliefs concerning economic activity held by working-
class second-generation Muslim women or younger cohorts of first-generation women. 
Conducting research in an area of high co-ethnic density and in an area that has a high 
score on the Index of Multiple Deprivation will increase the likelihood of including 
women from working-class backgrounds from a mix of birth cohorts and migration 
generations.  
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Religious practice was positively associated with LAHF for all EM women but not for 
Muslim women in the statistical analysis. The lack of association for Muslim women 
may be a result of underpowered models due to the small sample. This finding does 
however confirm the results of the study by Khattab et al. (2017) which found that 
religiosity does not have a negative impact on the economic activity of Muslim women. 
Some concerns have been raised about the validity of the large number of Muslims 
reporting high levels of religious practice in the EMBES 2010 survey, as well as the 
construction of the index of religiosity by Khattab et al. (2017) in Chapter 3. It would be 
informative to know more about patterns of everyday religious practice among Muslim 
women to see if concerns about social desirability bias in responses to questions about 
religious practice in the EMBES 2010 are justified. The qualitative data will also allow 
some triangulation of quantitative findings that suggest that frequent religious practice 
is not a barrier to economic activity. 
The plan was to conduct 30 in-depth interviews with 15 first-generation and 15 second- 
generation Pakistani women in the LAHF category, aged between 30 and 65, who lived 
in an area of high co-ethnic density between August 2015 and October 2015. The 
resulting sample contained 14 first generation Pakistani women and 13 second 
generation women and fieldwork took place between August 2015 and January 2016. 
A critical reflection on the qualitative phase of the project is presented in the following 
sections of this chapter.  
5.3 Critical reflections on the qualitative phase 
5.3.1 Qualitative in-depth interviews 
The qualitative method selected was in-depth interviewing. The use of semi-structured 
interviews would allow rich data to be collected with greater focus and predictability and 
in a shorter time-frame than that of ethnographic research (Hammersley 2016). It is 
suggested that this method is best placed to focus on description and classification to 
create a picture of social lives which can be challenged and re-presented by other 
researchers, most usefully when narratives are linked to numbers and images (Savage 
and Burrows 2007). The in-depth interview is regarded as ideally placed to capture 
rich, complex and nuanced data on the multi-faceted, diverse and fluid nature of 
religious belief in the field of the sociology of religion (Stausberg and Engler 2011;  
Bromberg 2011; Roof 2013). The interview method can provide insights on everyday 
practices (Chase 2013); “things that are regular, normative, taken for granted and so 
on are often of great social scientific significance” (Jonathan Potter in Silverman 2017).  
Standard practice for the conduct of semi-structured interviews involves the 
development of a thematic scheme or interview guide which includes main questions 
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and follow-ups (Bromberg 2011). Interviews can be narrative or can take a question 
and answer format. The planning of interviews was made complex because some 
interviews would be conducted in Urdu and Punjabi. There was also unpredictability 
about where the interviews would take place: in homes or other locations. Finally, it 
was anticipated that a narrative approach may not provide sufficient guidance for 
interviewees, particularly first-generation women, who were not accustomed to 
providing detailed accounts of their experiences.  
In lieu of the narrative approach or a semi-structured interview schedule, a thematic 
interview guide was developed (see Appendix 4). This afforded greater flexibility to 
translate questions into other languages and greater responsiveness to the dynamics 
of each interview whilst providing enough prompts where required. The same thematic 
interview guide was used for first and second generation respondents. The interviewing 
strategy was simple, effective and followed the following principle: “simple designs that 
are parsimonious and well-focused are among the best” (Roof 2011, p.78). 
5.3.2 The case study area 
The exact case study area has been anonymised to protect the anonymity of 
participants, therefore a detailed description cannot be presented. The study area 
spans two electoral wards in Manchester. It was selected because it has a dense 
Pakistani and Muslim population and both wards are areas of high multiple deprivation. 
The area is ethnically diverse with a long history of international migrations and has a 
dense and very visible concentration of Muslims of Pakistani heritage.  
Pakistani migration to the area commenced in the 1950s and the Pakistani community 
there now comprises of first, second, and third generations. The majority of families 
come from rural, pre-migration conditions but, as within other long-settled British 
Pakistani communities, there has always been a small-scale presence of migrants from 
urban and professional backgrounds who tend to be influential within the Pakistani 
community (Anwar 1979; Shaw 1988: Werbner 1990). In terms of household economic 
circumstances there are significantly lower numbers of owner occupiers compared with 
the national average. The numbers of workless households with dependent children 
are more than twice the national average (Manchester City Council 2017). 
 
The Pakistani Muslim community is embedded in the area, both culturally and 
structurally. There are several long-established and purpose-built mosques in the area 
as well as a whole host of local ethnic businesses providing goods and services 
catering for the Muslim and Pakistani communities. There is an ethnic enclave 
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including retail outlets; professional services firms; manufacturers and wholesalers of 
clothing; take-aways and restaurants; and taxi firms.  
 
Anonymisation of the case study area was a difficult decision, doing so “decouple[d] 
events from historically and geographically bounded locations” (Nespor 2000 in 
Saunders et al. 2015, p.618). Anonymity keeps participants identities secret and the 
ideal is that the participants are never traceable from the data presented about them 
(Saunders et al. 2015). Local area characteristics and the local labour market are very 
important to studies of labour market outcomes. The original research plan and 
consent procedure stated that the area would be named but participants and 
gatekeeping organisations would not, thus this added layer of anonymity was not 
ethically or procedurally problematic. Ethical decisions about anonymisation are a 
balance between ethics and deciding what needs to be described (Bromberg 2011). 
 
This position was reconsidered on a number of occasions, including towards the end of 
the final analysis and writing-up period; it had been two years since the interviews were 
conducted and this reduced the risk of identification because there may have been 
considerable changes in the women’s lives.  On balance, it was decided that the 
potential risks to the anonymity of research participants were too great. The 
presentation of findings that explain LAHF include essential details on migration 
histories of individuals and families, employment patterns of various family members, 
age, educational level and interactions within social networks. The case study area was 
anonymised and given the pseudonym of Mohallaton. Mohalla is the Urdu word for 
neighbourhood: a derivative of the word Mahol which means environment.  
 
5.3.3 Critical reflections on fieldwork 
Within the MMR framework it is recognised that the description of findings and methods 
will require different forms of prose and description (Hesse-Biber 2016). The 
importance of reflexivity requires the qualitative researcher to locate themselves in the 
research process. The researcher holds a dual role as both researcher and a research 
subject due to the co-constructed nature of the encounter (Matteson and Lincoln 2009). 
This entails a shift from passive voice to including the active and authentic voice of the 
researcher (Thapar‐Bjorket and Henry 2004).  
 
I account for my own place in the research in relation to my personal characteristics 
and acknowledge how this influenced the data collected in this critical reflection on the 
qualitative research process. Although further reflexivity is advocated by some authors 
117 
 
(Day, 2002), there is a danger that this contributes little to systematic understandings of 
qualitative data (Delamont and Atkinson 2004). My ethos has been to privilege the 
accounts of participants rather than my own experiences.  
 
5.3.4 Recruitment and engagement 
I considered the aim of completing 30 interviews in approximately three months 
realistic due to my previous extensive experience in conducting qualitative research 
with Muslim, and otherwise marginalised, groups of women in a variety of settings 
since 2007 (Khan et al. 2012; Scourfield et al. 2013; Chimba et al. 2012). On reflection, 
the original aim may have been overly optimistic. The fieldwork process was longer 
than expected and it forced me to diversify my approaches to engagement. I had the 
opportunity therefore to have many informal conversations about my project, and to 
participate in a range of social activities with Pakistani women in Mohallaton. This 
resulted in a far richer understanding of community life in Mohallaton. 
At the outset of fieldwork, I had a single contact in Mohallaton. This was a member of 
my mother’s kinship network who lives in the area. Making contact with this distant aunt 
resulted in meeting an influential gatekeeper, Khalida, who introduced me to the 
coordinator of a local community group for EM women. I was very aware that a single 
contact would not generate the number of required interviews within the short time-
scale. Snowballing from a single contact might also lead to homogeneity in the socio-
economic or socio-demographic characteristics of respondents. Throughout the 
research process I used a variety of methods to meet potential research participants 
including organisation-level access to community groups and activities; snowballing; 
and more opportunistic engagement in community spaces. There was no distinct phase 
of moving from one method of engagement to another, instead they overlapped as I 
responded to the realities of being in the field.  
The first stage in becoming familiar with Mohallaton began with spending time in the 
area, looking into shops, chatting to shop-owners, leaving copies of a project leaflet 
(see Appendix 1) and looking at advertisements and posters for local community 
groups.  It was on that first trip that I realised that my professional ‘uniform’ of jeans 
with a smart top made me stand out in the area so I bought, and immediately changed 
into, a long kurta (ethnic shirt).  
Contrary to my expectations, I had greater obstacles to securing the participation of 
economically inactive second-generation women than first-generation. Although these 
women were happy to engage with me, they were very hesitant to take part in an 
interview to talk about their views and perspectives. Several interviews were cancelled 
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at very short notice. I attribute this hesitance to a sense of embarrassment because 
they were economically inactive. Some women said that they worried whether they 
would be able to provide the ‘correct’ answers to my questions. There was also a 
nervousness about the nature of questions that would be asked. At the start of one 
interview I can only describe the interviewee’s look as one of complete terror; Shabana 
relaxed within the first five minutes of the interview and gave some insightful and rich 
responses to my questions. By the end of the interview we had built up a good rapport 
and I asked her what had made her so nervous; she replied that she thought I would 
ask questions about her intimate relationship with her husband despite having seen the 
information sheet and signed a consent form (see Appendix 2 and 3) 
The two migrant generations had very different social networks with little social or 
community-level interaction with one another in terms of friendship groups and social 
activities, despite living in the same area and regardless of age. To increase my 
opportunities to meet second-generation women I identified alternative gatekeeper 
organisations. For example, I approached a local mosque that appeared to provide 
facilities and services for women. I was able to obtain the email address of the 
chairman of the mosque committee and sent a formal email of introduction along with 
the project information sheet. My initial email was received positively by the chairman 
and he told me that he would raise the possibility of my having access to some of the 
female activities and facilities at the next monthly mosque committee meeting.  
When contacting mosque committees, it is important to bear in mind that they are 
staffed by volunteers who often have full-time jobs. Whilst I was waiting for a response 
from the mosque committee, a number of women I met offered to give me the contact 
details for female volunteers at the mosque or asked me to accompany them to 
mosque-based activities but I decided, rightly, to wait until I had obtained official 
permission. The level of access and assistance offered to me subsequently was 
generous and valuable. It was only in early December that I received confirmation that I 
could access the mosque and was given the contact details of a female volunteer who 
would help me to meet potential participants. I attended and participated in a number of 
activities at the mosque including a coffee morning, exercise class, halaqa and Quran 
recitation class. 
Many of the managers and volunteers at the organisations went above and beyond my 
expectations in helping me to meet women who met the requirements of my sample 
and providing access to meeting rooms to conduct interviews, as well as hot lunches 
and cups of coffee. The gatekeeper organisations or groups included a dars (Islamic 
Studies class in a private home); various women-only community groups; a 
mainstream community centre; a weekly parents coffee morning at a local high school; 
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mosque-based activities; and a toddler playgroup at a local Sure Start centre. I 
participated in a range of activities; this was not data collection as such but rather part 
of my approach to engaging with Pakistani women in the area. Some of these activities 
included participating in an exercise class; reciting the Quran in a tajweed class; 
sweeping up sand and cutting fruit at a mother and toddler group; and making cups of 
tea for volunteers at a drop-in session at a local community centre.  
My dependency on these organisations, however, came with certain conditions and a 
degree of loss of control over the way in which participants were engaged. This had an 
impact on how some of the research interviews were conducted and required some 
adjustment of my personal interview technique and method, therefore affecting the 
nature of the data collected. My ideal approach would have been to introduce the 
project to a group of women and then to have collected contact details of those 
interested to contact them later and arrange an interview. Instead, in one community 
group the co-ordinator selected the first generation women to be interviewed and the 
interviews were to be conducted in a meeting room in a local community centre. 
Similarly, the high school insisted that I undertook interviews on school premises and 
not ask the women for their contact details. Researchers don’t always have agency or 
the ability to take action and can feel helpless and immobilised in the research setting 
(Henry 2007). 
On reflection, I should have spent more time with the co-ordinator to discuss the 
parameters of engaging respondents and clarified what would be acceptable to both of 
us. I did raise this with her later and she stated that her control over the process had 
been to limit the risks to the interviewees. A previous academic researcher had 
conducted research in private homes and this had caused trouble for the women 
whose husbands had objected to the presence of a researcher in their homes. 
I feel that the group leader selected the participants she felt, in her own words, would 
give “nice” interviews. I took this to mean interviews that would represent the group and 
the wider community in a positive way. The women selected were educated and from 
urban areas of Pakistan. It is unlikely that these first generation women, let alone those 
from rural origins, would have been as willing to take part without the endorsement of 
the co-ordinator. Although I lost some control over the situation, her support was 
invaluable and the potential bias is acknowledged. These women did in fact give 
accounts which I believe to be critical and reflective in their observations on the 
community and their own experiences.   
The skilful and diplomatic management of difficult situations is an essential skill for a 
qualitative researcher. For example, I took a short break on the second day of 
interviewing at the community centre and returned to the meeting room to find my last 
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interviewee for the day had already arrived. She was dressed in a sari, which was 
unusual for a Pakistani woman in Mohallaton, and spoke Urdu with a slight accent. This 
woman, a Muslim woman of Indian heritage who did not live in the Mohallaton, had 
taken the place of another interviewee. I spent some time trying to explain to her that I 
only meant to interview Pakistani women, and she spent some time trying to convince 
me that being Indian was really not that different to being Pakistani.  
After she asked when she would get her voucher more than once, I realised that her 
insistence on taking part was related to the financial incentive. She agreed to the 
consent procedure and I undertook a brief interview of 10 minutes with her and signed 
off on her voucher; the resulting audio file was not saved or transcribed. As it was the 
last of the interviews with the women at the community centre, I did not raise it as an 
issue with the co-ordinator and can now look back at the episode with some 
amusement. As Gilliat-Ray reminds us, data collection can be “uncomfortable, 
confusing, amusing, and traumatic” (Gilliat-Ray 2010, p.418). 
It is important to acknowledge the spatial and temporal parameters of data collection 
(Hammersley 2016). Locations such as homes and institutions have different socio-
cultural and institutional norms and rules on behaviour and performance (Gilliat-Ray 
2010). My presumption has always been that the family home would be the most 
convenient place for women to be interviewed and I have always put forward this 
option as if I am being particularly accommodating. On reflection, and as a direct result 
of fieldwork for this project, I now see this was indeed presumptuous and rather selfish.  
Access to family homes is another rich source of data in the form of field notes; one is 
able to observe and note practices and displays of religiosity and other aspects of 
culture as well as observe social interactions amongst family members and to see 
everyday life in action. Also, respondents tend to be more relaxed and open within their 
own home; they are often able to spend more time on the interview and this leads to 
more in-depth and rich interview experiences. The home is then perhaps the ideal 
location for data collection for me, but perhaps not best for the women being 
interviewed. 
There are a number of drawbacks for interviewees when they take part in interviews in 
private homes. For all women, particularly those with young children, making the home 
presentable for a researcher may be an additional burden on their daily domestic 
routines. Women who are LAHF might be expected by their family and friends to be at 
home and therefore may be more likely to be interrupted during the interview. Where a 
family is workless, discussion of household income is likely to be a sensitive topic and 
the male partner is more likely to be in the home. Given the high proportion of Pakistani 
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men working unsociable/flexible hours in self-employment, such as catering or taxi-
driving, this may also be the case for women with working male partners. Where there 
is informal work or fraudulent benefits claims, the male partner may be very reluctant 
for his partner to take part in a research interview.  
Had I insisted on undertaking interviews in private family homes, I believe far fewer 
women would have taken part and there was a potential risk of harm to the participants 
by disrupting family relations, even if momentarily. I do not know how many of the 
interviewees told their husbands that they had taken part in the project: certainly none 
explicitly told me that they had. The interviews were conducted in a location of the 
respondents’ choice: eleven interviews took place in meeting rooms in community 
centres and sixteen took places in respondents’ homes.  
The initial, three month plan became an intensive fieldwork period of six months, with 
almost daily trips and frequent cancelled interviews. Persistence and professional 
conduct were key to eventually obtaining the final sample. For example, a BME 
umbrella organisation in Manchester gave me the contact details for the manager of a 
local community centre. I sent an introductory email with details about the project but 
did not receive a reply. I visited the centre when I saw it was open one day and the 
manager, who had read the email but had been too busy to reply, spent some time 
talking to me over a cup of coffee. I was invited back to the community centre to 
observe activities and engage with second generation young women: two interviews 
resulted from this contact. Towards the end of the fieldwork in December, I dropped off 
some small boxes of chocolates to add to the Christmas food parcels that would be 
sent out from the foodbank which operated from the centre. 
I refer to the qualitative phase of the project as fieldwork and not simply qualitative 
interviewing. When I referred to it as “a qualitative study with ethnographic moments” at 
a research methods conference for early career researchers it was clear that some of 
the ethnographers did not approve of this description. Without meaning to disrespect 
carefully planned ethnographic fieldwork, I feel that this is a useful description of the 
extent of my engagement in Mohallaton. Observing first hand gave rich insights into the 
experiences of the women who live there, including everyday experiences that were 
not spoken about in interviews. 
For example, after a day of fieldwork I called into a halal supermarket on the high street 
in Mohallaton on my way home. As usual, I was not wearing hijab and on that day 
might have stood out because I was wearing a brightly coloured kurta. The first-
generation, young, Pakistani man serving me at the meat counter spoke to me in a 
sing-song voice and in a manner that can only be described as flirtatious, which I found 
offensive and inappropriate. He clearly sensed this in my manner when I spoke to him 
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in English and proceeded to serve me in a more subdued way. This experience told me 
something about the way in which women who do not wear hijab are regarded by some 
men in Mohallaton and the very public way in which men can comment or behave 
towards the women around them. It was my ability to speak up, loudly and clearly, in 
English, and the possession of confidence to express my displeasure, that I was able 
to immediately assert some authority over the situation. The experience remains an 
unpleasant and vivid memory. If this behaviour is commonplace, then it might be an 
effective form of social control over women that was recognised in studies conducted in 
the 1980s and 1990s (Shaw 1988; 2000; Mohammed 2005a; 2005b).  
Fieldnotes on experiences in the field were not treated in the same way as interview 
data; they were not coded or analysed, but they deepened my knowledge of the social 
realities of Mohallaton and therefore contributed to the overall analysis. Some 
references are made to fieldnotes where they add to description or analysis in the 
following qualitative findings chapters.  
5.3.5 Researcher position and research ethics 
The qualitative phase of the research project received approval from the School of 
Social Sciences Ethics Committee at Cardiff University. Permission to give each 
interviewee a gesture of thanks in the form of a £20 gift voucher for a local supermarket 
was approved within the application. As well as procedural approval, the conduct of 
qualitative research required constant consideration of what constituted ethical 
behaviour as a researcher, including the way in which I positioned myself in relation to 
the women I interviewed and observed. 
The research context is constructed by the researcher and participants through social 
interaction (Hammersley 2016). A researcher’s personhood is an essential and ever-
present aspect of investigation and it is important for them to situate themselves in the 
research (Dwyer and Buckle 2009). The researcher’s embodied presence is critical in 
data collection and interpretation; visible markers of difference such as gender, age, 
race and ethnicity have a critical influence on data collection by determining levels of 
access and providing cues about the trustworthiness of the researcher (Gilliat-Ray 
2011).  
In terms of my own positionality, at the time of the qualitative fieldwork I was 35 years 
old. I am a British Muslim, Pakistani woman. I was born and raised in Rochdale. I 
speak Urdu and Punjabi fluently. I am the mother of two children. These are the 
features of my personal and social biography that gave me a degree of ‘insider’ status 
during my research activities in Mohallaton. My ability to speak in Urdu and Punjabi in 
particular gave me enhanced status, particularly among first-generation women. It 
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provided a credential of socio-cultural authenticity and meant I was regarded as a 
person with knowledge of Pakistani culture who was entitled to ask questions about 
socio-cultural traditions, social networks and the migration experience. Language was 
the key to fruitful interviews and the collection of rich data on the experiences of first-
generation women.  
I was something of an ‘outsider’ in the case study site as well. Most obviously, I do not 
wear hijab, so I do not publicly and immediately identify as Muslim: unlike most of my 
interviewees. I was not known to people in my case study site and had only one initial 
point of contact. My educational attainment and the fact that I was a PhD student was 
perhaps the feature that most set me apart from the interviewees. 
In terms of how I positioned myself during the fieldwork, I maintained a professional 
demeanour, as opposed to “professional distancing” (Dwyer and Buckle 2009, p.60). It 
was possible to build rapport and conduct research interviews that elicited rich data 
whilst maintaining my professional identity. Unlike Henry (2007) who conducted 
research in India as a ‘diasporic researcher’, I had no problems maintaining the 
position of a legitimate and authoritative researcher. I feel my professional, and 
outsider, status helped my respondents to feel comfortable in the interview context and 
reassured them of my ability to maintain confidentiality and anonymity. 
What I had underestimated, perhaps naively, was the extent to which the topic of work 
and employment was an emotive one, particularly for younger women in the sample 
(both first and second-generation). The questions asked about constraints to economic 
activity elicited emotional responses and insights into familial and marital relationships. 
I conducted the interviews sensitively, checking with interviewees that they wanted to 
continue if they became visibly upset, or if the topic was of a sensitive nature. Some of 
the topics covered included domestic violence, financial and emotional abuse and 
sexual harassment. 
I embraced my position as an outsider and saw my access as a privilege; I did not seek 
insider status. I felt that this would be a patronising approach to individuals and families 
who had spent all or most of their lives in Mohallaton and had made considerable 
personal, social and economic investments in building lives, families, social networks 
and a sense of community. Further, individuals living in close-knit communities might 
feel more comfortable talking to a stranger; an outsider may be able to ask questions 
unacceptable from an insider (Serrant-Green 2002). I did not feel as if I was included in 
references to ‘us’ (or ‘hamara’) that implied a shared belonging to community in 
Mohallaton, unlike Gawlewicz, (2016) who conducted research amongst a co-ethnic 
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Polish community. I also avoided assumptions of similarity that may have led to 
incomplete explanations during interviews (Dwyer and Buckle 2009).  
My positioning as both an insider and outsider is best summarised as follows: “[it gave 
me] the ability to be open, authentic, honest, deeply interested in the experiences of 
[…] participants and committed to accurately and adequately representing their 
experience” (Dwyer and Buckle 2009, p.59).The greatest stigma I have faced with the 
question of insider or outsider status has been in conversation with other academics, 
some of whom question my insider status and suggest that the collection and analysis 
of qualitative data is invalid or biased as a result of my partial insider status. Serrant-
Green (2002) has observed that issues of bias or validity tend not to be raised with 
White professionals working with the indigenous population. 
5.3.6 Transcription and Translation  
I transcribed and translated all research interviews and saw this as the first step in data 
analysis. Extra care was taken to ensure that translated transcripts had “conceptual 
equivalence”, or comparability of meaning, between what was being expressed and the 
translated transcription (Gawlewicz 2016, p.32). Translation requires important 
decisions about how to represent ideas and people; the use of professional or informal 
interpreters and translators who are not skilled qualitative researchers has serious 
implications for data collection and interpretation and should be used with considerable 
caution (Gawlewicz 2016).  
I will briefly describe three situations of using translators and some of the associated 
problems. Whilst interviewing a Bangladeshi family as a researcher on the Muslim 
Families Project (Scourfield et al. 2012), I had just enough awareness of Bangla to 
ascertain that the daughter was tempering her mother’s responses when translating 
responses related to religiosity. It was clear to me that she was questioning her 
mother’s more ‘cultural’ responses. During the same project, an Arabic community 
worker accompanied me to interpret during an interview with a Yemeni woman; the 
community worker clearly saw some of the questions as a questioning of Islam rather 
than questions about religiosity. She made a number of exclamations of dismay at the 
questions before putting them to the interviewee, therefore influencing the interviewees 
perception of the questions. In an interview I conducted with a recent migrant from 
Sierra Leone on her experiences of social services involvement in child protection 
proceedings, the professional interpreter reduced the lengthy responses of the 
interviewee to one or two word responses (Chimba et al. 2012).  
The use of translators and interpreters significantly, and negatively, affects the 
collection of qualitative data. It was a considerable advantage that I was able to 
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conduct, transcribe and analyse the qualitative interviews conducted in Urdu and 
Punjabi myself. 
5.3.7 Anonymity  
Names of participants, gatekeepers and organisations were replaced with pseudonyms 
or removed during the transcription stage. The anonymisation of Mohallaton has been 
discussed above. Other identifying features, such as caste, were removed and 
replaced with a reference to whether they were high or low-ranking castes. Places of 
work and professions have been anonymised to professional class or replaced with an 
equivalent occupation. Some of the illnesses that some of the women suffer from have 
also been replaced with more general terms. There is a focus on socio-economic 
circumstances rather than interpersonal and familial relationships, other than those 
directly affecting economic activity, in the presentation of qualitative findings. 
Anonymisation is an ongoing, working compromise which requires sacrifice of some 
detail (Saunders et al. 2015).   
Any documents that include references to real names, such as consent forms or 
confirmations of receipt of gift vouchers, are held as password protected documents to 
which nobody has access but the researcher.  
5.3.8 Qualitative Analysis  
The qualitative data was analysed using NVivo 10 analysis software. A coding frame 
was designed by analysing three transcripts (see Appendix 5). Codes were categorised 
by the research themes identified in the literature review. Project supervisors each read 
two transcripts to check the coding frame and made some suggestions as to additional 
codes.  
The initial coding involved line-by-line reading which created an in-depth knowledge of 
the dataset. Coded data from NVivo was then closely examined to explore the 
outcomes and experiences of the interviewees. Systems of classification and 
typologies were developed to describe differences, similarities and patterns in the 
qualitative data (elaborated in Chapter 6). Existing knowledge and theory were then 
used to explain and describe outcomes for different groups of women.  
Qualitative findings are presented in the following three chapters. In Chapter 6, I 
present findings in relation to migration, settlement and childhoods in Mohallaton. 
Social networks, home and family are described in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8, religiosity 
and experiences of work are described and analysed. I attempt to integrate the 
theoretical content of the data with the narrative accounts of the interviewees. It is in 
the narratives of these women that multiple layers of experience and disadvantage can 
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be identified and understood. Qualitative and quantitative findings are integrated and 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
. 
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Chapter 6: Qualitative Findings I 
Mapping and Modelling Waves of Migration from 
Pakistan to Britain 
 
6.1 Introduction: Waves of Migration Model – a visual 
representation 
 
The evidence presented in this thesis so far, from the review of literature to the 
quantitative findings chapter, demonstrates little evidence of generational change in the 
labour market outcome of belonging to the LAHF category of economic inactivity 
amongst British Muslim women. In contrast, the qualitative findings from this project do 
provide evidence that women of different migrant generations, and birth cohorts within 
them, have different experiences of structural and socio-cultural barriers and 
constraints to their economic activity.  A model has been developed to map out male 
and female migration from Pakistan which introduces qualitative evidence for evidence 
of inter and intragenerational change. This model will be described and explained in 
reference to the relevant, mainly qualitative, literature and the qualitative findings of this 
research project.  
 
The development of the model came about because of the constant need to 
contextualise the narratives of interviewees in terms of their migrant generation and/or 
birth cohort. The cumulative knowledge acquired through the analysis of the statistical 
and qualitative data arising from this project, and the existing body of literature on 
socio-economic inequalities among EM groups in Britain, has been used to develop a 
visual model of waves of Pakistani migration to Britain. The model demonstrates how 
the qualitative narratives from this project add depth and nuance to the extant 
literature.  
The qualitative data provide valuable insights into the diversity of migration trajectories 
and experiences of Pakistani women in contemporary Britain. The interviewees’ 
narratives of their migration experiences were not linear; understandings of any one 
individual migration journey built up and cascaded throughout each interview as each 
interview theme was covered. The mapping out of family trees, paths of migration, and 
each woman’s education and work trajectory required careful readings and re-readings 
of narratives. Analysing and understanding the migration experience of each 
interviewee and their family involved bringing order to stories that spanned continents, 
cultures, societies, decades and often large casts of family and social networks.  
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Each wave of migration brought, and continues to bring, with it a set of socio-economic 
circumstances that has implications for its own, and subsequent generations’, 
economic activity. The model begins to set out the argument that it is the cumulative 
effect of the economic and socio-cultural conditions of waves of migrant generations 
that result in high levels of economic inactivity amongst first and second-generation 
British Pakistani women in the contemporary context. The model begins to make 
explicit the interdependencies between male and female labour market experiences 
and behaviour. The economic inactivity of Muslim women cannot be sufficiently 
understood without reference to the economic activity of Muslim men and their 
migration journeys. 
The model does not fit the experience of every woman in the sample, instead it is a 
typology of the range of experiences of the interviewees, as well as those of the 
families they either joined (first-generation women) or were born into (second-
generation women).  It sets out the ways in which respondents are distinguished 
between and categorised in the subsequent qualitative findings chapters and identifies 
distinct cohorts of first and second-generation women. There is also some evidence of 
new and atypical forms of female migration from Pakistan which have not previously 
been identified in the literature on labour market inequalities among ethnic minority 
groups in Britain. 
The model is visualised in the diagram below. It includes time periods since the 1950s 
in decades along the horizontal axis. The dashed line across the top of the chart 
represents a move from Pakistan to Britain. Blue rows represent male migrants and 
green, female.  
Figure 6.1 Waves of Migration - Pioneers 
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6.2 Wave 1, Male Migration: The Pioneers, 1950-1960 
Qualitative research conducted in the 1970s onwards outlines the migration and 
settlement of the earliest Pakistani male migrants to Britain (Anwar 1979; Shaw 1988; 
Werbner 1990; Kalra 2000). These men represented the first wave of migration from 
Pakistan and appear in Figure 6.1 above. They arrived as migrant labour to meet the 
demands of the British labour market for flexible, low-paid, low-skilled labour in 
factories and mills. On their arrival these men lived in all male households with family 
or friends from countries of origin; often working the same shifts in the same factories, 
living and working in poor conditions. These men did not arrive with the intention to 
settle in Britain, this is most obvious in the fact that migration separated them from their 
wives and children. They sent remittances to family and the primary aim of their 
migration was to improve the economic conditions for their extended families in 
Pakistan.  
Some of these earliest migrants, or pioneers, returned to Pakistan on the arrival of a 
younger male relative who would take over the sending of remittances; others lived 
transnational lives between Britain and Pakistan; some were joined by their wives once 
all their children had either married or migrated (Kalra 2000). From the 1960s onwards, 
the Pioneers provided financial and social support to enable the chain migration of their 
younger unmarried male relatives who represent the subsequent ‘settler’ phase of 
migration from Pakistan. Pioneers were not the fathers of the second-generation 
interviewees but often their older male relatives, often grandfathers and uncles. The 
accounts given of the pioneer phase by the interviewees are largely congruent with that 
found in the literature (Anwar 1979; Shaw 1988; Werbner 1990; Kalra 2000). 
Qualitative Findings 
Lubna is a second generation interviewee, her paternal grandfather was a pioneer 
migrant. He had received some education in Pakistan although he had no formal 
qualifications, he had some basic fluency in English because he had served in the 
British Army. Lubna states that his education and work experience set him apart from 
other men in his village of origin and aided his migration. His family in Pakistan were 
not poor, but he sought to improve their financial circumstances through migration. 
Lubna’s grandfather was joined by his sons and his wife in the late 1960s. 
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6.3 Wives of Pioneers: Daadis [paternal grandmothers] 
 
These women are not represented as a distinct wave of migration from Pakistan to 
Britain in the literature because some did not migrate to Britain at all; others migrated at 
an older age after their children in Pakistan, particularly daughters, had reached 
adulthood (Shaw 1988; Kalra 2000). Some of these women were of working age upon 
migration but their social age as mothers and grandmothers meant that economic 
activity was not expected of them within the normative structures of Pakistani families 
(Maynard et al 2008,). These older women held powerful and authoritative positions in 
family hierarchies (Shaw 1988; 2000; Werbner 1990; Afshar 1994). 
Figure 6.2 Waves of Migration - Daadis  
 
Qualitative Findings 
Daadis [paternal grandmothers] of G2 women, remain a relevant part of family life for 
some second-generation Pakistani women as mothers-in-law or grandmothers. Daadis 
continue to be authoritative figures in British Pakistani families. They uphold traditional 
Pakistani norms and values from Pakistan and encourage the maintenance of kinship 
ties in Britain and Pakistan. The presence of Daadis is a form of moral and cultural 
guidance and support to younger women in families, but also a source of constraint. 
These constraints include additional caring and housework responsibilities; limiting 
their choices in carrying out everyday tasks; their freedom to leave the home and to 
develop their own social networks; and decisions about economic activity. Daadis are 
likely to consider work in the formal labour market for younger women in their families 
as a source of shame because it implies that men are unable to provide for their 
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families. The second-generation women spoke about how the presence of their 
grandmothers constrained the lives and choices of their first-generation mothers in the 
1980s: 
 
“My mum, I think she’s only got one friend across the road but my grandma 
was very very sociable, she would go to everyone’s houses, she would be 
out at the neighbours all the time, we used to go looking for her sometimes. 
Or they used to be at our house, very close knit community and we knew 
everyone, they were like from back home in Pakistan. So they used to all 
come and there would be these old maasis [aunties] sitting on the sofas and 
drinking tea and chatting away.” (Shabana, second-generation)  
Daadis influenced the bounded and gendered childhood experiences of second-
generation women and they were involved in decisions about marriage, education and 
work. Shabana attributes some of her father’s more conservative and traditional views 
on the upbringing of his daughters to the influence of her grandmother. For example, 
not being allowed to wear Western clothing or to leave the house without supervision 
from parents as teenagers and young adults. At no point during the interview did 
Shabana express any direct criticism of her grandmother, in fact, she praised her and 
spoke of her in very loving terms: “I absolutely adored my grandma, she was 
everything to me, I really really loved her”. Despite her conservative views in some 
aspects of her grand-daughters’ lives, Shabana’s daadi advocated for her 
granddaughters to attend college by giving assurances of their behaviour to her sons 
and emphasising the need for them to have an education should they ever need to 
work.  
“My cousin lived next door, we were brought up like sisters. She is older than 
me by two years and her dad wouldn’t let her go to college and then my 
grandma persuaded him. She said to him that she is not going to do nothing, 
you’re not going to get her married and if she wants to study what’s wrong 
with that? Another two years in college, she’s got something if she ever 
needs to work in life. And it was a battle for her to go but then…the battle 
was fought so then it was ok for me to go”. (Shabana, second-generation)  
In contrast, Shameem was more critical of the effect that her grandmother had on her 
mother’s life. Shameem’s grandfather had served in the British Army and arrived in 
Britain in the 1960s, migrating to improve the family’s economic circumstances 
although the family was “well-off” in Pakistan. Her grandmother remained in Pakistan 
until her daughters were married, her husband would visit Pakistan regularly until she 
migrated. Shameem’s grandmother is a widow now and lives with her son and his 
family. She has always been resentful that Shameem’s mother migrated to Britain 
whilst her own daughters did not. Shameem’s mother’s choices were constrained to the 
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extent that she was not able to choose what to cook and rarely left the house, 
economic activity was never an option for her. 
“Back in the day she [mother] didn’t know any different and mind you, she 
probably didn’t have a chance to go anywhere because my grandma was 
pretty strict on her, my grandma wouldn’t have allowed it her you know 
working. She has always been horrible to my mum but my mum is never one 
to complain. My grandma to be fair, I know it’s a really horrible thing to say 
but it’s the truth, she loves us to bits but she really envies the fact that her 
daughters are not here so whenever she sees us around at my mum’s house 
there is always bitterness. She has always been horrible to my mum.” 
(Shameem, second-generation) 
The migration of daadis continues in the present day as older Pakistani women 
continue to join their first-generation sons and second-generation daughters-in-law 
upon old age or widowhood.  Some of these women are of working age (below 65 
years old) but they neither expect, nor are expected by their families, to work.  Although 
the migration of Daadis is small-scale in terms of numbers these women have 
significant influence over the social and cultural lives of their families because of the 
high social status and authority accorded to older women in Islamic and Pakistani 
socio-cultural frameworks.  
There are two daadis in the sample of interviewees, Bilqees and Suriya. Suriya lives 
with her first-generation son, second-generation daughter-in-law, and their children. In 
contrast to the restrictions placed by earlier daadis, Suriya had enabled the economic 
activity of her daughter-in-law by providing childcare and cooking for the family. 
Second-generation status means that daughters-in-law may not be as powerless as 
their first-generation mothers because they have enabled the migration of their 
husbands and parents-in-law. In her account, Suriya expressed support for her 
daughter-in-law’s economic activity and valued her contribution to household income.  
 
6.4 Wave 2, Male Migration – The Settlers, 1960-1980 
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1968 sought to limit the labour migration of non-
White men from commonwealth countries. The Act restricted the right of entry to 
migrants from the Commonwealth to those born in Britain or who had at least one parent or 
grandparent born here; making all other migrants subject to more stringent controls. This 
meant that chain migration came to an end in the late 1960s. There was a ‘beat the 
ban’ increase in male migration just before the new legislation was implemented 
(Anwar 1979). This wave of migrants was known as the ‘settler phase’. Settlers arrived 
as young men, in their late teens or early twenties. Like pioneers they had no, or few, 
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qualifications, were unable to speak English fluently, and came from rural backgrounds. 
Upon their arrival these younger men worked alongside their fathers or other male kin 
in mills or factories, sending remittances back home. 
Pakistani men experienced occupational concentration and segregation because of 
their poor human and social capital, and discrimination from White employers (Anwar, 
1979; Kalra, 2000). Pakistani men in Britain were concentrated in manual jobs in the 
textile industry, metal manufacture and the transport sector; working in jobs that the 
majority White population was unwilling to take (Anwar 1979; Shaw 1988; Kalra 2000). 
Industrial life and shift-work shaped lives of Pakistani men and households in the 
1970s (Anwar 1979; Kalra 2000).  The ‘myth of return’ to Pakistan framed male 
attitudes to low-paid work carried out in poor working conditions (Anwar 1979; Kalra 
2000). When the actuality of return became distant it became an ideology that 
determined behaviour because it made it easier for the men to think of their 
disadvantaged labour market position and poor working conditions as temporary 
(Shaw, 1988; Kalra 2000).  
 
The realisation that immigration might be curtailed for women in the future too meant 
that many men made the decision to ‘settle’ and to build families and communities in 
Britain (Gilliat-Ray 2010a). Settlers who were already married planned for their wives 
and children to join them and those who were unmarried returned to Pakistan to marry, 
often cousins, who subsequently joined them in Britain (Anwar 1979; Gilliat-Ray 
2010a). The large-scale migration of Pakistani women to the UK commenced from the 
late 1960s onwards (Anwar 1979; Shaw 1988: Werbner 1990). 
 
The distinction between pioneers and settlers as two distinct phases of male migration 
is common in the qualitative literature (Anwar 1979; Shaw 1988; Werbner 1990; Kalra 
2000). Kalra uses the Punjabi familial terms of ‘kaka’ for settlers and ‘baba’ for pioneers 
(Kalra 2000). Kalra’s categorisations are compelling because they differentiate 
between the birth cohorts of older and younger men, whilst at the same time locating 
their positions within family and community hierarchies; thereby giving an indication of 
their relative power and authority in the social structures of family and community 
(Kalra 2000). It is interesting to note that there have been a variety of labels and 
categories attached to Pakistani male migrants, but this has been less common for 
women. This is indicative of a homogenisation of the migration experiences of Muslim 
women in the literature and this is an issue that will be addressed in this chapter. The 
label of ‘daadi’ has already been applied to older female migrants above, similar labels 
will be applied to subsequent waves of female Pakistani migrants.  
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    Figure 6.3 Waves of Migration - Settlers
 
Qualitative Findings 
Settlers are the fathers of the second-generation interviewees, all but two of the 
women’s fathers arrived in processes of chain migration, joining older relatives. Settlers 
were a wave of selective male migrants; the sisters of these men did not migrate and 
some male siblings also remained in Pakistan, creating ongoing ties and obligations to 
kin in Pakistan.  
Most settlers worked in mill towns in the North of England and moved into Mohallaton 
after the onset of the economic recession of the late 1970s. Some details of the 
settlers’ migration to Britain are included in Table 6.1 below. 
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Table 6.1: Parents’ Migration Experience  
Interviewee Father Mother 
Aleena Chain, Mohallaton Joined Husband 
Halima  Chain, *NMT, Mohallaton Joined Husband 
Hina Chain, NMT, Mohallaton Joined Husband 
Kalsoom Family Migration, NMT 1, NMT 2, NMT3, NMT 1  Family 
Rizwana Chain, Mohallaton Joined Husband 
Lubna Chain, Mohallaton Joined Husband 
Misbah Chain, London, Midlands, Mohallaton  Joined Husband 
Nazia Chain, London, Midlands, Mohallaton Joined Husband 
Sana Couple, London, Bradford, Mohallaton Couple 
Shabana Chain, Midlands  Joined Husband 
Shameem Chain, Mohallaton Joined Husband 
Zara Chain, Midlands  Joined Husband 
Table Note: *NMT is Northern Mill Town  
Most of the second-generation women spoke about the additional burden that kinship 
ties in Britain and Pakistan placed on their fathers throughout their childhoods. Settlers 
sent regular remittance for household expenses as well as major investments such as 
the maintenance or extending of family homes, marriages of siblings or nephews and 
nieces, setting up siblings in business ventures and funding Hajj pilgrimage for parents. 
This is similar to the experiences of settlers in the literature but the data from this 
project shows how second-generation women reflect on their fathers’ transnational 
commitments and the effects they had on their lives, particularly education and 
marriage. The experiences of settlers also contextualise the experiences and 
expectations of more recent male migrants who arrive in Britain as the husbands of 
these women. 
Most of the women felt investment of resources in Pakistan were to the detriment of 
their own families in Britain. They felt that they, and their siblings, would have 
benefitted from greater input from their fathers in terms of support and advice about 
school and education, particularly during secondary school years. Halima’s father 
worked in a Pakistani warehouse from Monday to Friday and supplemented his income 
by running a market stall on the weekend to support family in Pakistani as well as his 
family in Britain: 
“It’s like the brothers they have to take care of everybody else, they have like 
all the burden […] even until day now he [father] has to bear the 
responsibilities of all his sisters, all his brothers.” (Halima, second-
generation) 
Shameem described how her father invested considerable time and energy into the 
maintenance of kinship ties in Britain and how this impacted on resources and 
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relationships within the household. Like his father before him, Shameem’s father is a 
well-respected member of the local Pakistani community: neighbours, family and 
kinship group will come to him to ask him to mediate or to give advice. 
“My dad was one of those people who everybody comes to with their 
problems because he is one of the elders and he’s a mediator for anybody’s 
problems - and I mean like Tom, Dick and Harry - everybody used to be at 
our house. And my granddad was one of those people, he was one of the 
people who people listen to and respect and that power kind of carried 
through to my dad.” (Shameem, second-generation) 
Shameem spoke about the toll that the obligations of chain migration have taken on her 
mother. Her mother has found the hosting of visitors to the home a considerable 
additional burden. Shameem states that her father’s economic support of wider family 
in Pakistan is expected and has been taken for granted. Although Shameem is proud 
of her father she sees the cost of his commitment to maintaining community and 
kinship ties to his own family and believes that her father should have spent more time 
with his own children and paid more attention to their progress and education.  
6.5 Wave 1, Female Migration: Ghar Walis [Women of the 
Home], 1970s onwards 
The first wave of female migrants from Pakistan are given the label ghar-wali in this 
project. Ghar-wali translates literally as ‘woman of the home’; it is a colloquial, but 
respectful, Urdu or Punjabi term for a man to refer to his wife. It is selected as a label 
for this category of female migrants because of the centrality of their roles in the 
domestic sphere and because their migration was defined by their position as wives 
and mothers. Ghar-walis arrived in Britain as very young women, in their late teens or 
early twenties, from rural backgrounds with little or no formal education or fluency in 
English. The overwhelmingly uniform picture of first-generation women in the literature 
is that these women very strongly committed to traditional practices, norms and values 
(Shaw 1988; Werbner 1990; Brah 1994; Afshar 1994; Dale et al. 2002a).  
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Figure 6.4 Waves of Migration – Ghar-walis  
 
Qualitative Findings  
The qualitative data from this project adds some important insights from ghar-walis 
themselves, or from their second-generation daughters, as to their experiences of 
migration and work. This research adds a longitudinal perspective to the early accounts 
of the experiences of ghar-walis presented in research conducted in the 1970s and 
1980s. Ghar-walis are now at, or nearing, retirement. The qualitative data includes 
information on their perspectives and attitudes towards education and work among 
younger women in their families as well as their own experiences. 
The earliest of ghar-walis arrived to live in all-male households with their husbands and 
male relatives. They undertook all the domestic work for these households and lived 
isolated lives around the shift work of settlers and pioneers, there were very few 
women and children in Mohallaton up until the mid-1970s. Upon the birth of second-
generation children most joint households shifted form to allow individual families to live 
in a single house, although some families still accommodated single male relatives. 
The sending of remittance remained a priority for British Pakistani families, it was a way 
of maintaining kinship ties and a sense of belonging to Pakistan. However, the context 
of low paid manual work for Muslim men and high levels of economic inactivity among 
Muslim women meant that transnational remittances could reduce household income 
and lead to financial hardship. 
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Firdaus was one of the first female Pakistani migrants to Mohallaton, she arrived in the 
late 1960s.  She presented a vivid description of early settlement and household 
circumstances. Firdaus was an interview respondent and gatekeeper who took part in a 
taped interview, she is not included in the formal sample of interviewees because she 
is over retirement age. She arrived in Mohallaton from Pakistan in the early 1960s at 
the age of 18 to join her husband. The household also included her husband’s uncle 
and his son and daughter-in-law. Firdaus described her daily life in those days as 
lonely and strange. The men of the household worked the night-shift in a local factory 
and the two women arranged their daily tasks and chores around these working hours. 
The men would wake in the late afternoon to eat ‘breakfast’, they ate dinner and 
relaxed on their return from work in the early hours of the morning.  
Firdaus’ uncle would do the shopping and outside chores for the household on his days 
off. All household wages were put into a common pot to pay rent and to make essential 
expenditure such as groceries, utility bills etc. Each of the younger men would receive 
a small amount of jeb kharch [pocket money] and the remaining money would be sent 
as remittance to Pakistan. Firdaus’ husband would give her a little pocket money from 
his own and she would use this to buy materials for her hobbies of sewing and 
embroidery.  
There were some arguments within the household as to how money was being spent; 
Firdaus spoke about hardships that she and her husband experienced such as not 
having enough food during this time and feeling very uncomfortable in the home. 
Eventually, and before the birth of their first child, Firdaus and her husband left that 
household to rent their own home, this proved controversial in the wider family in 
Pakistan as well as in Britain. It was only at this point that Firdaus began to leave the 
house regularly and interacted with the local community in the running of her own 
household and care of her children.  
Migration continued to be challenging and difficult for ghar-walis in the 1970s and early 
1980s. Some found adjustment so difficult that they returned to Pakistan with their 
children for several years. Rizwana’s mother was unhappy when she first came to 
Britain and she returned to Pakistan for a period of six years with two young children, 
her father would regularly make long visits to his family in Pakistani until his wife 
eventually returned. Three second-generation women spent long periods of time which 
included school attendance in Pakistan. Two of the interviewees reported that their 
husbands had similar experiences during their childhoods. The migration process was 
neither easy nor a simple one-way process for ghar-walis.  
“She didn’t like it here, she did not like it because obviously the language, 
she didn’t know anybody. My mum and my dad were kind of like the first out 
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of our family to come over so she didn’t have that family network support. 
She didn’t like it but she tried to do as much as she could. So when she went 
back it was only for like about month she was supposed to go back for and 
then she ended up staying six years.” (Rizwana, second-generation) 
Part of the reason that ghar-walis did not become economically inactive might have 
been related to socio-cultural factors such as the views of mothers-in-law and 
husbands, as well as the emotional difficulties caused by migration. However, structural 
factors were also important, local labour markets offered few employment opportunities 
for Muslim women. The gendered and racialised structure of work in textile mills in the 
Northern mill towns meant that daytime shifts were largely reserved for local White 
women and the nightshifts for Pakistani men; better paid and skilled forms of work were 
reserved for White men (Fevre 1984; Kalra, 2000).  As noted in the literature (Shaw 
1988; Werbner 1990; Brah 1994), there were few labour market opportunities open to 
ghar-walis other than informal homeworking, mainly sewing work for local 
manufacturers, working from home on industrial sewing. 
Half of the second-generation women reported that their mothers had worked. Of the 
six mothers who worked only one had participated in the formal labour market, the 
others had undertaken informal piece-work for local co-ethnic clothing manufacturers. 
Mothers who worked supplemented their husbands’ wage to meet household 
expenses. Informal homeworking was one of very few options for paid work for ghar-
walis for several reasons: their lack of qualification and lack of fluency in English; the 
burden of domestic work and childcare responsibilities; the disapproval of economic 
activity in families and the wider community; and the long working hours of husbands. 
Ongoing male migration from Pakistan in the 1970s influenced the daily routines of 
ghar-walis and their daughters. They experienced increased workloads of domestic 
chores and cooking and unsettled household routines. Amina is the oldest G2 
interviewee at 53 years of age, she described life in a crowded household as one of 
seven children where one bedroom in the house was set aside for the use of male 
relatives. Amina’s mother was responsible for cooking for these men as well as taking 
care of her own family: 
“Oh yeah it was very very crowded. There was one bedroom where [, there 
was always someone [male relatives] in there day and night, it was always 
used. The ones that worked in the day slept at night and the ones who 
worked at night slept there during the day. And I remember mum making 
great bug pots of curry […]. And as we grow older you know it started, I says 
oh mum why do we have to cook everything for them, do they give you some 
of the wages? But I always got into trouble because I always questioned 
everything. I just didn’t take it quietly, I said mum why do we have to do it? 
Why can’t they help?”  (Amina, second-generation) 
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All first-generation women who are married to first-generation men are included in the 
ghar-wali category which represents the first substantial wave of female migration from 
Pakistan. Some ghar-walis are younger than the mothers of the second-generation 
interviewees and have arrived more recently. Although formal routes for male labour 
migration were curtailed in the 1960s and 1970s, other formal and informal routes of 
entry (such as student visas, visit visas, asylum seeking, illegal entry) mean that some 
first-generation male migration still occurs. Although their means of entering the 
country are different, these men make similar use of the support of kinship and family 
networks to find work and accommodation as settlers. Upon attaining the right to 
permanently reside in Britain they return to Pakistan to marry, and/or apply for their 
wives to join them in Britain on spousal visas.  
Analysis of the qualitative data showed that first-generation women who are married to 
first-generation men experience similar socio-economic disadvantage and socio-
cultural constraints to economic activity, regardless of birth cohort. The experiences of 
ghar-walis are distinct from those of first-generation women married to second-
generation men and all second-generation women, regardless of age and time of 
arrival. Rifat is one such ghar-wali, her husband arrived in Britain to attend a training 
course, he was sponsored by his employer in Pakistan. Instead of returning to Pakistan 
when the course ended he overstayed his visa and moved into the ethnic enclave 
where he was able to find informal work. Her husband married a white British colleague 
on the encouragement of his Pakistani employers. Rifat gave her husband permission 
to marry again, she felt that she had little choice but to do so because the idea of being 
a single parent in Pakistan was untenable. After ten years of marriage he divorced his 
second wife and applied for Rifat and their children to join him in Britain.  
It is still relevant to understand and consider the labour market experiences of the older 
ghar-walis for several reasons. The structural and socio-cultural constraints 
experienced by ghar-walis are required to contextualise and understand the origins of 
patterns of high levels of economic inactivity amongst Muslim women in Britain. These 
starting points are also essential to explain the lack of significant generational 
improvement in economic activity rates for younger women. Further, ghar-walis 
continue to be influential in the socio-cultural lives of their younger female relatives and 
other women in the local community. Ghar-walis have set, and continue to uphold, the 
normative frameworks and expectations for Pakistani women in their roles as wives 
and mothers. Older ghar-walis play an important role in ‘policing’ or ‘guarding’ against 
transgressions from these norms using forms of social control such as the expression 
of overt or subtle disapproval, gossip, or controlling entry to social networks. 
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6.6 The Second-Generation  
The second-generation are all British Pakistanis born in Britain, or who arrived before 
the age of five (the age of compulsory school attendance in Britain). The category 
includes men and women in their 50s and younger, second-generation men appear in 
a blue row in the Figure 6.5 above and women in green.  
Figure 6.5 Waves of Migration - Second Generation   
There has been a lack of research evidence produced for cohort change in labour 
market outcomes amongst second-generation British women, possibly because of the 
lack of generational improvement overall and particularly in the outcome of economic 
inactivity amongst women. The qualitative data from this project identifies incremental 
and gradual changes in attitudes to work and education among cohorts of British 
Muslim women that correspond approximately with birth cohorts by decade and relate 
closely to the time periods at which second-generation women attended secondary 
school.  
6.6.1 Economic Recession of the Late 1970s and 1980 
The recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s constituted a major period effect in the 
lives of second-generation British Muslim women in the 1980s. The disadvantaged 
socio-economic position of settler fathers became entrenched because of changes in 
the levels and types of jobs available in the British labour market (Modood 1997; Kalra 
2000). The employment prospects of Pakistani men were poor due to their lack of 
transferrable skills, poor English language skills and poorly developed social networks 
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outside of their own kinship groups which might have assisted in job searches and the 
identification of opportunities (Kalra 2000). As marginalised manual workers, P&B men 
were directly exposed to market forces without the protection of salaried employment 
or trade union organisation (Heath et al. 2000). There is evidence that families moved 
into areas of high co-ethnic concentration to benefit from opportunities of employment 
and self-employment offered in ethnic enclaves (Werbner 1990).  
Businesses within the Pakistani ethnic enclave became a significant source of 
employment for settlers as self-employed owners of small business, own accounts 
workers and manual workers; mainly in small clothing factories and warehouses, 
catering or taxi driving (Werbner 1990; Kalra 2000). The working lives of Pakistani men 
became framed by vulnerable work and long working hours in the ethnic enclave rather 
than the shift-work of large textile mills and factories. As owners or workers in the 
ethnic enclave, Pakistani men were subject to low pay, long hours and interactions with 
often hostile white British customers (Kalra 2000). Experiences of marginalisation and 
discrimination increased reliance on the co-ethnic community created the conditions for 
the emergence of a reactive ethnicity (Mohammad 2005a; 2010). 
Qualitative Findings  
During and shortly after the recession of the later 1970s and 80s, eight settler fathers 
who had worked in textile mills and factories in Northern mill towns moved to 
Mohallaton with their families to find alternative forms of employment in the established 
Pakistani ethnic enclave. Five of these fathers went into self-employment; all but one 
failed within a few years. Most settlers found stable work in low-paid, long-hours work 
in factories or as taxi-drivers, working with and for other Pakistani men. The Pakistani 
community was bound by overlapping social, cultural and economic ties and the 
economic wellbeing of some families was dependent on participation in community life. 
In the 1980s, life in Mohallaton was framed by structural disadvantages of life in an 
area of high deprivation and the socio-cultural norms of the surrounding co-ethnic 
community.  
6.6.2  Experiences of Education 
Primary School 
Most of the respondents reported positive experiences of primary school. The age 
range of respondents means that experiences of British primary schools discussed in 
interviews spanned of period of the late 1960s through to the late 1980s. Some of 
respondents stated that it was upon attending school that they began to become aware 
of their ethnoreligious differences from the White majority. It is difficult to assess the 
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impact of perceived discrimination during childhood on socio-economic inequalities 
experienced later in life. It is, however, important to note that women in the sample 
began perceiving this discrimination, and their differences from the majority White 
group, from a very young age. 
“Primary school was fine, I used to enjoy primary school, but I realised that I 
was not like everybody else because I was Asian.” (Misbah, second-
generation) 
“[…] it was just because we were a bit different and but definitely sometimes 
like you know kids they would look at you and treat you different, like you’re 
an alien or something.” (Lubna, second-generation) 
Overall, there was to be little anxiety from parents in terms of primary school 
attendance and few instances of discrimination in primary school experienced by the 
interviewees, in contrast to choices and decisions about secondary schooling. From the 
age of 10 onwards, parental attitudes, ethnoreligious norms and expectations and the 
impact of living in an area of high co-ethnic density become apparent as influential 
factors in the educational trajectories of Pakistani women.  
Secondary School  
The qualitative literature identifies the teenage years of second-generation Pakistani 
young women during the 1980s as being constrained and limited, with little support for 
their education. From puberty a Pakistani young girls’ leisure time outside school or 
college was spent mainly at home with her female relatives and friends. She was 
expected to help with domestic work including childcare and preparing food for family 
and visitors (Werbner 1990). Teenage daughters would assist their mother with 
homeworking or help with domestic tasks so that their mothers could work (Anwar 
1979; Werbner 1988).  
Settler fathers worked long shifts or irregular hours in manual work or self-employment 
in the 1970s and 1980s and second-generation children saw little of their fathers 
(Anwar 1979; Werbner 1990). Parents were unlikely to attend parents evenings (Anwar 
1979). It was not uncommon for mothers to return to Pakistan with their children for 
long visits of a year or more at a time which had negative effects on the education of 
their children (Shaw 2000; Anwar 1979). Overall, there was little family support, 
encouragement or investment of household resources for the formal education of 
young women. 
Parents were particularly worried about the effects on the British co-educational system 
on their daughters, this was a widespread view in British Pakistani communities in the 
1980s and 1990s (Werbner 1990; Brah 1994). Single-sex secondary schools were 
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important to parents and some chose their area of residence in relation to the 
availability of all-girls schools (Werbner, 1990; Abbas 2003). In working-class Pakistani 
communities in the 1980s there was disapproval of attendance in any post-compulsory 
education, including attendance at local FE colleges or university (Shaw 1988). 
Qualitative Findings  
Secondary school attendance from the age of around 11 years old marked a significant 
change in the lives of second-generation women, they began to be treated as young 
women rather than children by their families. It was at this stage in the lives of second-
generation women that their parents became concerned about the threat of family 
dishonour that might be caused by the behaviour of their daughters. From the age of 
11 many aspects of the socio-cultural identities of young women were regulated and 
monitored. Most had to wear ethnic clothing and some form of head covering at home, 
friendships with young white women were discouraged, many were restricted to their 
homes outside school hours. The brothers of these women were not restricted in their 
dress or social interactions. 
“We have been kind of secluded, we didn’t have any friends that we just went 
to visit. We never stepped out our door. I didn’t know what was the end of 
my street, I never went because we weren’t allowed to play outside, we had 
to stay in. We’re girls, girls are not supposed to go out on the streets and 
things like that. So I didn’t socialise, I didn’t know who friends were.” (Halima, 
second-generation) 
Eight of the thirteen second generation respondents attended a girls only-high school 
which required a bus journey from Mohallaton, there was a co-educational 
comprehensive in walking distance of the area. As noted in the work of Werbner 
(1990), the availability of gender segregated education for their daughters seems to 
have made the transition from co-educational primary schools to secondary school 
easier for first generation Pakistani parents. Attendance at a girls-only secondary 
school allayed parental concerns about the likelihood of their daughters interacting, or 
having relationships, with boys or young men, thereby protecting family honour. 
“I had to go to a girls’ school, no saying it at all…apparently good girls didn’t 
go to mixed school. Oh yeah most parents were of that opinion, the good 
girls didn’t go to mixed schools.” (Amina, second-generation) 
The very real harm to the reputation of a girl and her family in the co-ethnic community 
caused by mixed-gender schooling is apparent in Shameem’s account of her friend. 
Shameem’s friend wrote the name of a boy she was at school with in her schoolbook 
and encountered repercussions from her Pakistani peers, both sets of parents and the 
wider Pakistani community. The account shows a high level of sensitivity in the 
community around the smallest of transgressions continued in the 1990: 
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“I was born and bred here and I know what happens within those classrooms 
and how things can rapidly change and how a girl can say she has a crush 
and get you know called a slag for the rest of the year and get badnaam [a 
bad reputation] for saying that she had a crush on someone. One of my best 
friends, she had a crush on somebody in school and this is how it unfolded 
was that the parents got involved and it was like oh my god she is such a 
bad girl. She got shunned for the rest of her high school years all the good 
girls didn’t want to know her because she was really bad now. She didn’t do 
anything wrong, she just said she liked someone and I think what ended up 
happening was that she had written his name on her book and then that went 
round and it was like you know kids make a big deal out of it don’t they? For 
the rest of her life she got that stigma and it stuck with her.” (Shameem, 
second-generation) 
Post-Compulsory Education and Early Marriage  
In the 1990s working class Pakistani parents continued to prevent their daughters from 
attending university, although attendance at a local FE college was not viewed as 
negatively. The local co-ethnic community was a strong influence in this respect, 
reinforcing negative views of the effects of HE on young women. There was evidence 
of intra-generational change amongst sibling groups about access to FE and HE and 
this causes some bitterness within families (Shaw 2000; Dale et al. 2002b). Dale et al. 
(2002b) found that young women in the 1990s were able to negotiate access to 
education but older married women were more likely to have been prevented from 
continuing their education.  
Young women who attended university, or who worked, were regarded as ‘modern’ and 
promiscuous and therefore outside the bounds of ethnic traditions and normative 
structures (Shaw 1988). The community played a significant role in policing and 
monitoring the behaviour and movement in public spaces of young women (Dwyer 
2002; Mohammed 2005a; 2005b).  Arranged marriages, particularly to cousins in 
Pakistan also played a part in curtailing the educational aspirations of young Pakistani 
women. HE would delay marriage, but parents were also worried that their daughters 
would be likely to find a marriage partner of choice, or that the increased independence 
in thought would make them more likely to disagree to an arranged marriage at all 
(Shaw 1988). 
It is important to place these restrictions on young women in the socio-economic 
context of the early 1980s and reliance on the co-ethnic community for economic, 
material, social and economic resources. If parents were seen to transgress the 
normative structure of the co-ethnic community by allowing their daughters to go to 
university, they risked ostracization from the community or kinship network (Shaw 
1988). This could have very real social, economic and material impacts for households 
that were reliant on the local co-ethnic community for employment and social support 
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(Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). Non-compliance to ethnic norms could result in 
punishments for young women which included, at their most extreme, becoming a 
prisoner in their own homes and death threats (Shaw 2000).  
Early expectations of transnational marriages were that marriages between second and 
first-generation spouses would be very similar to the experiences of their first-
generation parent. In the 1990s parents realised that this wasn’t the case, there were 
incidents of divorce, martial problems and breakdown and abandonment within 
Pakistani communities (Shaw 2000; Charsley 2006; 2007). This did not stop the 
practice of transnational marriage though, in some families transnational obligations 
were prioritised over the wellbeing of daughters (Shaw 2000). Education and economic 
activity were increasingly seen as back-up plans for their daughters if they had the 
need to provide for themselves after divorce or in times of financial hardship.  
Alongside family and community barriers to education, young Pakistani women in the 
education system were subject to stereotypes and constraints at school and college. 
Teachers noted an apathy around educational attainment amongst young Pakistani 
girls from the age of 14 (Shaw 1988). Brah’s research highlighted the key role that 
teachers and careers advisors played in encouraging or discouraging Pakistani girls at 
school (Brah 1994). The negative cultural stereotypes held by these professionals 
about the aptitude, ability and suitability for certain types of employment has lifelong 
consequences for young Pakistani women (Brah 1994; Ahmad et al. 2003). Bagguley 
and Hussain (2016) suggest that South Asian women are still subject to stereotypes as 
docile, uninterested in education and destined for arranged marriage.  
Qualitative Findings  
After she had completed an Advanced GNVQ Halima was told by her parents that she 
could not delay marriage to complete a university degree. She decided to work instead 
as this would help her to apply for her husband’s visa. Halima is one of six siblings, all 
of whom were married to cousins in Pakistan at relatively early ages. None of her 
siblings, male or female, were given permission to go to university. At the age of 16 
boys were expected to begin work and girls to prepare “to be shipped off to Pakistan”. 
Halima states that this was the case for many families in the case study area in the 
1990s, she thinks families would have removed girls from school earlier had they been 
legally able to do so. She feels that parents worried that higher education would 
change their children’s aspirations and expectations of their lives as well as increase 
their opportunities to make alternative choices: 
“I got married very early and I think the reason why us brothers and sisters 
got married early, we were not allowed to go to universities because we might 
have an independent mind and we might like a boy or a girl in university 
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which we might say we want to get married and I think we were just taken 
like sheep to Pakistan and then brain washed – he is a changga puthar [good 
son] you will be very happy [in Pakistani accent].” (Halima, second-
generation) 
Halima sees this system of marriage as a transaction to even out the disparities in 
economic circumstances across the extended transnational family network in order to 
benefit members who were not able to migrate earlier. She highlights the benefits that 
the transnational marriages of their children have had for her father’s sisters who were 
excluded from the original phase of migration in the 1970s. When describing the way in 
which her marriage was arranged Halima uses the words “brainwashing” and 
“grooming” and says that she feels “used” by her parents and in-laws. Nazia is less 
overtly critical of her father’s decision about her not taking part in education after her 
GCSEs, stating that she is unsure of why he made these decisions for her. 
Nevertheless, Nazia’s account of the period directly before she went to Pakistan to be 
married does resonate with Halima’s criticisms when she describes how she felt 
showered with gifts by her family: 
“I felt ok I didn’t feel pressured or anything. And I remember dad getting my 
passport done and they took me shopping […] mum bought me lots of clothes 
she said you know if you like your Khala’s [aunts] son. So I said ok, I’d seen 
pictures of him and they did shopping for me, whatever I wanted my dad got 
me and I don’t know what I had in my head I wanted a vanity case, and he 
got me one! And you know I was so happy and clothes whichever ones I 
wanted, I liked pastel colours and greys and I remember my mum saying in 
the shop are you mad, can you choose some colours with colour.” (Nazia, 
second-generation) 
Not all the respondents were critical of the way in which their marriages were arranged. 
Hina was engaged to a cousin in Pakistan at the age of 16 and married at 20 years old. 
Her parents showed her photographs of three cousins, all sons of paternal aunts, and 
asked her to pick one of the three. Hina feels that she was given a choice of who to 
marry and is happy with the range of options that were presented to her. She says that 
she is happily married now and feels that she made the right choice.  
6.6.3 Second Generation: Differences by Birth Cohort 
The qualitative data provides evidence for changes in attitudes among individuals, 
families in the wider community, particularly around the acceptability of post-
compulsory education for young women. This led to the development of a typology of 
three cohorts of second-generation women. The cohorts were labelled as the Class of 
1980, 1990 and 2000 – referring to the decade of secondary school attendance and 
are detailed in Table 6.2 below. The sample of second-generation interviewees is 
included in Table 6.3, interviewees are differentiated by cohort and the table includes 
148 
 
information about their age, highest educational qualification and the socio-economic 
status of their fathers during childhood.  
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 Second generation interviewees by cohort  
Class of 1980 
Pseudonym Age Education 
Father’s 
Occupational 
Class 
Father Co-
ethnic 
Workplace 
Misbah 40 BA 3 Yes 
Sana 41 Postgrad 2b No 
Aleena 40 BSc 2b Yes 
Kalsoom 43 None 4 Yes 
Nazia 45 None 4 Yes 
Amina 53 None 4 No 
Rizwana 40 GCSE 4 Yes 
Class of 1990 
Shabana 32 FE Diploma 2b No 
Lubna 36 GNVQ  3 (TD) Yes 
Shameem 32 HE Diploma* 3 (TD) Yes 
Halima 36 HE Diploma* 4 Yes 
Zara 36 GNVQ  4 No 
Hina 38 GNVQ  4 Yes 
Table Note: HE Diploma* attained after marriage 
 
 
Table 6.2 Second Generation – Cohorts 
Born  Classification Secondary 
School 
FE 
College 
University Age at 
Interview 
(2015) 
1970 Class of 1980 1980 1985 1987 40 plus 
1980 Class of 1990 1990 1995 1997 30-39 
1990 Class of 2000 2000 2005 2007 20-29 
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6.6.4 Second-generation, Cohort 1: Class of 1980 
The Class of 1980 grew up in the case study area when there was a less dense 
surrounding Pakistani population. Pakistani co-ethnic concentration increased in 
Mohallaton throughout the 1980s. There was little organisation of religious education 
and few established mosques and supplementary schools in the local area; some of 
the women received little or no religious education. The Class of 1980 gave accounts 
of childhood in the case study areas in the 1960s and 1970s. These accounts were 
often a mix of positive interactions within ethnically and religiously mixed 
neighbourhoods, and negative experiences of both occasional or more regular and 
sustained (sometimes severe) racial abuse and discrimination: 
 “We were the first Asian family here on our road, there was no other Asian 
family where we lived. But growing up we’ve seen a lot of racism. Oh, we 
had this person, a specific person, and he never used to allow us to walk 
past his house, he used to come out and swear at us [laughs]. He used to 
smash our windows…and then he actually literally put a swine’s head at our 
front door in a box and my mum thought it was a parcel and she opened it 
and she fainted when she seen it. So we’ve had that […] But yeah that’s quite 
intense that because like it was horrible, I can’t explain to you or describe to 
you the sort of things that used to happen with him. As soon as he used to 
see us that was it, he was out with his dogs and he’d say the dogs are going 
to come and eat you up and you pakis you shouldn’t be here and ra-ra-ra.” 
(Rizwana, Class of 1980) 
Throughout the qualitative analysis distinctions will be drawn between the experiences 
of women with HE qualifications and those with lower or no formal qualifications. The 
high level of educational attainment of some of the women in the Class of 1980 was 
unusual in relation to the sample and national levels of HE qualification attainment 
amongst Pakistani women. Analysis of the qualitative data revealed that women with 
undergraduate degrees in the Class of 1980 benefited from a range of advantages that 
encompassed both structural and socio-cultural factors both pre and post-migration. It 
is likely that these women would have attained HE qualifications because of these 
advantages regardless of cohort. 
All three of the women with undergraduate degrees came from families of high caste 
status in Pakistan. Their fathers came from rural areas of Pakistan and had few or no 
formal qualifications, they had migrated to improve their economic prospects but they 
had not lived in conditions of poverty prior to migration. When these men were made 
redundant from textile mills during the recession of the late 1970s, they all found stable 
employment. Sana’s father found work as a skilled worker in the mainstream labour 
market where he worked until retirement; Misbah’s father ran a successful business in 
the ethnic enclave which he expanded over the years; Aleena’s father worked for the 
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local council in a role that facilitated communication with the Pakistani community.  
None of the women stated that they had to negotiate their access to education, their 
fathers had expected them to attain university degrees and their siblings, older and 
younger, were all university educated. All the women received formal religious 
education during their childhoods.  
The women with low or no qualifications in the Classes of 1980 came from families of 
artisan or service caste status. The fathers of these women originated from rural and 
impoverished regions of Pakistan and conditions of poverty. None of these men had 
formal qualifications or fluency in English.  After the recession of the late 1970s these 
men became increasingly dependent on the ethnic enclave for their socio-economic 
wellbeing. Their high level of dependence on the co-ethnic community meant that 
deviance from the accepted norms of the ethnic community could have material 
implications for the family in terms of their acceptance within kinship networks and 
therefore potentially their access to employment or other community resources. 
Pakistani community norms that affected this group of women included: no access to 
post-compulsory education for girls; social networks that were limited to women from 
their own kinship groups; and early marriage to a first generation cousin.  
Marriages for the latter group of women in the Class of 1980 were often arranged when 
the women were in their late teens. The women who had HE qualifications had a 
greater choice as to both choice of partner and timing of marriage. For the women with 
lower, or no, qualifications the expectation of their parents was that they would be 
married soon and would not need to work so there was little point in their continuing in 
education. Negative views about the effects of college attendance for young women 
were reinforced by the local co-ethnic community. Amina enlisted the help of teachers 
and a social worker in an attempt to negotiate staying on in school to sit her O Level 
examinations: 
“I cried the odds and a social worker actually came around as well to talk 
about it because I complained to school. I don’t think she fought the corner 
hard enough […] my dad gave his lecture and she says ok. Well his 
justification was that I was going to when I leave school I was going to get 
married, I was going to be a housewife I wouldn’t be working so what do she 
need qualifications for? He called [insulted] her, he said you’re going against 
tradition and everything.” (Amina, Class of 1980) 
Three of these women were engaged to first-generation cousins during their teens, 
they all left school by the age of 16 and were married in their early 20s or sooner. In the 
years between leaving school and marriage they were taught how to cook and run a 
household by their mothers and assisted with caring for their younger siblings. They 
spent much of their time at home and could not go out without a chaperone. Amina 
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said that she was not allowed to leave the house without her brothers or father 
accompanying her and was not allowed to answer the door or the telephone.  
Working class first-generation parents from rural pre-migration circumstances did not 
expect their daughters to be economically active after marriage. They expected that the 
lives of their second-generation children would be very similar to their own, with the 
continuation of male-breadwinner and female-homemaker roles. Amina and Nazia 
were both divorced within a few years of marriage and went on to become sole 
breadwinners for their households for many years. In fact, all the women with no/low 
qualifications in the Class of 1980 went on to work for several years. The detailed 
accounts of three women from the Class of 1980 are presented below. These accounts 
demonstrate the cumulative effects of migration on British Pakistani women in this 
cohort and the effects of the economic recession on the educational attainment of their 
daughters. 
Kalsoom 
Kalsoom experienced the greatest disruption to her education of all second-generation 
women. At the age of 13 she was removed from mainstream education to attend an 
Islamic girls’ school in a local mosque, this school had insufficient resources and 
facilities. Kalsoom was removed from this school before sitting her GCSE exams. Her 
father justified his decisions by saying that it was forbidden in Islam for a woman to 
work and that women should stay at home to undertake domestic and caring 
responsibilities.  
Kalsoom migrated to Britain with her family at the age of 5, she is one of more than five 
siblings; some were born in Pakistan and others in Britain. Her family migrated from the 
southwestern province of Pakistan, in an area which is underdeveloped and has a 
predominantly rural economy. The ethnic culture and customs of the region are distinct 
from those of the Punjab and Azaad Kashmir, where most Pakistani migrants to Britain 
come from (Anwar 1979; Shaw 1988). 
Kalsoom’s father was not a chain migrant and did not benefit from an established social 
network of Pakistani male migrants. He seems to have suffered an additional penalty 
for not being part of chain migration; unable to secure regular work either in the 
mainstream labour market or in the Pakistani ethnic niche. He was a welder by trade, 
having learnt the skill working in shipyards in the port city of Karachi, however, in 
Britain he was restricted to informal work for friends and acquaintances. Kalsoom 
mentioned four family moves around different Northern towns due to the instability of 
her father’s work. Kalsoom’s father experienced downward social mobility upon 
migration, from skilled manual worker to a transient worker. The powerlessness he 
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experienced in wider society may have magnified his need to retain control over the 
domestic sphere.   
Kalsoom’s mother does not speak any English and has never worked, formally or 
informally. Due to intra-ethnic group difference and frequent changes in area of 
residence she did not have access to a stable social network of Pakistani women. 
Kalsoom’s mother’s role in family life is difficult to capture precisely in terms of her 
support for her husband or her daughters. Kalsoom says that her mother did not 
advocate for her daughters to remain in education and that the decision was entirely 
her father’s. Kalsoom’s mother is likely to have been relatively powerless within the 
household because she did not make a financial contribution through work; her 
husband clearly adhered to patriarchal gender roles and took control of decision-
making for the family.  
Kalsoom’s father justified his attitude to his daughters’ education in religious terms. As 
an adult Kalsoom says that she has a better understanding of her rights within Islam. 
She now believes that her father’s religious arguments for curtailing her education were 
not justified.  
“Islam, you know we have rights, we have a lot of rights […] we have got freedom 
of marriage, we are allowed to marry whoever we want to marry and yeah, and 
career wise we are allowed to have an education. Before my marriage I did not 
know this, that Islam does allow, I didn’t know.” (Kalsoom, Class of 1980) 
Kalsoom continues to have a difficult relationship with her father because of his 
decision to remove her from school and the restrictions that were placed on her 
independence and movements during her teenage years: 
“… it’s like with me and my dad there is no communication, we don’t really 
talk to each other. I think maybe there is a lot of anger. I have a lot of anger 
like why didn’t you let me do something. We don’t really communicate with 
each other but I do, when I see him he is very old now and you know because 
of my religion you’ve got to respect him, you’ve got to love him and I do, I do 
all that, and forgiveness. I will forgive him you know maybe there was so 
much things that he didn’t understand, because he is my dad at the end of 
the day.” (Kalsoom, Class of 1980) 
Nazia  
Nazia’s account of early childhood and primary school is one of stable beginnings, the 
disruptive effect of the economic recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s on the 
education and work trajectories of second-generation Pakistani women is most evident 
in her account. Nazia grew up in a city in the Midlands where her father was employed 
as a semi-skilled manual worker in a national engineering firm. The area was not one 
with a high concentration of BME population and Nazia gave many examples of the 
family having many white British friends. She stated that her father would seek out 
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information about good schools from his local contacts and invested considerable time 
and effort into her education: 
“Dad was quite interested in our education, he always wanted us to be in a 
nice school. I remember when we were in [city] he had to look for like a 
girl’s school for me and it was a bit out of the area for him [so] what my dad 
used to do was work nights and I think he’d come at about 4 in the morning, 
he’d have a nap, wake up, take me to school then come back, go back to 
sleep and then he’d come and pick me up as well. (Nazia, Class of 1980) 
When Nazia’s father was made redundant from his job at the manufacturing firm in the 
early 1980s the family moved to Mohallaton with the promise of support from extended 
family and employment opportunities within the co-ethnic niche for her father. The 
move resulted in unstable and informal employment for her father and mother and a 
change in lifestyle for the family as they became accustomed to living within an area of 
high co-ethnic concentration. Despite having initially displayed an interest in, and 
encouragement of, Nazia’s education her father ultimately her prevented her from 
participating in post-compulsory education; she sat her GCSE exams but was not 
allowed to collect her exam results and has never known if she has any qualifications.  
“He didn’t let me go to college, anything. He just said he said what do you 
want to do in college? I said oh I’d like to, because I enjoyed sewing, I’d love 
to do needlework. ‘Oh you can learn that at home’. I can still remember, sat 
in my room and he just didn’t let me go, didn’t give me a reason. No reason.” 
(Nazia, Class of 1980) 
Sana 
Sana holds a postgraduate qualification, the highest educational attainment of all 
interviewees. Her father made a conscious decision not to send her to the local primary 
school, which had a high proportion of Pakistani children, but to one which was further 
away and had mostly White pupils. From the quote below it seems that Sana’s father 
was keen for his daughter to build ties and connections with the majority White 
contacts, in preference to the local Pakistani community.  
“There was another local school but my parents chose not to send me there 
even though it was closer, they chose for me to go down the road to another 
one and there was a lot of white children there. They wanted to learn new 
things I think in that way, not like where all the Pakistanis are. I think on my 
dad’s part, my dad was quite sort of very Western thinking so you know…a 
bit more broad minded to be honest.” (Sana, Class of 1980) 
Sana was one of the few women in the sample who had grown up in a household 
where her father had experienced long-term employment stability in the mainstream 
labour market in Britain. He had worked in the British Navy in Pakistan before migrating 
to Britain and although he had little formal education, he was able to speak English. 
Sana’s family is of high status within the Pakistani caste system and originate from the 
154 
 
relatively prosperous region of the Punjab. Sana’s father’s work experience for a British 
employer, his caste and region of origin are all factors that may have contributed to his 
ability to secure stable employment in the wider labour market after migrating to Britain. 
Sana’s father was a skilled worker in the mainstream transport sector and remained in 
the same job until retirement. 
Sana’s high level of attainment in education and her progress within her chosen career 
demonstrate how favourable pre and post-migration circumstances might interact to 
lead to stability in household circumstances and good educational outcomes for 
Pakistani children, particularly daughters. Sana describes a childhood and family life 
that, despite being geographically located in an area of high co-ethnic concentration, 
did not involve a high degree of involvement with the Pakistani community, even with 
extended family who lived nearby. She states that her father deliberately distanced 
himself from the local Pakistani community. This may have meant that the normative 
conditions and cultural expectations that were experienced as barriers to education by 
some women from the area were not experienced in the same way by Sana. Sana’s 
sisters also attended university and now have professional careers. There seems to 
have been a strong expectation and acceptance of young women being degree-
qualified and having professional careers in the family. 
 
 
 
6.6.5 Second-generation, Cohort 2: Class of 1990 
Qualitative Findings  
There was a greater sense of permanence in household circumstances and community 
life in Mohallaton among the Class of 1990. There were several established shops and 
businesses catering for the Pakistani community and institutions such as mosques and 
community centres. The Class of 1990 described the streets in which they lived as 
majority Pakistani in contrast to the ethnically diverse neighbourhoods the Class of 
1980 described during their childhoods.  Many fathers had attained relatively stable 
employment in the ethnic niche, mostly manual jobs for local co-ethnic employers or as 
own accounts taxi drivers. Overall, there was a greater stability in socio-economic 
status and reduced levels of dependency on the ethnic enclave for economic and 
social wellbeing as compared to the 1980s.  
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This independence seems to have supported a growing autonomy amongst Pakistani 
families regarding their daughters’ education and marriage. Little attention has been 
paid to the socio-economic position of Pakistani parents in relation to inter and intra 
generational improvements. This is likely to be because of continued high rates of 
Pakistani men in manual occupations and in unemployment, there is little evidence of 
upward social mobility per se. However, the effects of longer periods of time spent in 
Britain and the settlement of households into more stable, albeit relatively 
disadvantaged, household socio-economic circumstances over time appear to have 
given subsequent cohorts of Pakistani women advantages in their educational and 
work outcomes over those women who were in secondary education in the 1980s.  
Post-compulsory attendance at a local college was a norm for young women in the 
1990s, although higher education was still considered to be undesirable among 
working-class Pakistani families. The local co-ethnic community remained influential in 
policing the behaviour and conduct of young women. There is evidence of a widescale 
shift in attitudes towards education for British Pakistani women in the 1990s, with 
increasing numbers gaining formal qualifications and attending university (Modood 
1997; Dale 2002b). This shift is also apparent in the qualitative data: all the Class of 
1990 held a post-compulsory vocational qualification, having attended a year or two at 
a local further-education college. These were GNVQ qualifications at Intermediate or 
Advanced level in subjects such as Business Administration or Health and Social Care. 
This inclination for vocational qualifications may have been a result of insufficient 
attainment at GCSE level to pursue the academic route of A Levels, or a recognition 
that young women would not be allowed to attend university.  
This increasing acceptance of young women attending local colleges to gain vocational 
qualifications was linked to the experiences of the Class of 1980. Second-generation 
women had in fact become economically active in the 1980s due to household 
circumstances and they had been limited to low-paid manual work because of their lack 
of qualifications. For many of the second-generation interviewees HE was never an 
option, although all of them would have liked to have attended university. Parents in the 
1990s saw education as a back-up plan in case their daughters had to become 
economically active to support their families after marriage, this may also in part 
explain a preference for vocational qualifications. This also indicates that, contrary to 
the assumptions of assimilation/integration theories, economic activity was not seen as 
a natural progression from education to economic activity within working-class 
Pakistani families. Instead, education was a contingency plan should a woman need to 
work after marriage.  
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6.6.6 Second-generation, Cohort 3: Class of 2000 
Qualitative Findings  
There were no interviewees of the Class of 2000 in the sample of women interviewed. 
Younger LAHF women were identified during the fieldwork phase but they were fewer 
in number than those in the older cohorts and less likely to agree to participate in the 
study (discussed in Chapter 5, Methodology Part II). This is likely to be a result of the 
engagement strategy and the selected locations, younger women may engage in 
different spaces and in different social networks than older cohorts of second-
generation women, or first-generation women. It may also be a result of fewer women 
in this younger cohort being LAHF or having wider and more diverse social networks 
beyond the case study area. Some of the women from the older cohorts did however 
speak about the experiences of their younger sisters, contrasting the experiences of 
the younger cohort with their own. 
The older cohorts now describe higher education (attending a local university) as the 
norm for young women in the Mohallaton area; it is both acceptable and expected by 
parents and the wider community. Marriage is delayed as a result and young women 
have a greater say in marriage arrangements. Work in the wider labour market is a 
realistic option for these young women because of their higher education qualifications, 
they are less dependent on the ethnic enclave than older cohorts for work 
opportunities. 
Older women report intragenerational change over time in the attitudes of their parents 
who are more supportive of the education and work of their younger daughters than 
they were in the past. First-generation parents now seem more likely to take into 
consideration the wishes of their own children over the attitudes of those in wider 
community and kinship groups. The wider community continues to be of importance to 
first-generation migrant but it is less likely to influence younger cohorts and subsequent 
generations, although commitment to immediate family remains strong.  
Shameem spoke about a change in her father’s attitude from her elder sister 
(Class of 1980) to her young sister (Class of 2000): 
“Dad has adapted to that, it’s like with my eldest sister he was pretty strict, 
she wasn’t allowed to wear trousers, she wasn’t allowed to wear make-up, 
Dad was really strict. And now I look at my youngest sister and [she] is about 
20 and she is at uni. It’s like my elder sister always says to my dad, dad she’s 
got make-up on. He’s like yeah it’s alright, do you know what I mean? 
[laughs]. Yeah, you never let me wear it. Dad’s like yeah but you know 
zamana [age/era] has changed but you know, it took them time to adapt.” 
(Shameem, Class of 1990) 
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Shameem states that her father was too busy with work as a taxi driver to attend 
parents evenings and used much of the little spare time he had on maintaining ties with 
other men in his kinship groups. He expressed little interest and offered no advice and 
guidance to his older children about education and work. More recently he has 
attended university open days with his youngest daughter and has taken a far greater 
interest in her choice of university and subjects.  
“At one point with my younger sister he was going to colleges and university 
and finding out […] now he’s like pushing my little sister to go to university 
and trying to talk to her about her career and what kind of stuff she wants to 
go into and what degree she wants to do. Whereas with us, he says he never 
took interest in it because he just presumed that we weren’t ever going to 
work.” (Shameem, Class of 1990) 
 
 
 
 
6.7 Second Wave Female Migrants: ‘Bhabis’ [sisters-in-law], 
1980s onwards 
There is little detailed information on this group of more recently arrived Pakistani 
female migrants in the literature. Their experiences have often been homogenised with 
either ghar-walis or the second-generation (Shaw 2000; Ahmed et al. 2003). 
Upon reaching adulthood men and women from the second-generation have married 
second-generation husbands or wives, but many, and some researchers suggest most, 
have married men and women from Pakistan (Shaw 2000; 2009; Peach 2006). 
Patterns of marriage are now included in Figure 6.7 below. The second wave of 
Pakistani female migration represents all women who migrated upon marriage to a 
second-generation man. The category is given the label ‘bhabi’, a familial term in Urdu 
and Punjabi that refers to the wife of an elder brother; this is a position of some 
authority and responsibility within families. Also included in Figure 6.7 is the third wave 
of male migration from Pakistan, the men who arrived in Britain after marrying a 
second-generation woman.  
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Figure 6.6: Waves of Migration – Bhabis 
 
  
 
 
Qualitative Findings 
The label bhabi has been chosen for the women in this wave of female migration to 
refer to the responsibility that these women are given to uphold and maintain 
ethnoreligious traditions and practices from Pakistan. Women in the second wave of 
migration from Pakistan are educated to GCSE or A Level equivalence; they gain some 
of their status within families as a result of being more educated than their 
predecessors, the ghar-walis.  Their educational attainment and fluency, or potential to 
become fluent, in English is a valued attribute in their selection as marriage partners for 
second-generation Pakistani men. Due to their higher level of education they are older 
at the time of migration than the ghar-walis were, in their early 20s rather than their late 
teens. The term bhabi is also a reminder that these women hold marginalised and 
disadvantaged positions as young women of ‘in-law’ status within British Pakistani 
family structures. 
Bhabis are often family members (most often cousins) of second-generation men. They 
believe that they are selected as marriage partners by their parents-in-law because 
they are seen to better represent Pakistani norms and values than second-generation 
women. The values of patience and the ability to accept challenging circumstances 
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with little complaint are particularly important, as well as the ability to transmit ethnic 
and religious education to their children. Bhabis are valued because of their knowledge 
of Islam and ethnoreligious norms and practices resulting from their socialisation and 
education in Pakistan. Bhabis are very aware of the vulnerability of their migrant status 
and their distance from their own families, these factors make them more likely to act 
within the bounds of family and kinship groups norms and hierarchies. Bhabis are 
expected to maintain the social structure and to accept their marginalised position 
within it.  
“If a girl from here marries a boy from here they can make do, but only a few 
of them. Girls from Pakistan have a different environment, they are able to 
compromise more. But here, there is little patience and struggle. I can only 
speak for myself that if people are bringing daughters-in-law from Pakistan 
it’s because they can put up with a lot more from their partners. If one is 
higher, one is lower. If one can’t put up with certain things the other can at 
least put up with it.” (Farida, bhabi) 
Economic activity is not expected of bhabis. Several interviewees spoke about how 
their in-laws had promised that they could further their education after migration. 
However, once they arrived in Britain they were told that they would have no need for 
English language classes or further education because they would not be allowed to 
work. Decisions about what bhabis could do were made by parents-in law, not 
husbands: 
At first my mother-in-law said that I could continue with my studies but then 
afterwards she said why do you need to sit in an office? And they didn’t let 
me work, they said why do you need to work?  Because my father in law said 
that you will be working with men”. (Tabassum, bhabi) 
The English language requirement for citizenship status has made access to English 
language classes easier for bhabis. If this was not a requirement of their visa 
application this would have been subject to negotiation with in-laws or husbands: 
“So I thought that I wanted to learn more so I went to the Job Centre and 
then and I found out from the Job Centre that in order to get nationality, ESOL 
was essential. If I didn’t have that then I wouldn’t have found out about 
anything. So because of nationality I did the ESOL course and then it was 
better than sitting at home, I didn’t have children then either so then I thought 
I should do something.”  (Nausheen, bhabi) 
Parents-in-law are influential in the lives of these women. Bhabis are likely to join 
extended family households and undertake extensive domestic work for the wider 
family until they move into their own homes after they have had one or two children of 
their own. Taking on the housework for large households, under the supervision of 
mothers-in-law, was something of a rite of passage for these younger first-generation 
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women. The burden of housework, restrictions on their opportunities, and the 
psychological impacts of migration meant that the first years of migration were very 
difficult periods of adjustment for most women in this cohort. Economic activity or 
educational attainment were not immediate concerns or likely possibilities, even though 
most bhabis arrived with aspirations to learn and work.  
“When I came here I had to make breakfast, lunch at 1 o’clock, tea at 4 and 
then dinner at night. So the whole of that responsibility came to me, I was 
very young then.  All the housework, washing clothes […] I have always 
heard that once you are married you should try to keep your in-laws happy, 
to live alongside them. If you are arguing all the time then it’s not a good 
thing, this is what my parents told me.” (Hanifa, bhabi) 
There is a strong expectation within families that these women will prioritise their roles 
within the home and family over economic activity. These women are subject to the 
authority of their parents-in-law and husbands not only because of traditional family 
structures but for their citizenship status in Britain. Ghar-walis had greater autonomy in 
the running of their households and decision-making upon migration because their in-
laws were likely to have remained in Pakistan.  
The households of bhabis are less disadvantaged than those of ghar-walis because 
their second-generation husbands speak English as a first language. However, a lack 
of generational improvements in employment outcomes for Pakistani men means that 
these second-generation men are largely employed in manual low-paid occupations. 
There is a dearth of qualitative research evidence on the economic activity of this 
second wave of female migrants and the extent of informal working amongst them has 
not been examined. The labour market outcomes of bhabis are either homogenised 
with those of older and earlier female migrants, or with second-generation women. The 
earliest qualitative research identified younger and more recently arrived migrant 
women as the most isolated and marginalised within Pakistani communities (Werbner 
1990). Contemporary insights into the labour market experiences of this group of 
women are much-needed and this is an area where the qualitative research arising 
from this project can make a significant contribution. 
Bhabis did not talk about any positive aspects of living with their in-laws after migration. 
Instead, they felt they were not able develop close relationship with their husbands, 
they had to manage large amounts of domestic work and they were isolated in the 
presence of the wider family. Possible benefits of living with in-laws were not spoken 
about such as: assistance with settling into Britain; learning how to run a British 
Pakistani household; not having the burden of paying rent or mortgage; sharing 
expenses with extended family. The interviewees expressed greater dissatisfaction 
with their experiences after migration than those in earlier qualitative studies (Werbner 
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1990; Shaw 1988; 2000).  The dissatisfaction may be a result of changes in the 
characteristics of transnational daughters-in law, many had some formal qualifications 
and came from middle-class and urban families. 
6.8 Irregular Migrants 
There are a small sub-set of women in the sample who did not fit within the four 
categories. They now appear in the model in Figure 6.8 below. This sub-set add a 
further layer of complexity to this mapping out of migration trajectories and have been 
labelled ‘irregular migrants. Although there are some aspects of these smaller waves of 
migration that correspond with those described above there are some important 
distinctions that will be described here to fully explore the complexity and diversity 
uncovered by using a mixed method approach. 
Figure 6.7 Waves of Migration – Irregular Migrants  
 
There is a small sub-sample of recently arrived older interviewees within the sample of 
first-generation women that meet neither the criteria for ghar-walis, daadis or bhabis. 
These women represent an emergent pattern of small-scale secondary migration to 
Britain of Pakistani families from countries in Europe such as Spain or Italy. This wave 
of migration has not yet been identified in the literature. The pattern of secondary 
migration of Pakistani families from Europe to Britain was confirmed in interviews and 
substantiated by observations and informal conversations during fieldwork undertaken 
in Mohallaton; informal observations around Rochdale; and in discussion with a group 
of policy researchers in Oldham where it had also been identified. This may be an 
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example of a small-scale ‘beat the ban’ rush of migrants who may have intended to 
move to Britain at some point but have decided to do so before Brexit. 
The pattern of secondary migration to Britain is of concern for several reasons, 
including the fact that these newly arrived families may not be fluent in English but may 
have learnt another European language. This is likely to adversely affect their 
educational and labour market outcomes; as European migrants they will not be 
required to learn English as a condition of permanent settlement in Britain. They are 
unfamiliar with British customs and practices and unaware of how to seek support from 
service providers in, for example, health and social care. Secondary migrants may not 
have the established networks of contacts in the co-ethnic community that the pioneers 
and their subsequent generations have benefited from. The impacts of multiple 
migrations may be particularly disruptive for the educational outcomes for the children 
of these families. The emerging evidence in this research suggests it is not a case of 
these family units being met with open arms but some resentment by established 
British Muslim communities. Considering these circumstances, the women within these 
families are likely to be more disadvantaged than first-generation women who have 
migrated directly to Britain as either ghar-walis or bhabis.   
Recently arrived daadis and irregular migrants are categorised as ‘irregular migrants’ in 
the sample of interviewees, as a group of migrants who are distinct from the larger-
scale migrations of ghar-walis and bhabis. Although they are new arrivals themselves, 
they have arrived into an ethnoreligious community with structures and organisations in 
place to facilitate religious and ethnic community life. There are existing and 
established networks and community organisations of first-generation Pakistani women 
to reduce social isolation and share knowledge and information on a range of issues, 
including work and employment. Community norms, expectations and aspirations are 
changing, albeit gradually, with the maturation of a growing second-generation and 
higher educational attainment. 
The waves of migration that are included in the sample of interviewees are shown in 
Figure 6.8 below. The sample of first generation interviewees, organised by migration 
wave, are set out in Table 6.4 below.  
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Table 6.4 First generation interviewees by migrant wave 
Figure 6.8 Interviewees by Migrant Generation and Cohort 
 
Pseudonym Age Education 
Husband’s 
Migrant 
Generation 
Husband’s 
Occupational 
Class 
Ghar-Walis 
Rifat 44 FE 1 3 (TD) 
Fatima 45 None 1 0 
Rashida 61 FE 1 3 (TD) 
Kishwar 52 FE 1 4 
Irregular Migrants 
Bilqees 58 FE 1 0 
Suriya 62 FE 1 0 
Shahida 59 HE 1 0 
Maqsooda 44 HE 1 4 
Bhabis 
Fazeelat 44 GCSE 2 3 (TD) 
Tabassum 47 FE 2 0 
Nausheen 36 HE 2 3 (TD) 
Farida 36 GCSE 2 4  
Hanifa 38 None 2 4 
Kausar 37 FE 1 4 
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6.9 Conclusion 
To understand constraints to economic activity it is essential to understand the effects 
of each of these waves of migration and their socio-economic consequences on the 
women interviewed, as well as the cumulative effects of waves of migration on all 
British Pakistani women. Each wave of migration represents a form of social distinction 
and differentiation. These distinctions are unrecognised through the lens of 
conventional, largely quantitative, studies of socio-economic inequality where the focus 
is on differences in outcomes, rather than difference in experience. A qualitative 
approach can complement quantitative analysis to provide a richer and more nuanced 
picture of patterns of economic activity, as well as to identify more gradual and subtle 
changes.  
The following diagram completes the model for waves of migration from Pakistan with 
the inclusion of the children of third generation children. 
Figure 6.9 Waves of Migration – A British Pakistani Model  
 
 
The third generation of British Pakistanis are the young men and women, or children, 
who have British born parents. Some of the third generation may be more accurately 
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described as 2.5 generation, where one parent is a first-generation migrant and the 
other is British born. The third generation were not included in the sample of 
interviewees but are included in accounts of first and second-generation women when 
they spoke about their expectations and aspirations for their children.  
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Chapter 7: Qualitative Findings II 
Muslim Women: Looking After Home, Family and the 
Community 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter will be how Pakistani women interact with others at home and 
in the community in Mohallaton. It will also examine how these interactions might 
increase the likelihood of women being economically inactive in the looking after home 
and family (LAHF) category rather than being in formal paid employment. The review of 
qualitative literature in Chapter 2 provided descriptions of close-knit family and kinship 
networks in areas of high co-ethnic concentration in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Findings from the qualitative phase of this project, presented in Chapter 6, upheld 
evidence of the disadvantaged position of second-generation young women in British 
Pakistani family and community structures. However, there was also evidence of 
change, women who attended high school in the 1990s were more likely to have 
received some post-compulsory education, attaining a vocational GNVQ qualification, 
than women in the 1980s. Nevertheless, early (usually transnational) marriage and 
limited post-compulsory education remained the norm for young women in working-
class households. The local Pakistani community played an important role in upholding 
these norms and policing the behaviour of young women.  
The qualitative findings presented in Chapter 6 demonstrated the impact of social class  
on  educational outcomes and marriage practices for second-generation women in the 
sample. Young women who came from more advantaged pre-migration conditions, and 
whose fathers attained employment in lower middle-class occupations, had more 
choice regarding higher education and timing of marriage. Again, this upholds what is 
known about the childhood and education experiences of middle-class young Pakistani 
women in the literature (Bagguley and Hussain 2016; Khattab and Modood 2018). Less 
is known about the experiences of adult Pakistani women in areas of high co-ethnic 
density and how community and family influence the decisions they make about 
economic activity.  
Bonding social capital is widely considered to deter economic activity among adult 
Muslim women and to support traditional gender norms. Community-level normative 
constraints on the behaviour of Pakistani women through surveillance and gossip were 
a notable feature that set them apart from women of other ethnic groups (Shaw 2000). 
Notably, the statistical research shows that bonding social capital does not significantly 
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increase the likelihood of economic inactivity among Pakistani women (Cheung 2014, 
Chapter 4 modelling results). Upon the inclusion of a measure of social capital in a 
multivariate model that predicted the likelihood of LAHF among Muslim women, 
Pakistani women were the only ethnic group of Muslim women more likely to be LAHF 
than Indian Muslim women. This indicates a potential interplay between bonding social 
capital and Pakistani ethnicity that might result in higher levels of LAHF.  
The quantitative literature, and the findings from the quantitative phase of this project 
presented in Chapter 4, confirm that marriage is significantly associated with economic 
inactivity in the looking after home category for Muslim women. Now rather dated 
qualitative evidence has been used to attribute the association of marriage with 
economic inactivity to adherence to traditional gender norms around male-
breadwinner/female-homemaker roles (Dale et al. 2002a; 2002b; Dale 2008). These 
accounts of gender roles in Muslim households require significant updating and this 
analysis will contribute to filling this gap in the current literature. The qualitative findings 
from this project began to develop a detailed and contemporary understanding of how 
Muslim women experience marriage and residence in an area of high co-ethnic 
density, and how these factors might affect their decisions relating to economic activity. 
The qualitative findings are presented using the categorisation system presented in 
Chapter 6 and summarised in Figure 7.1 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interviewee Classification  
Ghar-wali: married to a first-generation man who arrived as chain 
migrant 
Irregular Migrant: arrived post 2000, as family migrant (secondary 
migration) or joining other family (widowed grandmother-daadi) 
Bhabi: married to a second generation man 
Class of 1980: second generation, aged 40 plus 
Class of 1990:  second-generation, aged 30-39 
 
Figure 7.1 Interviewee Classification  
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7.2 Muslim Women in the Mohalla [Neighbourhood] 
7.2.1 Bridging Social Capital 
There was little evidence of bridging social capital in the lives of any of the 
interviewees. First-generation women did not mark this out as a negative aspect of 
their lives in Mohallaton, Instead, they valued the ability to speak in Urdu or Punjabi in 
the conduct of their everyday lives, for example when interacting with friends and 
neighbours or carrying out daily chores. For more recent migrants, this gave them a 
sense of independence from their time of arrival in Britain. The shared sense of 
Pakistani Muslim identity and the continuation of familiar socio-cultural practices were 
valued by all first-generation women.  
A small number of more recently arrived first-generation women saw living in 
Mohallaton as a way to limit their interactions with non-Muslims, they saw this as a 
positive feature of the area. This view was not common amongst those who had 
migrated earlier (ghar-walis) or second-generation women. The quotes below represent 
the spectrum of opinion on interactions with non-Muslims amongst first-generation 
women: Suriya prefers limited interactions whilst Kishwar welcomes her children’s 
white friends into her home. Most women fall in between these two positions, many do 
not have close non-Muslim friends, nor do they deliberately set out to avoid non-
Muslims:  
“It is a good thing because everyone speaks our own language […] so at 
least we can share conversations, our feelings, and it becomes easy for us 
to make friends […] It is very good to live amongst other Muslims and with 
other Pakistani people. I really like it that we have our own community, we 
have our own people. The others they have a different environment, we can’t 
adjust with them but we can say hello when we’re out and about. Obviously, 
they say don’t they that tarbooz tarbooz ka rang pakartha hai [when a melon 
rests with another melon it takes its colour]. So, if we mix too much then we 
will want to wear clothes like them or go their way. It won’t happen like this 
but it is possible that it might happen so I prefer to live with my own people.” 
(Suriya, irregular migrant - daadi) 
“The only difference is that we can’t eat some of their food. They don’t say 
the shahada. We can spend time with them, we can share some things with 
them and we should share that with them. Now my children’s English friends,  
boys and girls, come to our house, they sleep there, they eat from my dishes, 
I cook for them too […] I enjoy it all, I think that this is my country […] I don’t 
have anything in Pakistan, it is my country but I can’t go there, I can’t eat the 
food there, I couldn’t survive there.” (Kishwar, ghar-wali) 
Most first and second women do not associate their lives in Mohallaton as a deliberate 
strategy to maintain a distance from the white British population or people of other 
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ethnicities. For these women residential concentration is simply the result of patterns of 
settlement and the practicalities of living close to family, affordable accommodation, 
easy access to transport and proximity to  mosques and shops that sell halal food.  
“I like living here now because of the facilities and the other thing is, I can’t 
say that I won’t live here because we can’t afford to move elsewhere. The 
masjid is close and stores are nearby, post office, bus stops because I don’t 
drive, if I drove then I might think of living somewhere else. But everything is 
nearby for me that’s why I like living here.” (Rifat, ghar-wali) 
There is little evidence of generational change regarding access to bridging social 
capital. Most of the second-generation women had only Pakistani friends. There was 
also little evidence of social interactions between first and second-generation women, 
even between those of similar ages, outside of family contexts. For example, 
Shameem (Class of 1990) only spent time with her first-generation sister-in-law (bhabi) 
at family events in her parents’ home. The lack of interaction between first and second 
generation women in community locations was also noted during empirical data 
collection (see Methodology Part II, Section 5.3.4). 
Second-generation women had no daily or regular contact with white British people, 
only two of the women stated they had friends who were not Pakistani. Some of the 
second-generation women stated that they were part of a more ethnically diverse group 
of friends before becoming economically inactive but they had not maintained these 
friendships since leaving work. These women do not meet people of other ethnic 
groups in Mohallaton because of the ethnic make-up of the area. For the Pakistani 
women in the sample, taking part in general community activities did not lead to a 
greater opportunity to develop social contacts with the white British population. Halima 
described how the coffee morning at the local primary school is only attended by other 
Pakistani mothers, reflecting the ethnic make-up of the school. Similarly, observations 
at a local high school coffee morning revealed that only Pakistani mothers attended. 
Criticisms of low levels of integration of British Muslim women in policy and media 
reports can be a source of frustration for Muslim women: 
“Now you were saying that you know interact with other people, especially 
White communities and things like that but where do I interact with them? 
What about the White people interacting with the Asians and the Muslim 
communities, none of them are participating in these things […] I’m going to 
all these things but there is no White people in there so it’s the other way 
round isn’t it? Instead of people saying to me you interact, I’m going to say 
well where is your people whom I need to interact with. I’m going to coffee 
mornings, I’m going to sewing class, I’m going to all these things but there is 
no other communities who I can interact with.” (Halima, Class of 1980) 
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Access to bridging social capital is very limited for all Pakistani women, regardless of 
migrant generation or cohort. For the second generation, this is related to limited 
opportunities to make inter-ethnic social connections, whilst for first-generation women 
there is an element of socio-cultural preference as well as lack of structural opportunity. 
Overall, Pakistani women have greater access to bonding social capital and the social 
resources held within the co-ethnic community in Mohallaton. 
7.2.2 Bonding Social Capital 
Experiences of residence in a dense Pakistani community vary by generation. First-
generation women were more likely to experience intrusion, gossip and policing of 
behaviour by other women, as was reported in the literature in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Shaw 1988; Afshar 1994). A subtle generational shift was identified in the qualitative 
data: second generation women displayed greater autonomy and agency in making 
decisions about their interactions with other Pakistani women. First-generation women 
felt that they had to answer intrusive questions, they felt compelled to do so in order to 
access social and emotional support from their social networks which were composed 
of other first-generation women: 
“Pakistani women keep an eye out on who is coming and going, what 
vehicles is parked outside which house. You have to give an answer, you 
have to give an answer. I prefer that the people who live around us are 
Pakistani. I feel tassalli [support] from that. I compromise my privacy a lot 
because we are a small family […] I have made a couple of good friends I 
have a good relationship with them, they call up to see how I am, they come 
and go and when I was ill they would send food over for us.” (Rifat, ghar-wali) 
First generation women who were not members of extended family networks in 
Mohallaton were most vulnerable in this respect; they felt compelled to answer 
questions about their whereabouts, visitors to their homes and their family and 
household circumstances. If they did not answer they risked questions arising about 
their reputation and honour. Farida is questioned by her female neighbours about 
where she has been if she leaves the house for a day, or if she is seen with an 
unfamiliar woman. She feels unable to avoid answering the questions because it might 
harm her reputation if she refused to answer: 
“This is a bad thing that someone should tell me everything about their lives 
and that I tell everything about myself to anyone else […] you have to tell 
them things, you have to tell them, they expect that you should tell them.” 
(Farida, bhabi) 
In contrast to the women quoted above, Hanifa is part of an extended family, women in 
her family are not subject to the same level of community-level scrutiny. Her husband 
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and her in-laws are aware of her whereabouts and activities and she does not feel the 
need to justify her actions to other women in the community.  
There was some evidence of intergenerational change to this aspect of community life. 
Whilst some first-generation migrants felt unable to avoid scrutiny and felt pressured to 
share information about themselves, second-generation women had developed 
strategies to avoid the intrusion. There is evidence in the accounts of second-
generation women that kinship ties and their effects on families and individuals are 
declining in significance. Lubna witnessed the local Pakistani community growing 
throughout her childhood. She described spending so much time with families from her 
village of origin in Pakistan that she did not realise they were not in fact family 
members until she was older:  
“It was quite fun I mean like at that time you know like the family that was 
here it was quite close network and everyone knew each other and it was 
like happy times [laughs]. Yeah, I mean I think my grandfather was like one 
of the first to come here but like slowly you know the community really grew 
and there was a lot of people, even if they weren’t related they were from the 
same village, so they were just like family. It’s not until I became older that I 
realised that you know they’re not you know close relatives because 
everyone was just really close, you couldn’t tell.” (Lubna, Class of 1990) 
Lubna goes on to state that the kinship network is not as tightknit as it used to be; 
contact is far less frequent due to the busier lives of children and adults, to the extent 
that “you have to make an appointment to see your own brothers and sisters”. At the 
first reading her comments sound almost nostalgic, however, later in the interview she 
spoke about undertaking voluntary courses and activities so that she had a reason to 
regularly leave the house and therefore be less available to undertake chores that 
might be assigned to her from the wider family.  
Misbah’s parents made considerable efforts to maintain ties with the local Pakistani 
community and the family’s kinship network throughout England in the 1970s. Misbah 
does not actively maintain these community and kinship ties, nevertheless she does 
feel that she benefits from the networks her parents developed. When she moved to 
her current home a few years ago Misbah realised that the one of her neighbours was 
the daughter of old family friends. Although she does not have daily contact with her 
neighbour they both had babies around the same time, they swapped maternity clothes 
and gave each other practical help such as cooking meals for one another after the 
birth of their children:  
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 “So now we know of each other’s families […] so we have that link even 
though we never spent all those years together but because there is that 
bond with the elder generation it’s kind of helped us... I think it’s a blessing 
to have that, I’d rather not you know refuse the blessings that are given to 
me and yeah so I think a lot of people, certainly my family as well, it 
continues.” (Misbah, Class of 1980) 
The investment in time and resources that G1 parents made in creating and 
maintaining close social ties within the local community continue to benefit their 
children in very tangible ways: social and practical support and in some cases, access 
to paid employment in the co-ethnic community. For example, Hina’s parents were able 
to secure Hina and her husband employment in businesses through their contacts in 
Mohallaton.  
Misbah finds older first-generation women more likely to ask intrusive and personal 
questions; women of that generation from Pakistan seem to have different norms 
regarding polite conversation and different concepts of privacy. Misbah’s approach to 
dealing with these intrusive questions was more confident and resilient than first-
generation women of a similar age. Misbah displays a greater level of autonomy and 
control over her interactions with the Pakistani community, this is similar to the other 
two women with degree level qualifications. This exercise of choice may be an 
outcome in part of a relatively higher level of education as well as generational distance 
between first and second-generation women. 
 “Well it does hurt me and it’s usually elderly ladies you know […] so I try to 
keep the conversation quite minimal. I didn’t tend to go to places where I’d 
tend to see [those] people. I don’t think I am a rude person or anything, I 
just kept myself away…they may know of my family because we have been 
here for years but I personally don’t know them as much so perhaps that’s 
why they don’t intrude because I have not built strong relationships with 
them, at all.” (Misbah, Class of 1980) 
Unlike most second-generation women, Shameem does not use strategies of 
avoidance; she maintains kinship relations, visiting and taking part in ritual exchange.  
Shameem has undertaken the responsibility of being the female representative of her 
family in kinship and community networks in Mohallaton whilst her sisters, both older 
and younger, have been able to opt out. Shameem talks about the responsibility as a 
burden because it can be time-consuming: 
“What it is like if somebody dies or somebody has had a baby, I’m the sister 
who ends up having to drag the rest of them with me because we’re married 
now so its individual, you have to go and meet these people. And it’s not that 
we don’t want to meet them it’s just that we don’t have time and I am the one 
who has to end up [going]. It’s like I say to my sister I’m representing the 
frigging family, I’m representing all of youse and I have to sit there going so-
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and-so couldn’t come because this happened or she couldn’t come 
because…I mean I’m representing everybody. And we’ve been, so then 
nobody has a grudge that we didn’t come.” (Shameem, Class of 1990) 
Shameem saw the benefit of having access to the support of a wider kinship network 
when her mother became seriously ill. The kinship network became a source of 
significant support for Shameem during this time: holding prayer groups, making meals 
for Shameem’s family; taking care of her children so that she could spend time in 
hospital with her mother. These positive experiences have influenced Shameem’s 
commitment to maintaining ties, even though it is not always easy for her to do so.  
Three of the thirteen second-generation respondents moved to Mohallaton after 
marriage and they had some interesting observations to make as relative newcomers. 
These women’s experiences of Mohallaton provide evidence of the closed nature of the 
community. Two of the women had a small group of friends and did not take part in any 
community group activities. Kalsoom has no friends in Mohallaton at all despite having 
lived there for more than 15 years. Zara moved to Mohallaton from an area of low co-
ethnic density. Her husband is a first-generation migrant from Azaad Kashmir with an 
extensive kinship network in Mohallaton. Zara describes her husband’s family and his 
kinship network in Mohallaton as very closed and unwelcoming of outsiders: 
“It was like a nightmare for two years but then I got used to it […]. They 
wouldn’t talk to you, the women wouldn’t talk to you if you said hello to 
them and they would just look at your face.” (Zara, Class of 1990) 
Zara sees the women in her husband’s family and kinship group as being “backwards” 
in their lifestyle choices, and their views on education and work for women. There are 
2.5 or third-generation young women in her kinship network who are not allowed to 
attend college or university and are expected to be economically inactive. Zara 
chooses not to have a relationship with her in-laws. 
Second-generation women who move to Mohallaton from other parts of Britain 
experience greater social isolation than more recent G1 migrants from Pakistan. The 
experiences of these women as newcomers indicate that there is a strong social order 
operating in the community through kinship and family networks. For women, the social 
order is maintained by other women. The penalties for non-conformity can be discord 
within households or extended families and the withdrawal, or withholding, of 
community or kinship group acceptance and support.  
7.2.3 Residential Permanence in Mohallaton  
Alongside the drawbacks of scrutiny and gossip several respondents commented on 
other negative features of the area such as: high levels of crime and drug use, a lack of 
cleanliness and poor upkeep of homes in Mohallaton, as well as high levels of 
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migration into the area. These concerns are likely to be characteristic of areas of high 
deprivation. Some second-generation women were concerned about the impacts of 
social cohesion in the local area because of more recent migrations from Eastern 
Europe, Syria, and the migration of whole family units of Pakistani families from 
European countries, such as Spain and Italy. Despite this, none of the women 
expressed that moving out of the area was a long or short-term aim for them. 
The greatest barrier to moving away from Mohallaton for second-generation women 
was the need to remain near to wider family. Most second-generation women stated 
that being close to family, particularly parents and parents-in-law, meant that they could 
fulfil their caring responsibilities on a regular, sometimes daily, basis. Some of the 
women were able to make use of practical and emotional support from wider family in 
terms of childcare and the sharing of care responsibilities for the elderly. The interplay 
of cultural and structural conditions that lead to continued residence in an area of high 
Pakistani concentration are evident in Halima’s account. 
Halima has lived in Mohallaton since childhood. She lives with her husband, who is a 
taxi driver and their children Her parents live in her childhood home, a short walk away, 
and her siblings also live locally with their families. Halima values having easily 
accessible ethnoreligious goods and resources but finds that being close to the wider 
kinship network includes unwanted observation of her behaviour and movement 
around Mohallaton: 
 “Yeah I think there is pros and cons. The positive things I think would be is 
that you’re close to your mum and dad and your brothers and sisters. The 
shops are local, the masjid is local, the doctor is local, the schools are local 
[…] walking distance so that’s all the positive sides. Now the drawbacks are 
being so close to family […]  keep meeting them here and there and bumping 
into each other, gossip, backbiting, meeting everybody at the cash and carry 
[…]” (Halima, Class of 1990) 
Living near her wider family is not only a personal or socio-cultural preference but also 
something Halima feels is necessary due to her husband’s work as a taxi driver. When 
Halima’s husband first arrived in Britain he worked in a co-ethnic factory, he then 
became a taxi driver to increase his income and to have greater independence and 
flexibility in his working hours. He tried working during the day but became frustrated by 
slow trade and rush-hour traffic: 
“He didn’t like it during the day, he wanted to work at night because it was 
quiet, he hated the traffic. He said I can’t just sit in the traffic jams, I hate it, 
it’s boring just you know sitting there all day, no jobs. Manchester City Centre 
is quite busy at night because people from all over will come to the city 
centre.” (Halima, Class of 1990) 
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The change to his working hours required negotiation between the couple. It took 
Halima a while to adjust to the idea that her husband would be working during the night 
and sleeping during the day; this had not been her expectation of what “normal” family 
life would be like. At first, she was scared to stay at home during the nights with her 
young children, the proximity of her family helped her to overcome this difficulty: 
“The first two or three weeks were very difficult for me because I used to 
feel scared living alone at home, I didn’t want to be alone. He said no you’ll 
be fine and I’m just a phone call away and then you can call your family if 
anything happens or this and that. And then he kind of left me to it and then 
I’m used to it now, I’m alone at home at night with my kids and he is at 
work. But I hated it at the beginning, I wanted him to be normal, work during 
the day and be home at night.” (Halima, Class of 1990) 
Halima’s case demonstrates how the type of work that men have access to impacts on 
choices Pakistani families make about where they live because of the structure of own 
accounts or shift work. Two of the husbands of second-generation interviewees were 
self-employed in small businesses; five were taxi drivers; one worked a long shift in a 
local factory in a routine manual occupation. Self-employment, taxi-driving and shift 
work all require long working days, and in some cases, work during the night. The low 
pay associated with many of the occupations in the transport and catering sectors may 
also mean that housing in areas like Mohallaton is the only affordable option for these 
families. Low levels of household income increase the importance of having essential 
facilities, such as food and clothing shops, places of workshop etc, within walking 
distance.  
Alongside these structural constraints there seemed to be a socio-cultural attitude or 
preference for remaining in Mohallaton, and a subtle disapproval of those who chose to 
leave. Three second-generation women said that they had the financial means to move 
to a ‘better’ area but preferred to stay in Mohallaton. Hina was critical of women who 
moved out of the area to live in a more affluent neighbourhood.  She spoke about some 
Pakistani women who had chosen to do so and some of the difficulties they have faced 
around accessing ethno-religious goods and services and transport. It was clear during 
the interview that she did not think leaving Mohallaton was a good idea: 
“When they see other people moving [to a more affluent area] they get 
influenced, they think they will be much happier so they think of moving there 
and then they will have problems with the car, because the husband will take 
the car and what happens with the woman then? I have seen a couple of 
ladies in [community centre] […] and they are just staying at home or they’re 
coming walking.” (Hina, Class of 1990) 
Hina spoke about how material needs, such as two cars, might increase as families 
move to areas which might be more affluent but are at a greater distance from 
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Mohallaton. Moving to a more affluent area will almost certainly include purchasing a 
more expensive, perhaps larger, house. Hina saw the added expense of moving out of 
Mohallaton as a symbol of greed, which is frowned upon within the community. Hina 
spoke about a female member of her kinship network as the only member of the 
network who has moved to a more affluent area, in a disapproving way and found 
some of the difficulties the woman faced amusing.  
Aleena also mentioned other areas in Manchester that would be more desirable places 
to live but then went on to say that staying in the area despite, or even perhaps 
because of, its socio-economic deprivation is very important to her. To Aleena, and 
other second-generation women, staying in Mohallaton signified humility. For Aleena 
staying in Mohallaton signified a public display of her attachment to the values of her 
late father and to the house that her parents gave to her as a gift: 
I don’t want to become snobby which is what my father obviously taught us 
you know even though mashallah we were very wealthy we could have 
moved to rich areas but no my dad said no, keep your feet on the ground. 
He taught us to live very humbly. I think the humbleness and I think 
alhamdulillah that’s in all of us you know even like now if I wanted I could sell 
that house and move somewhere posh. Partly I do you know because of my 
girls. I mean my father gave me that house, my mother and father mashallah, 
it’s a gift they gave it to me.” (Aleena, Class of 1980) 
Women in Mohallaton were committed to the values of modesty and humility and there 
was a subtle disapproval of upward social mobility; moving out of Mohallaton to a more 
affluent area was seen as a display of wealth or greed and a criticism of the area and 
those who remained there. This form of disapproval acts as a mechanism that protects 
the bounded nature of the Pakistani community in Mohallaton and deters people, who 
are able to, from leaving. This disapproval may also be a coping mechanism for Muslim 
women in the face of structural disadvantage and marginalisation: greater value is 
placed on experiences of hardship than the comforts of socio-economic prosperity that 
they cannot access. 
“I learnt something one time, they say that when you want to look at your life, 
look at people below you, not the people above you […] In Islam, you can 
only envy if somebody has more knowledge in Islam and you just say Ya 
Allah [Oh Allah] you have given them this blessing, give it to me as well. You 
can’t say ok they’ve got a Jeep, I want a Jeep. They’ve got a four bedroom 
house, I want a four bedroom house. You should think of what I have got and 
what other people don’t have.” (Halima, Class of 1990) 
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7.2.4 Environment of State Welfare Dependency  
Recently arrived first-generation women spoke about what they perceived to be a 
widespread culture of welfare-dependency in Mohallaton, caused by the unwillingness 
of men and women to work. They stated that fraudulent benefit claims or informal work 
whilst claiming unemployment benefits was widespread and a haram (illegitimate) 
source of income. Recently arrived first-generation women may have had an outsider’s 
perspective on the Pakistani community in Mohallaton, but also perhaps a limited 
awareness of structural inequalities that Muslim communities in Britain have faced over 
generations. As new migrants they are themselves subject to the greatest level of 
marginalisation and therefore were perhaps critical of Pakistani people who, they feel, 
are behaving badly because they are most likely to suffer the repercussions in wider 
society.  
“We have seen it ourselves that people are sitting here so well and healthy 
and they say they can’t find work. I ask, why can’t you find work? You can 
find work. 50%, this is my opinion only, I have seen this a lot, nobody works 
here. Nobody works. People here have the thinking that if we work then we 
might make £800 or £900 or £1000, if we take benefits we will get £1800, 
£1900.  It should be changed! We have seen here that younger men in their 
30 and 40s survive on benefits, they have four or five children and they claim 
benefits in the names of their children […] husbands are at home all the time 
this is what I have seen as a common thing.” (Maqsooda, irregular migrant) 
“Jisse mille yun, vo kare kyun? [if he gets something for doing nothing, why 
will he do anything?] Those who are getting income from benefits and at such 
a rate that you would get less if you were to work, you get more if you are not 
working. Then they get into the habit, then they prefer to sit around and still 
eat. Even me, if I got money then why would I work for 8 hours? If I get more 
sitting at home so why wouldn’t I go to watch a film, wander around, go on 
outings. And now they are all very worried. The mothers now are very worried 
about what they will do. They will have to work. They will have to work. I have 
a friend, she has to go to the job centre every week. They will find you a job 
and tell you that you have to do it, you will no longer get any benefits […].” 
(Shahida, irregular migrant) 
Long-settled women, second-generation women and the wives of second generation 
men did not raise this issue in interviews. This may be because they had a greater 
solidarity with the Pakistani community in Mohallaton, where they had spent all or most 
of their lives and were therefore unwilling to be critical of ‘their’ community. Or, because 
state benefits were the main source of income in their own households and they did not 
want to be associated with fraudulent claims or informal work.  
Younger first-generation women saw hypocrisy in the pressure they faced from men 
and women in their families and the wider community not to work; their desire to be 
economically active was regarded as an undesirable source of income that symbolised 
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greed and immodesty in the context of able-bodied men relying on state benefits. 
Farida spoke to her neighbours about her desire to work and found that they 
disapproved. Instead of deterring her from working, this experience gave her a stronger 
motivation and justification for working: 
“So she [neighbour] spoke to her husband and the second day she gave me 
the response that people talk about working because they love money, I 
didn’t like this at all [...] indeed I have a house and a good husband, I still 
want to work. I don’t really care what anyone thinks I don’t need a degree 
from anyone. If my husband is fine with me I don’t need anyone’s permission, 
certainly not anyone standing on the road […]. If you have 7 children and 
you’re claiming benefits, lying to get benefits, that’s better for you? But if you 
want to work a part-time job, that’s greedy? That’s up to us to decide then 
isn’t it, what is right and what is wrong.” (Farida, bhabi) 
Rifat also expressed resentment about the hypocrisy she perceived in the Pakistani 
community: first-generation women are deterred from formal work whilst their informal 
work in the secondary labour market, as cleaners and piece-workers, is accepted. 
Further, there are structures and mechanisms in place to support fraudulent benefit 
claims and informal work, She attributes this hypocritical attitude to the pride of Pakistani 
men. She asserted that she was being honest in the quote below because of the evident 
surprise of the researcher to her statements about the extent of informal work and false 
claims for state benefits in Mohallaton: 
“It’s true, not a lie. You might not know but I live here and I do know, I am 
talking about my own community. They’re all doing some type of fraud and 
they lie to take benefits. Another thing is that here they lie about disabilities, 
they do dramas, they go to the doctors, tell lies and then - you must write 
about this too, but at least listen to me - there is a doctor who takes £100, 
£200 from Pakistani women and writes them a note that they have a 
disability, a false disability. And her rule is that the first disability payment 
that person receives has to be given to her. These are Pakistanis for you.” 
(Rifat, ghar-wali) 
These women see fraudulent benefit claims and choosing not to work if family income 
is higher because of state benefits as immoral and haram. This is clearly a 
controversial topic that could have repercussions for the wider Pakistani community 
and is reported bearing this in mind. It is relevant to note here that figures from the 
Race Disparity Audit (Cabinet Office 2017) reveal that Pakistani households are not the 
ethnic group most likely to be reliant on state benefits and tax credits as their primary 
source of income. Many households in Britain are reliant on several sources of 
household income that include: payment from employment; benefits; tax credits; 
pensions; and investments (Cabinet Office 2017).  
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Nevertheless, these women clearly felt that welfare-dependency was an important 
contextual issue to explain their own circumstances as well as those of other women in 
Mohallaton. A recognition of hypocrisy and wrongdoing opens a space for women to be 
critical of community norms and to re-evaluate the constraints the community poses to 
their economic activity. The fact that women who were more longstanding members of 
the Pakistani community in Mohallaton did not raise the issue perhaps indicates their 
unwillingness to be critical of community norms and their greater compliance with them.  
7.2.5 Section Conclusion 
Economically inactive Pakistani women in Mohallaton have very little opportunity to 
access bridging social capital. In most cases this is due to a lack of structural 
opportunities to meet people of other ethnicities in the conduct of their everyday lives, 
for example at local shops or at the school gates, rather than a socio-cultural 
preference for segregation from the white majority. A small number of recently arrived 
migrants express a preference for residential segregation. The most significant form of 
social capital for interviewees of both generations is bonding social capital. 
First and second generation migrants have limited interactions with one another 
outside of family settings. This was noted in the data collection stages as well as in the 
analysis of qualitative data. Access to bonding social capital, in the form of emotional 
and social support, is subject to accepting intrusive scrutiny from other first generation 
women. First generation women who have not arrived to join an extended family are 
most likely to require support from their social networks and to experience the greatest 
level of intrusion. These social networks of first generation women disapprove of 
women being in formal paid work. By not participating in these networks, women risk 
social isolation as well as questions being raised about their respectability and honour.  
Second-generation women also find the presence of wider kinship networks intrusive, 
but many have developed strategies of avoidance or resilience to counter intrusive 
questioning by first-generation women. Second-generation women have distinct social 
networks therefore they do not risk isolation by doing so in the same way as young first 
generation women do. Second-generation women who migrate into Mohallaton after 
marriage describe the Pakistani community as closed; they experience greater 
difficulties in integrating with the networks of Pakistani women compared to recently 
arrived first-generation women, perhaps because they are less willing to be subject to 
scrutiny.  
There is some evidence of decline in the importance of kinship networks in the 
everyday lives of second generation women and they can avoid kinship obligations if 
they choose. However, ties within kinship networks and the local Pakistani community 
180 
 
more widely continue to bring some benefits to women in terms of social, emotional 
and practical support. Bonding ties are not wholly rejected by second-generation 
women, even though their influence seems to be declining. Overall, bonding social 
capital is a greater deterrent to the economic activity of first-generation women than the 
second-generation.  
The local availability of ethno-religious goods and services is an important factor for all 
the women who live in Mohallaton. Second generation women are more likely to have 
mixed views about Mohallaton, these are around life in an area of high multiple 
deprivation. It is the practical and emotional support from immediate family as well as 
the ability to live an “Islamic lifestyle” that ties them to Mohallaton, as well as the 
availability of affordable housing. Some of the reliance on family support is created by 
the nature of the work that Pakistani men do, such as taxi-driving during the night. 
Many of the second-generation women also have caring or support responsibilities for 
elderly parents, parents-in-law and perhaps grandparents too and therefore choose to 
live in Mohallaton to fulfil these obligations.  
Alongside these practical and structural reasons for living in Mohallaton, there seems 
to be a ‘subtle disapproval’ of women or families who choose to move out of 
Mohallaton into a more affluent area. Those who leave are regarded as snobby and 
may even be accused of greed. Staying in the area despite having the means to leave 
seems to be a source of prestige and symbol of humility, as well as commitment to the 
Pakistani community in Mohallaton. Or, it may be an ideological way of coping with 
structural marginalisation and residence in an area of high deprivation. An alternative 
perhaps to the ‘myth of return’ that helped settlers and pioneers cope with their 
structural marginalisation in the labour market in the 1970s and 1980s (Anwar 1979; 
Shaw 1988).   
More recently arrived Pakistani women spoke about an environment of welfare 
dependency in the area, this is not mentioned by more long-settled women,  or by 
second generation women. They felt that receipt of state benefits was a significant 
deterrent to the economic activity of men and women in Mohallaton. Rifat believed that 
men prevented their wives from undertaking formal paid employment to maintain higher 
levels of state benefit payments due to low incomes, whilst encouraging their wives to 
work informally. Informal work will be discussed in Chapter 8. The next section of this 
chapter will discuss family life for British Muslim women. 
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7.3 Marriage 
7.3.1 Introduction  
All the interviewees were married to Pakistani men. The employment characteristics of 
their husbands and primary sources of household income are included in Table 7.2 
below. All older first-generation women (irregular migrants and ghar-walis) were, or had 
been, married to first-generation men; there were three widows in the sample. Young 
first-generation women in the bhabi cohort were married to second-generation men. All 
second-generation women were married to men who had been born in Pakistan: two of 
the husbands had arrived in Britain as children and had received most of their 
education here and are therefore categorised as second-generation.  
The qualitative data provides evidence that transnational marriage, and marriage 
between cousins, continued to be the predominant form of marriage in Pakistani 
families in the late 1990s and up to 2010 in Mohallaton; as was the case for Pakistani 
communities in Bristol and High Wycombe (Charsley 2006; 2007; Shaw 2009). The 
statistical findings from this project, and other studies, show that marriage has a 
significant association with economic inactivity in the LAHF category for Muslim women 
(Dale 2008; Khattab and Hussain 2018). Through the analysis of the qualitative data 
three features of marriage emerged as having a significant impact on economic activity: 
mothers-in-law; gender norms around domestic labour; remittances sent to Pakistan by 
first generation husbands. 
Figure 7.2 Classifications for Tables 7.1 and 7.2  
Characteristic  Categories 
Employer Typology 
(Last Employer) 
Type 1 – Mainstream 
Type 2 – Mainstream employer, located in enclave 
Type 3 – Ethnic employer, mainstream service, 
located in enclave  
Type 4 - Ethnic employer, enclave business 
Employment Classification* (Last Job) 1   Higher Professional 
2a Lower managerial/professional 
2b Skilled Worker 
3   Own Accounts Worker 
3(TD) Taxi Driver 
4 Manual/unskilled 
5 Long term unemployed/Never Worked 
Income Source SB State Benefits 
IE Income from employment 
Husband’s Migrant Generation  
 
1 First 
2 Second  
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Table 7.1 Marital Status and Household Socio-economic Status, First-Generation 
 
 
Pseudonym Age Education 
Age at 
Migration 
Husband’s 
Migrant 
Status 
Children 
aged 
<11yrs 
 
Husband’s 
Employer 
Type  
Occupational 
Class 
Residence 
Type 
Primary 
Sources of 
Income 
1st Generation 
Ghar-Walis   
Rifat 44 FE 36 1 No  Type 4 3 (TD) Rented  SB  
Fatima 45 None 30 1 No  Widow - Rented SB  
Rashida 61 FE 22 1 No  Type 4 3 (TD) Owned IE 
Kishwar 52 FE 22 1 No  Type 4 4 Owned IE 
Irregular Migrants 
Bilqees 58 FE 50 1 No  Widow - Rented SB  
Suriya 62 FE 55 1 No  Widow - Owned SB  
Shahida 59 HE 47 1 No Retired - Owned SB  
Maqsooda 44 HE 41 1 No  Type 3 4 Rented IE+SB  
Bhabis   
Fazeelat 44 GCSE 23 2 No  Type 4 3 (TD) Owned IE 
Tabassum 47 FE 18 2 Yes  Divorced - Rented SB 
Nausheen 36 HE 23 2 Yes  Type 4 3 (TD) Owned IE+SB  
Farida 36 GCSE 20 2 Yes  Type 2 4  Owned IE+SB  
Hanifa 38 No Quals 18 2 Yes  Type 1 4 Owned IE+SB  
Kausar 37 FE 21 2 Yes  Type 4 4 Rented IE+SB  
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Table 7.2 Marital Status and Household Socio-economic Status, Second-Generation
Pseudonym Age Education 
Husband’s 
Migrant 
Status 
Children 
aged 
<11yrs 
 
Husband’s 
Employer 
Type  
Occupation
al Class 
Residence 
Type 
Primary 
Sources of 
Income 
2nd Generation 
Class of 1980 
Misbah 40 BA 2 Yes  Type 1 1 Owned IE 
Sana 41 Postgrad 1 Yes Type 1 2a Owned IE 
Aleena 40 BSc 1 Yes Type 1 2a Owned IE 
Kalsoom 43 None 1 No   Type 4 3 (TD) Owned IE+SB 
Nazia 45 None 1 Yes  Type 4 3 (TD) Rented SB 
Amina 53 None 1 No  Divorced - Rented SB 
Rizwana 40 GCSE 1 Yes  Not in Work 4 Rented SB 
Class of 1990 
Shabana 32 GNVQ 1 Yes  Type 4 3 (TD) Owned IE+SB 
Lubna 36 GNVQ  2 Yes  Type 4 3 (TD) Owned IE+SB 
Shameem 32 HE Diploma* 1 Yes Type 3 3 Owned IE 
Halima 36 HE Diploma* 1 Yes  Type 4 3 (TD) Owned IE+SB 
Zara 36 GNVQ Adv 1 Yes  Type 4 3 (TD) Owned IE+SB 
Hina 38 GNVQ Adv 1 Yes  Type 4         4 Owned IE+SB 
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7.3.2 Mothers, Mothers-in-law and Mixed Messages 
Women of different generations, marital status and levels of education are subject to 
different expectations of, and attitudes to, their economic activity. Single British young 
women are expected and encouraged to be economically active, particularly those with 
higher education qualifications.  
“Girls should work, they should work until they are married, they should avail 
of their education.” (Shahida, irregular migrant) 
Upon marriage, young women come across a barrier to economic activity in the form of 
disapproval from first-generation mothers-in-law. For first-generation women reputation 
and status within the co-ethnic community are a significant priority. Some older first-
generation women hold strong views about the undesirability of economic activity of 
young married women; for these women formal economic activity is associated with 
neglect of home and family. Concerns around sexual purity or integration with white 
British working-class norms were identified as reasons for economic inactivity among 
Muslim women in the older literature (Shaw 1988; Werbner 1990; Brah 1994); these 
did not emerge as significant factors preventing women from being economically active 
in the contemporary context. 
Economic activity does, however, continue to be seen as a source of embarrassment 
for some mothers-in-law because they feel that it implies that their sons are unable to 
provide for their wives and children (Afshar 1994; Shaw 2000). When young women 
have children the pressure on them to leave work, or not to enter the formal labour 
market, increases. Some second-generation women themselves place greater value on 
their roles as wives and mothers, particularly in respect of religious nurture and the 
spiritual rewards entailed in the care of home and family for Muslim women. 
Motherhood leads to economic activity for more reasons than the opinions of mothers-
in-law, but for some women these opinions represent a significant barrier to their 
economic activity. 
Positions within family structures, whether an ‘in-law’ relative or not, leads to 
differences in views about the acceptability of economic activity. Mothers of second-
generation women tend to encourage and support the economic activity of their 
married daughters, most importantly by providing family childcare.  Misbah experienced 
significant pressure from her mother-in-law and husband to leave work, even though 
her mother had agreed to look after her child to allow her to return after her maternity 
leave from work ended. Before their marriage Misbah’s husband had agreed that she 
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could return to work after having children, but ultimately he was convinced by his 
mother to prevent her from returning to work after the birth of their first child: 
“My mum kept saying to me I will look after them, don’t worry […] have an 
open mind, be sociable, enjoy a bit of both worlds. My mother-in-law was no 
no, once you have children you have to look after them, nobody else should 
take the burden on parenting and anyway why would you want to work if your 
husband is on a good salary. She used to say, oh I pray that your husband 
has so much money that you don’t need to work. And it’s like well thank you 
but there is that social element, there is that happy you know happy 
chemicals I want released in my body.” (Misbah, Class of 1980) 
There are clearly different perspectives held by first-generation women, as well as 
between the first and second-generation. Misbah wanted to work because of the 
intrinsic satisfaction she gained from her work and because it enabled her to have 
connections with wider social networks; this aspiration was understood and 
encouraged by her mother, but not by her mother-in-law. Misbah continues to feel 
regret and disappointment on the pressure decision placed on her. Despite her higher 
education qualification Misbah was unable to successfully negotiate remaining in 
employment after the birth of her first child.  
Daughters-in-law who do not have HE qualifications, whether first or second-generation 
are more likely to be discouraged from seeking, or remaining in, employment after 
marriage or family formation. This is because of the relatively low levels of pay that 
these women are likely to attain in employment and because this work does not 
improve the status of the family. For example, there is greater prestige associated with 
a daughter in law who works as a GP than one who works as a machinist in a local 
factory. A woman with HE qualifications and a professional career is more likely to be 
able to negotiate continued economic activity and to independently afford the costs 
associated with economic activity, such as childcare and transport if she receives no 
family support.  
Lubna does not have a HE qualification. She worked as a classroom assistant before 
marriage and for a short time after. She left work because her in-laws insisted that she 
took over all cooking, cleaning and caring work for the extended family. The wife of her 
husband’s brother, who also lived in the extended family home, continued with her HE 
studies after marriage and went on to work after having children. Lubna perceives the 
unfairness of the situation and describes herself as a “push-over”.  
The women in the bhabi category find that their mothers-in-law disapprove of their 
economic activity whilst at the same time supporting their own daughters to work by 
providing family childcare. Farida’s mother-in-law provided no support for her efforts to 
find work whilst supporting her daughters: 
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“I went to a factory and they didn’t like it, they thought she is here from 
Pakistan why will she work? And they said it to me once or twice rudely that 
doesn’t our son give you any money? My mother-in-law said that to me that 
has my son kept you naked and hungry? I said ok have your sons-in-law kept 
your daughters naked, is that why they work? I want to stand on my own two 
feet, I want to become more confident.” (Farida, bhabi) 
The views of a group of older first-generation women were collected in an informal 
group discussion during a weekly session of their mental health and wellbeing group. 
The women spoke about their own experiences of economic activity and those of other 
women in their families. This was not a formal focus group, but notes were taken on the 
insights they shared. There seemed to be an acceptance of second-generation 
younger women working and a sense of pride in their achievements and efforts, 
particularly if this was ‘good work’ in a valued profession. Some of these older women 
supported young women in their families, daughters and daughters-in-law, to work by 
providing childcare. This seemed to be a source of pride for the older women and gave 
them a sense of importance and being valued in the everyday lives of their families as 
found by Maynard et al. (2008) in their study of older EM women. One woman joked 
about her children being in a panic over childcare because she was planning on taking 
a two week holiday to Pakistan. They appreciated the needs on the part of second-
generation women to contribute to the finances of their households to improve their 
socio-economic circumstances. 
There was a difference in the opinions these older women held about the economic 
activity of their first-generation daughters-in-law. There was a collective sense that 
younger female migrants had it much easier than their first-generation predecessors 
who had arrived in the 1970s. There was a strong expectation that these first-
generation daughters-in-law should make do and adapt to the lifestyles of their in-laws. 
The older women joked about more recently arrived young women having arrived into 
the lap of luxury and contrasted this with their own experiences of bringing up large 
families in harsh material and economic conditions whilst working in the ethnic enclave 
as homeworkers or in factories in the 1970s and 1980s. The most common joke was 
about the clothing choices of these younger migrants and their need to be up-to-date 
with the latest fashions from Pakistan; in observing the interactions of the group, this 
seemed to be a familiar joke amongst this group of women. There was clearly little 
value attached to the economic activity of first-generation daughters-in-law. 
The normative expectations of first-generation young women were very different from 
those of the second-generation. Werbner (1990) identified that younger female 
migrants with dependent children were the most marginalised group of women within 
the ethnic enclave; the views of this older group of women showed that this was still the 
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case. Women in the bhabi cohort of the first generation are subject to greater inequality 
in family structures than second-generation women: 
“Daughter in law is not your own daughter is she? She is someone else’s 
daughter, you can treat her as you want.” (Farida, bhabi) 
“I think that if a person has no confidence the family place more pressure on 
them to make them subordinate. They have one rule for their own family 
[daughters] and one rule for others [daughters in law].” (Nausheen, bhabi) 
7.3.3 Gender Norms and Domestic Work 
Several women spoke about husbands, both first and second-generation, sharing 
childcare tasks, either in relation to their own husbands or other men in their families. 
These childcare activities were generally not undertaken by men to the extent that they 
allowed their wives to work. This does however signify a shift in family relations from 
the relationships that older first-generation fathers, the settlers, had with their second-
generation children. There was, however, no evidence of any generational shifts with 
regard to domestic work. In fact two of the second-generation women, Shameem and 
Halima, attributed their economic inactivity directly to the dual burden of domestic work 
and paid employment. Both women state that their husbands were unwilling to share in 
domestic tasks and they felt that this attitude was related to their husbands’ first-
generation status and socialisation into Pakistani norms of differentiated gender roles. 
Halima sees her husband’s lack of participation in household tasks as a lack of 
understanding of what he should do, whilst Shameem sees it as a refusal to 
compromise: 
“I found it very very difficult because you know with the Pakistani mentality 
you know the boys they are spoilt you know the sisters and the mothers look 
after them. They literally don’t do anything so my husband didn’t know that 
he had to help me. So even though I was at work and my husband he started 
doing shifts in the evening so he was able to look after my daughter until I 
came home from work […] all he was doing was looking after the children, 
nothing in the house was getting down, no cooking, no cleaning, no dishes 
nothing, I still had to do all that you see. So he was a very good dad, he was 
looking after the children well, but nothing in the house would get done. 
(Halima, Class of 1990) 
“Well he has no problem with me working, see this is not the issue - he does 
not have a problem with me working, he has a problem with me then not 
doing the housework. The reason I gave up working was for myself and my 
own sanity, nothing to do with him, He was like if you want to work, work. The 
only problem was is that I was running around like a headless chicken 
literally, I was coming home, cooking, cleaning and looking after my kids so 
because he is just not domesticated. I do blame his mother because she 
spoilt him rotten and so for him you know a man wasn’t allowed to move the 
glass because that’s a woman’s job.” (Shameem, Class of 1990) 
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Both Halima and Shameem state that giving up work has been a compromise for the 
sake of their marriages. Clearly, traditional gender roles are very difficult to negotiate; 
neither woman was able to change her husband’s attitudes or behaviour and the issue 
raised conflict within their marriages. The perspective of husbands was bolstered by 
the support of traditional gender norms amongst wider family and community.  
Shameem thinks that her current lifestyle meets the Pakistani ideal of a successful 
marriage, which is for a wife to stay at home and care for the children whilst her 
husband goes out to work. Shameem has a different concept of what makes a 
successful marriage, which she says is framed by both her Islamic knowledge and her 
British upbringing. Leaving work is not an easy choice for women who work for more 
than simply financial rewards or for those who value their financial independence. 
“I think success is having a marriage that you’re both you know 
compassionate, you know you’re working in sync. I’d say 90% of the 
people I know personally it’s a struggle, they’re making their marriage 
work. It’s a constant compromise because of the fact that our worlds 
are so apart [Because one spouse is from Pakistan]. I have come to 
accept it in a begrudging way, I’ve had to compromise. Sitting here 
today and I can tell you that I could have easily split up with my 
husband, I would have done it a long time ago. Not because he is a 
bad man it’s because we’re just chalk and cheese, Because I’ve 
suppressed a lot, I can’t argue with him and I can’t win so what’s the 
point in arguing and again and again and again, do you get what I 
mean?” (Shameem, Class of 1990) 
To reduce conflict Shameem has left work and has become, as she puts it, “grudgingly 
accepting” of the things that she cannot change or influence in her home and marriage. 
This acceptance comes at a high personal cost to Shameem and the decision to leave 
work was not an easy one for her. She had worked for the same employer since the 
age of 18, progressed in her career and her employer had funded a HND in a work-
related technical skill. She feels like she has lost her independence and that her 
husband has “killed something inside me”. The choice to leave work to conform to 
socio-cultural gender norms is likely to have been made possible, in some cases, by 
income top-ups in low-income and single-earner households in the form of state 
benefits or tax credits. If household income overall is not affected by their leaving work, 
then the compromise is only that of their own desire to work.  
None of the interviewees, irrespective of generation, education or social class, spoke 
about any sharing of domestic work such as cleaning or cooking, either when they 
were in paid employment or since they have become economically inactive. All women 
in the sample expressed a desire to work part-time and locally so that they could fit 
paid employment around their caring and domestic work. None of the women spoke 
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about any adjustments to working patterns, or increased participation in childcare or 
household tasks, that their husband could, or would, make for her to work. Alongside 
gender norms and values, it is important to consider how work and employment 
patterns of Pakistani men might limit the flexibility they have to accommodate the 
economic activity of their wives. The effect of marriage on economic activity is not 
simply caused by the fact of marriage itself, but who Muslim women are married to. 
Other than the husbands of the women with HE qualifications, who were in mainstream 
professional occupations, all husbands worked in Class 3 or 4 occupations. Nine of the 
twenty-two husbands who were in work were taxi drivers, thirteen worked in Type 4 
organisations; the ethnic enclave is the primary source of employment for men in 
Mohallaton (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2 above). Only two second generation husbands, 
excluding those with professional occupations, had achieved work in the mainstream 
labour market, both men were in Class 4 manual and unskilled occupations. All taxi 
drivers worked long shifts, often nightshifts. An example of the adjustment that had to 
be made to everyday life and family routines was presented earlier in this chapter in the 
case of Halima.  
Other workers in the ethnic enclave also work long shifts or unsociable hours. Hina’s 
daily life is structured around her husband’s working day. He works in a local 
warehouse between 10am and 7pm during the week and then from 9 until 3 on a 
Sunday. She prepares a meal for him during his lunch break between 3 and 4. He 
regularly returns home from work later than expected because the warehouse will 
remain open to accommodate (Pakistani) customers and all male workers are expected 
to remain until the warehouse has been locked up at the end of business for security 
reasons. There is little flexibility or predictability in his working day and that would make 
it difficult for Hina to make plans to work around school hours, nor is she able to work 
on weekends.  
Hina’s husband is frustrated by the unpaid overtime but is limited to work in the ethnic 
niche because he does not have any formal qualifications. Although his fluency in 
English has improved over time, to the extent that he is responsible for household 
administrative tasks such as organising home and car insurance. He has not sought 
employment in the mainstream labour market because he appreciates that his 
workplace is close to home and that his employer allows him to take extended holidays 
so that he can make a trip to Pakistan every summer. Some more recently arrived first 
generation men seek to maintain ties with family in Pakistan in the same way that 
settlers did.   
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Many of the self-employed husbands also work long and unsociable hours. Shameem’s 
husband runs his own business in the enclave and she finds it hard to establish a 
regular family routine, which would be essential if she were to work. She states that the 
lack of routine is due both to the nature of his work alongside his view on gender roles 
at home: 
“He doesn’t have a timing which is annoying because if I know he had a 
timing then I can work with that. There’s no routine in the household. You 
know it is a struggle and I think it’s more of a struggle having a husband that 
is, he is a chauvinist as well he really believes a woman’s place is in the 
kitchen and at home and that’s it.” (Shameem, Class of 1990) 
7.3.4 Remittances  
Some, but not all, of the first-generation husbands arrived in Britain with the 
expectation that they would prioritise sending remittance to Pakistan to assist their 
family members; in much the same way as pioneer or settler migrants had. This 
expectation was greatest among men from rural and poor backgrounds in Pakistan 
who had married cousins. Their wives had initially supported these aims and worked 
together with their husbands to meet the immediate needs of their husbands’ families in 
Pakistan. The first-generation parents of the women supported this effort; sending 
remittance to family in Pakistan had always been important to the social status of 
settlers (Anwar 1979; Shaw 1988).  
 
 
“Absolutely why wouldn’t they send it? Who will feed their elderly mother and 
father? If they can give some help to their brothers and sisters and fulfil the 
living expenses of their parents too, the people who live abroad earn more, 
so it is their duty to give that money. So why should they live in poverty? 
Even if their family is in poverty here they still have a farz [duty] to look after 
their parents. Do you think people should forget their parents?” (Suriya, 
irregular migrant) 
Couples often settled into a routine of the husband sending much of his income to 
Pakistan, and for the wife to spend her income on essential expenses in Britain, 
including mortgage payments and the purchase of food. When these women left work 
to have children this arrangement was no longer financially viable on a single income. 
Some families underwent significant financial hardship to enable men to continue 
sending money to Pakistan, and conflict arose in families. One woman reported that 
her husband became physically abusive towards her because of the stress caused by 
financial problems, which spiralled to the extent that the family lost their home because 
they were unable to make their monthly mortgage repayments.  
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“We bought the house but couldn’t afford to pay the mortgage repayments 
and we were getting letters that we would have to leave the house, this made 
my husband stressed. The wallpaper was coming off the walls and there was 
no carpet, no boiler, there was nothing in the house and we had to stay there 
and it was so cold. There were lots of problems. He sent all the savings to 
Pakistan and then he had nothing. We were very stuck. And during that time 
he hit me, very badly, he punched me in the face five times.” (Kausar, bhabi) 
Halima gave up work when she was no longer able to rely on family support with 
childcare.  Halima had worked from the age of 18 and had paid the mortgage and bills 
for the family home; her husband would pay for food and grocery shopping and the 
remainder of his money would go to Pakistan. After she left work Halima continued to 
meet the same household expenses using Tax Credit and Child Benefit payments, she 
suffered from stress and depression during this time. Halima reached breaking point 
with the financial situation when her in-laws tricked her husband out of a £10,000 
investment in a property and she transferred the mortgage and all bill payments to her 
husband’s account. Her husband brought the matter to her parents who had previously 
been supportive of her husband’s desire to help his family back home; in this instance 
they agreed with the position she had taken: 
“I said I’m not taking it and then I said I’ll put my foot down I said ok 
then if you want to keep ties with them and you want to support them 
you do it at your own back, you work for it. I don’t care, double your 
hours of your shifts, you’re paying all the bills, you’re paying all the 
mortgage, you’re paying for all the food on the table, you do all that. 
And then if you’ve got money left then send it back home to your 
relatives.” (Halima, Class of 1990) 
Halima now uses the money she receives in tax credits and child benefit directly for the 
children’s benefit and is saving towards future university costs. She no longer suffers 
from stress and takes part in several social activities during the week. Halima could 
take this strong and decisive stance because she had worked and contributed to family 
income in the past, she had the support of her parents and she was fully aware and in 
control of household income from state benefits. It is unlikely that first-generation 
women, and indeed some second-generation women, would be able to take control of 
the situation in the same way, particularly if they had never worked. 
Halima did not see any benefits of improved status or greater respect within the wider 
family for the financial sacrifices she made. She feels that family in Pakistan 
undervalue the hard work of those who send remittances from Britain and that they see 
it as their right to share in the economic benefits of migration.  
“Well you know in the face they do give you respect but deep down I 
don’t think they appreciate what we do for them. They think we have 
money growing on trees, all we literally have to do is lift our hand, pull 
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the notes down and put it in an envelope and send it to Paki-land. 
Literally, this is what they think we do. They don’t know that people 
here have to clean their own toilets and they have to wash their own 
clothes and do their ironing themselves and they don’t appreciate it. I 
don’t think they appreciate the amount of work my husband has to do 
in order to keep them going.” (Halima, Class of 1990) 
Not all second-generation women had negative experiences of their in-laws and any 
financial support sent to Pakistan. Sana’s husband’s siblings have also migrated to 
Britain and are both working professionals, his mother lives in a city in the Punjab 
region of Pakistan and does not require extensive financial support but Sana does not 
resent his support of his family in any way. Sana’s husband’s family in Pakistan are 
highly educated, professional and of a high caste. Similarly, Shabana’s husband is 
from the Punjab region and of a high caste. Shabana does not object to any financial 
support he sends to his mother and has a good relationship with her mother-in-law. At 
the time of interview, Shabana’s husband had been in Pakistan for a month overseeing 
repairs to his family home in Pakistan.  
Conflict relating to sending remittance to Pakistan is likely to arise where household 
income in both countries is limited, stretching the incomes of households in Britain to 
the point where it is the cause of considerable stress. Pre-migration circumstances of 
generations of poverty and limited work opportunities, particularly in rural areas where 
caste can determine occupation, might make the needs of family in Pakistan more 
urgent than those of the nuclear family in Britain which produces the income: 
“Family in Pakistan don’t let us save any money here. Nothing at all. Trip to 
hajj, fixing up houses, organising weddings. Someone doesn’t have a roof, 
someone needs wedding gifts from their wedding, someone needs to be 
invited to dinner. You can see the state of our house, he won’t get a new floor 
for £500, it’s been five years. But lots of money has gone to Pakistan. If we 
buy something here the news reaches Pakistan straight away and then the 
demands from there double. (Rifat, ghar-wali) 
7.3.5 Section Conclusion 
The economic activity of single women is accepted and indeed, expected. The 
economic activity of married women second-generation women is increasingly 
accepted, although considered undesirable by some older first-generation women. 
First-generation women are authoritative figures in their families and in the wider 
community, they uphold traditional views regarding family honour and gender-
differentiated roles within homes and families. The attitudes of mothers-in-law are 
important influencing factors in whether younger women work or not.  
The economic activity of younger and more recently arrived first-generation women is 
disapproved of by older women. This is linked to their low earning potential and the 
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low-status work that they are limited to because they do not hold recognised 
qualifications, although many have GCSE or A Level equivalent qualifications. It is also 
linked to the expectation that first generation daughters-in-law should uphold ethno-
religious norms, this is key to their selection as marriage partners for second-
generation men. First generation daughters-in-law occupy a particularly marginalised 
position in family and the wider community. Overall, the influence of mothers-in-law 
was only decisive regarding economic activity in a small number of cases, often where 
daughters-in-law were already disadvantaged by the first-generation status, their lack 
of British HE qualifications and limited access to anything other than low-status and 
low-paid work. 
Although younger Pakistani men are more likely to share in childcare tasks than their 
settler fathers or fathers-in-law, this is not extended periods of sole care of their 
children. Furthermore, there is no discernible generational (or cohort) shift in the views 
of Pakistani men regarding gender roles within the home in relation to domestic work. 
The occupational status of working-class Pakistani men and the industries in which 
they are concentrated makes the sharing of household tasks difficult on a practical 
level, this is accompanied by an unwillingness to do so based on traditional gender 
norms.  
There appears to be an intragenerational shift among first generation men; according 
to their wives, more recently arrived first generation men do not object to their wives 
working. Second-generation men also do not, in principle, object to their wives working 
- although their mothers might. The economic activity of women is not viewed as a 
source of shame by many husbands, nor is it considered harmful for women to mix with 
white British men and women in workplaces. All women expressed a preference for 
working in feminised sectors in jobs such as nursery assistants, teaching assistants or 
in the mainstream retail sector. This shift in attitudes among first-generation men may 
be related, in part, to the importance of sending remittance to Pakistan. 
Some women felt that the dual burden was not worthwhile if household income was 
being used to provide, in their view, luxury items for family in Pakistan, particularly 
when these were male siblings who were physically able to work. For these women 
economic inactivity becomes a way to take control of their household circumstances. 
By falling back to traditional gender norms, which are very difficult for them to 
challenge, they argue that their husband’s income and the family’s state benefits 
entitlement should be spent on the essential needs of his own family in Britain, and 
only surplus income can be sent to Pakistan; almost a case of ‘if you can’t beat them, 
join them’. The women bolster their position by saying that traditional gender norms are 
desirable in Islam, particularly with regard to the nurture and care of their children.  
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The negative effect of marriage on economic inactivity related more directly to 
traditional gender norms within households. There is a distinct lack of change over time 
or generation in attitudes and behaviours in relation to the sharing of household 
domestic tasks or any substantial care of children, regardless of socio-economic status 
and level of education. This socio-cultural attitude operates alongside the practical 
constraint posed by the concentration of Pakistani men in shift work or own accounts 
work which can entail working during the night or otherwise long hours.  
As in the previous section on social networks, we see that tax credits and other state 
benefits influence the economic activity of Pakistani women. In Section 7.1 some first-
generation women perceived a culture of welfare dependency in the local area. They 
stated that some first-generation men prevented their wives from working, or asked 
them to work informally, to maintain higher levels of household income through state 
benefits. In this section it was seen some second-generation women use tax credit 
income to take some control over household finances, to negotiate traditional gender 
roles within marriage and to redirect income for the direct benefit of their children. None 
of the first-generation women interviewed spoke about having direct or indirect control 
of tax credit income. This may be result of a lack of understanding of the tax credit 
system and household income, due to language or comprehension, or that household 
income was not a topic that they wished to discuss.  
This ability to take control of tax credit income may have been enhanced by the 
structural factor of welfare reform in 2003 that redirected state benefits from husbands 
to wives. Before 2003, the Working Families Tax Credit was typically paid with male 
wages. In 2003, Working Families Tax Credit was split into two new tax credits: 
Working Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit. For couples, the working tax element was 
usually paid with male wages and the child element was redirected to the designated 
‘carer of the children’, usually the mother (Fisher 2016). In Fisher’s study of household 
consumption patterns, using national level data from the Expenditure and Food Survey 
2001-2005, he found that there was an increase in spending on children’s goods, such 
as toys and musical instruments and home improvements, after the 2003 reform; 
indicating that the reform led to more targeted spending for the benefit of children and 
whole households (Fisher 2016).  
The structural factor of the British state benefit system applies to all British households 
where state benefits such as tax credits are the primary source of household income. 
The receipt of state benefits may contribute to high levels of economic inactivity 
amongst Muslim women, as it does for many British women whose primary source of 
household income is state benefits and tax credits in particular. The UK benefit system 
has encouraged women to withdraw from the labour market, particularly those on a low 
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income (Rubery and Rafferty 2013). Wage subsidy through the tax credit system 
encourages breadwinners to enter low-paid jobs whilst disincentivising second-income 
earners (Rubery and Rafferty 2013). 
For some Pakistani women the current state benefit system of tax credits allows socio-
cultural considerations about divisions of labour to become pre-eminent, because if 
they were to work the household would have the same, or lower, levels of income. The 
system of tax credits means that there is no economic justification, or benefit, of these 
women working. This may reduce their ability to negotiate being in work, or, their 
motivation to seek work. Furthermore, this factor may lead to informal work to become 
a means to substantially increase household income alongside state benefits for some 
women.  
The insights gained through the qualitative analysis thus far reinforce the statistical 
finding that being members of households where the primary source of income is 
something other than paid employment, and state benefits in particular, may form part 
of the explanation of high levels of economic inactivity in the LAHF category of 
economic inactivity. Of course, the additional structural factor of state benefits plays out 
alongside, or in interaction with, the ethno-religious penalty and socio-cultural 
constraints already identified. It is interesting to note that primary source of household 
income, or reliance on state benefits specifically, is not included in statistical analyses 
of economic inactivity as standard.  
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Chapter 8: Qualitative Findings III 
Religious Practices and Beliefs and Experiences of 
Work 
 
8.1 Introduction  
This section presents qualitative findings and analysis relating to religious practices 
and beliefs in the lives of the interviewees, including those that impact on their 
economic activity. This analysis brings into sharp relief the value of supplementing 
quantitative analyses of cross-sectional data with qualitative insights. In the first section 
the religious practices and beliefs held by the interviewees are described and analysed, 
with a focus on those aspects of religiosity that might impact on economic activity. In 
the second section, the work experiences of currently economically inactive women are 
described and examined. The qualitative data and analysis presented in this chapter 
demonstrate the value of bringing a longitudinal perspective to understandings of 
employment trajectories (Elliot et al. 2018).  
By demonstrating changes over time this analysis shows that the experiences of 
Muslim women, both in terms of religiosity and employment, are better described in 
terms of spectra and changes over time and life-stage, rather than static and simplistic 
binary terms. That being said, the ‘big picture’ provided by statistical analysis of cross-
sectional nationally representative data remains essential to understanding the extent 
of the ethnoreligious penalty and to identify the themes and research questions for 
qualitative inquiry. The effects of religiosity on economic inactivity in the LAHF category 
and experiences of work are analysed in the context of ethnoreligious penalties in the 
labour market.  
8.2 Religious Practices and Beliefs  
8.2.1 Introduction 
Interviewees were prompted to describe and to give examples of religious beliefs and 
practices in their everyday lives, as well as decisions and choices around economic 
activity; this allowed systematic comparisons to be made about levels of religiosity 
among the women in the sample. The main religious practices that the women spoke 
about were hijab (modesty and ‘covering’ practices), and salah (daily prayers). The 
interviewees spoke about their religious beliefs about whether Muslim women should 
work and their views on the roles of Muslim women in homes, communities and wider 
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society. The women’s responses are summarised below in Table 8.1 (first generation) 
Table 8.2 (second generation) using the categorisation system in Figure 8.2. The 
reader is reminder of the classification system of interviewees by generation and cohort 
figure 8.1. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 8.2 Religious Practice and Belief Categories for Tables 8.1 and 8.2 
 
 
 
 
 
Indicator of Religiosity  Categories  
Hijab 1.Hijab and Abaya 
2.Hijab and loose outerwear (coat or cardigan) 
2A.  Ethnic Clothing (shalwar kameez) 
2B.  Western Clothing  
3. No head covering 
Salah  1. 5 times a day  
2. Daily 
3. Infrequent 
4. None 
Religious Belief: Economic 
Activity is Undesirable  
0.  No 
1. Yes 
Interviewee Classification  
Ghar-wali: married to a first-generation man who arrived as chain 
migrant 
Irregular Migrant: arrived post 2000, as family migrant (secondary 
migration) or joining other family (widowed grandmother-daadi) 
Bhabi: married to a second generation man 
Class of 1980: second generation, aged 40 plus 
Class of 1990:  second-generation, aged 30-39 
 
Figure 8.1 Interviewee Classification  
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           Table 8.1 Religious Practice and Belief Categories by Cohort, First Generation 
 
 
 
  
Pseudonym Age Education 
Husband’s 
Migrant 
Generation 
Veiling 
Practice 
Individual  
Practice 
Belief: Economic 
Activity 
Undesirable 
Ghar-Walis 
Rifat 44 FE 1 2A 2 0 
Fatima 45 None 1 2A 1 1 
Rashida 61 FE 1 2A 2 0 
Kishwar 52 FE 1 2B 1 0 
Irregular Migrants 
Bilqees 58 FE 1 2A 1 0 
Suriya 62 FE 1 1 1 0 
Shahida 59 HE 1 2A 1 1 
Maqsooda 44 HE 1 1 1 0 
Bhabis 
Fazeelat 44 GCSE 2 2A 1 1 
Tabassum 47 FE 2 2A 1 0 
Nausheen 36 HE 2 2B 4 0 
Farida 36 GCSE 2 2A 2 0 
Hanifa 38 No Quals 2 1 1 1 
Kausar 37 FE 1 2A 2 1 
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                                 Table 8.2 Religious Practice and Belief Categories by Cohort, Second Generation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pseudonym Age Education 
Husband’s 
Migrant 
Generation 
Veiling 
Practice 
Individual  
Practice 
Belief: 
Economic 
Activity 
Undesirable 
Class of 1980 
Misbah 40 BA 2 2B 1 0 
Sana 41 Postgrad 1 2B 1 0 
Aleena 40 BSc 1 1 1 0 
Kalsoom 43 None 1 3 4 0 
Nazia 45 None 1 3 4 0 
Amina 53 None 1 2B 3 0 
Rizwana 40 GCSE 1 2B 4 0 
Class of 1990 
Shabana 32 FE Diploma 1 2A 4 0 
Lubna 36 GCSE 2 2A 4 0 
Shameem 32 HE Diploma* 1 2A 2 0 
Halima 36 HE Diploma* 1 1 1 0 
Zara 36 GNVQ Adv 1 3 2 0 
Hina 38 GNVQ Adv 1 2A 1 0 
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8.2.2 Hijab 
 
Hijab is a visible symbol of Islamic belonging, it is both a source of empowerment and a 
source of discrimination for Muslim women. It is the covering of the head and hair with 
a scarf from forehead to chin. In an environment of potential prejudice and 
Islamophobic hostility for Muslim communities, including in the labour market, British 
Muslim women are subject to stereotypes wherein they are regarded as passive or 
oppressed (Gilliat-Ray 2010a). The hijab is also considered to be an indication of level 
of religious salience and practice. Cheruvallil-Contractor (2012) suggests that Muslim 
women who wear the hijab and pray are ‘practising Muslims’ whilst those who state 
Islamic affiliation but do not undertake either of the two practices are ‘believing 
Muslims’.  
 
As can be seen in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, the interviewees displayed a range of covering 
practices; from wearing hijab with an abaya (loose cloak, usually black), to women who 
did not those cover their head at all. The form of dress, whether western or ethnic is 
differentiated because wearing ethnic dress is another level of cultural distance from 
British majority norms, in addition to the hijab. From Table 8.1 it can be noted that all 
the first-generation women wore hijab, usually in combination with ethnic dress of 
shalwar kameez with a loose-fitting outer garment. Two first-generation and two 
second-generation women wore hijab with abayas and this was the most modest form 
of dress. There is greater diversity in covering practices and dress amongst the 
second-generation (see Table 8.2). Three of the second-generation women do not 
wear hijab, four combine hijab with ethnic clothing and four with ‘Western’ clothing. 
None of the women interviewed saw wearing hijab as a barrier to formal economic 
activity. 
 
There was no evidence of women being forced to wear the hijab by their families or 
husbands. Hijab-wearing first and second-generation women spoke about a point in 
their lives at which they had made a conscious decision to adopt hijab, as opposed to 
covering their head with a light veil or not covering at all; for most women this was in 
adulthood and after marriage. All the women wanted to learn more about Islam, for 
their own benefit and that of their children. Some women relied on their own children 
for Islamic education as they invest in mosque classes and Islamic Studies sessions for 
them; others gained information from Islamic channels of Sky TV; some shared 
information with friends on social media such as WhatsApp groups and Facebook; a 
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few women attended Islamic study circles, tajweed [Quran recitation] classes and 
lectures in local mosques and Islamic centres. 
 
Second-generation women spoke about how their first-generation husbands had 
influenced their religious practice. Most second-generation women spoke about 
becoming more religious (praying daily, learning more about Islam, wearing the hijab) 
after marriage to a Pakistani-born husband. Second-generation women had 
discussions about Islam with their first-generation husbands and felt encouraged to 
increase their religious practice; it is the Islamic duty of a Muslim husband to provide 
leadership for religious practice within his family. Women married to second-generation 
men, the bhabi cohort, were less likely to talk about sharing religious knowledge and 
having discussions around practice and belief with their husbands. This may be related 
to a socio-cultural expectation that first-generation women to be better-versed in 
Islamic knowledge due to Islamic Studies being a compulsory component of the 
educational curriculum in Pakistan, or that second-generation men are less religious 
than first-generation men of same birth cohort.  
The accounts of the women show that adoption of hijab is not a static symbol of 
oppression for Muslim women; covering practices vary between women and over life-
stage. It is a conscious display of Islam identity and a declaration of their commitment 
to the value of modesty in behaviour and dress. Shameem adopted the hijab at a 
young age, chose not to wear it in early adulthood and then returned to wearing it. 
Misbah wore hijab and abaya during her time as a student at university but now wears 
hijab with colourful Western clothing. Interviewees spoke about the confidence and 
comfort they felt in wearing hijab and modest clothing that did not reveal their figures. 
Hijab gave the interviewees greater confidence in their interactions in mixed gender 
settings, particularly in their interactions with Muslim men, as a visible symbol and 
reminder of the boundaries of their physical and social interactions for themselves and 
others. 
 
Shabana stated that she did not qualify herself as a “religious person”. What made this 
statement particularly interesting was that during the interview she was dressed in a 
black hijab and abaya whilst being interviewed by a female interviewer in her own 
home. If religiosity could be measured by observations of dress, then Shabana would 
personify a very religious Muslim woman. She said: “if you see the way I dress, you 
would think I pray all the time.” Shabana explained that her choice to wear an abaya 
during the interview was because she was wearing her pyjamas under her abaya; she 
usually wears hijab with ethnic clothing in public. Shabana has worn modest dress 
since childhood and feels most comfortable in shalwar kameez [Pakistani ethnic dress, 
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loose tunic and trousers]. She began to wear the hijab at the age of 26 although her 
husband had asked to wear hijab a few years before that: 
“I wear the hijab because I want to cover myself […] and I know it’s a good 
thing and that’s it. But I want to cover myself I don’t like being on show 
basically. Like some women can wear tight fitted clothes I can’t I have to 
feel comfortable.” (Shabana, Class of 1990) 
Shabana does not think that whether a woman wears the hijab or not is an indicator of 
religiosity in terms of ritual prayer – “because I wear it and I know I’m not [religious], 
and I know!” When Shabana was asked what she thought about the EMBES survey 
results which show high levels of daily prayer amongst British Muslims she was very 
incredulous and said that she didn’t believe the statistic was accurate. Like Shabana, 
Zara does not think that hijab is a marker of religiosity. She thinks that some young 
women in Mohallaton wear hijab to please their parents and to give the impression of 
being “clean and pure”.  
Shameem has been wearing hijab since her mid-20s, her elder sister does not wear 
hijab and her younger sister has only recently begun wearing hijab. She was nervous 
about how she would be treated in the public-facing role she worked in by non-Muslim 
clients and colleagues, but found that she was not treated differently. She stated that 
her first-generation husband is ambivalent towards the hijab and is not convinced when 
she tells him that it makes her more confident when using public spaces in Mohallaton. 
Wider observations of Mohallaton indicate that adult Muslim women who do not wear 
hijab are the exception to the norm. The researchers own experiences in the field 
confirm that not wearing hijab can lead to discriminatory behaviour within the ethnic 
enclave (see Methodology Part II, Section 5.3.5).  
 
“I said to my husband, do you know, there is a massive difference in the way 
people look at you. He was like, how is that? I was like because they look at 
you with respect, they do. And he said you’re just paranoid I said no I’m not 
I said seriously, they’ll say baji [sister] or they will address you differently and 
so from there I was like yeah this is for me this is what I like.” (Shameem, 
Class of 1990) 
If wearing the hijab is in itself a source of discrimination in the mainstream labour 
market, then most Muslim women from the case study area are subject to it. The 
interviewees did not see wearing hijab as an indicator of a Muslim woman’s preference 
to work or not. Second-generation women noted a marked rise in Islamophobia since 
the Gulf War in the early 1990s. Although they might not see wearing hijab as a barrier 
to work themselves, it may mark Muslim women out as targets of religious 
discrimination or stereotyping in the mainstream labour market. First-generation 
women may be subject to an added layer of cultural or ethnic discrimination because 
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they are more likely to wear ethnic clothing and hijab. The data on religious practice 
provides evidence for whether wearing the hijab is, in fact, an indication of higher levels 
of religiosity.  
 
 8.2.3 Individual and Group Religious Practice  
 
Individual religious practice is the most stringent test of religiosity (McAndrew and Voas 
2014). In Tables 8.1 and 8.2 variations in levels of practice can be seen. All women 
who adopt stricter covering practices of wearing hijab and abaya pray also five times a 
day. Some women who wear hijab pray five times a day, others do not pray at all. 
Women who prayed daily but not five times a day stated that the prayers they missed 
were Fajr (sunrise prayer) and Isha (nightfall prayer) because of tiredness, these were 
usually older women or women with young children.  
 
The qualitative findings support statistical studies that identify generational decline in 
religious practice amongst British Muslims (McAndrew and Voas 2014). Six of the 
thirteen second-generation interviewees stated that they prayed infrequently or not at 
all. This is far less than would have been expected from the data on high levels of 
individual practice in the second-generation in the EMBES 2010, as noted in Chapter 4. 
This supports the suggestion that individual religious practice was overstated in the 
EMBES 2010 amongst the second-generation. The qualitative data supports statistical 
findings in terms of higher levels of practice amongst the first-generation. This may be 
a result of first generation women feeling a greater need to give socially desirable 
responses to the question in the interview but is also in line with evidence for religious 
practice levels being higher amongst the first-generation.  
  
Shabana describes her husband as “religious”, for Shabana being religious requires 
praying five times a day. Shabana does not regard herself as “religious” or “practising” 
because she prays three or four times a week, if that. Her husband encourages her to 
pray and she wants to pray more regularly.  
 
“I don’t know what you mean by religious, it depends, but to me if you ask 
me are you religious I would think you are asking me do I pray, am I 
practising. And I don’t pray five times a day so I wouldn’t qualify myself as a 
religious person…you have to pray five times a day to be religious, that’s why 
I say my husband is religious, he takes his religion very seriously which is 
good, I think it’s brilliant and I need that in my life.” (Shabana, Class of 1990) 
Second generation women in the Class of 1980 who stated low or infrequent practice 
were also the most disadvantaged in terms of the socio-economic status of their 
households, both currently and during their childhood. They had not received any 
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formal Islamic education or instruction during their childhoods; there was limited 
development, and access to, formal Islamic institutions in the local area in the 1970s 
and early 1980s.  These women stated that they had few interactions with the local co-
ethnic community outside their families. They did not attend communal religious 
activities whether formal or informal. Their lack of Islamic knowledge and limited 
religious practice restricted their access to social networks where they might benefit 
from community resources of ethnic or religious capital.  
 
The three women with HE qualifications displayed higher levels of individual religious 
practice and participation in communal religious activities. Their fathers belonged to 
high-ranking castes and experienced greater stability in employment throughout their 
working lives. Pakistani men of higher social class and caste status were influential in 
setting up and managing religious institutions such as mosques and madrassas and 
this was a way of enhancing their social status within Pakistani communities (Anwar 
1979; Werbner 1990). These women had all received formal religious instruction during 
their childhoods, including learning how to recite the Quran, how to pray, and Islamic 
Studies education. They now participate in social networks that consist of similarly 
educated women and are based on religious activities or in religious settings.  
Misbah is one of the three degree qualified women in the sample, she has been active 
in faith-based social networks since childhood and has volunteered at mosque-based 
activities since she was a teenager. As a young adult Misbah was active in a network 
of educated and professional Muslim women, from across Manchester, who would 
attend weekly Islamic study circles. She described how her chosen subject for 
undergraduate studies was influenced by the advice and encouragement she received 
from within this social network. 
None of the women in the Class of 1990 had HE qualifications, they came from 
disadvantaged social class backgrounds (fathers in manual occupations, low caste 
status and rural origins). Unlike the women with no or low qualifications in the Class of 
1980, they had all received religious instruction during their childhood; several 
mosques had been established in Mohallaton by the early 1990s.  Shameem and 
Halima attained vocational HE diplomas as adults and both women participated in 
similar religious group activities as the women with HE qualifications. Access to higher 
education and skilled work alongside their religious education has opened access to 
(middle-class) spaces and networks that contain the resources of ethnoreligious capital 
for these women. Access to Islamic knowledge, the key tool in negotiations around HE 
and work for Muslim women, is therefore related to socio-economic status. 
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The only group activities where economically active women interacted with 
economically inactive women were religious learning events, study groups and 
lectures, held in the local mosque that had extensive facilities and open access for 
women. These events or activities often take place at evening and weekends and are 
conducted in English. Access to these activities or events is limited by fluency in 
English language, the presence of young children and the working patterns of 
husbands and socio-economic status. First-generation women are more likely to attend 
religious group activities held in private homes, conducted in Urdu or Punjabi and 
attended by other first-generation women on weekday morning; older ghar-walis were 
more likely to attend than bhabis. Participation in Islamic events is limited by both 
social class and migrant generation.  
None of the interviewees saw religious practice in terms of individual or communal 
religious practice as a barrier to economic activity. There is an accepted Islamic 
practice of making up missed prayers (Kaza) and many women recognised the 
willingness of workplaces to accommodate the prayer requirements of Muslim 
employees. 
“No no, I can still pray namaaz and read my Quran. I can think whatever I 
like in my mind. I can still make dua in my mind. Allah has commanded that 
we pray, he has not forbidden us from working, we should work and you can 
pray alongside, it makes no difference.” (Kishwar, ghar-wali) 
Religious practice did not emerge as a barrier to economic activity from the perspective 
of Muslim women themselves. Although overt religious practices such as wearing the 
hijab and praying in workplaces may be sources of discrimination in the labour market. 
There was evidence though that some Muslim women hold religious beliefs that are 
barriers to economic activity.  
 
8.2.4 Religious Beliefs  
 
All the women in the sample agreed that economic activity was not impermissible, or 
haram, for Muslim women. Nevertheless, there were differences in whether the 
interviewees considered it desirable. Five of the fourteen first-generation interviewees 
considered that it was undesirable for women to undertake paid employment; the 
concepts of ‘barkat’ and ‘majboori’ were key to their explanations for why.  The women 
used the term barkat to refer to income that received Allah’s blessing and which would 
therefore be beneficial for the economic and spiritual wellbeing of a household. 
Majboori translates to compulsion or helplessness, in the context of the interviews the 
women used the term to refer to financial hardship. 
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“Allah commands that a woman should look after home and children so that 
is enough. A man receives barkat [blessings from Allah] for earning an 
income, there is no barkat for a woman’s earnings […]. A woman should only 
work in times of majboori [need].” (Fatima, ghar-wali) 
Hanifa also held this view. She had been economically active in the past and hoped to 
be again. She was asked whether she considered her income to have been without 
barkat to which she responded:  
“I am just telling you what is in my religion, it is in our religion that there is no 
barkat in the earnings of a woman. You asked about religion, about being 
Muslim, I told you from that perspective […] Allah has decreed that a man 
has his duties and the woman needs to raise her family.” (Hanifa, bhabi) 
These women felt that a woman should only undertake paid work if there was a 
financial need for them to do so, for example if their husband was in low paid work or 
was unable to work through illness. Financial necessity referred to meeting immediate 
needs of shelter, clothing and food. These women associated ‘non-essential’ economic 
activity with neglect of home and family and greed, they were critical of women who 
worked in the absence of majboori. These women felt earnings from this work would 
not have barkat: 
 
“If I don’t need to, I won’t do it. Even in the little we have there is barkat from 
Allah. So for this reason my iman [faith] has increased and I am living as 
Allah commanded and I have everything I need. I have one or two friends 
like this who have left their husbands for money, they are running after 
money, they work to make money and they are sitting embracing their 
money, they cry as well that nobody loves them, it wasn’t in our destiny. They 
have everything, from head to foot they have everything but they are still 
crying. I don’t want that in my life.” (Kausar, bhabi) 
“Barkat means blessing. Allah will help you if you do legitimate work If you 
work because your husband’s income is insufficient to bring up your children 
well and you work to help him, he might be disabled or something then you 
work, Allah will help you then. Otherwise, if a husband is on a very well paid 
job of £70,000 to £50,000 a year and you are also working, there is no reason 
if you are leaving your children in a crèche and they are neglected, 
sometimes they are here or there, they are watching TV or playing on the 
internet, then this is not a good life is it? There is no benefit of that money is 
there? This is what I mean.” (Shahida, irregular migrant) 
Shahida placed a value on financial sufficiency in the above quote of an annual 
household income of 50 to 70 thousand pounds. It is unlikely that the households of the 
women in the sample, or in Mohallaton more widely, would be able to achieve such a 
high level of income. This level of income would require both members of a couple to 
work full-time in intermediate or professional occupations. There is an element of some 
exaggeration in her statement but it raises the idea that women who are perceived to 
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have comfortable lifestyles with husbands in steady work are considered to be 
neglectful of their home and family if they choose to work. 
Most second-generation women and younger first-generation women did not hold 
religious beliefs that directly prevented them from working. Although some of these 
women did prioritise their roles within their homes, particularly the religious nurture and 
care of their children over economic activity. These women felt there were spiritual and 
moral benefits of undertaking a solely home-making role and that economic activity 
would limit their ability to provide nurture and care but were not critical of mothers who 
were economically active.  
“Because my family is important for me, Islamically as well. Islamically man 
has the outside responsibility, woman’s responsibility is to do the housework 
at home. It doesn’t make her low graded only because she is working at 
home. Some people have this view or a thought that if she is not working 
outside it’s not work. This is hard work as well, staying home doing the work, 
doing cooking, bringing groceries from outside, picking up the kids, this is the 
same responsibility but a different responsibility so that does count 
Islamically and there is a reward for that as well, definitely.” (Hina, Class of 
1990) 
Shameem feels that participation in Muslim community life and learning about Islam is 
an important part of role modelling a British Muslim identity to her children. She 
believes the nurture of third-generation British Muslim requires a more deliberate and 
conscious process: extra care and thought is required to develop a Muslim identity in 
the third generation. She feels that third-generation children have more options in 
terms of lifestyle choices than the second-generation did, and they will have to choose 
to adopt Islamic ways of life: 
“I need […] to develop my elder daughter’s you know choice and explain 
things to her because it’s like my brother says, we can’t force our religion on 
our children, they have to make that choice themselves, they’ve got to 
understand why […] And he has always said, you know you need to let your 
children make that choice for themselves and the only way we can do it is 
equipping them with the knowledge that we’ve got. Yeah because we’re kind 
of like born into Islam so we kind of take it for granted.” (Shameem, Class of 
1990) 
Sana holds the highest educational qualification of all women in the sample. Of all the 
interviewees she spent the greatest amount of time in the interview reflecting on her 
religious beliefs and practice and how these have impacted on her decisions about 
work and family. Sana left her professional career to spend more time with her children 
to teach them Islamic values, to act as a role model and to support them in their 
mainstream education. Sana states that the nurture of Muslim children in Britain 
requires considerable time and consideration from parents: 
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“Muslim parents have to teach their children a lot of values and I think it’s 
hard sometimes when you’re working full-time to be able to take that on 
board as well […]. It’s like telling them to cover up their body, have modesty 
but what is modesty? You have to teach them, you can’t just tell them that, 
like to tell them to cover their hair but to actually make her understand why 
modesty is a value […]. To understand that you need to respect your parents, 
that’s a big value that a lot of kids nowadays don’t know […] you know you’ve 
got to do it in a certain focused way you know you’ve got to do it like this and 
so I just think that on that side of things I just needed more time and I was 
really stressed as well to be honest.” (Sana, Class of 1980) 
The values that Sana sees as core to Islamic nurture are modesty, honesty, respect: 
these provide the “solid foundation” needed by Muslim children. Alongside these 
values, five daily prayers are the “heart of it…your five salahs, everything is just built 
around that”. Sana, her husband and their children pray five times a day. Sana states 
that she and her husband discuss the religious nurture of their children and they share 
the aim of ensuring that they are brought up with strong Islamic values. The decision 
for Sana to leave work to concentrate on the education of their children was a joint one 
and they see the resulting changes in lifestyle as part of the “project” of bringing up 
their children. Sana states that they are financially comfortable enough as a household 
to have made that decision and they have negotiated what they can do without, her 
husband works in a professional occupation.  
Strong views about the undesirability of Muslim women working were not just held by 
older first-generation women. One second-generation woman encountered during the 
recruitment phase at a local community centre, where she was volunteering in the 
kitchen, objected strongly to this research project because she felt that it was based on 
the premise that Muslim women should be economically active. She did not take part in 
an interview because she did not live in Mohallaton, but she did engage in a 
conversation about her views. She felt quite strongly that Muslim women who worked 
neglected their children and that it was a sign of greed. She felt that a strong faith in 
Allah should mean that Muslim women should be able to undergo even severe financial 
hardship to bring up their children and expressed pride in the fact that she did not work. 
When her own situation was explored further she revealed that her own family’s main 
source of income were state benefits which, she agreed with the researcher, would be 
funded in part by mothers who do work. 
8.2.5 Section Conclusion  
There were a range of religious beliefs and practices among the interviewees. Hina 
stated that she had become a “practising Muslim” in more recent years. When asked 
what she meant by the term she made a distinction between what she called “name-
sake Muslims” (Muslim by name only) and “practising Muslims”: 
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“Like ok for example some Muslims they are name-sake Muslims, they have 
a Muslim name but their character is like lying, cheating, robberies, not 
socialising with other people or having a bad effect on social life or other 
people in the community. So practising Muslims, a Muslim doesn’t lie, he 
doesn’t cheat, if he does a sin he feels really bad he straight away asks 
forgiveness from Allah, he always involves Allah in all aspects, anything, little 
things, big things, he talks to Allah, he prays. I think that’s it.” (Hina, Class of 
1990) 
Hina’s explanation presents an interesting spectrum of Islam practice and religiosity. At 
one end are name-sake Muslims: those who do not practice their faith and are a bad 
influence on other Muslims. At the other end of the spectrum there are Muslims who 
have the basic values ascribed to good citizenship; they have a constant awareness of 
Allah; and they fulfil the basic requirements of Muslims regarding prayer and modesty. 
Some of the respondents in the sample would fall within the practising Muslim 
category, others would fall in between the two categories; there were no self-professed 
or observed “name-sake Muslims” in the sample. Hina’s insights help  to formulate a 
conception of Islamic practice belief and practice that is not static and which moves 
beyond the binary of practising Muslims and believing Muslims (Cheruvallil-Contractor 
2012).  
Islamic practices of veiling and prayers were not seen as deterrents to economic 
activity at an individual level, however, the religious beliefs held by some of the women 
were. The importance of the religious nurture of children and the complexities of 
developing British Muslim identities in the third-generation is complex and demanding. 
Second-generation women spokes about the considerable time and consideration 
required to teach their children about religious practices, to instil Islamic values, and to 
develop British Muslim identities.  
Low levels of religiosity were associated with disadvantaged family backgrounds and 
limited access to sources of ethnoreligious capital within Mohallaton. During childhood, 
Islamic education had been more available to young second-generation women who 
were relatively advantaged in their socio-economic status and pre-migration 
circumstances. As adults, community activities based on Islamic practice or education, 
or in religious spaces, were the only social spaces where economically inactive women 
interacted with economically active women. Access to bonding social capital that might 
lead to greater information about work and employment was therefore limited to women 
with higher level qualifications and those from middle-class backgrounds and 
households.  
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Second-generation women who attained higher level qualifications after marriage were 
able to gain access to these social networks. Older first-generation women were more 
likely to take part in home-based religious activities that were conducted in Urdu or 
Punjabi. Bhabis and working-class second generation women from the Class of 1980 
were most marginalised in terms of their access to ethnoreligious resources. In the 
case of the Class of 1980 this was because of their lack of religious knowledge and 
disadvantaged socio-economic status. Bhabis were not able to participate because of 
their lack of fluency in English, the working patterns of husbands and the lack of 
engagement between women of first and second generations in Mohallaton.   
 
For women from middle-class backgrounds the focus on religious nurture of children is 
likely to be an active choice that requires adjustment of household practices and 
sources of income, as in the case of Sana. For women from working-class families 
there may be an element of choice, but it is also an outcome that is enabled by a 
system of state benefits that means that their economic activity would not bring any 
additional financial benefits to their households. The time that these women can give to 
the nurture and education of their children may in part explain the increases in 
participation in higher education among young British Muslims since the 1990s. The 
state benefits system may be a structural factor that has enabled the mobilisation of 
ethnic capital as identified by Modood and colleagues (Shah et al. 2010; Khattab and 
Modood 2018).  
By framing the time they are able to invest in the care of their homes and families 
(through not being in formal paid employment) as a choice, interviewees were able to 
assert an element of agency into their narrative accounts. It is possible that strongly 
expressed religious views about the desirability of Muslim women working may be a 
mechanism to cope with the structural inequality experienced within Muslim 
communities. Thereby positioning economic inactivity as an empowered choice rather 
than simply the result of structural inequalities that they feel powerless to change. 
Indeed, the second generation woman who felt strongly that Muslim women should not 
work, did go on to talk about very educated members of her own family having 
experienced discrimination in workplaces. This included her older sister who was LAHF 
because of her inability to progress within her career as a research scientist despite 
holding a postgraduate qualification.  
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8.3 Experiences of Work 
 
8.3.1 Introduction  
 
Generational differences in experiences of formal paid employment are apparent in the 
qualitative data. Every second-generation woman had undertaken formal paid 
employment at some point in their lives; work experience ranged from eight months to 
15 years and there was a diverse range of employers and types of employment. First-
generation women were far less likely to have ever worked. None of the older first-
generation women, ghar-walis or irregular migrants, had undertaken formal paid work 
in Britain. Half of the bhabis (three out of six) had worked. Both generation and cohort 
were clearly factors in whether the women had ever been economically active; 
experiences of work were also influenced by level of education and type of employer.  
This section will examine experiences in work, formal and informal, by generation and 
cohort.   
8.3.2 Typology of Employers/Employing Organisations  
Four types of employing organisations were identified as sources of work and 
employment for the interviewees. A typology of organisations has been developed from 
the qualitative data, with some references to literature, to contextualise the women’s 
experiences of work and the effects of these experiences on their subsequent 
economic inactivity. The typology draws upon the accounts of second-generation 
women because they were far more likely to have been economically active across a 
range of employing organisations. The organisations are labelled Types 1 to 4. 
Type 1 and 2 employers are mainstream, usually public sector, organisations. Type 2 
organisations are located in the ethnic enclave, Type 1 are not. Work opportunities in 
both are subject to formal application and recruitment processes. Due to their location, 
a significant number of clients or customers are likely to be Pakistani or Muslim in Type 
2 organisations. The local Pakistani community may benefit from shared information 
and knowledge about work opportunities in Type 2 organisations. Pakistani language 
skills and socio-cultural knowledge may be essential or desirable work-related skills. 
Lubna’s work as a classroom assistant in a local primary school where most children 
were Pakistani is an example of Type 2 employment whilst Misbah’s work as an 
outreach worker for a national charity was Type 1 employment.  
Type 3 and 4 organisations are located within the ethnic enclave. The enclave is a 
network of co-ethnic businesses within geographical areas of high co-ethnic 
concentration (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). Ethnic enclaves emerge in areas of 
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high residential concentration where migrant groups establish business niches which 
supply goods or services either to the mainstream and/or cater specifically for the 
needs of their own ethnic group. These ethnic businesses rely on a local web of social 
networks and connections from their country of origin and they are almost exclusively 
reliant on the local co-ethnic population as a labour supply (Portes and Sensenbrenner 
1993).   
Type 3 employing organisations provide mainstream professional services; they are 
Pakistani-owned and located in the ethnic enclave. The workforce is mainly Pakistani, 
as are the service-users or customers. The women in the sample undertook 
administrative roles in these organisations, recruitment for which was primarily through 
Pakistani social networks; formal processes of recruitment were secondary to initial 
contact made through social networks.  
The informal aspects of the recruitment process mean that the level of skill or 
qualification that would be required for the same job in the mainstream is not 
necessarily an essential requirement; consequently, levels of pay may also not be 
commensurate with the mainstream equivalent. Co-ethnic employees are sometimes 
able to attain employment at a higher level than their human capital. These workplaces 
comply with legal regulations around employment and working conditions; it is this 
feature of Type 3 organisations that set them apart from Type 4. An example of work in 
a Type 3 organisation is Nazia’s work as a receptionist in a GP practice. 
Type 4 organisations are Pakistani-owned small-medium businesses within the ethnic 
enclave involved in the manufacture, wholesale or retail of goods, or the provision of 
catering and transport services (take-aways, restaurants and taxi ranks). These 
organisations are part of a dense network of local Pakistani businesses. Type 4 
organisations also have opportunities for informal employment, including homeworking. 
Although there may be a formal recruitment process this is secondary to social 
networks and contacts; the initial contact is almost certainly made through social 
networks and word-of-mouth recommendations 
Co-workers are almost exclusively Pakistani and the type of work available is mainly 
unskilled manual work that does not require any formal qualifications or fluency in 
English and there are few opportunities for progression. Type 4 organisations provide 
work opportunities for recently arrive migrants that may not be available in the wider 
labour market (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Kalra 2000). Dense social ties in the 
ethnic enclave protect employers from demands for better working conditions and pay 
commensurate with the mainstream.  
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Working conditions in Type 4 organisations are not generally in line with the 
mainstream. There are often poor staff facilities, no systems of holiday pay or sick 
leave, an expectation of ad hoc or unpaid overtime, and no robust systems in place to 
report discrimination or harassment. Workers may have greater flexibility for cultural, 
social or religious obligations than they would find in the mainstream. These 
workplaces are embedded in the culture of the surrounding local Pakistani community 
which is familiar, known and understood by the workforce. Workers have common 
expectations of the conduct and behaviour of management and their co-workers.  
The work experiences of the interviewees are summarised in Tables 8.3 and 8.4 using 
the classification system in Figure 8.3. 
Figure 8.3 Classification for Work Experience Table 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Key to Employment Experience Table  
Employer Typology 
(Last Employer) 
Employment 
Classification* 
(Last Job) 
Informal Work 
Type 1 – Mainstream 
Type 2 – Mainstream employer, 
located in enclave 
Type 3 – Ethnic employer, mainstream 
service, located in enclave  
Type 4 - Ethnic employer, enclave 
business 
1    Higher Professional 
2a Lower 
managerial/professional 
2b Skilled Worker 
3    Own accounts 
4    Manual/unskilled 
5   Long term unemployed 
HW Home-worker 
FW - Work in family 
business 
WP – informal work in 
workplace  
0 = none 
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Table 8.3 Employer Type, Occupation Class, Informal Work and Voluntary Work by Generation and Cohort – First Generation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employer Type, Occupation Class, Informal Work and Voluntary Work by Generation and Cohort 1/2 
Pseudonym Age Education 
Employer 
Type  
Class of 
Occupation 
Informal 
Work 
Voluntary 
Work 
Children aged 
<11yrs 
  First Generation 
Ghar-Walis 
Rifat 44 FE 5 5 0 No No  
Fatima 45 None 5 5 0 No No  
Rashida 61 FE 5 5 0 No No  
Kishwar 52 FE 5 5 FW Yes No  
Irregular Migrants  
Bilqees 58 FE 5 5 0 No No  
Suriya 62 FE 5 5 0 No No  
Shahida 59 HE 5 5 0 Yes No 
Maqsooda 44 HE 5 5 0 No No  
Bhabis  
Fazeelat 44 GCSE 2 4 HW Yes No  
Tabassum 47 FE 2 4 0 No Yes  
Nausheen 36 HE 5 5 0 Yes Yes  
Farida 36 GCSE 5 5 HW No Yes  
Hanifa 38 No Quals 5 5 FW No Yes  
Kausar 37 FE 4 4 WP No Yes  
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Table 8.4 Employer Type, Occupation Class, Informal Work and Voluntary Work by Generation and Cohort – Second Generation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
 
 
Pseudonym Age Education 
Employer 
Type  
Class of 
Occupation 
Informal 
Work 
Voluntary 
Work 
Children aged 
<11yrs 
  
2nd Generation 
Class of 1980 
Misbah 40 BA 1 2b 0 Yes Yes  
Sana 41 Postgrad 1 2a 0 No Yes 
Aleena 40 BSc 1 2a FW Yes Yes 
Kalsoom 43 None 1 4 0 Yes No   
Nazia 45 None 3 4 0 Yes Yes  
Amina 53 None 4 4 0 Yes No  
Rizwana 40 GCSE 1 4 0 Yes Yes  
Class of 1990 
Shabana 32 FE Diploma 3 4 0 Yes Yes  
Lubna 36 GNVQ Adv 2 4 0 No Yes  
Shameem 32 HE Diploma* 1 2b 0 Yes Yes 
Halima 36 HE Diploma* 2 2b 0 No Yes  
Zara 36 GNVQ Adv 3 4 0 No Yes  
Hina 38 GNVQ Adv 4 4 0 No Yes  
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8.3.3 Class of 1980 – Experiences of Work 
Second-generation interviewees worked in all four types of organisation, with 
concentrations in two levels of occupation: Classes 2 and 4. Women with British HE 
qualifications, at diploma or undergraduate level, all held Class 2 occupations. Women 
with lower, or no, qualifications were limited to Class 4 occupations. This association with 
better occupational status and higher qualifications is expected (Khattab 2009; 2012).  
The three women with undergraduate degrees or above had clear expectations that they 
would work and have careers after graduating, they did not experience any obstacles from 
their families in accessing education or paid employment. Two of the women, Sana and 
Misbah, went on to work in fields directly related to their studies. All the women with 
undergraduate degrees worked in Type 1 or Type 2 organisations in Class 2 occupations 
at the point at which they became economically inactive. They had positive experiences of 
these workplaces and good relationships with their colleagues and managers, there were 
no reports of ethnic or religious discrimination. Aleena and Misbah did not, however, enter 
the mainstream labour market directly after their graduating, their first jobs had been in the 
ethnic enclave. 
Aleena worked in a Type 3 community welfare association and had negative experiences 
in dealing with the board members who were second-generation, educated and 
professional, Pakistani men. She described them as ‘dragons’ and ‘cave men’. She felt 
that they set out to side-line women working and volunteering in the organisation and 
undervalued their contributions. She made the decision not to work with, or for, Muslim 
men any longer and moved on work in a local mainstream community centre (Type 2) 
where she felt valued and respected by her white male manager. Her brother encouraged 
her to seek work elsewhere: 
“And I thought sack them, they don’t want us. And I had enough of Muslims, I 
wanted to work with non-Muslims. Because they didn’t respect us, Muslim 
women, they did not appreciate the work we did. It was all the women that did 
the work but they never appreciated us, never thanked us, never never 
acknowledged it so well I thought, goodbye I’m off. My brother says to me listen 
don’t be so upset go work with non-Muslims. I looked at it as an opportunity, 
alhamdulillah, and they really respected me, really valued what I did.” (Aleena, 
Class of 1980) 
Misbah began working in a Type 4 organisation as a last resort after a long period of 
applying for jobs and undertaking unpaid work experience in the mainstream labour 
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market. Misbah felt that discrimination against her religious identity because she wore 
hijab affected her ability to find work in the mainstream industry. Misbah had been 
reluctant to work in the enclave because of reports of mistreatment of staff.  
 “And basically, I went there and you know immediately they didn’t want to pay 
me. And then they were just being a little bit unprofessional which was what I 
was expecting because I had heard a lot you know, and I wasn’t labelling them 
because obviously I live in Mohallaton. So when I joined I thought to myself oh 
I’ll just be here for a couple of months but nothing came up and it was not as 
easy as I thought either.” (Misbah, Class of 1980) 
Misbah thought that by taking up the offer of work in the enclave she would gain 
experience and technical skills that she could transfer to the mainstream industry. She 
agreed to work for no pay initially, working 12 hour shifts from 6am to 6pm. After 
encouragement from her older sister she negotiated an annual salary of £6000.  Misbah 
received inadequate training and was placed under significant pressure, particularly from 
older members of staff who told her she should be grateful for the work.  
“I was actually genuinely very nervous and very anxious and the only reason 
why I pursued it was because I thought I’ve got to develop the skills properly 
before I leave this building, not that any jobs were coming for me anyway […] I’d 
applied for so many places but nothing came of them, nothing materialised.” 
(Misbah, Class of 1980) 
Misbah was able to pick up the skills she needed but remained unsuccessful in her 
attempts to enter the mainstream in her career of choice: She eventually moved on to work 
in the mainstream in a community outreach role for a national charity. She enjoyed the 
new job but regrets the lack of opportunities that were available to her to pursue her 
chosen career. 
All three of the degree-educated women had access to mainstream employment, however, 
for two of them the ethnic enclave was a bridge between HE qualification attainment and 
mainstream employment. With such a small sample size it is not possible to make 
generalisations about this bridging relationship. It is interesting to note though that despite 
being critical of their experience of working in the enclave, it provided them with paid 
employment and the opportunity to develop skills that could eventually be transferred to 
well-paid jobs and fair working conditions in the mainstream labour market.  
On the other hand, having been employed in the mainstream labour market for all her 
working life, Sana plans to run a small business from home, catering to the local Pakistani 
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community using the skills and experience gained in her professional career. Working in 
the enclave will give Sana the flexibility and control over her working life that was difficult 
for her to achieve in the mainstream. The ethnic enclave can be a location of opportunity 
for Muslim women with higher qualifications, despite the poorer working conditions.  
Opportunities for employment in the ethnic enclave were also important to women in the 
Class of 1980 who had no/low qualifications. Amina’s father had removed her from school 
before she sat her O Level examinations and she was married to a cousin from Pakistan 
shortly after, she began working shortly after her divorce. Amina worked in three Type 4 
businesses. She was limited to work that required no formal qualifications, although her 
ability to speak English may have been a useful skill. She could only work in the local area 
because she did not have a car and required flexibility to work around school hours and 
holidays, she did not have any family support. Amina was not given paid holiday or sick 
leave and her employers often expected her to work longer hours than had been agreed: 
“Literally because once you start working there they think that that’s it, you don’t 
have no other life […] the hours they ask you to work, the days that they ask you 
to work. And they do take the piss, because a lot of the Asian women don’t know 
the rules and regulations and what they’re entitled to […] You know things like 
we never got any holiday pay, if you took time off work you didn’t get paid”. 
(Amina, Class of 1980) 
Amina went on to work in a Pakistani warehouse, she started off working “on the tables”, 
labelling and packing items of clothing for delivery. Over the years she went on to become 
a supervisor but was powerless to change the poor working conditions: 
“I was a supervisor. Literally, I ran the warehouse singlehandedly and I was only 
being paid £5 an hour and I was full time on the books, no holiday pay, no 
nothing… you know you didn’t get the proper facilities you know for tea or coffee 
making or something it’s always thingy. Toilets, you know they didn’t have no 
cleaners or anything we had to do it as we went along and it was always the 
women who were expected to clean the toilets, well I aint fucking cleaning no 
toilets. That’s not part of my job description.” (Amina, Class of 1980) 
Amina saw herself as relatively privileged in the co-ethnic workplace as compared to first-
generation women. Her ability to speak English and her knowledge of her employment 
rights helped her to progress to a supervisory position and to challenge harassment.  
Amina gave examples of incidents of sexual harassment of female workers in the 
warehouse by first-generation men. As a supervisor she dealt with these incidents and she 
was supported by her employer in the decisions she made: 
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“I got rid of a few male workers there who had made a pass at them. Some of 
the women had come and complained about it and I escorted him off the 
premises, I says no way. Boss wasn’t there, took him up to the office to the 
secretary, told her this is what’s happened, he’s broke her watch she’s come 
crying to me. I says I don’t need that kind of person working in this warehouse. 
She agreed with me, I escorted him off the premises. I said you want to wait for 
the boss you wait there, I said don’t set foot in here otherwise I will phone the 
police and report you. And I got a lot of stick over that because he was Pakistani, 
because he was Muslim, because he was fresh off the banana boat. I says tough 
titty, if they want to do things like that, stay back home. He actually went into the 
toilets after her. Why did he go into the toilets after her?” (Amina, Class of 1980) 
Although she felt that she was inadequately compensated for her effort, Amina enjoyed 
her job at the warehouse. The non-financial rewards in terms of the respect she was given 
by her boss and colleagues and the level of responsibility and trust she was entrusted 
with:  
“Mentally, physically, financially, I don’t think it was worth it now. But to me it was 
a job that l loved, I really did like you know the adrenaline, meeting the orders 
you know the rush of it. I really thrived on it and then once I left work I told you 
that time that I was ill.” (Amina, Class of 1980) 
It was unlikely that Amina would have found a job at a similar level of responsibility in the 
mainstream labour market.  Amina left this job because she was feeling unwell, after a 
period of illness she was registered disabled; she was in receipt of Disability Living 
Allowance payments at the time the interview took place. Amina was in fact not LAHF but 
in the sick/disabled category of economic inactivity. During the engagement process she 
stated that she not in receipt of any work-related benefits but during the interview she 
revealed that she was not required to work because of her illness. She was included in the 
final sample of interviewees because of the rich narrative account she gave during her 
interview, particularly about her experiences of work. 
Nazia also sought work in the enclave after early marriage to a first-generation cousin, he 
was registered disabled shortly after he arrived in Britain. She found work as receptionist 
at a local Pakistani GP practice through a friend of the family. Nazia worked there for four 
months, she then moved on to another practice where she remained employed for 17 
years.  Her employer, a female GP, was supportive of her parenting responsibilities and 
she was entitled to sick leave and holiday pay whilst working there. It is unlikely that Nazia 
would have been able to find similar work in the mainstream labour market because of her 
lack of qualifications – “I didn’t have any experience I didn’t have any education, I could 
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read and write.” The first short-term opportunity that arose in the ethnic enclave was 
pivotal to her attaining stable work and good working conditions.  
Like Amina and Nazia, Kalsoom and Rizwana were limited to unskilled manual work 
because of their low level of education; they both worked in Type 1 organisations in Class 
4 occupations. Kalsoom trained and worked as a healthcare assistant and worked for 
three years in a local hospital. She left the job because of perceived religious and ethnic 
discrimination and lack of progression. She was one of very few Asian healthcare 
assistants at the hospital and felt isolated at work. She felt particularly uncomfortable 
around the time of the 7/7 terrorist attack in London when other members of staff spoke 
about the event in her presence:  
“I mean I remember like walking into the staff room and they were like talking 
about terrorism and I was like making my cup of tea. What’s that got to do with 
me? You know they were like talking, they were going on and on and on and 
there would be one who would like look at me and think she’s nothing to do with 
all this, just calm it now […] they were just going on and on and getting angry. 
And it was summat to do with you know that September 11th and then the 7/7 
and I’m just thinking but I am here to work you know and I just felt all eyes were 
on me.” (Kalsoom, Class of 1980) 
She also felt that younger and more inexperienced members of staff who were white 
British were given opportunities to attend training and acquire skills to move up pay grades 
while she stayed in the same position. Kalsoom spoke about a sense of unfairness that 
Muslim women must struggle to enter the labour market because of cultural or family 
constraints, only to face discrimination once they do: 
“I felt like I was Band 2 after three years, I just had to leave you know. There are 
things that make us leave then. You know it’s like difficult, looking at my life when 
I was young it’s difficult to come out of the house because the father and sons 
they don’t want you to work. And then when you are in the workforce, they say 
these things as well. In the work environment I felt like I was not moving forward.” 
(Kalsoom, Class of 1980) 
Kalsoom’s work status as a part time agency worker increased her sense of vulnerability 
when deciding whether to report discrimination or making a case to receive further training. 
Kalsoom says that she has considered working within the local Pakistani niche to avoid 
discrimination but has chosen not to thus far because she values the opportunity to mix 
with a variety of people and does not see this as part of living a British lifestyle: 
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“I’ve been thinking that maybe I should go to my Asian area and but then I 
think but I am British, I’ve been brought up in a British lifestyle [laughs]. I’m not 
like hey I’m going to go to my Muslims, Asians. I like a mix, I like everyone 
really.” (Kalsoom, Class of 1980) 
All of the women in the Class of 1980 plan to return to work once their children are older, 
and this usually meant over the age of 11 and attending secondary school, other than 
Amina who is unlikely to return to work because of her ill-health. They would all prefer to 
work in part-time jobs in Type 1 or 2 mainstream organisations in the public sector, other 
than Sana who hopes to become self-employed and to work from home. Their preference 
to work part-time is related to their domestic and caring responsibilities. The women with 
HE degrees are all married to husbands in professional occupations and they state that 
their primary motivation to return to work is related to the intrinsic rewards and satisfaction 
of work rather than improving the financial circumstances of their households. Less 
qualified women who hoped to return to work in order to improve household financial 
circumstances, therefore they would have to find work where their pay would be greater 
than the amount received in tax credit payments.  
8.3.4 Class of 1990 – Experiences of Work  
None of the women in the Class of 1990 had attended university to attain undergraduate 
degrees. Two of the women in this cohort held vocational diplomas that they had attained 
as adults after marriage. The ethnic enclave remained an important source of employment 
for this younger cohort. 
Shabana only worked for eight months, the shortest period of any of the second-
generation women. She found work in a local Type 3 organisation as a receptionist with 
the help of a family member who already worked there. The work enabled her to fulfil the 
documentary and income requirements of the visa process for her husband. She left when 
she became pregnant and has not returned to work since. She describes herself as a 
homely person and she enjoys being a stay-at-home mother. She says that she would go 
out to work if there was financial need, but her husband’s income as a taxi driver 
(supplemented by state benefits, including tax credits) is sufficient for her family’s needs. 
Her priority is the nurture of her children and she states that she would only ever work part 
time when they were older:  
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“I have always been homely anyway. I like staying at home, I will be honest with 
you. I love staying at home looking after the kids, cooking. My day goes by, I 
don’t regret nothing, I like it. For me my kids are Number 1 nothing else. For me 
being there for my kids is enough. I want them to study, I want them to have 
higher education and I want to support them to do that and I can’t do that if I am 
not with them.” (Shabana, Class of 1990) 
Like Shabana, Zara and Hina also left work after becoming pregnant with their first 
children and did not return to work. They also prioritise and see greater value in their roles 
within their homes and families over economic activity. Hina’s mother relocated to Pakistan 
with her daughters when Hina was 11 to avoid their attendance in a mixed-gender school 
and to ensure they had an Islamic education. The family returned to Britain when Hina was 
14 years old. Hina required extra language support at school and found it difficult to make 
friends. When she left college, having attained a GNVQ in Health and Social Care, she 
hoped to work for a mainstream retailer. She did not want to work outside the local area or 
use public transport because she suffered, as she still does, from anxiety and low 
confidence: 
“Because [when] I came from Pakistan I had very low confidence, I had low 
self-esteem and having less friends or no friends, that actually pushed me 
back. Language problem as well and I was quiet. I was a very very shy person, 
very shy person.” (Hina, Class of 1990) 
After six months of Hina unsuccessfully applying for jobs in the mainstream, her mother 
approached the owners of the local Pakistani supermarket and they agreed to employ her 
as a checkout operator. Hina continued to apply for other jobs but ended up being “stuck” 
at the supermarket for three years. Hina felt she was treated badly there because of her 
gender, age and marital status. Older and more experienced co-workers, both male and 
female, would place younger staff under pressure whilst they stood around chatting, “it 
wasn’t fair and we were doing more work or sometimes we were alone on the till and there 
was big queues and you had to deal with that on your own, it was that much pressure.” 
Often Hina would miss scheduled breaks and her lunch hour was delayed. Her boss also 
frequently asked her to work seven days a week, he would justify the request by saying, 
“you’re not married it’s ok”.  
Hina knew she was being treated unfairly but saw little option as there were no other job 
opportunities open to her. She stayed there until her husband got his visa, she fell 
pregnant shortly after and did not return after maternity leave. Her husband is in full time 
223 
 
 
 
work, as a manual worker in a Type 4 Pakistani-owned warehouse and household income 
is sufficient to meet the family’s needs. Hina suffers from a low-level chronic illness which 
exacerbates her social anxiety and affects her mental and emotional wellbeing. When she 
feels better she would like to return to work as a checkout operative in Tesco to assist with 
family finances. She feels that this work would fit around her family commitments and the 
care of her children. For similar reasons, Zara would like to return to work as a teaching 
assistant when her children are older. Unlike Hina, Zara has a plan in mind for achieving 
this goal, she plans to undertake a Teaching Assistant qualification and had organised 
some voluntary work experience at a local school.  
Lubna’s ambition after leaving school was to become a nurse but she was uncertain about 
the academic route. This made negotiations with her father, who was opposed to her going 
on to higher education, much more difficult. Before marriage, and for a short period after, 
Lubna worked as a classroom assistant. She left work because her in-laws are elderly and 
she had to take over all cooking, cleaning and caring for the extended family. She would 
like to return to work to contribute to household income and meet the needs of her children 
and to increase the financial security of the household: 
“I know my kids would like me to go to work because of the financial side of it, 
at the moment we are like really like struggling. The children’s needs are just 
growing and we’re struggling. At the moment it’s just like kind of hand to mouth 
it’s like no savings. We’ve not been on a family holiday for like, my younger 
one has never been on holiday. (Lubna, Class of 1990) 
Lubna is limited to low paid work because of her low level of qualifications. She believes 
that the family would “lose out” financially if she were to take up part-time unskilled work in 
the local area because the family’s entitlement to family tax credits would reduce and they 
would no longer be entitled to NHS exemptions. Lubna was one of few women in the 
sample to explicitly state that receipt of state benefits directly affected her motivation to be 
economically active, but this is likely to be the case for many of the women with dependent 
children, low qualifications and husbands in low-paid work. Many women spoke about 
there not being an urgency is to return to work because household income was ‘sufficient’ 
to meet their needs. Household income is likely to include an element of ‘top-up’ based on 
the low income of their husbands and the number of children in the household. 
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“So yeah I mean financially I think you know it would probably be good to be 
working but then I think the big part of it is like the help that we get from the 
government it’s like if I were to get a job now I would probably, because I don’t 
have the education would not be able to get a well-paid job. Probably make a bit 
more than, no probably actually in the long-run we would be worse off because 
you would lose all your like NHS exemptions and things so yeah definitely don’t 
think it…no and especially because I would probably only do like part-time.” 
(Lubna, Class of 1990) 
Rizwana also feels dependent on the state financial assistance she receives in terms of 
family tax credits as a reliable source of income and is concerned that she would not make 
enough money to meet her family’s needs if she returned to work: 
“It is a loophole again you know on benefits and that, once you’re on the benefits 
like trying to get back into work is harder. It’s just so much harder because you’re 
used to, like if you get back onto work and then you get like a wage and you’re 
getting paid at the end of each month and what not and you’re not getting paid 
enough and then you’re thinking my daughter needs trainers, where will you get 
the money to finance it from? Whereas the benefits are there you kind of rely on 
the benefits I didn’t even want to go down that route and then when I did it was 
like, it’s hard to get off. (Rizwana, Class of 1980) 
Shameem and Halima differ from others in the Class of 1990 because of their higher 
educational attainment, they attained HE vocational diplomas after marriage and with the 
support of their husbands. They worked in Type 1 and 2 mainstream organisations and 
reported positive experiences of work and working conditions, they clearly gained a lot of 
satisfaction and esteem from their jobs. They both reported that they left work because of 
the dual burden of having to undertake all the caring and domestic work for the household 
alongside their work and that their leaving work has not created financial difficulties for 
their families; this has been discussed in some detail in Chapter 7.  
8.3.5 Older First Generation – Experiences of Work 
 
Older first-generation women, whether early arrivals or recent migrants, had no experience 
of formal work in Britain. All but one of these older women stated that they had formal 
qualifications, most held FE equivalent qualifications and two stated that they had higher 
education qualifications. It is strongly suspected by the researcher that educational 
attainment may have been overstated by some women in this cohort. Many of the women 
could not recall the subjects they had studied at higher levels and/or were unable to give 
detailed accounts of their experiences of higher education. The high level of qualifications 
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may also reflect the privileged premigration conditions that some of these women came 
from, particularly those engaged through a particular community group, which included 
mostly women of urban and middle-class origins in Pakistan. The selection of these 
participants was heavily influenced by the group leader and this is discussed in the 
Chapter 5 (Section 5.3.5).  
Maqsooda and Shahida were the mostly highly qualified women among older first-
generation women, they were in the irregular migrant category. Both women had a 
reasonable level of fluency in English (researcher’s evaluation). They arrived in Britain as 
whole family units as part of a secondary migration. Shahida had arrived ten years prior to 
being interviewed and Maqsooda had arrived more recently, two years prior to interview. 
Neither woman has worked since arriving in Britain. At the age of 59 Shahida has children 
who are young adults, some of whom are married and a husband who has retired, she 
does not intend to work; this is likely to be related to her social age, she neither expects 
nor is expected to work. This is also true of the other two irregular migrants, Suriya and 
Bilqees, who migrated as widows to join the households of their first-generation sons and 
second-generation daughter in laws.  
“My biggest happiness was that I was going to live with my son, I would be able 
to spend time with his children and play with them. This was my only aim.  And 
the children are very attached to me and I like spending time with them.” (Suriya, 
irregular migrant, daadi) 
The irregular migrants in the sample are not representative of the wave of recently arrived 
secondary migrants from other European countries in terms of their urban pre-migration 
circumstances and educational level. This small-scale wave of secondary migration was 
identified in Chapter 6. The general opinion on these family units is that they are likely to 
be from rural and disadvantaged backgrounds, to have little education and limited fluency 
in English. Nevertheless, the interviews with these women do verify some of the claims for 
a small wave of new migration of Pakistani family units from Europe. 
Older first-generation women, ghar-walis and irregular migrants, had similar responses to 
questions about formal economic activity as older female P&B interviewees in Dale et al. 
(2002a). These women had never considered being employed upon migration and had 
little information and knowledge about the mainstream labour market: 
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“I hadn’t even thought about it because there was no tradition in our family in 
Pakistan of working or that a woman should work. I never worked outside the 
home. I did want to work but when a person has a family, with the children, then 
we don’t have the education that we need and we don’t understand what it is we 
should do […]. No one had ever worked, none of the ladies around here worked.” 
(Rashida, ghar-wali) 
8.3.6 Bhabis – Experiences of Work 
Only three first-generation women had any experience of formal paid work, all these 
women were in the bhabi cohort. In terms of birth cohort, they are of similar ages to the 
second-generation, there was also a similar range of qualification attainment when the 
Pakistani qualifications were given approximate British equivalence. Like the second-
generation women, most bhabis were married and had children of primary school age.  
All but one bhabi, Hanifa, expressed strong aspirations to work. Hanifa held strong 
religious beliefs about the gendered division of family roles and has no ambition to work. 
Her husband works in a Class 4 job in the mainstream labour market during the week and 
drives a taxi over the weekend. The family is in receipt of tax credits, there are more than 
five children in the household. Hanifa believes that her husband’s significant efforts in 
providing for his family make their family’s source of income legitimate, or halal.  
All other bhabis had invested time in training and/or volunteering to gain skills and 
experience to enable them to enter the labour market. The younger women in this cohort, 
in their 30s, had all attended English classes to meet the requirements of the British 
citizenship process. They felt that the requirement to do so meant that they had 
unproblematic access to English classes which otherwise would have been difficult to 
negotiate with their parents-in-law. Through attending these classes some women 
developed greater confidence in speaking English and found access to wider sources of 
information about work and training than they would have had it not been a condition of 
acquiring British citizenship.  
Farida is a bhabi who has explored options for work. She attended a probationary period 
at a local Pakistani factory but found the pay being offered to be too low. The rate of pay 
was £3 per hour, dependent on completing a given number of pieces per hour. The 
minimum wage in 2010 was £5.93 per hour. This was clearly informal work because it 
contravened the legal minimum wage requirements. Farida did not feel that the level of 
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pay was adequate, but she saw that other first-generation women were willing to work 
under these demanding conditions for very low pay:  
“You die over the work for an hour, you have to work really quickly, for what, 
£2.50, £3? No. I couldn’t do that, if I am going to work I am going to work for fair 
pay or I won’t do it…but the women who were working there were single 
mothers. There was a woman who had an older married daughter and she said 
she was going crazy sitting at home so she worked like that and she said she 
can make £300 to £350 a week because she worked six or seven days. She 
was happy, just sitting at the machine from 10 o’clock til late in the evening.” 
(Farida, bhabi) 
Informal work does not affect the level of means-tested state benefits families receive due 
to low income, tax credits or unemployment and can substantially boost household 
income. Farida occasionally conducts informal paid work, sewing Pakistani outfits.  She 
states that this form of work is not profitable and is something that she only considers 
doing for her close friends. Farida feels that the most significant barriers to work for her are 
not being in fluent in English and her lack of IT skills. She says that she is desperate to 
work, to support her husband by contributing to household finances but also to increase 
her confidence and independence. Her ambition is to work on the checkouts at Tesco.  
Like all the other women in the bhabi cohort, Farida chose to take part in the interview in 
Urdu. During the interview she received a phone call from her children’s school asking 
about school dinner for her child and she was able to communicate fluently in English. 
Many of the bhabis had good levels of spoken English, however these women are not 
confident that they have will be able to communicate in English in workplaces, despite 
being able to speak English at a fluent level (researcher’s evaluation). At the time of 
interview Farida had signed up to begin IT lessons in the coming months. Overall, she 
seemed to have little information on how to improve her skills to meet her ambitions to 
work in the mainstream labour market, from her informal co-ethnic social network or from 
any external sources.  
Nausheen is a member of a local community group that is composed of first-generation 
women. Nausheen has found a mentor in an older member of the group who has given her 
guidance on accessing the mainstream labour market. Nausheen hopes to become a 
teaching assistant and has in the past undertaken a voluntary teaching assistant role,  
however, her experiences in that placement were not altogether positive. She felt that she 
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was not given enough guidance as to the boundaries of her role and that her own lack of 
confidence meant that she felt unable to clarify this with the people she was working with: 
“I have had problems in those places as well. I would only do as much as the 
teacher told me, when I tried to get involved myself I would feel like I was 
becoming a burden on people. It was how I felt mainly but there was a reaction 
afterwards that I wasn’t doing enough, but I thought the teacher might mind if I 
was getting too involved in the classroom activities. So now I have realised that 
some of them were rude to me as well.  If I got too involved they didn’t like it. If 
they were busy and I wasn’t doing anything then they wouldn’t like that either, 
they would think that I was just sitting back and watching without helping. So I 
found it very difficult to balance, I couldn’t understand how to balance it.” 
(Nausheen, bhabi) 
Nausheen has a clear plan for how to achieve her ambition of becoming a teaching 
assistant. She has enrolled on the necessary vocational teaching assistant course as well 
as entry level courses in English and Maths. She has also taken on a role as a board 
member of the community group to improve her confidence and to practice speaking 
English in a professional setting. Nausheen is the highest qualified bhabi, with a Pakistani 
Masters qualification and has been making efforts to find employment in the mainstream 
labour market since the time of her migration more than ten years prior to the interview 
taking place. Less qualified first-generation women, without the support of a mentor, are 
likely to face even greater challenges in planning and working towards labour market 
participation.   
Farida and Nausheen were making efforts to attain employment in the mainstream labour 
market, they had chosen not to seek work in the ethnic enclave and this has perhaps 
made their route to economic activity more challenging. All the three bhabis who have 
experience of formal work worked in the ethnic enclave; Tabassum and Fazeelat went on 
to work in a mainstream public sector organisation but their first jobs were in the ethnic 
enclave. As with second-generation women, the enclave provided important opportunities 
for work and for gaining workplace skills and experience that led to entry into the 
mainstream labour market. Tabassum and Nausheen experienced, or witnessed, gender-
based discrimination and sexual harassment in Type 4 manufacturing firms: 
“The workers there regarded the women as a piece of factory equipment, they 
could look at us any way they wanted, say offensive things to us. It was a dirty 
environment, they weren’t good people […] I pray that Allah never makes 
anyone work in a factory, not in an environment like that. There was no respect 
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for women there. They would endure any kind of abuse in order to work there 
[…]. If the boss had said to her to come and spend time with him alone in his 
office she would just go. I asked her why did you go, you shouldn’t have gone 
there. She said what can I do, it is a majboori, if I don’t get on with the boss I 
won’t get work. I didn’t like these things at all, they made me sick.” (Kausar, 
bhabi) 
“I did try to work. I worked in a factory and the manager said that he would help 
me and wanted to have a relationship with me I left work at that factory, I said 
no. He said have a relationship with me, I will pay your bills, I will do everything 
for you and then I said no […]. I didn’t want to work where my honour was at 
risk. He said he would get me a car, driving lessons, a big house, if I had a 
relationship with him”. (Tabassum, bhabi) 
Experiences of working in factories were not wholly negative though. Kausar went on to 
work in another factory and found the manager there to be much more respectful and 
understanding:  
“Where I worked last, that boss was someone’s father, someone’s grandfather, 
a brother. He treated me like a daughter and behaved in an educated and 
respectable way. He knew that I wasn’t brilliant at the job, I would sew two 
pieces together and then cut one of them off. He would say my daughter sew it 
up, I need to sell it. (Kausar, bhabi) 
None of the second-generation women, other than Amina who was the oldest second-
generation interviewee, were employed as manual or unskilled workers in Type 4 
manufacturing organisations; this seems to be work undertaken by first-generation women 
only. Their first-generation status, limited fluency in English and poor knowledge of their 
employment rights makes them more likely to accept poor working conditions and any 
mistreatment, making them a compliant workforce. As was seen in the case of Farida 
above, not all first-generation women are willing to take up such employment, her 
husband’s income supplemented by state benefits was enough for their family’s needs 
without resorting to such work. In the case of Amina, we saw that second-generation 
women were better able to challenge and question unfair practices. Aleena was able to 
walk away from her job in a Type 4 organisation and transferred her skills and knowledge 
to a mainstream organisation. First-generation women had fewer options and choices than 
second-generation women. 
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8.3.7 Informal Work  
Informal work is an important area that lacks contemporary empirical evidence but is 
thought to be an important factor in the economic inactivity of Muslim women in Britain 
(Peach 2006). Studies conducted in the 1970s and 1980s showed that informal work, in 
the forms of work in family businesses, informal work in workplaces and homeworking 
were prevalent among first-generation Pakistani women in dense Muslim communities 
(Werbner 1990; Phizacklea 1990). There is a dearth of contemporary research on the 
nature and extent of informal work among British Pakistani women, even though it is 
widely considered to contribute to low levels of formal economic activity. The reason for a 
lack of research is attributed to the difficulties in accessing marginalised groups of women 
and the fact that informal work is likely to be a particularly sensitive topic. Qualitative data 
from this project adds some important contemporary insights into informal working 
amongst Pakistani women.  
Women were specifically asked about their experience or knowledge of homeworking in 
the local area. None of the women stated that they themselves had ever conducted 
informal homeworking in the form of piecework in Pakistani factories or as homeworkers. 
This is unsurprising and may not be an accurate picture, women were unlikely to admit to 
conducting such informal work, particularly if they thought that it was illegal or against the 
rules of any state benefits they were receiving. Two of the women, Farida and Fazeelat, 
said that they occasionally provided sewing and catering services respectively for their 
friends and neighbours in the local community in return for payment. Kishwar and Aleena 
had conducted paid work for family businesses in the past, Hanifa had worked in a family 
business without payment.  
Kausar was the only woman who stated that she had worked informally in a workplace. 
This was in a Type 3 organisation, a Pakistani-owned business offering a mainstream 
service. She attained this work through her family network:  
“I would work on the till and count dockets and input information into the 
computer too. Yes, that work is good, much better than factory work because I 
was given some responsibility and paperwork, it was good I could work calmly 
and quietly. Sometimes the white people who came there would be racist, they 
would abuse me sometimes for example if I asked for ID they would swear at 
me […] and they would be threaten me that they would show me when I left 
the building and on those days my boss would drop me off at home, they were 
very good. I would from 7 until 1 at the post office [for] £50 a week, that’s why I 
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left it after four months. Absolutely nothing, they never gave anything, not even 
wage slips they were very bad to me. It was better at the factory that I got 
wage slips, tax was taken”. (Kausar, bhabi) 
Kausar describes her employers as both good and bad. Good because they offered her a 
level of protection from racist customers and bad because they did not formalise her work 
or pay her adequately. Having said earlier that she wouldn’t wish for anyone to work in a 
factory she now says that formal work in a factory was preferable to working in this Type 3 
business. The contradictions in her statements are indicative of the complexities around 
experiences of work in the ethnic enclave for first-generation migrants. Workers are aware 
of how limited the employment opportunities open to them are, they are grateful for the 
opportunities and protection from discrimination available to them in the ethnic enclave. 
They are also aware that they are not afforded the same rights to pay and safe working 
conditions that would be available to them in the mainstream. The power imbalance is 
weighted in favour of the employer and informal workers are most vulnerable. It may be 
the case that informal workers were subject to greater harassment and discrimination than 
formal workers in the enclave, but the empirical data cannot provide an answer to this 
question because none of the women, other than Kausar, stated that they had undertaken 
informal work. 
There were reports from the interviewees about informal work being prevalent amongst 
recently arrived first-generation men and women in the Mohallaton. Informal work was only 
spoken about amongst recently arrived first-generation women and from their accounts, it 
was a form of work conducted by other first-generation migrants. Fatima and Rifat were 
both able to provide details on the nature of informal work in Mohallaton: 
“Yes, you can sew at home, some makes samosas, lots of other things, sewing, 
ironing and things like, lots of people have need, poor things, they have to do it. 
Some sell clothes from home, there are lots of things and everyone does 
something. Some do make-up at home, one thing or another, factory work too. 
Teaching children how to recite the Quran, teaching Urdu. People who are older, 
even young people, people who have very young children, they need people to 
help out with cleaning and cooking in the house there is that too. For example, 
if you are working and you can’t take your children with you can you? So you 
leave your children at somebody else’s house…” (Fatima, ghar-wali) 
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“And the other thing is that Pakistani women don’t work, this is a lie. I would say 
80% of women work here, but hidden work so that they can claim benefits too. 
Do you understand? Cleaning and cooking, childcare, lots of women work here, 
they work in factories too so that they can hide their benefits. In Within the 
community everyone knows. If you go to a factory all the Pakistani women are 
working for pay of £3.50, packing, and they get £3.50. Some of them work in 
their own homes. It’s not they don’t work, they put the same amount of effort in 
but just because they don’t want to pay taxes and they defraud the government. 
This is the truth, it’s not a lie.” (Rifat, ghar-wali) 
There seems to be a much greater range of work opportunities in the informal sector than 
was the case in the 1970s and 1980s. There are opportunities to provide skilled services, 
for example as teachers of Quran recitation or tutors for mainstream education or 
providing health and beauty services in private homes; these forms of work are likely to be 
far more profitable that piece-work. Domestic and caring services, such as child-care, 
cooking, cleaning and ironing work in private homes were not part of the picture of informal 
work in the ethnic enclave in earlier decades.  
An increase in formal economic activity, moves towards nuclear family households and 
access to independent sources of income among some groups of Muslim women seem to 
have created a secondary labour market with a wider range of informal work opportunities 
in Mohallaton for other groups of Muslim women. The split is a generational one; with the 
economic activity of second-generation women fuelling the creation of a secondary labour 
market for ‘economically inactive’ first-generation women. 
Rifat thinks that informal work is prevalent among first-generation Pakistani women for two 
reasons. Firstly, for men to protect their reputation of being a breadwinner for their 
families. Secondly, Rifat believes that large numbers of women work informally because 
their husbands will not allow them to undertake work that will reduce the level of household 
benefits. Rifat arrived with the expectation that she would work. She was educated to FE 
level in Pakistan and undertook a range of vocational training courses there in anticipation 
of moving to Britain and working, however, when she eventually migrated her husband did 
not give her permission to work. His reasoning was that her income would reduce the 
household benefits they received, she could work informally or not at all. Rifat has not 
undertaken informal work and is highly critical of her husband’s attitude, which she says is 
common in Mohallaton. She sees this approach to household income as forbidden in Islam 
and would prefer that she and her husband to improve their circumstances:  
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“I thought I would make a home of my own choice, we would live together just 
as we want to. I thought I might work because I have lots of skills, I know sewing 
and cooking and I can make lots of handmade things. I did a course in sewing 
school, I did a two year diploma there to learn how to sew clothes, making 
curtains, making bedsheets. I thought I would be able to help my husband and 
that we would do lots of things together. But when I got here I couldn’t do 
anything because of my husband, these people depend on benefits and they 
don’t work or let their wives work either. If we work then obviously we will get 
less in benefits and we would have to work. From the beginning I think that we 
should work […] when tax is taken then we get public services. He didn’t think 
like that at all.” (Rifat, ghar-wali) 
Kausar witnessed informal working among older first generation women in the factories 
she worked in: 
“There was a lot of greed that people work for money, they take benefits too but 
they need more money so they work. There are some older women who are 
pensioners, they claim pension and work in the factory too. Do numbri kaam 
[fraudulent work]. When there would be a raid I would stay sitting where I was, 
and the rest of the factory would empty out completely. They would all run away, 
all of them […] I would ask, aunty why did you go. So they would say oh don’t 
ask, I work on the sly, I don’t show my earnings.” (Kausar, bhabi) 
All the interviewees were asked about their knowledge of informal work. There are women 
for whom informal work is not part of the landscape of work and employment opportunities, 
this is the case for all second-generation women. There are women who choose not to 
undertake any form of economic activity and therefore they did not speak about informal 
work during their interviews, this was the case for all ghar walis and other older first-
generation migrants. Younger first-generation women were most likely to be aware of 
opportunities for informal work. 
Those women who were aware of informal work opportunities are first-generation women 
in their 30s and 40s who were seeking work or who had worked. This is the social network 
wherein informal work is discussed and where the resources to find informal work 
opportunities can be found. As in the case of welfare dependency, discussed in Chapter 7, 
it may be the case that long-settled first-generation women and those of the second 
generation women chose not to speak about informal work out of a sense of loyalty to the 
local community and the desire to present it in a positive light. The nature of relationships 
in tight-knit communities “proscribe what individuals believe they can vocalize, 
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relationships with others influence what stories are recognised, valued, or dismissed, or 
dammed” (Seaton 2008, p.295).  
8.3.8 Skills Development, Training and Voluntary Work 
Most first and second generation took part in social activities that involved other women of 
the same migrant generation. Their primary motivation in taking part in structured groups 
or activities was to avoid social isolation and to enhance their sense of wellbeing. There 
was very little intergenerational contact in any these group settings.  All second-generation 
women were able to speak Punjabi, Kashmiri or Urdu fluently, despite this there was very 
little interaction between first and second generation women outside family and home 
settings.  
Some of the women, both first and second generation, attended community groups to 
increase their work-related skillset and/or to contribute to the household economies. For 
example, five of the women took part in weekly sewing classes to learn how to sew 
shalwar kameez for themselves and their daughters, allowing them to avoid tailoring costs. 
Skills gained through attendance at cooking classes or hygiene courses, for example, 
could be implemented in everyday life or used to gain informal work.  
Older women were more likely to use skills development opportunities and training to 
participate in the social aspects of the training courses, although they were clearly proud of 
their achievements they were not associated with economic activity:  
“I have taken sewing classes too and I have done a volunteer course.  [I learnt] 
how you can help people, adults and children, how to attend meetings, serve 
tea. I complete a First Aid course here and a Food Hygiene Certificate and then 
we worked towards an art exhibition. I have kept myself busy here and my life is 
full […] I am active, and I am fit and healthy […]. My children are very happy and 
they are very proud that their mother is so active and can do so much.” (Suriya, 
irregular migrant) 
The statistical findings from this project and findings from other sources show that Muslim 
women are more likely than women from any other religious group to participate in 
voluntary activities; seven of the thirteen second-generation women in the sample took 
part in some form of voluntary activity. Bhabis and second-generation women were most 
likely to use their participation in group activities as an opportunity gain information about 
education, training and work in the local area, and to develop work-related skills. For 
example, Kalsoom volunteers one day a week at a local mainstream charity shop to 
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improve her confidence and skills so that she can apply to work as a checkout operator in 
a mainstream supermarket. Misbah volunteers at a local mother and toddler group, her 
youngest child is under the age of 1 and she can take the baby with her to work and to 
meetings. Misbah would like to work in a community-based job in the future and feels that 
this is a good way to develop her skills.  
Despite their efforts, few women have a clear sense of how to transfer these skills and 
experiences into a clear plan to attain work in the mainstream labour market. Instead, 
there is often an ad hoc range of volunteering experience and skills development that do 
not demonstrate clear progression or working towards a defined goal. The women did not 
understand how to gather and demonstrate the range of their experiences into a CV or 
application form. Online applications were a considerable obstacle for the Class of 1980 
who did not have any formal qualifications and for the bhabi cohort. The women had 
limited access to formal assistance with recruitment processes because they were not 
compelled to attend Job Centres. For many women the inability to demonstrate, 
communicate and record their range of skills, training and work experience was a 
significant barrier.   
8.3.9 Section Conclusion 
All second generation women had some experience of formal economic activity, 
regardless of level of education and socio-economic status. Most of the women hoped to 
return to work once their children were in secondary school, or even aged 16 and over. 
The experiences they had of work varied by their level of educational attainment and the 
jobs and employers that they had access to. The women of the Class of 1980 who had left 
school with no qualifications were the most disadvantaged among second-generation 
women. A typology of employing organisations was developed, and the ethnic enclave 
emerged as an important source of employment for second-generation women.  
Women with HE qualifications found the enclave to be an important bridge between 
graduating and obtaining work in the mainstream labour market. Jobs within the enclave 
were not commensurate with the mainstream in terms of working conditions, pay and the 
protection of employee rights. Many women, both first and second-generation, reported 
experiencing or witnessing age and gender discrimination, workplace bullying and sexual 
harassment. Nevertheless, jobs in the ethnic enclave were important sources of 
employment when entry to the mainstream labour market was restricted, because of low 
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qualifications and/or discrimination. Work in the enclave gave the interviewees 
opportunities to gain work experience and work-related skills as well as a source of 
independent income.  
The three women who worked primarily to support visa applications for their first-
generation husbands left work shortly after their husbands arrived in Britain. The effects of 
these short-term bursts of economic activity did not seem to have a lasting positive impact 
on motivations to be economically inactive. Second generation women with low 
qualifications were restricted to low paid work that provided the same, or less, income than 
they would receive through state benefits. 
Due to their social ages as grandmothers, lack or recognised qualifications and limited 
fluency in English, as well as the socio-cultural normative expectations at the time of their 
migration, older first-generation women had not sought work in the formal labour market. 
Despite being of working age, work and employment were not pertinent to their lives or 
lifestyles. These women represent a static population in the LAHF category of economic 
inactivity and it is highly unlikely that their presence in the statistic will change. Due to the 
young ages at which these women married and had children they have become 
grandmothers at relatively young ages, some are in their 50s and therefore will remain in 
the LAHF category for 15 years or more.  
Women in the bhabi category had either worked or were participating in activities and 
undertaking skills training to prepare to seek work. These women faced the greatest 
challenges to economic activity. The ideal for these women was to gain work in 
mainstream organisations. The biggest barriers they face are lack of fluency or confidence 
in speaking English; their lack of knowledge about work opportunities; and difficulties in 
completing online job applications and creating CVs. Bhabis are almost universally 
disadvantaged within family hierarchies because of their gender and age, and their 
positions as daughters-in-law. They are also most directly affected by gossip and scrutiny 
from other first-generation women. These women are unable to benefit from the resources 
and information held by second-generation women because they do not share the same 
social spaces. As well as the structural constraints to their economic activity because of 
their gender, migrant status and ethnoreligious penalties, these women are the most 
marginalised within their communities and families.  
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For more recently arrived migrant women, the informal labour market presents a wider 
range of opportunities than it did in the 1970s and 1980s. As well as piece-work first-
generation women provide a range of services to other, mostly second-generation, 
women. An increase in formal economic activity amongst the second-generation has 
created a market for informal work among the first-generation of the same birth cohort. 
Under the current system of state benefits, such informal work supplements household 
incomes where the main source of income is tax credits. Informal work is accepted by 
husbands who do not want their wives to work formally, either because it is a source of 
embarrassment, or because they do not want state benefits to be reduced as a result. 
Informal work is also an option for those women who cannot, or believe they cannot, gain 
access to the mainstream labour market.  
Long-settled first and second-generation women did not speak about informal work, it is 
unlikely that they were completely unaware that such a secondary labour market exists in 
Mohallaton. The reason they claimed no knowledge of it is likely to be related to their 
sense of loyalty to their community. As with the discussion of welfare benefits in the 
preceding chapter, more recently arrived first generation women were more likely to 
address this controversial topic. Their willingness to do so may be related to a difference in 
perspective as relative outsiders, but also their positions as a marginalised group within 
the ethnic community who suffer most from inequities and unfair treatment. These women 
were critical in their reflections on British Pakistani community life during the interviews.  
The findings in relation to welfare dependency and informal work are likely to be biased by 
the particularly disadvantaged positions of the women who spoke about them. The views 
of these women are controversial, not least because they feed into negative stereotypes of 
Pakistani communities and families. Nevertheless, it would be an omission and an 
inaccurate representation if these views were not reported.  
If the aim of the project had been specifically to understand and explain informal work in 
secondary labour markets, problems of engagement may have been more acute. 
However, the findings in relation to informal work emerged in a context of a wider 
discussion about economic activity. This may have meant that the women felt comfortable 
talking informal work as one option, in relation to other forms of work and how they had 
made decisions about economic activity.  Most importantly, if the sample had not been 
designed to include this cohort of first-generation women it is unlikely that the topic would 
have arisen during the interviews. By excluding, or not making concerted efforts to include, 
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this cohort in research on socio-economic outcomes for EM groups in Britain an important 
aspect of economic activity has been overlooked. The findings presented here 
demonstrate that empirical insights into informal work are available with the correct 
methodological approach and a commitment to securing a hard-to-reach purposive 
sample.  
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Chapter 9 
Discussion and Integration of QUANT-QUAL Findings 
 
9.1 Answering the Research Questions 
In this final chapter the findings from the quantitative and qualitative phases of this mixed 
methods research project will be summarised and integrated. Each research question will 
be addressed in turn, in reverse order, to finish by answering the first, and central, 
research question of this thesis: RQ1. What are the key explanatory variables in the 
economic inactivity of British Muslim women?  
Theme 6 Home and Family 
RQ6a. What is the contemporary picture of the impact of marriage on the economic 
activity of Muslim women? 
RQ6b. How does the occupational status of partners impact on the economic 
activity of Muslim women?  
RQ6c. What is the impact of state benefits on economic activity? 
Marriage is an important factor in the economic inactivity of Muslim women.  Quantitative 
studies demonstrated that single Muslim women with HE qualifications are as likely to be 
economically active than women of other ethnic groups; Muslim women are more likely to 
leave the labour market upon marriage than women of other religious belongings (Dale 
2008; Khattab and Hussain 2017).  
Qualitative studies conducted in the 1990s or earlier provided evidence that traditional 
gender norms around male-breadwinner/female-homemaker roles were prevalent in 
Pakistani families and this was an important explanation of high rates of economic 
inactivity (Afshar 1994; Brah 1994; Dale et al. 2002a). This qualitative research on 
traditional gender norms and economic inactivity is now out-of-date by ten years or more, 
updating these accounts and noting any changes over time or generation is an important 
contribution that this study has made.  
240 
 
 
 
The quantitative findings from this project demonstrate that marriage is a significant 
predictor of economic inactivity amongst Muslim women, confirming findings from other 
studies. The significant effect of marriage on economic inactivity is assumed to represent 
delineated gender roles whilst primary source of income is an indication of the socio-
economic status and wellbeing of households. 
‘Other income source’ was included as independent variable in the multivariate analysis. 
The variable referred to the primary source of household income being anything other than 
income from employment. To maintain the integrity of the size of the sample all forms of 
income other than employment income were included in ‘other income source’ variable. It 
was argued that all ‘other sources’ were dependent on goodwill or means-testing and 
therefore implied greater financial vulnerability, however, the main point of interest in this 
variable was identification of those women who lived in households that were reliant on 
state benefits.  
Living in households where the main source of household income was, primarily, state 
benefits significantly increased the likelihood of LAHF across all models in the multivariate 
analysis stage. This is a strong indication that it is not only gender norms in marriage but 
household income, determined largely through the occupational status of husbands or 
partners, that increases the likelihood of economic inactivity amongst Muslim women.  
The analysis of qualitative findings found that none of the second-generation women, or 
women in the bhabi cohort, stated that their husbands had prevented them from working or 
had encouraged them to give up work. The traditional values that posed a barrier to 
women working were not the traditional male-breadwinner/female-homemaker roles but 
men being unwilling to assist with housework and seeing it entirely as a woman’s 
responsibility.   In contrast with earlier findings on marriage and economic activity (Dale 
2008), second generation women felt quite strongly that their Pakistani-born husbands 
were more traditional in their views about the sharing of household tasks.  
The division of labour in households was an emotive issue and second-generation women 
felt helpless to counteract or negotiate the very strong gendered norms of their first-
generation husbands. First-generation women were less likely to overtly state that their 
husbands did not share domestic tasks, but they did not mention any sharing of household 
tasks or caring responsibilities in their descriptions of everyday lives and routines. Overall, 
there was no evidence of generational shifts towards more egalitarian household roles. 
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State benefits allow second-generation women to retain an element over control over 
household finances and enable them to make the compromise of becoming economically 
inactive to lessen marital discord. The low-paid work that most second-generation women 
were restricted to, because of their low level qualifications, meant that there was little 
effect of their leaving work on overall household income, once state benefits were 
accounted for. The occupational segregation of men in low-paid work as manual workers 
or own-accounts workers (mainly as taxi drivers) meant that state benefits were a 
substantial, or the primary, source of income for many households. If women were to 
undertake low-paid work and/or part-time work household income may even decrease. 
The reliance on state benefits is cyclic rather than a one-way causal effect of economic 
inactivity leading to welfare dependency because of the very real prospect that a return to 
work would mean a reduction in overall household income.  
The labour market marginalisation of Pakistani men leads to an exacerbation of normative 
gender roles and dependency on state benefits. Pakistani men often work long hours in 
manual or own accounts work and this limits the time they have to spend at home to assist 
with household tasks, particularly if they work during the night. The low pay they receive 
for their work leads to state benefits representing a greater proportion of household 
income, which means that any low-paid part-time work of their wives would reduce 
household income. The economic inactivity of married Muslim women in the LAHF 
category cannot be understood without referring to the poor labour market experiences of 
Muslim men. It is likely that policy initiatives aimed solely at improving labour market 
outcomes for Muslim women will be ineffective unless there are equivalent measures to 
improve the labour market outcomes of Muslim men. 
In the qualitative literature first generation mothers-in-law had been identified as barriers to 
the economic activity of their second generation daughters-in-law (Dale 2002a; 2002b; 
Ahmed et al. 2003). Less was known about the experiences of more recently arrived first-
generation women. For the cohorts of second-generation women in this sample who had 
married transnationally, their parents-in-law lived in Pakistan. Therefore, the views of these 
family elders were not an important consideration in decisions about economic activity. In 
contrast, the two second-generation women who had married local second-generation 
men both left work because of the disapproval of their mothers-in-law. For one of these 
women returning to work would have caused considerable marital discord and may have 
resulted in divorce. Conversely, mothers were supportive of their own daughters’ economic 
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activity and offered encouragement and practical support in the form of childcare. There is 
a greater acceptance of the economic activity of young second generation women 
amongst older first-generation women, although some of these older women associate 
economic activity with neglect of home and family.  
The expectations of recently arrived first-generation daughters-in-law are significantly 
different from those held of second generation daughters. These women are selected as 
wives for second-generation sons because of their socio-cultural skills and knowledge, 
their economic activity is disapproved of by their in-laws. These younger women are likely 
to be from cities or town in Pakistan and to have had some formal education. These 
factors form part of their selection as wives but they are not expected to put their skills and 
knowledge to use in the labour market. These women arrive with the expectation that they 
will study or work but, in most cases, once they arrive in Britain their in-laws do not 
encourage them leave the house; in some cases breaking promises they had made to 
these women before marriage. The disapproval of parents-in-laws is a significant 
additional barrier to economic activity for these women, alongside their status as migrants, 
limited fluency in English and unrecognised Pakistani qualifications.  
The findings in relation to marriage and primary source of household income suggest that 
a fruitful line of further inquiry will be the relationship between state benefit receipt and 
economic inactivity. Traditional gender norms are very resistant to change and it is more 
difficult to effect cultural change than structural change. Further, the introduction of 
Universal Credit will alter the relationship between economic inactivity and the receipt of 
state benefits for many Muslim women, this is likely to disrupt household economies and 
routines.  
Where socio-cultural norms are unresisting to change regardless of financial wellbeing, 
some households may be pushed into poverty. Alternatively, the new system of state 
benefits may catalyse socio-cultural change and push households towards more 
egalitarian arrangements. In principle, if there is greater financial incentive to work then it 
is likely that more Muslim women will become, or remain, economically active. However, 
the low qualifications that many women, particularly first generation women hold, means 
that the work they do will be restricted to manual and unskilled work.  
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Theme 5 High Co-ethnic Concentration 
RQ5. Do dense British Muslim communities and social networks promote or inhibit 
economic activity amongst women? 
The statistical findings from the project revealed that high levels of bonding social capital 
do not significantly increase the likelihood of Muslim women being LAHF, in line with the 
findings of Cheung (2014). The qualitative findings showed that there were generational 
differences in the way life in the dense co-ethnic community, and its effects on economic 
activity, were experienced. Second and first-generation women have distinct social 
networks and there is very little social interaction, outside family relationships, between the 
two migrant generations. 
First-generation women are subject to the scrutiny of networks of other first-generation 
women, this is a condition of their access to social resources of practical and emotional 
support from these networks. Social networks of working class first-generation women 
generally disapprove of women working. Non-conformity to the norms of these social 
networks puts women at risk of being the subject of gossip and social isolation if practical 
and emotional support and friendship is withdrawn. This is in line with the findings of 
qualitative studies undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s (Shaw 1988; 2000; Werbner 1990). 
Since the 1990s and as adults, second-generation women seem to have developed 
strategies to avoid excessive scrutiny and they only participate in social networks that they 
feel comfortable with. They exercise greater choice and autonomy in their relationships 
with kinship groups and the wider community and there is a decline in the importance of 
kinship networks for the second generation. Most second-generation women value the 
presence of kinship networks and appreciate the longstanding relationships their parents 
have developed and nurtured, but they do not feel compelled to conform to community or 
kinship group norms.  
An interesting finding was that of a community-level disapproval of social mobility which 
affects both first and second generation women. This was most evident when women 
spoke about remaining in Mohallaton, they were disapproving of those women who chose 
to move ‘out’ to more affluent neighbourhoods. Those who did so were regarded with 
subtle disapproval, akin to Portes’ conception of ‘levelling pressures’ within ethnic 
communities that enforce the boundaries of the community group and deter members from 
leaving (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). 
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There is a widespread community level acceptance, and approval, of further and higher 
education. Indeed, it is expected that young women (the Class of 2000) will attend  
university. Education, both secular and Islamic, is given significant importance and value in 
Mohallaton. It is no longer the case that young women are prevented from going to 
university, although they are expected to attend local universities and to live at home whilst 
studying.  
University educated, single young women are expected to go on to become economically 
active. However, acceptance of higher educational attainment does not necessarily mean 
a greater acceptance of economic activity among married women. It is at this point that the 
experiences of Muslim women diverge from theories of assimilation and integration which 
assume that attaining parity in educational terms will lead on to economic activity and 
socio-economic integration. The socio-cultural expectations and ideals of married working 
class Muslim women who live in areas of high co-ethnic density are that they will not work. 
The wider structural factors of the system of state benefits and labour market 
discrimination faced by Muslim men and women frame and exacerbate the socio-cultural 
constraints that these women face.  
Theme 4 Religion and Religiosity  
RQ4. Do religious beliefs and practices have an impact on economic inactivity 
amongst British Muslim women? If so, how, and is there generational variation? 
The statistical analysis confirmed the findings of Khattab et al. (2017), who found that 
religiosity does not increase the likelihood of economic inactivity amongst Muslim women. 
Measures of both individual religious practice and salience emerged as insignificant 
predictors of economic inactivity for Muslim women. The qualitative findings added greater 
insight into why this was the case. 
Firstly, there is greater variation in religious practice in terms of individual religious practice 
than the EMBES data reveals. The qualitative data supports the proposition that the 
question on individual religious practice in the EMBES was subject to high social 
desirability bias - the overreporting of socially desirable behaviours (Lavrakas 2008). 
Previous findings regarding significant decline in individual practice among the second 
generation are upheld in the qualitative data (McAndrew and Voas 2014). The lack of 
significance for individual religious practice on economic activity is also upheld by the 
qualitative analysis, none of the women felt that prayer would, or should, prevent them 
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being in formal employment. There are accepted practices of making up missed prayers 
and most women felt that workplaces would be accommodating. 
The other religious practice that the interviewees spoke extensively about was wearing 
hijab. The accounts the women gave about wearing hijab highlighted how the women had 
made autonomous decisions based on their own knowledge and understanding of Islam, 
which changed over time and life-stage. This discussion helps to move away from binary 
conceptions and stereotypical representations of hijab-wearing Muslim women as 
oppressed and subordinate and helps to develop a concept of Islamic practice as 
spectrum. Women move backwards and forwards along the spectrum of religious beliefs 
and practices, from more religious to less religious at different points in their lives. This 
conceptualisation of religiosity as a spectrum rather than a static binary helps to de-
homogenise views of Muslim women. 
The content of religious beliefs, as opposed to measures of religious salience (which was 
included the models and proved insignificant), are difficult to capture in survey 
questionnaires. Generational differences in the religious beliefs held by Muslim women 
about economic activity emerged. Although paid employment is not haram it was 
considered undesirable by several first generation women. Older first generation women 
are authoritative figures in Pakistani families and communities and the fact that this view is 
held, and expressed, by these women could signify a considerable deterrent to economic 
activity. Some clarity is needed within the British Muslim community regarding the moral 
stance to social mobility generally, and the value of women’s paid employment. An Islamic 
justification for economic inactivity for women might pose a significant barrier.  
Attendance at communal activities amongst the second generation is ad hoc and irregular. 
Religious settings are some of very few social locations when economically inactive 
women interact with the economically active. These social networks and the sources of 
ethnoreligious capital found within them is limited to second-generation middle class 
women who have HE qualifications. Poorly qualified second generation women, those 
from working-class backgrounds, and first-generation women of the same birth cohort are 
excluded from this form of social capital. At a time when the role of Muslim women in 
mosques and other communal religious spaces is being debated and renegotiated, there is 
an opportunity to ensure that women from working-class backgrounds and first generation 
women can participate and have representation in these important community institutions. 
Younger first-generation Muslim women emerge the most marginalised in terms of their 
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access to communal religious activities and the social resources (ethnoreligious capital) 
held within them   
 
Theme 3 British Muslim Women in Work 
3a. What experiences of work do British Muslim in the LAHF have? 
3b. Do experiences of work vary by generation or cohort? 
3c. What are the work-related aspirations and expectations of British Muslim women 
and do these differ by migrant generation or cohort? 
Quantitative studies, including the statistical analysis in this thesis, demonstrate that single 
second-generation Muslim women are as likely to be economically active as women of 
other religious belonging, particularly among those with HE qualifications (Dale 2008; 
Khattab et al. 2017). It was likely then that many of the second generation interviewees 
would have some experience of work. As a cross-sectional dataset the EMBES does not 
enable a longitudinal perspective on work and employment trajectories and therefore the 
qualitative data is complementary dataset. Indeed, the qualitative findings revealed that all 
second-generation women had worked.  
Unsurprisingly, women who had HE qualifications fared better in the labour market than 
those will lower or no qualifications. A typology of employing organisations was developed 
to characterise the employment experiences of the interviewees. Most women with low or 
no qualifications were restricted to low-paid work in the ethnic enclave. Some of the 
women with no qualifications were able to attain long-term employment in the ethnic 
enclave. Further, it was interesting to note that the ethnic enclave was also an important 
bridge for two of the women with HE qualifications.  
Experiences of work in the ethnic enclave were overwhelmingly negative, particularly for 
first generation women. The enclave also provided opportunities for informal work, and it 
seemed to be the case that income from informal work was used to supplement state 
benefits. There is a need for some ethnic employers to be educated, or better informed, 
about the creation of safe and healthy workplaces and fair employment practices. The 
formalisation of all working arrangements should be encouraged.  All the women stated a 
247 
 
 
 
preference for work in the mainstream labour market and options should be explored to 
improve labour market access for these women and to remove barriers of discrimination.  
All the women who did not have HE qualifications would benefit from better knowledge and 
information on part-time work opportunities in the mainstream labour market. First 
generation women lack confidence in their ability to speak English in workplaces and 
would benefit from targeted language training in this regard. The researcher’s assessment 
was that most of the younger first generation women had a good level of fluency in English 
but lacked confidence. Second generation women without HE qualifications and all first 
generation women stated that they required some IT training and advice on how to 
complete online application forms and the creation of CVs.  
Many of the women undertook voluntary skills training and/or volunteering work in the local 
community but were unable to demonstrate and communicate the skills they had acquired. 
Some form of skills passport and a system to collate and record these experiences would 
be helpful for these women. Structured work experience with clear objectives and a mentor 
or supervisor to provide support would also be useful areas to explore. There are existing 
and trusted community groups in place that are run by, and for, EM women which might be 
useful points of access to the women within the community.  
There was evidence of widening opportunities to undertake informal work in the ethnic 
enclave. The increase in economic activity among some, mostly second-generation, 
women seems to be driving the development of a secondary labour market for first-
generation women. Informal work carries significant risks of exploitation and vulnerability 
on the part of workers. Informal work has always been a way in which British Pakistani 
women have negotiated socio-cultural and structural constraints to economic activity. 
Some provision of training or guidance on entrepreneurship and self-employment may be 
helpful for women to formalise their work and to reduce their vulnerability.  
Theme 2: Generational Change 
2a. Is there evidence of generational change in the LAHF outcome? 
2b. Do the causes and experiences of economic inactivity differ by migrant 
generation or cohort? 
The bivariate analysis of the EMBES revealed generational shifts across several outcomes 
including: improvements in educational attainment and overall economic activity rates, less 
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reliance on state benefits; and more ethnically diverse friendship groups. However, the 
multivariate analysis revealed that generational change was an insignificant predictor of 
economic activity; second-generation Muslim women were no less likely to be 
economically inactive than first-generation women. This is in line with studies that reveal a 
lack of generational improvement in labour market outcomes by ethnicity for Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi groups, and for Muslims compared to other religious groups.  
The socio-cultural factors of traditional gender norms within the domestic sphere are as 
persistent as the structural inequalities that Muslim men and women face. The qualitative 
analysis showed that first generation women in the bhabi cohort are the most marginalised 
within the ethnic community and wider society. Second generation women are more likely 
to frame their economic inactivity as a choice in a context of ‘sufficient’ income, the primary 
source of income was likely to be state benefits in working-class households.  
In framing their inactivity as a choice, women describe their experiences in a way that 
emphasises their own agency, often with no acknowledgment, or recognition, of the 
structural factors that limit their options for work and other forms of socio-economic 
integration. When socio-cultural constraints are analysed within the framework of ethno-
religious penalties, narratives around choice and agency in economic inactivity can be 
interpreted as reminiscent of the ‘myth of return’: the ideological strategy used by pioneers 
and settlers to help them to cope with extreme structural marginalisation in the labour 
market and wider society in the 1970s (Anwar 1979).  
Theme 1:  Explaining Economic Inactivity in the Looking After Home and Family 
(LAHF) Category 
In the statistical analysis marriage, the presence of dependent children, income source 
and religious affiliation emerge as factors that increase the likelihood of LAHF among 
British Muslim women. The qualitative data supports the statistical finding that marriage 
and motherhood significantly increase the likelihood of economic inactivity. Whilst single 
women are expected to work, married women, and particularly those with young children, 
are not. The qualitative data reveals that there is generational continuity in gender norms 
and that Pakistani men do not participate in household domestic or caring tasks; this is 
related to socio-cultural attitudes alongside structural constraints due to the ways in which 
their work patterns are structured. Some of the women in the sample spoke about the 
greater consideration and time they had to give to developing a strong British Muslim 
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identity in their children and to ensure they had access to both religious and secular 
education.  
The statistical analysis found that Muslim women are significantly more likely to be LAHF 
than women of other religious belongings. Pakistani women are most likely of all Muslim 
women to be economically inactive in relation to the reference category of Indian Muslim 
women. The religious penalty is upheld in the analysis and has subsequently been used to 
frame all socio-cultural experiences and disadvantages identified in the qualitative 
analysis. 
The explanation for economic inactivity is complex and the variables in the analysis that 
emerge as significant cut across socio-cultural (religious affiliation, marriage and 
motherhood) and structural (income source and discrimination) domains of explanation. 
The qualitative data and a focus on socio-economic outcome by migrant generation 
enabled a more comprehensive, albeit complex, picture to emerge. By categorising and 
differentiating by migrant generation, even in the absence of statistically significant 
generational change, a more holistic picture that enables differentiation and categorisation 
by generation and cohort, emerged.  
This process of differentiation by generation has added a deeper understanding of 
economic inactivity in the looking after home category. The mixed methods research 
approach has contributed to a move away from stereotypes and static binary 
conceptualisations to a more in-depth understanding of diversity and difference. By using 
the concept of the ethnic penalty as a framework and starting point for understanding 
labour market disadvantage, socio-cultural explanations have been analysed in the context 
of structural disadvantage.  
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9.2 Implications  
The following implications arise from the findings of this project: 
Implications for Policy Makers 
➢ Education for small-medium business owners on employment standards and 
workplace health and safety. Also, encouragement or incentivisation to formalise 
any causal or adhoc work arrangements.  
➢ Provide entrepreneurial and business management skills to women who work 
informally. 
➢ Focus on workplace language fluency, skills and confidence for first-generation 
women. 
➢ Provide structured work experience opportunities with an assigned mentor or 
supervisor. 
➢ Ongoing longitudinal research on Universal Credit and its outcome for marginalised 
groups.  
➢ For Universal Credit and Job Centre administrators or practitioners to be aware of 
socio-cultural constraints to work and to have training in how to deal with these 
respectfully. 
Implications for the British Muslim Community 
➢ Religious leaders need to clarify position on economic activity of Muslim women 
and social mobility more generally. 
➢ Ensure that access to mosques is not only more accessible to women, but to 
ensure that they include working class women and first generation women too. 
➢ Create fora or social spaces where the first and second generation can interact to 
share information and knowledge 
➢ Religious, community leaders and individuals to promote greater cohesion and 
understanding between the generations.  
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Implications for Researchers 
➢ The development of research projects that are designed using mixed methods 
research approaches to examine labour market outcomes. 
➢ Increase interdisciplinary dialogue and project development 
➢ Present findings, whether qual or quant, in a manner which is accessible and 
inclusive to encourage engagement from a wider range of specialists.  
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Appendix 2: Detailed  Information Sheet for Interviewees 
 
                                                                                                        
 
     INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Beliefs, Choices and Constraints: Understanding and Explaining the 
Economic Inactivity of Muslim Women in Britain 
Asma Khan 
Mobile: ********** 
You are being invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide whether or not 
to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
Who is conducting this research project? 
I am a PhD student at Cardiff University and I am conducting this research project as part of 
my doctoral studies. My project is being supervised by Professor Sophie-Gilliat Ray, Director 
of the Centre for the Study of Islam in the UK and Professor Ralph Fevre, Cardiff School of 
Social Sciences. 
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This project is funded by the Jameel Scholarship Fund which has been established to 
promote knowledge and research for the benefit of Muslim communities in the UK, and to 
promote better understanding of Islam in wider society. 
 
What is the aim of the research?  
Research shows that Muslim women are less likely to be in paid employment than women 
of other, or no, religious belonging. Statistics show us that an increasing number of Muslim 
women in Britain are in work but that there is still a considerable gap. Statistics can tell us 
many things about those who are in work or not, but not much is known about how and 
why Muslim women make these decisions.  My research project aims to meet this gap in 
current knowledge and, more broadly, to improve understandings of the lives of Muslim 
women in Britain. 
Why have I been chosen?  
You have been chosen to take part in this project because I am interested in interviewing 
British women over the age of 25 and those who are not students.  I am particularly 
interested in what you will be able to share with me in terms of your choices and 
experiences with regard to work.  
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will 
be given this information sheet to keep and you will be asked to sign a consent form. If you 
decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time.  
What would I be asked to do if I took part?  
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Participating in this project will involve you taking part in an in-depth interview which will be audio 
recorded.  I am interested your experiences of education and work as well as family and community 
life.  The interview will take place at a time, date, and location which is convenient for you.   
How is confidentiality maintained?  
I will transcribe and anonymise the audio recording of your interview before I analyse it.  
Your name will not be associated with any files or documents resulting from your interview. 
I will also carefully remove any other identifying features from your interview, such as your 
occupation or place of work if these are distinctive.  
All documents relating to your interview will be password protected and encrypted.  The 
audio file will be stored in a secure location and I will be the only person who has access to 
the audio file. For legal reasons I will have to keep a copy of the audio file for five years.  
Data from this project may also be included in future academic publications however your 
real name will not be associated with anything you say during the interview. 
What benefit might this research be to me or other subjects of the research? 
The findings of the research will be useful to other academics who are interested in learning 
about the employment patterns of Muslim women in Britain and in British Muslim life more 
generally.  The project should also improve understandings of British Muslim communities.  
If you have any further questions about your participation in the project or if you have any 
concerns please contact me: 
Asma Khan 
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Appendix 3: Consent Form for Interviewees 
 
 
 
 
 
Beliefs, Choices and Constraints: Understanding and Explaining the Economic 
Inactivity of Muslim Women in Britain 
CONSENT FORM 
If you are happy to participate please read the consent form and initial each box and 
sign the form: 
I confirm that I have read the attached information sheet on the above project and have 
had the opportunity to consider the information and ask questions and had these 
answered satisfactorily. 
I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time without giving a reason. 
I understand that the interview will be audio recorded.  
I have been informed that I am able to contact the researcher with any questions after the 
interview has taken place.  
I would like to be informed of the research findings from the project and to receive a copy of 
the final report.  
I agree to the use of quotations that are anonymous.  
 
 
      I agree to take part in the above project:               Consent taken by Asma Khan 
 
     Name: 
 
     Signed:                  Signed:  
 
      Date:               Date:  
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Appendix 4: Thematic Interview Schedule  
 
 
 
• Migration experience 
 
• Education 
 
• Work History: any experience of work including informal work 
 
• Individual religious practice: daily routines, spirituality, social 
networks, teaching and learning about Islam, religious identity 
 
• Islam: school of thought, views on women in society, women and 
work, values 
 
• Marriage: timing, choice, changes in lifestyle, constraints, 
opportunities 
 
• Family: dependents, caring commitments, obligations, choices and 
opportunities, household income 
 
 
• Locality/Neighbourhood: experiences of social integration, social 
networks, labour market opportunities, resources 
 
• Social networks: friendship groups, norms, role models, aspirations 
 
• Community: religious/ethnic, community norms, pressures, 
constraints, opportunities, role models.  
 
269 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5: Coding Frame for Qualitative Analysis  
 
 
Code Sub-Codes 
Socio-economic status By Husband’s Occupation 
By Father’s Occupation 
Evidence of Upward Social Mobility 
Evidence of Downward Social 
Mobility 
Caste Caste 
 Thoughts about caste system 
Islamic Affiliation   
Childhood  Growing up in Britain - the 60’s 
Growing up in Britain - the 70’s 
Growing up in Britain - the 80’s 
Growing up in Pakistan – the 60’s 
Growing up in Pakistan – the 70’s 
Growing up in Pakistan – the 80’s 
Education Primary School 
High school 
College/FE 
University  
Father’s Influence 
Mother’s Influence 
Other Family Influences 
Other Influences 
Aspirations, Expectations and 
Realisation  
Barriers 
Other training and education 
 
Pre-Marriage Arranged Marriage (arrangements) 
Thoughts and Feelings 
Impact on work/education 
Impact on place of residence 
Aspirations and Expectations 
Age 16-18 
Age 18-24 
Age 25+ 
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Post Marriage Migration 
Impact on education 
Impact on work  
Life with in-laws 
Thoughts and Feelings 
Aspirations, Expectations and 
Realisation 
Divorce 
Impact on social networks 
 Impact on religiosity  
Migration Journey – 1st 
Generation 
Timing 
Marriage 
Route (formal/informal) 
Return  
Thoughts and Feelings 
Aspirations, Expectations and 
Realisation 
Enabling Factors   
Mother’s Migration Journey – 
2nd Generation 
 
Father’s Migration Journey – 
2nd Generation 
 
Father’s Settlement  Work 
Community/Neighbourhood 
Role in Family/Kinship network 
Religiosity 
Mother’s Settlement Work 
Community/Neighbourhood 
Role in Family/Kinship network 
Religiosity  
Chain Migration  
  
Family Relationships Husband 
Children 
Father 
Mother 
Siblings 
Other Extended Family 
Domestic Responsibilities   
Caring Responsibilities  Childcare 
 Other Family 
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Case Study Area Life in case study area 
Comparison with other places 
Neighbourhood Changes over time 
Life in High Co-ethnic Density Area 
New/Other Migrants 
Crime and Safety 
Local Mosques 
Positive Aspects 
 Negative Aspects 
Comparisons with living in 
other places 
Other places in Britain 
 Other countries 
Work History Formal work 
Informal work at home 
Informal Work other workplace 
Family work 
 
Experiences at Work Positive 
Religious Discrimination 
Gender Discrimination 
Racial Discrimination 
Sexual harassment 
Negative Other 
 
Husband’s Work  
Co-ethnic Workplaces  
Self-employment  
Attitudes of men towards 
women working 
 
Culture V Religion Debate  
Social Networks  Voluntary/Charity Activities 
Community Groups/Activities 
Co-ethnic Friendship Groups 
Intra-ethnic Friendships 
Faith-based Social Networks 
Life within British Muslim 
Households 
1960s 
1970s 
1980s 
1990s 
2000’s 
2010 + 
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Significant Others Work and 
Education 
Role Models 
 Social Contacts 
Religion Individual Religious Practice  
Communal Religious Practice 
Teaching and Learning about Islam 
Role of Women in Islam – 
community level 
Role of Women in Islam – 
Family/Home 
 Views on Women and Work in 
Islam 
Hijab/Clothing 
Language Fluency   
Household Income   
Choice  
Power   
Agency  
Negotiation   
 
 
 
 
